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BITCOIN AND THE BLOCKCHAIN AS POSSIBLE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TOOLS: STRENGTHS AND 
WEAKNESSES 
Fiammetta S. Piazza* 
Bitcoin and similar virtual currencies are rapidly evolving and gaining traction in today’s economy. 
However, legislators in the United States and abroad are still assessing the legal status of cryptocurrencies 
and often pursuing quite different approaches in their regulation. On the other hand, the blockchain, the 
technology underlying Bitcoin transactions, offers itself as a great tool that should be implemented in the 
corporate governance field because of its recording certainty features. The blockchain, through the 
distributed ledger, allows users within a network to perform peer-to-peer digital transactions while accessing 
and monitoring changes in the ledger as they occur.  The ledger also offers an opportunity to maintain 
information securely, by encrypting and allowing access only to holders of cryptographic “keys”.  
Because of its lack of a centralized issuer and absence of securities deriving from a national apparatus and 
definite legislation, Bitcoin presents a series of uncertainties that prevent implementation as a corporate 
governance tool. Instead, the blockchain’s capacity to maintain confidential information securely, such as 
corporate strategies to be voted on by a board of directors or shareholders, within a network of allowed 
users and to record transactions or events with certainty should be explored and implemented in the 
corporate field. This article analyzes the current legal status of Bitcoin and blockchain technology; the 
relationship between the two; and advantages and disadvantages of implementing either or both 
technologies for transparency of ownership, corporate voting, accounting, and self-executing, “smart”, 
contracts purposes. This article suggests that while neither should be implemented for accounting and 
ownership reporting purposes, blockchain could prove a useful tool for corporate voting. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the rapid evolution of the Internet and the transition to 
the Web of a diverse array of infrastructure and systems, virtual 
currencies have quickly developed. Today, virtual currencies play a 
key role in the transformational change affecting the world economy, 
reflecting the expanded venues available to consumers to access 
goods and services.1 Indeed, unlike traditional currencies, virtual 
currencies offer a peer-to-peer exchange mechanism eliminating the 
need for intermediaries and central clearinghouses.2  
  While virtual currencies are not afforded legal tender, they may 
still have equivalent traditional currency value.3 Within this category, 
Bitcoin has developed and attained primary market status among 
virtual currencies that can be exchanged for traditional currencies.4 
Bitcoin’s main feature is the so-called blockchain: a ledger where the 
parties to each transaction report their exchange. Accordingly, while 
the features and characteristics of each Bitcoin exchange may vary 
tremendously, it is possible, within the exchange and with the 
necessary access authorization, if any, to monitor transactions. 
However, this does not translate in complete transparency because 
some exchanges permit users to create anonymous accounts. While 
this is no longer possible in the United States following the recent 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) guideline 
making it clear the Banking Secrecy Act applies to Bitcoin even 
though it has not been recognized as currency, anonymous foreign 
exchanges may still impact American corporate governance because 
of the global nature of today’s economy and the ease of access to 
those foreign exchanges.5  
                                                 
1  International Monetary Fund, Virtual Currencies and Beyond Virtual 
Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations, 5, available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1603.pdf.   
2 Id.   
3 Sarah J. Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Feature, Advancing a 
Framework for Regulating Cryptocurrenciy Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. REG. 495, 
504 (2015). 
4 Id.   
5 Dep’t of the Treasury Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Guidance 
Paper FIN-2013-G001, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons 
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Section II of this paper discusses, in subsection A, the general 
realm of virtual currencies and Bitcoin’s supremacy. Subsection B 
distinguishes between Bitcoin, blockchain technology, and distributed 
ledgers. Subsection C analyzes the mechanics of Bitcoin’s 
transactions on the blockchain. Lastly, subsection D, surveys the 
current regulatory framework regarding Bitcoin in the United States.  
Section III examines the consequences of implementing 
Bitcoin or the blockchain in the governance of companies. 
Specifically it examines the potential benefits and disadvantages of 
both as tools to enhance transparency, conduct corporate voting and 
accounting, and enter “smart contracts.” Ultimately, this paper 
suggests implementation of blockchain, but not of Bitcoin, may be 
viable in some of those areas.  
II. VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, BITCOIN, AND THE BLOCKCHAIN 
A. Virtual Currencies and Bitcoin: Evolution and Problems  
Satoshi Nakamoto – an alias6 – has long been thought to be 
the creator of Bitcoin when a technical paper was posted on the 
                                                 
Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies (2013) available at 
https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf. 
6 While Bitcoin has developed since Nakamoto first published its 
protocol, the true identity of its designer (or designers) is still unknown. After 
posting the protocol, Nakamoto, other than for a few messages, has disappeared 
and, in his words, “[has] moved on to other things.” Who is Satoshi Nakamoto?, THE 
ECONOMIST (Nov. 2, 2015 23:27) 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/11/economist-
explains-1 (discussing how, among other things, Nakamoto’s own funds have 
remained untouched). Several individuals and agencies, spanning from John Nash 
to the NSA, have been thought to be the “face” behind the Nakamoto mask, but 
no ultimate finding has been made. See, e.g. Justin OConnell, 10 People who have been 
Called the Inventor of Bitcoin, Satoshi Nakamoto, CRIPTOCOINSNEWS (Aug. 21, 
2015), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/called-the-inventor-of-bitcoin-satoshi-
nakamoto/ (discussing the ten people who have been thought to be the inventor). 
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Internet describing the protocol in 2008.7 However, recent 
developments around the identity of Bitcoin’s creator identify in 
Craig Wright the true “father” of Bitcoin.8 Regardless of the identity 
behind Bitcoin, the protocol was first implemented in 2009 and, since 
then, several versions of the cryptocurrency have been created and 
are easily available for download.9  
Before explaining the functioning of Bitcoin and its role in 
today’s economy, it is helpful to remember that traditional currencies 
are defined as a system of money used and generally accepted in a 
country (or union of countries as in the European Union’s eurozone) 
as a form of payment.10 Traditional currencies are also known as fiat 
currencies from the Latin term fiat meaning “let it be done” or “so it 
shall be” in the sense of a governmental decree or order. This is so 
because, different from commodity-based money like gold, silver or 
copper-backed coins, fiat currencies do not have an intrinsic value. 
Instead, the national government, as issuer, declares its value as legal 
tender and, in the words of Milton Friedman, “[t]he pieces of green 
paper have value because everybody thinks they have value. 
Everybody thinks they have value because in his experience they have 
had value.”11 Indeed, fiat currencies are part of multi-layer national 
infrastructure inclusive of a national bank or system of banks (e.g. the 
United States Federal Reserve) and an agency or department 
                                                 
7 P. CARL MULLAN, THE DIGITAL CURRENCY CHALLEGE – 
SHAPING ONLINE PAYMENT SYSTEMS THROUGH U.S. FINANCIAL 
REGULATIONS 85 (Palgrave MacMillan eds., 1st ed. 2014). 
8 Following years of speculation, Australian Craig Wright has come 
forward claiming to be the original creator of Bitcoin. As proof, he “digitally signed 
messages using cryptographic keys created during the early days of Bitcoin’s 
development. They keys are inextricably linked to blocks of bitcoins known to have 
been created or ‘mined’ by Satoshi Nakamoto.”  Australian Craig Wright Claims to be 
Bitcoin Creator, BBC.COM (May 2, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
36168863.  
9 MULLAN, supra note 7, at 86. 
10 Article, Ralph E. McKinney Jr. et al., The Evolution of Financial 
Instruments and the Legal Protection against Counterfeiting: A Look at Coin, Paper, and 
Virtual Currencies, 2015 U. Ill. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 273, 274.  
11 MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO 
CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 249 (1980).  
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entrusted with the production of currency (e.g., the United States 
Department of the Treasury Bureau of Engraving and Printing.)12  
A virtual currency is a “medium of exchange existing entirely 
in intangible form that is not legal tender but which can substitute for 
legal tender.”13 Within the broader category of virtual currencies 
often used for online games and social media are cryptocurrencies, 
Bitcoin being the most popular example.14 Cryprotcurrencies are 
distinguishable from other virtual currencies in that theyare “internet-
based virtual currenc[ies] in which the ownership of a particular unit 
of value is validated using cryptography.”15 Accordingly, Bitcoin is a 
virtual currency with equivalent value in real currency but no legal 
tender status, at least in most jurisdictions.16 
The American Constitution reserves to the Federal 
Government the power to coin money and regulate its value.17 
However, laws prohibiting the circulation and use of unauthorized 
instruments meant as currency or generally means of payment, have 
not been interpreted to prohibit new types of money.18 Instead, these 
laws have been applied for prosecuting counterfeited US dollar bills 
and coins.19 Nonetheless, many countries have taken a direct stance 
and have explicitly ruled that Bitcoin cannot be used as legal tender 
within their borders.20 Even so, private parties can agree, in contract, 
to use Bitcoin as method of payment for their transactions. Thus, the 
                                                 
12 Id. at 277. 
13 Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 3, at 504.  
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 In Re Coinflip, Inc. et al., CFTC Docket No. 15-29 (CFTC Filed Sept. 17, 
2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf. 
17 U.S. Const. art. I, §8(5). 
18 U.S.C. §336. 
19 Julie Andersen Hill, Virtual Currencies & Federal Law, J. 
CONSUMER & COMM. L., 49 (2015). 
20 European Central Bank, Virtual Currency Schemes – A Further Analysis, 
24 (2015), 
available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemesen.pdf. 
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biggest hurdles Bitcoin faces are volatility and absence of a 
supporting institutional infrastructure.21  
Between March and April 2013, “Bitcoin’s dollar exchange 
rose from about $50 to $350 and then fell back to near $70. Bitcoin’s 
price rose even more sharply during the fall of 2013, rising from near 
$50 in September to more than $110 by early December. During 
2014, Bitcoin’s price showed large day-to-day variations but generally 
trended down. By mid-January 2015, a Bitcoin was priced near 
$200”22 then, as of July 2015, Bitcoin was trading at an exchange rate 
of $279.32 per Bitcoin.23 However, it should be noted that Bitcoin’s 
volatility has been declining steadily and Bitcoin has maintained lower 
levels of volalititly compared to unstable reserve currencies like the 
Russian Ruble and the Brazilian Real.24 Specifically, Bitcoin’s volatility 
between March and May 2016 has been about 1.23% and around 
1.45% between April and May 2016.25 For comparison, and to better 
grasp Bitcoin’s level of risk, volatility of gold averages at around 
1.2%, while major currencies average between 0.5% and 1.0%.26 
Furthermore, “while gold has decreased by around 11% amid the 
[F]ederal [R]eserve’s announcement of new interest rates 
implementation, the price of [B]itcoin has increased to around 
US$430.”27 In 2017, in the midst of uncertainties surrounding what 
                                                 
21 Since most countries have abandoned the gold standard – the 
guarantee that anyone could trade a country’s currency in return for equivalent 
amount of gold – the value of national currencies derives from social acceptance, 
trust, and confidence in that country’s economy. The Global Monetary System – Not 
Floating, but Flailing, THE ECONOMIST (July 5, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21606322-after-150-
years-monetary-experimentation-world-remains-unsure-how. 
22 Craig K. Elwell, M. Maureen Murphy & Michael V. Seitzinger, Bitcoin: 
Questions, Answers and Analysis of Legal Issues, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE REPORT, 7 (Jan. 28, 2015) (available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43339.pdf). 
23 Id.  
24 Joseph Young, Volatility of Bitcoin Price Consistently Declined since 2010, 
BITCOIN NEWS SERVICE (Jan. 3, 2016, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.newsbtc.com/2016/01/03/volatility-of-bitcoin-price-consistently-
declined-since-2010/.   
25 The Bitcoin Volatility Index, BITCOIN VOLATILITY, 
https://btcvol.info/. 
26 Id.  
27 Young, supra note 24.  
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policies will be implemented regarding Bitcoin by the new 
administration, “the cryptocurrency rose 3.1% to $1,164.10 
. . .topping the all-time closing high of $1,137 set in November 
2013.”28 February 2017, as a response to the newly inaugurated 
presidential administration, has indeed marked the longest Bitcoin 
has traded at over $1,000.29 This is because commentators expect 
“the Trump administration to be at least more accepting of the 
cryptocurrencies, even if they will not necessarily embrace them.”30 
This stems, at least in part, from the fact that Trump’s transition 
team includes “Bitcoin supporters” like Peter Thiel, co-founder of 
PayPal and investor in several Bitcoin companies, and Mick 
Mulvaney, an outspoken supporter of Bitcoin and founder of the 
bipartisan Blockchain caucus.31 Mulvaney, Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, has created the bipartisan caucus aimed at 
educating Congress about Bitcoin and blockchain technology.32 This 
is a significant step, regardless of political views, to foster regulation 
and thus certainty around cryptocurrencies and blockchain 
technology. Mulvaney has also stated that “[b]lock chain technology 
has the potential to revolutionize the financial services industry, the 
United States economy and the delivery of government services, and 
I am proud to be involved with this initiative.”33 
Hypothetically, and national debates aside, if Bitcoin’s 
acceptance becomes more widespread, its volatility may decrease and 
this, in turn, may result in increased global acceptance of Bitcoin as a 
                                                 
28 Olga Kharif, Bitcoin Price Sets Record on Trump Policy Uncertainties, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2017 10:35 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-23/bitcoin-price-sets-
intraday-record-on-trump-policy-uncertainties.  
29 Charles Bovaird, Bitcoin Price Tops $1,000 for Longest Stretch in History, 
COINDESK (Feb. 21, 2017 20:32), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-price-tops-
1000-longest-stretch-history/.  
30 Neha Thakur, Will Trump and Bitcoin be Good Partners, NEWSBTC (Jan. 
23, 2017 9:35 AM), http://www.newsbtc.com/2017/01/23/will-trump-and-
bitcoin-be-good-partners/.  
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Shivdeep Dhaliwal, Donald Trump Inauguration Special: Make Bitcoin Great 
Again!, THE COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 20, 2017), 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/donald-trump-inauguration-special-make-
bitcoin-great-again.  
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means of exchange.34 However, without a national infrastructure 
backing the virtual currency, Bitcoin’s success can merely be 
temporary as in the case of mortgage-backed securities and other 
financial instruments in the past.35 Indeed, it has been argued that 
Bitcoin may become the subject of a financial bubble as it “seems to 
fit the basic definition of speculative bubble – that is, a special kind 
of fad, a mania for holding an asset in expectation of its 
appreciation.”36 News regarding price increases both publicize and 
amplify bubbles’ effects.37 They often justify the current bubble 
phenomenon by attributing it to an inspiring “new era” story aimed 
at attracting more attention as the prices rise.38 In Bitcoin’s case, the 
narrative was that “a computer whiz invented a new kind of money 
in the form of electronic currency units, as part of decentralized 
computer-driven system for a world economy that extends beyond 
the reach of any single government.”39 Indeed, commentators have 
speculated Bitcoin has already been the subject of a bubble in China 
in 2013.40 There, the Government has issued laws both banning the 
use of Bitcoin and prohibiting transfers out of the country of 
currency in amounts higher than $50,000.41 Interestingly, on 
November 3, the price of Bitcoin rose to its 2015 peak of US$377.36, 
amounting to a 75% increase since August of that same year.42 
Supporting the speculation that Bitcoin was the subject of a Chinese 
bubble, while the price rose globally, Chinese Bitcoin exchanges were 
                                                 
34 Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency 
Regulation in the Bitcoin Age, (Aug. 22, 2014) (available at SSRN 2485550). 
35 David Min, Understanding the Failure of Market Discipline, 43 (Mar. 3, 
2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2403988). 
36 Robert J. Shiller, In Search of a Stable Electronic Currency, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/business/in-search-of-a-
stable-electronic-currency.html. 
37 Id.  
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
40 Anthony Cuthbertson, Bitcoin Price Hits 2015 Peak Amid Speculation of 
‘Second Bitcoin Bubble’, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015), 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/bitcoin-price-hits-2015-peak-amid-speculation-second-
bitcoin-bubble-1526956. 
41 Id. 
42 Id.  
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trading the virtual currency at leading prices, “sometimes trading at 
$10/bitcoin higher” than other exchanges world wide.43  
Historically, national central banks have been entrusted with 
the mandate of protecting their national currency by “seeking to 
match the supply of money to the needs of the economy and thus 
maintain[ing] price stability.”44 This result is usually achieved by 
attempting to make inflation rates as close as possible to set 
benchmarks. Those benchmarks are usually low, as in the 2% target 
of the United States, to avoid the uncertainty about the future and 
the corrosive effects on currency value that would be caused by high 
inflation.45 In fact, trust that a national currency is a reliable store of 
value derives from the confidence that the currency will be honored 
at a value reflecting public expectations.46 Accordingly, be it directly 
by setting interest rates,47 or indirectly by issuing public 
communications “prepared for the purpose of shaping economic and 
monetary conditions prospectively, as instruments of persuasion,” 
central banks play a pivotal role in managing currency stability.48 
Bitcoin’s independence from countries’ currency systems has been 
claimed to be its strength, however, while this may be somewhat true 
for highly unstable economies, it is not an automatic conclusion for 
more stable and confidence-inspiring ones. Indeed, regardless of the 
actual level of a country’s economic stability, it does provide 
consumers with an interface to relate to and that is neutral from 
private interests. Distinguishably, Bitcoin’s anonymous creation and 
the private ownership of all Bitcoin exchanges create a reality where 
                                                 
43 Id. 
44 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Why Does the 
Federal Reserve Aim for 2 Percent Inflation Over Time?, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/economy_14400.htm. Similarly, in Europe, 
the ECB has a targeted inflation rate below, but close to 2%. See ECB, Monetary 
Policy, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/html/index.en.html. 
45 Sarwat Jahan, Inflation Targeting: Holding the Line, IMF, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/target.htm. 
46 Hilary J. Allen, $ = € = Bitcoin?, (Aug. 13, 2015), Suffolk Law School 
Research Paper No. 15-33, 15,  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2645001.  
47 Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. 
L. REV. 75, 77 (2011). 
48 Douglas R. Holmes, Communicative Imperatives in Central Banks, 47 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 15, 17 (2014). 
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Bitcoin stability depends on the interrelation of conflicting private 
interests.  
Interestingly, according to its own website, Bitcoin’s value 
derives from the fact that it is “useful as a form of money.”49 This 
circular reason strengthens the fear that while the public is currently 
interested in purchasing Bitcoin because of trust in its development, 
if this belief disappears no central bank or government can provide 
support to users. A sudden end to the acceptance of Bitcoin as a 
payment method would translate into chaotic erosion of its value 
and, ultimately, Bitcoin would lose its status as currency.  
The lack of a neutral institution devoted to price stability can 
explain, at least in part, Bitcoin’s volatility and riskiness. In contrast 
to public sovereigns, Bitcoin exchanges have a private corporate 
nature and relatively easy access to bankruptcy procedures that could 
leave subscribers, as creditors, unprotected to a higher degree than 
they would be if a bank were to be insolvent. However, as mentioned 
above, Bitcoin is an interesting alternative in unstable economies 
where the national currency is completely distrusted. For example, 
Argentina is increasingly gaining interest in Bitcoin.50 Nonetheless, 
Bitcoin may not be the best option even in those economies. An 
example of a more structured and more reliable alternative currency 
is the Unified System for Regional Compensation (“SUCRE”).51 
SUCRE started as a virtual currency for transaction between Ecuador 
and Venezuela. It was intended as a medium to replace the US dollar 
as means of exchange in order to limit and decrease the US influence 
                                                 
49 Bitcoin, Why Do People Trust Bitcoin?, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#why-
dopeople-trust-bitcoin. 
50 See J.M.P. Montevideo, Bitcoin in Argentina: If it can’t Make it there, THE 
ECONOMIST (June 12, 2014, 13:36), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/06/bitcoin-argentina; 
Nathaniel Popper, Can Bitcoin Conquer Argentina?, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr, 
29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/magazine/how-bitcoin-is-
disrupting-argentinas-economy.html?_r=0.  
51 Mercedes Alvaro & Jeffrey T. Lewis, Who Needs Bitcoin? Venezuela has its 
“Sucre”, (Jan. 2, 2014 6:51 pm), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304202204579256062854362716
. 
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and control over Latin American trade and, at the same time, increase 
stability of those markets.52  
While theoretically appealing, Bitcoin lacks the full faith and 
credit that has allowed national currencies to successfully function 
and resist crises.53 “No private issuer enjoys the same extent for its 
markets, the same capacity to coerce demand for its liabilities, or the 
same psychological association with confidence in society.”54 This is 
not to say that currencies alternative to national fiat currencies cannot 
successfully exist. However, it is of extreme importance that virtual 
currencies, by nature, tend to be unstable and extremely sensitive to 
new events requiring past commitments to be readjusted.55  
Consider the fate of bank-issued money in the United States 
prior to the establishment of the US dollar as the common currency. 
Many state banks issued their own IOUs with nothing but their own 
assets to back them. Predictably, they failed whenever too many 
claimants sought to make good on their claims at the same time. This 
follows from the hierarchy of finance and the fact that non-state 
entities, by definition, have limited resources. Critically, their ability to 
mobilize fresh resources may falter precisely when it is most needed, 
namely in times of crisis.56 
Accordingly, Bitcoin and other similar virtual currencies’ are 
too unstable to implement an overreaching corporate governance 
system like that applicable to companies. Doing so could potentially 
expose shareholders to greater risks than traditional transaction-
recording methods do without a countervailing benefit.  
                                                 
52 Id. See also generally, Caroline R. Hurtado, Note, Fiscal Policies as Decisive 
Solutions for Troubled Economies: Differing Legislative Enactments in Argentina and Ecuador, 
24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 391 (discussing the dollarization process 
undergone Latin American countries to obviate to economic instability).   
53 FELIX MARTIN, MONEY: THE UNAUTHORIZED 
BIOGRAPHY, 75 (2014). 
54 Id. at 114. 
55 Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECO. 315, 322 
(2013). 
56 Id.  
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B. Distinguishing Distributed Ledgers, Blockchain, and Bitcoin.  
Blockchain and Bitcoin are too often incorrectly used 
interchangeably because of the strong association between the two. 
However, the blockchain is merely the technology through which 
Bitcoin functions and making the distinction between the two is 
fundamental to understanding the potential independent use in 
corporate governance of the blockchain, but not of Bitcoin, 
proposed by this paper.  
The blockchain is a particular type of distributed ledger and 
represents the technological evolution of a tool as old as commerce.57 
Indeed, in ancient times transactions were recorded on papyrus and 
paper, today, the same recording occurs in computerized form.58 
What distinguishes distributed ledgers from the traditional form of 
recording is that, through algorithms, the ledgers can be 
collaboratively created by all of those sharing it in a network 
consisting of multiple sites, geographies, and institutions.59 
Distributed ledgers allow all users within the network to access and 
visualize changes to the ledger as they occur while maintain the 
information safe from unauthorized access via cryptographic “keys” 
and signatures, controlling users’ relative powers.60 Indeed, 
underlying the distributed ledger technology lays the blockchain, 
which accomplishes peer-to-peer digital cash transaction in Bitcoin, 
or otherwise.61 This is further analyzed in the next subsection. 
Distributed ledgers, as contrasted to Bitcoin, offer an 
interesting tool to implement in corporate governance because of 
their potential positive effect in at least some field of governance 
which is discussed in Section III of this paper. Compared to current 
data management methods, distributed ledgers offer a more secure 
alternative given their resistibility to hacks. Unlike centralized 
                                                 
57 UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC 
ADVISOR, Distributed Ledger Technology: Beyond Block Chain, 5, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/492972/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-technology.pdf. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See infra Subsection Section II-c. 
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systems, a successful cyber-attack on a distributed ledger would have 
to contextually target all shared copies.62 While not completely 
immune from hacks, this technology is also resistant to unauthorized 
changes or malicious tampering because users can immediately spot 
those changes.63 The technology represents an opportunity for 
evolution in various fields given its adaptability to various uses: 
distributed ledgers are capable of applicability to most transactions 
given their ability of “guaranteeing and tracking assets as they move 
from one ledger to another.”64 Interestingly, various governments 
globally, are already moving towards the implementation of 
distributed ledger technologies paralleling the private corporate 
world.65 
C.  Mechanics of Bitcoin Transactions on the Blockchain   
Given Bitcoin’s nature, mathematical formulas and 
cryptography respectively control its issuance and use.66 While users’ 
software store a public record of all transactions – the blockchain – 
the actual identity of the transacting parties remains anonymous, as 
no personal information is required to create an account on the 
platform or exchange Bitcoins.67 Elimination of a third party 
intermediary, such as a bank, ensures anonymity within Bitcoin 
transactions.68 Anonymity is furthered by the absence of reporting 
                                                 
62 UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC 
ADVISOR, supra note 57, at 6.  
63 Id.  
64 Money with no Middleman, THE ECONOMIST, 
http://www.economistinsights.com/technology-innovation/analysis/money-no-
middleman/tab/1, (last visited May 10, 2016). 
65 UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC 
ADVISOR, supra note 57. Five countries (United Kingdom, Estonia, Israel, New 
Zealand, and South Korea, have also created a network of digitally advanced 
government with the goal of strengthening the digital economy. See UNITED 
KINGDOM CABINET OFFICE AND GOVERNMENTAL DIGITAL 
SERVICE, D5 London: About D5 Member Countries, (Dec. 9, 2014), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/d5-london-about-d5-member-countries.  
66 MULLAN, supra note 7, at 86-87. 
67 Id. (noting that Bitcoin’s issuance is capped at 21M units). 
68 Federal Reserve Board, Bitcoin: Technical Background and Data Analysis, 5 
available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2014/files/2014104pap.pdf.  
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requirements and regulatory agencies, such as central banks and 
taxing authorities.  
In the absence of a third party clearinghouse, participants are 
free, but not bound, to voluntarily record each transaction on the 
blockchain.69 However, the effectiveness of this recording method is 
disputable: users who record their transactions are rewarded with 
newly minted Bitcoins.70 Conversely, no penalty follows from failure 
to record.71 This incentive-based policy explains, at least in part, the 
steady growth of Bitcoin systems.72 
The blockchain is comprised of a series of transactions each 
consisting in a “block”.73 Each block indicates the asset and 
consideration exchanged, the time of the transfer, and the identity (or 
at least the pseudonym) of the transacting parties.74 Each block is 
“chained” to the preceding and the subsequent one through headers 
that report information (using codes) regarding the content of the 
previous transaction block.75 Thus, through the codes reported in 
each block’s header one can retrieve the preceding transaction block 
and so on until the original transaction is reached.76 However, while it 
is possible to trace Bitcoin transactions back to the original 
acquisition of assets, depending on the type of exchange used, it is 
potentially impossible to trace the transaction back to individuals.77 
Furthermore, depending on the visibility options set by the exchange, 
blockchain records may be publicly visible or restricted to authorized 
users and subscribers only.78 In the alternative, an intermediate 
solution has developed whereby a company uses a private blockchain 
accessible to authorized users only to record its daily transactions but 
then periodically updates and reports an aggregate version of those 
                                                 
69 Id.  
70 Id. (explaining that minting refers to the creation of new Bitcoins). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 PAOLO TASCA, Digital Currencies: Principles, Trends, Opportunities and 
Risks, Deutche Bundesbank research report (2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657598. 
74 Id.  
75 Id.  
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
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transactions on a publicly accessible blockchain.79 This intermediate 
solution is called, given its mechanics, a side chain.80  
Regardless of the accessibility options, to execute a 
transaction, both a private and a public key are necessary.81 Each 
party to the transaction has a private encryption key that provides 
access to their personal account and that, when paired with the public 
key, allows transactions to go through.82 Specifically, a transaction 
requires a “pair of interlocking encryption keys” acting as peer-to-
peer signatures.83 The use of digitally encrypted signatures to 
authenticate transactions is threefold in that it ensures the 
authentication, non-repudiation, and integrity of payment messages.84  
Moreover, Bitcoin transactions are final and irreversible: 
voluntary refunds are the only way to revert the effect of the 
transfer.85 Because there is no administrator, no transaction can be 
blocked or penalized.86 Furthermore, Bitcoin users have the option to 
either keep a Bitcoin wallet (also called dark wallet when kept on dark 
web87 exchanges), on their own or through third parties, or convert 
the currency back to their local currency.88 The latter option may, 
depending on the method used, entail a potential for identity 
                                                 
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 MULLAN supra note 7, at 86. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Federal Reserve Board, supra note 68, at 8. 
85 MULLAN supra note 7, at 87. 
86 Id. 
87 The dark web is a layer of the web accessible only through specific 
software and where users can maintain nearly absolute anonymity. Stuart Dredge, 
What is Tor? A Beginner’s Guide to the Privacy Tool, THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 5, 2013 
07:47 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/05/tor-
beginners-guide-nsa-browser (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).   
88 Steve Kovach, What It’s Like Using an ATM that Automatically Turns 
Your Cash into Real Bitcoins, BUSINESSINSIDER (Mar. 10, 2014 5:00 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-atm-2014-3 (on how to buy and cash 
Bitcoin). 
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discovery.89 Indeed, it should not come as a surprise that a commonly 
heard phrase in the Bitcoin industry is “buyer beware.”90  
As mentioned, Bitcoin further differs from traditional 
currencies in that no central bank controls the amount of currency 
available and no jurisdiction guarantees it.91 Instead, a mathematical 
protocol with no central administrating or monitoring authority 
generates the Bitcoin.92 Given its math-based issuance and incentive-
based transaction recording, while Bitcoin’s current cap of $21M 
should not be reached earlier than 2140, each Bitcoin unit can be 
divided into fractional units thus enhancing the currency’s presence 
and spread.93 The cap of Bitcoin availability tends to suggest a 
commodity-like nature, which will be discussed more in depth in the 
following section about Bitcoin regulation alternatives. However, 
unlike traditional natural commodities, Bitcoin’s cap is only 
mathematically enforced and thus easily transformable, which adds a 
further layer of unique complexity.  
Furthermore, software and services like TOR (necessary to 
access the dark web), the “dark wallet” (Bitcoin wallets stored on the 
dark web), and Bitcoin-laundering services which are intentionally 
designed to obscure the source of a Bitcoin transaction, enhance 
Bitcoin’s already anonymous character and further complicate 
traceability.94 Indeed, in the case of laundering services, the chain of 
transactions on the blockchain is obscured by “linking all transactions 
in the same [B]itcoin address and sending them together in a way that 
makes them look as if they were sent from another address.”95 Other 
services pursuing the same goal instead “comingle” different series of 
                                                 
89 This paper does not go into detail as to Bitcoin use in the dark web but 
suffices it to say that there Bitcoin’s anonymous features are extremely enhanced by 
additional layers of encryption. Id. 
90 MULLAN supra note 7, at 87. 
91 FATF Report, Virtual Currencies Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT 
Risks (June 2014), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-
potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 As mentioned above, use of Bitcoin in the dark web offers further 
opportunities to avoid and evade regulation. Id. 
95 Id. 
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transactions, rendering the identification of the user to whom the 
sender intended to direct the funds impossible.96 
To further understand Bitcoin’s instability, it should be noted 
that Bitcoin acceptance peaked in 2013 with over 64,000 businesses 
around the globe accepting it as form of payment.97 However even 
lucrative businesses suffer from this instability, for example Mt. Gox, 
the largest Bitcoin exchange, filed for bankruptcy in 2014, after 
Bitcoin valued at around US$500 million mysteriously disappeared.98 
This example, considering the anonymous features of the currency, 
illustrates the great volatility and risks associated with the trading of 
Bitcoins.  
Enforcement agencies picked up on Bitcoin early, and, 
relatively soon after its creation, the FinCEN intervened issuing an 
interpretative guidance which is discussed in the next subsection. 
D. Current Regulatory Framework for Bitcoin in the United States  
Similarly to other virtual currencies, no Bitcoin-specific 
regulation has been enacted, nor does this paper suggest that it is 
necessary. However, a definitive categorization of Bitcoin as a 
specific financial instrument is necessary for market confidence in 
terms of legal certainty and clarity regarding applicable statutes and 
regulations. Indeed, while this article focuses on the dichotomy of 
Bitcoin and blockchain technology as potential corporate governance 
tools, it is important to understand that depending on the definition 
of Bitcoin as a certain financial instrument or another, its regulation 
may change considerably. Specifically, depending on the path 
followed, Bitcoin may function as a reliable governance tool. While 
legislatures are globally moving towards regulating Bitcoin use and 
exchange, regulation is not uniform as countries are following 
different approaches.  
This article suggests that, notwithstanding what the applicable 
regulation is, Bitcoin is not a suitable corporate governance tool 
                                                 
96 Id. 
97 Federal Reserve Board, supra note 68, at 5.  
98 Id. at 2. 
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because of externalities that render the virtual currency unstable and 
unreliable. However, to overview the current regulatory framework in 
the United States is helpful in understanding how unripe the legal 
system is to accept Bitcoin as corporate governance tool. Instead, this 
article suggests that, for at least certain aspects of corporate 
governance, distributed blockchain ledgers may represent a feasible 
and practical tool as discussed below in Section III. 
Given the lack of a universal definition of Bitcoin, its status 
and consequent regulation greatly differs depending on whether it is 
categorized as a form of money, a security, or a commodity.99  
 1. Current Applicable Law  
FinCEN has clarified in its 2013 guideline that, because of 
their anonymous features, Bitcoin users and exchangers are subject to 
the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”).100 Specifically, the guideline clearly 
states the BSA applies “to persons creating, obtaining, distributing, 
exchanging, accepting, or transmitting virtual currencies”, but does 
not go as far as classifying Bitcoin’s status. 101 Pursuant to the BSA, a 
“money transmission service” is a two-step service of “acceptance of 
currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency from one 
person and the transmission of currency, funds, or other value that 
substitutes currency to another location or person by any means.”102  
Following the FinCEN 2013 guideline, Bitcoin administrators 
and exchangers, in their capacity as Money Services Businesses 
(“MSB”), must comply with the appropriate Treasury Department 
registration process.103 Conversely, Bitcoin users do not fall within 
the guideline MSB definition and are outside the Treasury 
                                                 
99 For further and deeper analysis of Bitcoin’s regulation see, Fiammetta S. 
Piazza, Bitcoin in the the Dark Web: A Shadow over Banking Secrecy and a Call for Global 
Response,  
100 Guidance Paper FIN-2013-G001, supra note 5.  
101 Id.  
102 Id.  
103 Id. (emphasis in original); Money Services Business (MSB) Registration, 
FINCEN, 
https://www.fincen.gov/financial_institutions/msb/msb.registration.html, (last 
accessed Feb. 5, 2016).   
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Department scope of authority, at least for registration purposes.104 
The guideline also defines and clarifies that Money Transmitting 
Services (“MTS”) are within the scope of the USA Patriot Act of 
2001, which, among other addressed issues, imposes fines for, for 
example, failure to register and obtain a Money Transmitter license.105 
FinCEN’s conclusion that the BSA applies to Bitcoin 
represents a major turn towards a thorough regulation of Bitcoin and, 
by extension, of other similar cryptocrurrencies. 
 2. Status as a Form of Money 
“[Bitcoin] can be used to purchase goods or services, and 
[. . .], to pay for individual living expenses.”106 Based on this 
reasoning, a Texas District Court ruled on a matter of first instance 
and held that “[i]t is clear that Bitcoin can be used as money.”107 
While relatively limited in terms of market acceptance, Bitcoin “can 
also be exchanged for conventional currencies, such as the US dollar, 
Euro, Yen, and Yuan.”108 Accordingly, the Texas court found that 
“Bitcoin is a currency or form of money.”109 The ruling is dated July 
2013, only four months after FinCEN’s guideline publication. 
While avant-garde and based on a sound reasoning, the Texas 
court ruling should be carefully approached. Indeed, even though 
Bitcoin is exchanged and used as money, unlike national currencies, it 
lacks the support of a central authority like the United States 
Treasury for the US dollar and it does not have intrinsic value, as do 
                                                 
104 Id.  
105 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot ACT) Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56. 
106 Id.  
107 SEC v. Shavers, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 
2013). (Addressing the issue of whether jurisdiction under the Securities Acts of 
1933 and 1934 applied to the facts of the case involving a Bitcoin Ponzi scheme).  
108 Id. 
109 Id. (The court’s ultimate finding was that investors wishing to invest in 
BTCST provided an investment of money). 
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commodities.110 Because of the differences between traditional 
national currencies and Bitcoin, it has been argued that Bitcoin lacks 
at least one of two required characteristics to be considered a true 
currency.111 Specifically, although Bitcoin may be a means of 
exchange it is not a store of value.112 
Furthermore, in evaluating whether Bitcoin can be brought 
within the definition of currency, it is of remarkable importance to 
remember Bitcoin’s lack of national infrastructure, as opposed to fiat 
currencies. Indeed, other than in exceptional cases, a national 
currency can always be exchanged for and accepted as form of 
payment. Instead, Bitcoin could vanish both because of the 
combination of Bitcoin being the result of an Internet mathematical 
protocol, the absence of a physical “paper-trail” backing up the 
blockchain, and the Internet and computers being subject to 
viruses.113     
 3. Status as a Security 
The issue of  “whether the Bitcoin itself could be a security” 
has yet to be addressed by a court.”114 Indeed, while Shavers 
acknowledges it as an option, the court there did not delve into an 
analysis of whether Bitcoin can be considered a security instrument. 
The issue is even more intricate considering that, while there is 
agreement regarding the fact that a security is, in economic terms, a 
                                                 
110  Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Bitcoin Is Evil, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 28, 
2013), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/28/bitcoin-is-evil/?_r=0.  
111 John Authers, Time to Take the Bitcoin Bubble Seriously, FIN. TIMES 
(Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4ad1bba0-61fa-11e3-aa02-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3sNu5guRP. 
112 Id.  
113 An example of a more structured and more reliable alternative 
currency is the Unified System for Regional Compensation (SUCRE). SUCRE 
started as a virtual currency for transaction between Ecuador and Venezuela and 
was intended as a medium to replace the US dollar as means of exchange to limit 
and decrease the US influence and control over Latin American trade and, at the 
same time, increase stability of those markets. Alvaro & Lewis, supra note 51. See 
also generally, Hurtado, supra note 52. (discussing the dollarization process 
undergone Latin American countries to obviate to economic instability). 
114 Daniela Sonderegger, Note, A Regulatory and Economic Perplexity: Bitcoin 
Needs Just a Bit of Regulation, 47 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 195.   
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form of investment, there is not a uniform definition. Instead, 
different countries’ legal definitions vary, sometimes significantly, 
covering a broad spectrum of alternatives. In the United States, the 
Securities Act of 1933 comprehensively defines the term and 
provides, in relevant part, that “security means any note, stock, 
treasury, stock, security future, security-based swap, bond . . ., 
investment contract . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument 
commonly known as a ‘security’. . . .”115 
Over the years, American courts have developed and used the 
Howey test to determine whether an interest is a security pursuant to 
the Securities Act of 1933.116 In Howey, the court, beginning with a 
textual analysis of the law, reasoned that the preliminary issue to 
solve to understand what is a “security” is determining what is 
intended by “investment contract.”117 Specifically, the Howey test 
analyzes whether, at the time the interest is issued, the “investment 
contract,” and consequently the security, is “a contract, transaction or 
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise 
and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or 
a third party.”118 For purposes of applying the Howey test, whether 
the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates, or by 
nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise, is 
irrelevant.119 However, Bitcoin’s analysis in light of the Howey test is 
ineffective, at least in part because Bitcoin’s features do not suit 
themselves.120 Specifically, while Bitcoin users may invest Bitcoin, the 
cryptocurrency itself does not generally represent a share of a 
common enterprise the investor believes will prove fruitful through 
the efforts of a third party. Thus, although Bitcoin may be used as a 
                                                 
115 15 USCS § 77b. 
116 SEC v. Howey Co., 293 U.S. 293.  
117 Section 2 (1) of the Act defines the term “security” to include the 
commonly known documents traded for speculation or investment. This definition 
also includes “securities” of a more variable character, designated by such 
descriptive terms as “certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing 
agreement,” “investment contract” and “in general, any interest or instrument 
commonly known as a ‘security.’” Id. at 297. 
118 Id. at 298-299. 
119 Id. 
120 Sonderegger, supra note 114, at 195.   
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security if the mentioned conditions are met, it remains unclear 
whether it does, unequivocally, qualify as such.121  
 4. Status as a Commodity  
Classical political economy defines a commodity as product 
or service produced by human labor and available for sale on the 
market.122 Regardless of school of thought, it is generally agreed that 
a commodity is a good, easily interchangeable with other 
commodities of the same type also used in commerce.123 Indeed, an 
essential characteristic of commodities is that their quality is 
essentially uniform across producers and are uniquely fungible.124 
Specifically, to be commodities, goods must be: (1) standardized; (2) 
usable upon delivery; (3) and their price must vary enough to justify 
creating a market for the item.125 As an illustration, agricultural goods 
like wheat, corn, oil, and coffee, energy-related goods like coal, oil, 
and gas as well as precious metals like copper, silver, and gold are 
typical commodities.126  
Unlike the unexplored status as a security, the US 
Commodity and Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) issuance of 
its first action against an unregistered Bitcoin option-trading platform 
in 2015, confirms that Bitcoin, and similar digital currencies, fall 
within the definition of commodities and are thus subject to the 
Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”).127 While the CFTC’s action 
apperars to show a clear intent to regulate Bitcoin as a commodity, it 
might be an effort to at least pose some restrictions and promote its 
regulation.  
                                                 
121 Id. at 196.   
122 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: VOLUME I 38 (Int’l Publishers, 1967).  
123 Commodity, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commodity.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).  
124 Id.  
125 Commodity, INVESTING ANSWERS, 
http://www.investinganswers.com/financial-dictionary/commodities-precious-
metals/commodity-1035 (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).  
126 Commodity, BUSINESS DICTIONARY, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/commodity.html (last visited Feb. 
6, 2016).  
127 In Re Coinflip, Inc. et al., supra note 16. 
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It is important to note that, significantly differently from 
traditional commodities, Bitcoin’s availability is potentially limitless. 
However, taking into account Bitcoin’s potential status as a form of 
money and its lack of an infrastructure typical of national currencies, 
Bitcoin’s availability is limited. This is because of the long-standing 
belief that currencies, typically currencies of countries possessing 
significant quantities of commodities or other natural resources, have 
been endorsed as commodities.128 Additionally, Bitcoin is notably 
different from traditional commodities, as it is extremely volatile.129 
For these reasons as well as Bitcoin’s virtual nature, leading to its 
unknown supply because of its algorithmically coded scarcity and 
future demand, some argue Bitcoin is more dissimilar to traditional 
commodities than it is similar.130 
In light of the general uncertainty surrounding Bitcoin, the 
CFTC has clarified “commodity” as a term to be broadly construed 
to include “all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for 
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”131 Regardless, 
scholars are perplexed about the CFTC’s finding and suggest its 
implications may shake Shaver’s holding that Bitcoin can be a 
security.132 In the words of New York Law School Professor 
Houman Shadab,”[t]he [CFTC order] puts to rest any notion that 
virtual currencies qualify as securities. Otherwise, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission would be bringing this action, not the 
CFTC.”133 Unfortunately, no light is shed in the general gray fog 
surrounding Bitcoin even in this context because neither the SEC nor 
                                                 
128 Brian Perry, Forex Currencies: Commodity Pairs (USD/CAD, 
USD/AUD, USD/NZD), INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/university/forex-currencies/currencies8.asp (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2016).  
129 Bitcoin’s volatility is further discussed in Section II-A of this article. 
See supra p. 268. See, also, e.g., Young, supra note 24.  
130 Danny Bradbury, Why Bitcoin’s Volatility is Unique among Commodities, 
COINDESK (Apr. 29, 2014, 11:11 A.M.), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoins-
volatility-no-other/.  
131 7 U.S.C. 1(a)(9). See, e.g., Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. SEC, 
677 F. 2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1982). 
132 Pete Rizzo, CFTC Ruling Defines Bitcoin and Digital Currencies as 
Commodities, COINDESK (Sept. 17, 2015 22:06), http://www.coindesk.com/cftc-
ruling-defines-bitcoin-and-digital-currencies-as-commodities/. 
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the CFTC have issued any disclosures following issuance of the 
CFTC order. Consequently, while it is undisputed that Bitcoin falls 
within the scope of the definition of commodity, no final 
determination can be made regarding its status as security.  
 5. The Federal Reserve, the Internal Revenue Service, and Other  
  State and Federal Regulators 
The Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet Yellen expressly 
stated during testimony before the Senate Banking Committee that 
the agency “doesn’t have authority to supervise or regulate Bitcoin in 
any way.”134 This conclusion was heavily motivated by the absence of 
a “central issuer or network operator,” which makes it “not easy to 
regulate Bitcoin.” 135 The Chairwoman has not offered policy 
guidance but has made clear that “[t]his is a payment innovation that 
is taking place entirely outside the banking industry.”136 
Taking a diametrically opposed approach, the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) has affirmed its authority over Bitcoin. 
Specifically, the IRS has clarified that it treats Bitcoin like property 
subject to property tax and that “sale or exchange of convertible 
virtual currency, or the use of convertible virtual currency to pay for 
goods or services in a real-world economy transaction, has tax 
consequences that may result in a tax liability.”137 As a means of 
comparison, the United Kingdom has moved towards a 
comprehensive regulation of Bitcoin.138  The HM Revenue and 
                                                 
134 Ryan Tracy, Yellen: Bitcoin ‘Doesn’t Touch’ Banks the Fed Oversees, THE 
WALL STREET J. (Feb. 27, 2014 12:32 P.M.), 
https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/no-headline-available-1393521584.  
135 Charles Cooper, Fed Chief Yellen: No Power to Regulate Bitcoin, CNET 
(Feb. 27, 2014 10:37 A.M.), https://www.cnet.com/news/fed-chief-yellen-no-
power-to-regulate-bitcoin/.   
136 Shelly Palmer, Bitcoin: Money, Currency or Something Else?, THE 
HUFFINGTONPOST (March 3, 2014 10:10 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shelly-palmer/bitcoin-money-currency-
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137 IRS Notice 2014-21: Virtual Currency Notice at 1, March 25, 2014, 
available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf.   
138 Sarah Saunders, Cryptic Currency, TAXATION (March 11, 2015), 
https://www.taxation.co.uk/Articles/2015/03/10/332784/cryptic-currency.  
2017 Piazza 5:2 
287 
Customs (“HMRC”) has issued a policy brief on the treatment of 
income received from, and charges made in connection with, 
activities involving Bitcoin and other similar cryptocurrencies, for: 
Value Added Tax (“VAT”); corporation and income tax; and capital 
gains purposes.139  While the country’s recent vote towards leaving 
the European Union will have consequences over this issue, 
currently, the tax treatment in the United Kingdom is as follows: 
acquisitions by mining are considered outside the scope of VAT; 
Bitcoin is considered a foreign currency for corporation and income 
tax purposes; and gains or losses on Bitcoin are chargeable or 
allowable for capital gains tax if they accrue to an individual and are 
not covered by trading profit rules.140 
Domestically, states have moved in the direction of regulating 
Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies through license systems. For example, 
New York has proposed a “BitLicense” regulation plan aimed at 
“help[ing] protect consumers and root[ing] out illicit activity.”141 So 
far, five more states – California, Colorado, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, and Texas – have also moved toward a similar and favorable 
regulation of the Bitcoin.142 Implementation of these systems of 
regulation, offer the benefit of ease of enforcement and monitoring 
because they offer the opportunity to conduct upfront investigation 
of Bitcoin issuers and exchanges.143 
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140 HM Revenue & Customs, Revenue and Customs Brief 9 (2014): 
Bitcoin and other Cryptocurrencies (March 3, 2014), 
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III. BLOCKCHAIN AND BITCOIN: POTENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION AS 
NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TOOLS  
This section analyzes the potential benefits and detriments 
deriving from implementing Bitcoin together with or independently 
from the blockchain technology in corporate governance. This paper 
suggests that the present features of Bitcoin and its current under-
regulation do not necessitate its implementation because of the 
extreme exposure to volatility risks and hacks. However, the paper 
suggests the blockchain technology, as distinguished from Bitcoin, 
may instead offer a viable tool in areas of corporate governance like 
voting.   
The following subsections explore the relative benefits and 
disadvantages deriving from implementing Bitcoin or the blockchain 
in the corporate governance of companies as tools for enhanced 
transparency, voting, accounting, and self-executing contracts (smart 
contracts).  
A. Transparency of Ownership and Trading Value  
Transparency and disclosure are at the base of good 
corporate governance models in that they enable shareholders and 
stockholders to make informed decisions and hold corporate 
executives accountable, thus limiting the agency costs associated with 
asymmetry of information.144 In line with this perspective, countries 
globally have moved towards implementation of legislation aimed at 
enhancing corporate disclosures in a broad attempt at curtailing a 
greater role for shareholders in corporate governance.145  
                                                 
144 See, e.g., Benjiamin Fung, The Demand and Need for Transparency and 
Disclosure in Corporate Governance, 2 UNIVERSAL J. MGMT 2, 72-80 (2014), 
http://www.hrpub.org/download/20140105/UJM3-12101630.pdf.  
145 For example, in the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
requires publicity of information including roles of and responsibilities of board 
and management executives and the Williams Act of 1968 requires disclosures 
regarding tender offers. Sarbanes-Oaxley Act of 2002, 107 P.L 204 (2002); Williams 
Act, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 90 P.L. 439 (1968).  
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Transparency can be considered to be based on five pillars: 
(1) truthfulness, (2) completeness, (3) materiality of information, (4) 
timeliness, and (5) accessibility.146 Implementing distributed ledgers as 
a corporate governance tool could, at a minimum, result in enhanced 
timeliness and accessibility of corporate information. Indeed, as 
discussed in the previous section, users given access to the ledger 
would be able to track changes in the ledger as they occur thus 
allowing for timely transmission of information to shareholders. 
Shared ledgers would also address the accessibility pillar of 
transparency in that information stored on the ledgers would be 
readily accessible to all authorized users. The use of shared ledgers 
does not directly affect truthfulness and completeness of shared 
information, however they would allow users to easily monitor 
transactions as well as recognize possible breaches to the system.147 
Conversely, the same result may not flow from using Bitcoin because 
of its anonymous features as further discussed hereunder. 
Accordingly, this paper suggests use of blockchain, but not Bitcoin, 
in corporate transaction recording to foster enhanced transparency.  
In the United States, Bitcoin is undergoing regulation and 
exchangers are thus implementing amendments to their systems to 
comply with the BSA and, consequently, certain minimum identity 
requirements are now necessary for subscription as an exchange 
user.148 However, it is not mandatory for companies wishing to use 
Bitcoin in their governance to use local exchanges only. Indeed, just 
like a company may have international shareholders, it may decide to 
use an international Bitcoin exchange that allows reduced identity 
checks. Accordingly, because local regulation of Bitcoin exchanges 
are highly diverse in type and thoroughness, if any, using a foreign 
blockchain may result in non-transparent ownership. This would be 
so because of lack of disclosure requirements as well potential 
anonymous accounts.  
Use of local exchanges respecting the BSA could still not be 
sufficient to ensure complete transparency of ownership. Possible 
implementation of closed blockchains, accessible to authorized users 
                                                 
146 Fung, supra note 144, at 75-76. 
147 See, supra, Section II-B, at 274.  
148 See supra, Section II. 
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only, or of side chains, would de facto frustrate the goal of inspiring 
shareholders and investors’ trust in the company by way of allowing 
transparent and easy access to ownership arrangements and 
instantaneous changes thereof.  
Assuming full transparency is implementable, it would have 
remarkable effects on the behavior of players such as managers, 
investors, and shareholder activists. Using executive compensation as 
an illustration, this paper discusses the consequences of complete 
transparency. Specifically, regardless of the driving forces producing 
the final arrangement, managers’ compensation is often a 
combination of salary and equity.149 Currently, public companies are 
required to file with the SEC disclosures including executive 
compensation, however those filings do not necessarily come in a 
format easily comprehensible to non-sophisticated investors.150 
Implementation of blockchain technology could render executive 
compensation more easily traceable and quantifiable for lay investors  
because of its user-friendly interface. Indeed, while theoretical 
problems regarding whether executive compensation is optimal or 
whether the specific boards are beholden to the executives in their 
choices, complete transparency coupled with easier understanding 
would at least allow shareholders real time monitoring. This would 
enhance the shareholders’ role of serving as a check on both board 
decisions, generally, and executive compensation, specifically.  
Depending on the percentage distribution of each 
component, managers’ incentives tend to flow towards, more or less, 
shareholder-centered strategies. Indeed, acquisition and liquidation of 
managers’ equity in the company have become of central importance, 
especially after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.151 
Among other things, the act has reduced filing periods for managers 
to disclose their acquisition and disposition of company shares.152 
Indeed, while originally managers had to make such disclosures 
                                                 
149 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay without Performance: Overview of 
the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 443 (2005).   
150 See generally, Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ration Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html.  
151 Sarbanes-Oaxley Act. 
152 Id.  
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within ten days from the acquisition of disposition, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act has reduced this disclosure window to two business 
days.153  
While enhancing shareholders awareness, registration of 
company shares on a public ledger could undercut the effectiveness 
of equity-based compensation because trades observable in real time 
would have a lower value to executives as they could lose trade 
leverage or edge as a consequence.154 This might result in increased 
salary-based compensation of executives given the loss of value of 
their equity compensation.155 Furthermore, registration of shares on 
the blockchain would also result in higher consciousness by 
shareholders of when company shares are pledged as collateral for 
loans or in connection with derivative hedging product.156 These 
typical managerial moves may seem alarming to an inexperienced and 
uninformed market observer even when fully sound according to 
business judgment and could thus result in unwarranted market 
drops. Accordingly, while registration on the blockchain and the 
heightened transparency flowing from it can increase the role of 
shareholders in the governance of companies, it may also result in 
inefficiencies and obstacles in a board’s execution of its strategic and 
managerial role within the company.157   
On the other hand, assuming full transparency is achieved by 
implementing direct public blockchain systems, as opposed to side 
chain, the positive effects of transparency could still be undermined if 
Bitcoin is used. In fact, using Bitcoin to assess the value of 
transactions, here of compensation, and given the volatile value of 
Bitcoin, it would be quite possible to circumvent true reporting 
simply by assessing the transaction during low Bitcoin value trading. 
This would effectively enhance likelihood of circumvention of 
accounting fraud and misreporting frustrating the purpose of 
                                                 
153 Id. 
154 David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, (NYU Stern Sch. 
of Bus. & Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w21802, 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2703207.  
155 Id. 
156 Id.  
157 See, id.; Jill E. Fish, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. R. 265, 
272-275 (1997).  
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legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oaxley Act. Accordingly, while 
intermediary fees usually associated with banking transactions may be 
avoided, this would be at the cost of providing executives with an 
additional method to circumvent honest accounting.  
Lastly, regardless of the blockchain used (Bitcoin-based or 
simple shared ledger) registering a company’s shares on the 
blockchain, would possibly also translate into added management 
costs, especially up front in the form of accountants and executive 
training, and system transitioning. Implementation of the blockchain 
could, at least initially translate in an additional layer of diversification 
of the board. Indeed, while accountants may be tasked with the 
mechanical registration on the ledger, the board should be aware of 
the consequences of certain timing of transactions. However, these 
costs do not seem justified given the high level of doubt surrounding 
the effectiveness of blockchain for corporate governance purposes.  
Accordingly, Bitcoin should not be used to record 
transactions, specifically executive compensation, because of its still 
unclear status and unstable nature. The blockchain technology behind 
it instead may promote enhanced transparency. But this heightened 
transparency may actually come at the detriment of shareholders, 
especially in the case of inexperienced investors that may not be 
familiar with typical corporate strategies and might misinterpret 
perfectly innocent board decisions. Accordingly, given the limited 
additional benefits of registration on public blockchain as compared 
to the current disclosures required by the SEC, it is advisable the 
blockchain too not be used, at least in this field.  
B. Voting  
Corporate elections, given diverse and spread ownership 
structures, are commonly held through corporate proxy systems. 
Currently, vote tabulation are subject to a considerable degree of 
inaccuracy resulting in certain cases in the inability to verify the 
question “who won?”158 
                                                 
158 Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate 
Voting, GEORGETOWN L. J. 96, 1227, 1279 (2008). See also, A Call for Change in 
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Studies have found that proxy voting, while solving the issue 
of reaching quorums even though shareholders may be absent from 
the voting meeting, has flaws such as inexact voter lists, incomplete 
distribution of ballots, and problematic vote tabulation.159 
Implementation of blockchain could solve these issues given its 
accuracy and reliability levels deriving from availability of copies of 
ledgers to all users. In practice, voting via blockchain would be 
achieved by allocating eligible voters tokens (also called “vote coins”) 
in a number that represents their voting power.160 Voters would then 
transmit to addresses on the blockchain their vote, which would then 
be registered on the ledger.161  
Additionally, implementation of blockchain voting may defeat 
empty voting practices. Empty voting occurs when “an investor uses 
borrowed shares or certain combinations of derivative securities to 
acquire voting rights temporarily, without economic exposure to the 
cash flow rights connected to a share.”162 These voting strategies 
mostly rely on secrecy and, while legally doubtful, the difficulty 
connected to their monitoring and enforcement continues to enable 
them. Accordingly, a transparent system like shared ledger would 
effectively render empty voting impossible. 
However, empty voting is not necessarily a negative tool. 
Supporters highlight the efficient effects of the strategy in that it 
effectively permits pricing of voting rights according to the marginal 
benefit attributed to the highest-valued voter.163 Empty voting is also 
a great tool for minority shareholders in that it provides them with an 
opportunity to maximize their profit by selling or temporarily renting 
their voting rights.164 This view assumes that shareholders’ interests 
                                                 
the Proxy Advisory Industry Status Quo 50-61 (Ctr. on Exec. Compensation (White 
Paper c11-07b, Jan. 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ProxyAdvisoryWhitePaper02
072011.pdf. 
159 A Delaware attorney “estimates that, in a contest that is closer than 55 
to 45%, there is no verifiab[ility]” of the election results. Kahan & Rock, supra note 
158, at 1277-1281.  
160 Id. 
161 Id.  
162 Yermack, supra note 154. 
163 Id.  
164 Id. 
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are more focused on their profits per se than on actual active 
participation in the decision making process of the company. Indeed, 
whether empty voting is considered an acceptable practice also 
depends on what level of shareholder participation in corporate 
governance one believes appropriate.165 
Opponents of empty voting, instead, point out the potential 
undemocratic effect of disjoining ownership and voting rights, which 
could, especially where it is the minority that rents or sells its voting 
rights, turn against the very shareholders that are attempting to 
benefit from the practice.166 Indeed, where minority shareholders 
have, as it is common, opposite interests to the majority and control 
shareholders, selling or renting their voting rights to those parties 
may result in the support and passage of a resolution not in their best 
interests.167 Accordingly, the benefit of empty voting is strongly based 
on whether one considers shareholders’ interests to be those of  
immediate profit making, or long term and active participation in 
company governance. 
Independently from how one views empty voting, given the 
relatively straightforward use of the blockchain in the context of 
voting, this could be an area in which the blockchain could be tested 
for potential further implementation in governance. The removal and 
independence of voting from share value avoids the evaluation issue 
discussed above in the context of Bitcoin blockchains and could 
render implementation of such model feasible too. In fact, the tokens 
would be automatically assigned and would not be representative of 
value. Thus, the analysis above regarding Bitcoin’s volatility would 
not apply, rendering this specific use quite implementable even in the 
regulatory status quo.168  
Accordingly, voting via blockchain would effectively solve 
ambiguities about election outcomes and thus reduce opportunities 
to manipulate such results and would therefore be an advisable 
corporate governance tool. 
                                                 
165 Onnig H. Bombalagian, Can Borrowing Shares Vindicate Shareholders 
Primacy?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231, 1238-1257 (2009).  
166 Yermack, supra note 137. 
167 Id. 
168 See supra Section II.  
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C. Accounting  
Commentators have suggested companies may successfully 
transition to blockchain accounting and voluntarily post all their 
ordinary business transactions on distributed ledgers.169 This result 
may be achieved both through use of Bitcoin as a means of exchange 
for transactions or by reflecting the value of transactions via token 
amounts using blockchain technology. However, neither method 
implements a truly transparent system. Instead, both would allow for 
managerial manipulation because of the value assessment issues 
posed by Bitcoin and mentioned in Section III-A.  
Implementation of blockchain accounting could reduce 
accounting and auditing costs in that various units of a company 
would be able to directly and centrally record transactions into the 
ledger and thus there would be no need for an auditor to examine the 
books of every unit to then assemble them ex post.170 Furthermore, 
blockchain accounting would also lower the cost of auditing in that 
auditors and governmental agencies would have direct access to the 
ledger and be able to examine the regularity of transactions as they 
occur. This system would thus require extended access to the ledger 
by certain institutional players, such as taxing agencies, raising the 
issue of who is entitled to access those records. Accordingly, the the 
question of whose interests companies must pursue and what the 
objectives of corporate governance are affect the resolution of this 
issue. A possible solution to avoid overbroad access to confidential 
records could be to grant access to only those market player that 
would have access to SEC disclosures. However this could frustrate 
                                                 
169 Ryan Lazanis, How Technology Behind Bitcoin Could Transform Accounting as 
We Know it, (Jan. 22, 2015), TECHVIBES, http://www.techvibes.com/blog/how-
technology-behind-bitcoin-could-transform-accounting-as- we-know-it-2015-01-22.  
170 Oliver Staley, The Unsexy Future of Blockchain is Accounting, QUARTZ 
(Mar. 3, 2016), http://qz.com/629662/the-unsexy-future-of-blockchain-is-
accounting/; see, also, Blockchain Technology: A Game-changer in Accounting?, 
DELOITTE, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/de/Documents/Innovation/B
lockchain_A%20game-changer%20in%20accounting.pdf (last accessed May 10, 
2016); Matthew Spoke, How Blockchain Tech will Change Auditing for Good, 
COINDESK (July 11, 2015, 15:00), http://www.coindesk.com/blockchains-and-
the-future-of-audit/.  
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the very purpose of blockchain accounting by denying access to more 
confidential information needed by taxing agencies.       
Furthermore, commentators pushing for adoption of 
blockchain accounting stress that this method would ensure complete 
transparency as the entire ledger would be immediately visible, 
assuming no restrictions to access are set by management, to all 
stakeholders, from shareholders to creditors, and from lenders to 
interested parties.171 While back-dating of transactions or amortizing 
operation expenses over long periods is not feasible given the time-
stamped nature of the transaction blocks, forward dating can be 
achieved by simply keeping a parallel undisclosed accounting 
system.172 Indeed, parallel accounting, be it on a side ledger or in 
paper form, would still offer companies an “under the table” 
opportunity to circumvent reporting duties. Accordingly, this system 
does not accomplish the result it purports to achieve: spotting and 
impeding self-interested and fraudulent transactions.173 Indeed, 
proponents of this type of accounting forget to take into account 
human nature. They assume a perfect reality where voluntariness to 
report all transactions at the moment they occur is the rule and self-
interests are nonexistent or not pursued. But how can a voluntary 
reporting system ensure transparency in a system, especially in big 
corporations, where ownership and management are quite separate? 
Considering transition costs as well as the above-described pitfalls, 
feasibility of blockchain accounting seems utopic and impracticable.  
D. Smart Contracts 
A smart contract is a “computerized protocol that executes 
the terms of a contract.”174 Smart contracts are not a wholly new 
concept, however, the advent of virtual currencies and Bitcoin have 
offered a way to reinvent this transactional product. Given Bitcoin’s 
rapid success among consumers, smart contract providers have 
                                                 
171 Yermack, supra note 154. See also, DELOITTE, supra note 170.  
172 Id. at 17. 
173 Id.  
174 Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts, (1994) unpublished manuscript, available 
at http://szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html.   
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quickly developed and offer user-friendly interfaces.175 Accordingly, 
consumers may engage in smart contracts that vary from easy daily 
sales to substantive investments without going through traditional 
intermediaries.  
Technically speaking, the same concept at the basis of smart 
contracts applies from daily tasks like operating a mechanical soda 
machine to more sophisticated exchange market operations. The 
premise on which a smart contract is based is assuring 
performance.176 Applicability of this mechanism to blockchain 
technology translates in execution of contracts based upon the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of specific verifiable events varying 
from the passage of time to sophisticated contingencies such as 
financial outcomes.177 
While smart contracts may succeed and prove valuable to 
private individuals’ where timing and certainty of execution are key,178 
they may not prove successful as corporate governance tools. While 
smart contracts may reduce agency costs associated with debt, they 
would impose on corporations, and thus on boards, tight boundaries 
for strategic actions. As one commentator noted, the willingness of a 
company to enter into a smart contract in regard to a loan may be 
limited as it “represents a pre-commitment not to behave 
opportunistically in the future and it would protect a lender against 
fraud strategies by a debtor such as pledging the same collateral to 
two borrowers.”179 This effect may also prove legally unfeasible 
considering directors’ fiduciary duties to shareholders as in the 
context of hostile takeovers and relative Revlon duties.180  
                                                 
175 See, e.g., SMARTCONTRACT, http://about.smartcontract.com/#1-
naming-and-description. 
176 Id.  
177 Id.  
178 Sue McLean & Simon Deane-John, Demystifying Blockchain and 
Distributed Ledger Technology – Hype or Hero?, MORRISON FOSTER (Apr. 5, 2016), 
http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2016/04/160405Blockchain.p
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Furthermore, the private nature of smart contract providers 
and consequent access to bankruptcy mechanisms for those 
providers, in addition to Bitcoin’s volatility, increases the risks of 
market bubbles and chaos were some of the providers to fail 
suddenly. Accordingly, however efficient, smart contract use does not 
necessarily translate into corporate governance benefits warranting 
the risks associated with committing to a set and irreversible course 
of action (once a smart contract is active and the set occurrences 
happen, execution is automatic). Accordingly, without prior 
regulation of the status of smart contracts within the realm of 
investment instruments, companies should not engage in such 
transactions so as to better safeguard shareholders’ interests as well as 
the overall company’s stability. Lastly, the complete automation of 
execution overburdens companies’ boards, thus, without a possibility 
to provide for “fiduciary out” mechanisms, smart contracts are not 
an appropriate corporate governance tool and should be left to the 
realm of private transactions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Bitcoin’s current under-regulated status and the lack of 
confidence deriving from the absence of assurances derived from a 
centralized bank and government backing, renders use of Bitcoin as a 
corporate governance tool unjustifiably risky. However, the 
distributed ledger technology of blockchains, as distinguished from 
Bitcoin, can, in some fields, represent an efficient solution. During a 
question-and-answer session with the Commonwealth Club Chair 
George Scalise, Federal Reserve Chairwoman Yellen herself 
recognized that, while Bitcoin is not within the scope the Federal 
Reserve’s authority, 
“[Blockchain] is a very important, new technology 
that could have implications for the way in which 
transactions are handled throughout the financial 
system. We’re looking at it in terms of its promise in 
some of the technologies we use ourselves and many 
financial institutions are looking at it. It could make a 
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big difference to the way in which transactions are 
cleared and settled in the global economy.”181  
Chairwoman Yellen has consistently pointed out that 
“[blockchain] could have very significant implications for the 
payment system and the conduct of business.”182 Although the 
Federal Reserve is not currently exploring regulation, Yellen has 
explained that the Federal Reserve is, importantly, “trying to 
understand the nature” of fintech” and that she believes “innovation 
using these technologies could be extremely helpful and bring 
benefits to society.”183 Accordingly, regardless of political views and 
affiliations, the blockchain represents an opportunity to be 
pursued.184 Indeed, this article argues that blockchain technology is 
more suited than Bitcoin to be implemented in the realm of 
corporate governance because of its more reliable nature.  
In regard to the registration of shares to enhance 
transparency of ownership and shareholders’ confidence, neither 
Bitcoin nor the blockchain would better the current situation. Indeed, 
companies may implement closed side chains to hide, at least 
temporarily, some transactions and thus defeat the goal of enhancing 
the respective managing and monitoring roles of boards and 
shareholders.185 Furthermore, in the case of Bitcoin, its volatile value 
does not create trust in that transactions may be conveniently 
recorded during low trading value so as to allow executives to pursue 
self-interests and gain on the edge.186 Moreover, while the blockchain 
may avoid this edging issue, potential shareholders’ panic may still be 
a problematic consequence of complete transparency.187 Thus, while 
companies could create diversified access levels by creating different 
                                                 
181 Stan Higgins, Fed Chair Yellen: Blockchain is an ‘Important Technology’, 
COINDESK (Jan. 18, 2017 22:00), http://www.coindesk.com/fed-yellen-
blockchain-important-tech/.; For the full speech, see, Commonwealth Club, Federal 
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187 Yermack, supra note 154; see supra p. 289.  
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keys, transparency, the very benefit that the technology purports to 
achieve would be capped at the outset similar to the status quo. 
Accordingly, implementation of either Bitcoin or the blockchain in 
this area is not warranted, as it does not enhance the current status of 
the SEC, and other similar, disclosures.  
The arena of corporate voting is, instead, one where 
implementation of distributed ledgers, and possibly Bitcoin, may 
bring about a better corporate governance model. Indeed, in this 
area, the actual market value of shares is unnecessary in the 
computation of shareholders’ voting rights.188 Accordingly, the time 
stamping and accuracy level guaranteed by block chain technology 
would probably bring about a better voting system. While use of 
Bitcoin in this area does not pose the risks and issues it poses in areas 
such as transaction reporting and accounting where value is key, 
Bitcoin’s use should, at least until further regulation is enacted, be 
paused in favor of block chain technology not using virtual 
currencies.  
Accounting represents the most problematic area in which 
block chain or Bitcoin could be implemented within corporate 
governance. Bitcoin’s volatile value is detrimental to implementation 
in at least two ways. First, fluctuations in Bitcoin’s value may actually 
further illegal and evasive acts of boards attempting to circumvent 
accounting laws instead of encouraging transparent and truthful 
accounting.189 Indeed, registering transactions at a later date would 
permit, through exchange rates, modification of the actual value of a 
company’s assets and liabilities.190 Second, and this applies to 
blockchain generally as well, this system of accounting is based on 
the false premise that boards are made of individuals perfectly able to 
withhold self-interests.191 Instead, managerial evasion of shareholder 
monitoring would still be possible, especially given the voluntary 
blockchain  reporting mechanisms. Also, implementation of such a 
radically different method of accounting would result in great costs, 
                                                 
188 Kahan & Rock, supra note 158.  
189 Supra pp. 293-296. 
190 Yermack, supra note 154; see also supra p. 294. 
191 Supra p. 296. 
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thus, its relative benefits are not warranted, regardless of whether 
Bitcoin of mere distributed ledgers are used.192   
Lastly, while blockchain-based smart contracts represent an 
interesting evolution in the area of self-executing contracts, 
implementation in the corporate governance arena is not warranted 
because of board’s fiduciary duties issues. This is so regardless of 
whether the smart contract is based on Bitcoin currency, though in 
that case, implementation would pose the added dangers deriving 
from value volatility and lack of supporting infrastructure discussed 
with regards to accounting. 
Accordingly, because of its private and unpredictable nature 
as well as its current under-regulation, Bitcoin does not present great 
enough benefits to offset the risks deriving from its implementation. 
This is so especially in the American market and economy, which do 
not suffer from lack of consumer confidence in the national currency 
like other currencies. Instead, the block chain can achieve a 
progressively relevant status as a corporate governance tool. 
Accordingly, this paper discourages, at least in the current regulatory 
atmosphere, implementation of blockchain accounting and 
ownership reporting but does support blockchain as a corporate 
voting instrument aimed at ending empty voting and enhancing 
accuracy.   
 
                                                 
192 Supra p. 291.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A key characteristic of international financial law is the lack of 
binding rules: Almost every aspect of the field has been created 
through “non-binding” standards that states, banks and financial 
institutions can implement on a voluntary basis through so-called 
“soft-law”. 
This regime was put to the test in the recent 2007-2008 
financial crisis, and was found to be wanting, particularly in its ability 
to coordinate all relevant actors. While there were many causes for the 
crisis, it is clear that the financial institutions and their national 
regulators played a key role in triggering it.1 Therefore, there appears 
to be a post-crisis consensus that financial institutions cannot only be 
regulated through market forces,2 but rather that governmental 
oversight is needed—as the failures and successes of countries in 
                                                 
1 See Joseph Stiglitz, The Anatomy of a Murder: Who Killed the American 
Economy?, in WHAT CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 139, 141–42 (Jeffrey Friedman 
ed., 2011) (recognizing that although there are many actors and institutions 
responsible for the crisis, “blame should be centrally placed on the Banks (and the 
financial sector more broadly) and the investors,” because the former created the risk 
they were supposed to manage by “engag[ing] in excessive leverage” and the latter 
didn’t understand the risk involved); but cf. Richard Posner, Afterword: The Causes of the 
Financial Crisis, in WHAT CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, Id. at 279 (“there were two 
main causes [for the crisis]: unsound monetary financial intermediation [and 
inadequate banking regulation]”). 
2 See José Fernández, Global Politics, 5 MEXICAN LAW REVIEW 333, 363–64 
(2013) (arguing that the 2008 financial crisis ended the neoliberal free-market model, 
thereby posing a global economic challenge difficult to overcome: “finding an 
economic model to go beyond statism (Welfare state), and mercantilism (liberalism)”) 
(emphasis in the original).  
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weathering past crises attest3—and more coordination between parties 
through regulation at the international level.4 
In the aftermath of the crisis, a new entity was created to 
address the lack of coordination: the Financial Stability Board (FSB). 
Established in April of 2009 by the Group of Twenty (G-20)—an 
informal forum for central banks’ governors and financial ministers of 
nineteen economies and the European Union to discuss global 
economic issues—the FSB has assumed the function of coordinating 
all the regulatory and supervisory actions done at the international 
level.5 As a successor of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), which in 
turn was created by the Group of Seven (G-7)—akin to the G-20, the 
G–7 is a political forum for the most industrialized economies—the 
FSB “has assumed a key role in promoting the reform of international 
financial regulation.”6 However, unlike other creations in the 
international financial legal regime, the FSB was not endowed with any 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Karen Sigmond, Banking Regulation in Mexico: Lessons from Financial 
Crisis, 4 MEXICAN LAW REVIEW 3, 31 (2011) (praising the creation of the CNBV in 
Mexico during its 1995 crisis—the governmental entity entrusted with supervising 
the whole financial system—and asking whether this could be made at the 
international level); see also Geoffrey Miller, Is Deposit Insurance Inevitable? — Lessons 
from Argentina, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPARATIVE 
AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 392, 398–401 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan O. Sykes 
eds., 1997) (arguing that one effect of the Mexican 1995 crisis was the bank runs and 
burgeoning crisis that arose in Argentina during that year, which in turn led Argentina 
to the creation of both a deposit insurance system and an entity that oversees its 
functioning to counteract the crisis effectively; thus, despite the opposition of high-
ranking officials in Argentina’s government to deposit insurance, that country 
departed from its policy of controlling bank risk through only market discipline 
because the political pressure of reinstating the deposit insurance system became 
irresistible). 
4 See Rosa Lastra, Do We Need a World Financial Organization?, 17 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 787, 805 (2014).   
5 G20 2016 CHINA, About, (last visited May 1, 2016), 
http://g20.org/English/aboutg20/AboutG20/201511/t20151127_1609.html; 
Charter of the Financial Stability Board (June 19, 2012), art. 1, (last visited May 1, 
2016), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Charter-
with-revised-Annex-FINAL.pdf.  
6 FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, About: Our History, (last visited May 1, 
2016), http://www.fsb.org/about/history/.  
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real international legal personality,7 and therefore, its decisions are not 
legally binding.8 
In light of this “softness”, different proposals have emerged 
that try to give more “teeth” to the international financial architecture, 
particularly through “hardening” the existing norms into 
internationally, legally binding ones, enforced through an international 
organization.9 On the other side of the debate, there are calls to keep 
soft-legal instruments and forums with greater flexibility, but 
enhancing their effectiveness to accomplish what the pre-crisis regime 
did not: more coordination of supervisory, standard-setting, and 
enforcement authorities.10  
Considering that debate helps establish a backdrop for the 
present paper which will try to explain why the current international 
financial legal regime has taken the shape it has, particularly as it 
regards to the use of soft-law norms and institutional-creation in the 
apex of the regime: the coordination level of the relevant actors in the 
regime. Furthermore, it will be argued that path-dependency and the 
powers zealously held by national financial regulators are two 
                                                 
7 Articles of Association of the Financial Stability Board (January 28, 
2013), art. 1, (last visited May 1, 2016) http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_130128aoa.pdf (“An association by the name of “Financial 
Stability Board” . . . is hereby established pursuant to Article 60 of the Swiss Civil 
Code.”). 
8 Charter of the Financial Stability Board, supra note 5, art. 24 (“This 
Charter is not intended to create any legal rights or obligations”); but cf. Suyash 
Paliwal, The Binding Force of G-20 commitments, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1 (2014) 
(analyzing the bindingness of the commitments undertaken within the FSB as 
unilateral declarations, custom, estoppel and reciprocity). 
9 See Lastra, supra note 4, at 793 (“The IMF is the only institution (other 
than the Bank for International Settlements and the World Trade Organization) that 
has international legitimacy, an array of tools (surveillance, conditional financial 
assistance, and technical assistance), appropriate financial resources, and staffing to 
assume a formal role as global financial authority . . . . [O]nly the Fund can effectively 
contribute to the enforcement of those standards through its surveillance function.”); 
see also John Jackson, Global Economics and International Economic Law, 1 J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 1, 22-23 (1998) (providing a laundry list of topics to address whenever designing 
international institutions for the banking and financial sectors). 
10 See Jan Wouters & Jed Odermatt, Comparing the ‘Four Pillars’ of Global 
Economic Governance: A Critical Analysis of the Institutional Design of the FSB, IMF, World 
Bank, and WTO, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49 (2014). 
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important factors that explain the current informal, “softness” of the 
FSB.11 Through arguments that explore the unique and rapid 
technological changes of the regime, the use of soft-law in international 
financial law has been said to be preferred because of its flexibility and 
expediency. However, on one hand, through these soft-law and 
informal forums national regulators have been able to retain the power 
they hold pursuant to their domestic legislative instruments, while on 
the other, have found success in projecting these enhanced power and 
enforcement capabilities on the international level. Contrary to what 
would occur by ceding rule-making power to an international 
organization—which allegedly would complicate the decision-making 
process and diminish direct communication among national 
regulators—the national regulators retain the ability to wield the rules 
of the international financial game through soft-law standards that 
conform to their points of view, and which countervail the need for 
achieving consensus with more stakeholders12 that formal venues and 
treaty-making would require. 
Although not every national financial regulator is invited to the 
game, this result is not necessarily negative, as the main priority and 
value of the regime (financial stability) does not rely on the democratic 
character of the rule-making process and institutions, but rather, on 
the technocratic knowledge of its experts. But even when taking that 
factor into account, the move from the “elite” membership of the FSF 
to the FSB’s more democratic structure signals a positive step taken by 
the controllers of the regime: the national financial regulators.   
II. SOFTNESS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW 
Many of the legal institutions and instruments underpinning 
the international financial legal regime are neither treaty-based, nor 
considered to be part of general international law. Conversely, they are 
part of another subset of norms referred to as “soft–law” that are used 
in the international financial legal world; particularly because of soft 
                                                 
11 See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of International Financial 
Regulation, 88 IND. L.J. 1405 (2013). 
12 Like their national diplomatic representatives or other foreign 
regulators. 
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law’s tendency for flexibility and effectiveness vis-à-vis their “harder” 
siblings.   
A. Distinction Between “Soft” and “Hard” International Law 
Under a rule-based approach to public international law,13 
legally binding norms are only those reflected in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice: international treaties, 
custom, and general principles of international law;14 everything else is 
legally irrelevant.15 Under this positivistic view, only rules created by 
states are legally binding, and thus enforceable.16 
In contrast, different ways of regulating areas of international 
relations have emerged on a transnational and global basis, thus leading 
to the emergence of the so-called “soft-law” norms.17 The main 
characteristic of these soft law norms is that they do not comply with 
either of the requirements for “harder” norms: those being created by 
states and conforming to one of the three primary sources of 
international law. Therefore, they are not “legally” binding, but rather, 
implemented on a voluntary basis without the ability to be legally 
enforced or sanctioned at the international level.  
Because soft-law does not require creation by states, it has 
largely been international organizations, private entities, other non-
state actors, and even subsets of states’ governments creating them.18 
                                                 
13 The main feature of this approach is the emphasis on the normative 
aspect of public international law, conceptualizing the law as a system of rules 
binding upon its subjects, which can be appreciated through an examination of the 
three recognized normative sources of international law. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, 
THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39–41 (2011). 
14 Statute of the International Court of Justice (entered into force 24 
October 1945) 1 UNTS 993, art. 38 (1).  
15 JOSÉ ÁLVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 
48 (2005).  
16 Id. 
17 Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and 
Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EJIL 1 (2006). 
18 See Mauricio Del Toro, El Fenómeno del Soft Law y las Nuevas Perspectivas 
del Derecho Internacional, 6 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 
[Mexican Yearbook of International Law] 513 (2006) (advocating for the 
conceptualization of soft law as a continuum of normative force to analyze practically 
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Thus, this flexibility makes these alternative bodies suitable for 
whenever there is deadlock or lack of consensus for a multilateral 
treaty, or a need to harmonize the rules at the international level.19  
When technocratic experts create soft law, the legitimacy of 
these rules rely on their consensual basis to attain the common goal of 
their creators, as well as the technocratic expertise involved.20  
The use of soft-law has mainly been attributed to two of its 
main virtues: flexibility and effectiveness, both of which have been 
praised for their help in achieving greater rates of compliance in certain 
areas, such as capital adequacy.21 Whereas soft-law can be rapidly 
created without the need to seek state consensus or state participation 
                                                 
how the international legal system works and norms are created by actors other than 
states). 
19 See e.g., Andrea Bjorklund, Assessing the effectiveness of soft law instruments in 
international investment law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND SOFT LAW 51, 81 
(Andrea Bjorklund & August Reinisch eds., 2012) (analyzing the forms of soft law 
instruments and their usage for investment law, concluding that because of the 
criticism to the regime and failed, past attempts to negotiate a multilateral instrument 
without states’ participation—like the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment—the “negotiation of a 
multilateral instrument might be facilitated and influenced by a soft law instrument 
that brings together investment law practice in an objective manner, that sets forth 
areas of convergence and divergence and the choices that need to be made by 
drafters, and that clearly sets out the policy implications of each of those choices”. 
In other words, not a codification attempt, but rather “the distillation would more 
likely take the form of a commentary, annotation or treatise, and would be directed 
towards a wider audience than just States, though it could help to guide treaty 
negotiators and decision-makers, including States and arbitrators”). 
20 See Alejandro Rodiles, Coalitions of the Willing: Coyuntura, Contexto y 
Propiedades. Un Primer Esbozo, 7 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE DERECHO 
INTERNACIONAL [Mexican Yearbook of International Law] 675, 701-02 (explaining 
that soft law norms compete with formal public international legal rules, as the 
former do not claim legitimacy from their legal status, but rather from the political 
consensus achieved by its participants—engaging in a normative process to regulate 
a common right cause—and the technocratic nature of both the decision-process 
and the standard created).  
21 Bas Arts & Dieter Kerwer, Beyond legalization? How global standards work, 
in LAW AND LEGALIZATON IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 144, 160–62 (Christian 
Brütsch & Dirk Lehmkuhl eds., 2007).  
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at all, custom and principles require long periods of time and universal 
consensus to emerge. 
Likewise, whereas soft-law can be created by entities other than 
states and does not require consensus by its creators or the ratification 
of national legislatures to exist and be modified, treaties do require the 
consensus of state entities or international organizations for their 
creation, usually after a national legislature ratification process has 
occurred, and can only be modified with the consensus of the involved 
parties;22 all of which lengthens the creation and adaptation processes 
and may hinder its effectiveness as a rule–making tool.23 When 
informal forums, or what Vabulas and Snidal call “informal 
international intergovernmental organizations,” (IIGOs) are preferred 
over international organizations it is due to the following reasons:  
States opt for less formality by using IIGOs when the 
advantages of lower sovereignty and negotiation costs, 
flexibility and speed outweigh the need for 
enforcement commitment, consensus, and the 
bureaucratic centralization.24 
Accordingly, although soft-law lacks the status of harder law, 
per se, “[it] is not necessarily inferior to legally binding obligations as a 
                                                 
22 See UNGA Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 
1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, arts. (2)(1)(a), 11, 39; see 
also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organzations, arts. 2 (1)(a)(b), 11, 39.   
23 Hanspeter Neuhold, Variations on the Theme of ‘Soft International Law’, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND FRAGMENTATION. 
FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF GERHARD HAFNER 343, 344 (Isabelle Buffard et al. 
eds., 2008); but cf. Nico Krisch, More equal than the rest? Hierarchy, equality and US 
predominance in international law, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 135, 156–59 (Michael Byers & George 
Nolte eds., 2003) (depicting the use of informal standard-setting—such as the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision—as a departure of the sovereign equality of 
states, and thus as an opportunity for the United States to place itself above the law: 
“the United States relies heavily on informal means of lawmaking and enforcement, 
as this very informality allows it to disregard many of the constraints otherwise 
imposed by sovereign equality.”). 
24 Felicity Vabulas & Duncan Snidal, Organization without delegation: Informal 
intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements, 8 
REV. INT. ORG. 193, 219 (2013). 
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means for solving problems in international relations [because, as 
discussed previously] . . . it offers advantages, which in some cases may 
outweigh its shortcomings [i.e., their lack of enforceability].”25 As 
espoused by Chris Brummer, the use of soft law in international 
financial regulation is bolstered by disciplining mechanisms that make 
soft law more coercive: “reputational constraints inform the decision 
making of regulators in the same way that reputation disciplines heads 
of state who commit to international agreements”.26  
B. International Financial Architecture  
The use of soft-law mechanisms can be seen throughout the 
whole international financial regime. To illustrate this, the following 
sections will analyze the three different levels or stages that comprise 
the regime: standard-setting; supervision and coordination; and 
enforcement and sanctioning.  
 1. Standard-setting 
International financial law has been regulated mainly through 
soft-law norms, such as standards, which are implemented on a 
voluntary basis by national financial regulators or financial institutions 
and banks. Almost invariably, all members of the FSB27 have engaged 
in international standard setting: states’ financial regulators; 
international financial organizations;28 and other standard-setting 
bodies that were conceived to standardize international finance and 
that we could call standard-setting bodies strictu sensu.29 
                                                 
25 Neuhold, supra note 23, at 351.   
26 Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works, 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 
263 (2011). 
27 See Charter of the Financial Stability Board, supra note 5, art. 5(1). 
28 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, and the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). 
29 Such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the 
Committee on the Global Financial System, the Committee on Payments and Market 
Infrastructures, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, the 
International Accounting Standards Board, and the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions.  
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Perhaps the most effective production of soft-law, in terms of 
compliance, has been BCBS’s work on standardizing the capital 
adequacy of banks, which has been praised for the high number of 
states that have implemented it (90 percent of all countries adhere to 
Basel I’s capital requirement), and that effect has been attributed to the 
BCBS’s departure from the rigidness of classic international law 
making,30 in addition to its undisputed expertise in that area.31 An 
additional example of highly valued soft-law is the Equator Principles 
of the International Financial Corporation, a member of the World 
Bank Group, which sets de facto standards for parties dealing with 
project finance on a global scale by inciting financial institutions to 
voluntarily adopt standards in order to implement normative and 
business related rationales for the conduction of environmental and 
social risk management.32 Likewise, this includes the 
                                                 
30 See Arts & Kerwer, supra note 21; see also Rodiles, supra note 20, at 693–
95 (defining the Basle Committee of 1975 as a “coalition of the willing”: defined as 
a transnational network of actors that do not rely on the procedural or substantive 
rules of public international law rule-making, but conversely engage into normative 
creation processes through standards that depart from it and which are implemented 
effectively because of the political consensus of its participants and the convenience 
to accomplish a common goal). 
31 See Arts & Kerwer, supra note 21 (“the Committee has a high reputation 
of experts, no competition from other bodies that engage into standard-setting in 
that area, and has effective third party enforcement mechanisms—national 
authorities implement the law voluntarily or are obligated through loans from IMF 
or other international lenders that require compliance with the standard”); but see the 
critiques on Basel Rules’ role in the 2007–2008 financial crisis in Juliusz Jablecki & 
Mateusz Machaj, A Regulated Meltdown: The Basel Rules and Banks’ Leverage”, in WHAT 
CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 1, at 200, 226 (analyzing the negative role 
that Basel’s rules had by diminishing the financial entities incentive to regulate 
themselves: “Capital-adequacy rules based on fixed risk measurements—and 
designed (paradoxically) to protect the economy from excessive credit expansion—
were used in unanticipated ways, hiding the risks from the sight of supervisors and 
investors alike and giving everyone an utterly false sense of security, confidence, and 
stability.”); see also Posner, supra note 1, at 288 (“the American amendment to Basel I 
adopted in 2001, and Basel II, adopted in 2004, underestimated the riskiness of 
mortgage-backed securities by assigning them a minimal risk weight, and so gave 
banks a green light to buy more of these assets than turned out to be safe for the 
economy as a whole.”).  
32 See Christopher Wright, Setting standards for responsible banking: examining 
the role of the International Finance Corporation in the Emergence of the Equator Principles, in 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
51 (Frank Biermann et al. eds., 2009); see also Susan Park, Socialization, the World Bank 
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Recommendations on anti-money laundering by the Financial Action 
Task Force.33 
Although there are a lot of ways in which members of the FSB 
engage in standard-setting, for purposes of the present paper, it 
suffices to show that none of the standard-setting bodies strictu sensu 
possess international legal personality.34 This explains why those 
bodies are depicted as a different class of members than states’ national 
regulatory agencies and international financial organizations, which do 
possess an international legal personality within the FSB Charter.35 
Likewise, it explains why they all work with the BIS’s assistance in 
                                                 
Group and global environmental governance, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 91 (Frank Biermann et al. eds., 2009) 
(appraising the International Financial Corporation’s proneness to incorporate 
environmental norms into its work and contrasting it with the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency’s reticence, also part of the World Bank; particularly 
because the former has been opened to environmental networks that have socialized 
the institution, thereby diffusing environmental norms through the International 
Financial Corporation’s work, whilst the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
has resisted this effect). 
33 See, e.g., Nicholas Turner, The Financial Action Task Force: International 
Regulatory Convergence Through Soft Law, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 547, 559 (2014) (“The 
FATF demonstrates that under the right conditions, it is possible to achieve 
substantial, albeit imperfect, legal and regulatory coordination across the globe.”). 
34 See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, Monetary & financial 
stability - Overview, (last visited Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.bis.org/stability.htm (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision Charter, §3 (“The BCBS does not possess any 
formal supranational authority. Its decisions do not have legal force. Rather, the 
BCBS relies on its members’ commitments . . . to achieve its mandate.”)); BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, Committee on the Global Financial System: mandate, id. 
(“The Committee . . . is a central bank forum”); BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL 
SETTLEMENTS, Charter of the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, 
id. at §3 (“CPMI does not possess any formal supranational authority”); 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS, (last visited May 1, 
2016), 
http://iaisweb.org/index.cfm?event=showHomePage&persistId=2F9C2180155D8
9A4065E749C0A3A37F0; INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, 
(last visited May 1, 2016), http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/Pages/IFRS-Foundation-
and-IASB.aspx; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, 
About Iosco, (last visited May 1, 2016), 
https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=about_iosco. 
35 See Charter of the Financial Stability Board, supra note 5, art. 5(1). 
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terms of venue, infrastructure, and resources.36 Finally, this premise 
also illustrates why states use this approach: because they are a form of 
IIGO, lacking a binding effect in their decisions.37 
 2. Supervision and Coordination 
This level of the international financial legal regime is shared 
mainly between the FSB and the IMF.38 Whereas the former is 
concerned with macro-stability, the latter has been said to be 
concerned with the micro-stability of avoiding risky behavior by banks 
and other financial institutions.39 However, considering that the IMF 
participates within the FSB and the latter’s mandate in coordinating all 
financial entities, it can be said that the FSB holds the coordination 
                                                 
36 See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, Monetary & financial 
stability – Overview, supra note 34 (describing the kind of assistance rendered by the 
BIS); see also C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 13, 75 (2d ed., 2005) (analyzing how the dual 
personality of the BIS as a legal person in both international and Swiss law does not 
affect its character as an international organization); see also ROLAND PORTMANN, 
LEGAL PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 228–32 (2010) (analyzing the BIS 
litigation of Reineccius et al. v. Bank for International Settlement as a form of “actor 
conception”—attaching legal consequences to an international actor without 
justifying them—whereby a panel of arbitrators recognized the international legal 
personality of the Bank and analyzed certain legal consequences deriving therefrom, 
such as the applicability of the expropriation and compensation rules of international 
law towards its actions vis-à-vis private investors). 
37 But see Gregory Shaffer & Mark Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, 
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. LAW REV. 706, 765–
67 (2010) (arguing that many of the standards produced by standard-setting 
organizations within the international financial legal world have been hailed for being 
effective because the existing treaties and soft law instruments created acted 
complimentarily, on account of the consensus generated by the powerful states that 
participated actively in all of the standard-setting forums explained above: the 
European Union and the United States). 
38 But see Gary Hufbauer, Rules of the International Trade, Investment, and 
Financial Systems: What they Deliver, how they Differ, the way Forward, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
833, 839 (2014) (citing Rosa M Lastra, ‘Do we need a World Financial Organization’, 
Special Conference in Honor of Professor John Jackson and the Institute of 
International Economic Law, Georgetown Law Center, 16 November 2012) (arguing 
that the World Trade Organization also performs this role in the liberalization of 
financial trade, and that the BIS and other standard-setting bodies share the FSB’s 
role at the micro-stability level). 
39 Id. 
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role of all standard-setting and supervisory functions within the 
international financial architecture: 
The [FSB] is established to coordinate at the 
international level the work of national financial 
authorities and international standard setting bodies 
(SSBs) in order to develop and promote the 
implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory 
and other financial sector policies. In collaboration 
with the international financial institutions, the FSB . . 
. address[es] vulnerabilities affecting financial systems 
in the interest of global financial stability.40 
Regarding the IMF’s supervisory functions, it is important to 
note that its supervisory function was triggered by the abandonment 
of the par-value regime in the 1970s.41 Consequently, the IMF went 
from being an international monetary institution with a limited 
mandate on exchange rate stability and convertibility to a financial one 
with a much narrower mandate, redefining its three main functions: 
surveillance, conditional financial support, and technical assistance.42 
This has led the IMF to address issues ranging from payment systems, 
to financial reform, banking and other capital markets.43 Contrary to 
the FSB and other actors, the IMF has been heavily criticized for its 
stance on development, particularly through its function as the lender 
of last resort for states in addition to the conditions typically imposed,44 
which allegedly straightjackets developing countries to follow a set of 
economic policies that may not be the best for their development. It 
also has been denounced for neglecting environmental and 
                                                 
40 Charter of the Financial Stability Board, supra note 5, art. 1; see also 
Wouters & Odermatt, supra note 10, at 75 (“the FSB was not established to 
harmonize rules or to impose international regulation, but rather to coordinate other 
important actors involved in maintaining financial stability.”). 
41 Rosa Lastra, The International Monetary Fund in Historical Perspective, 3 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 507, 514 (2000). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 521–23 (“[Since the Mexican and Asian crisis in the mid-1990s,] 
the IMF appear[ed] to . . . emerg[e] as a de facto international lender of last resort” 
through its financial support to developing economies in stress.”). 
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stakeholders’ interests, such as human rights,45 that seem to constrain 
basic sovereign regulatory spaces.46 Even compared to other 
international financial institutions, the IMF has not been viewed as 
receptive towards civil society and developing countries interests and 
demands,47 contrary to the World Bank that created the Inspection 
Panel for that purpose,48 for example. Be that as it may, today, the IMF 
                                                 
45 See, e.g., David Enríquez, El Derecho Internacional Económico. Apuntes para 
una Crítica Contemporánea, 6 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 
[Mexican Yearbook of International Law] 251 (2006) (advocating for an 
interdisciplinary approach towards international economic legal issues that considers 
stakeholders’ interests, including human rights and environmental concerns); see also 
David Enríquez, Batallas en el Sistema Financiero Internacional. Críticas y Réplicas 
Contemporáneas en torno al Fondo Monetario Internacional y al Banco Mundial, 11 BOLETÍN 
MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO [BMDC] 467, 499–502 (2007) (arguing that 
states parties to loan agreements with the IMF and the World Bank, as well as those 
institutions, have an obligation to respect human rights). 
46 See, e.g., ANTHONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE 
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 258–69 (2004) (arguing that the World Bank and 
the IMF, through the promotion of “good governance” in their conditional loans—
a recipe for making governments accountable, transparent and democratic, which in 
turn links human rights and development—reproduce colonial aspects of 
international law by imposing upon Third World countries structural adjustment 
programs that reshape their economic, political and financial systems, and that are 
driven by the economic considerations of richer states, wherein the countries 
regulated cannot participate in their elaboration).  
47 See Enríquez, Batallas en el Sistema Financiero Internacional. Críticas y Réplicas 
Contemporáneas en torno al Fondo Monetario Internacional y al Banco Mundial, supra note 45, 
at 523–25 (contrasting the IMF’s and the World Bank’s receptiveness to civil society’s 
criticisms and democratic deficits: whereas the IMF’s openness has been limited to 
its co-partnership role in combating poverty and debt relief with the World Bank 
because economic concerns—and the need to tighten orthodox economic policies—
have prevailed over other interests in order to secure the repayment of its loans, the 
latter has been more receptive due to more criticism by civil society and because its 
infrastructure financing projects directly concern social and environmental problems; 
for instance, the World Bank has permitted civil society participation and has 
changed its policies through the creation of the Inspection Panel). 
48 Alix Gowlland-Gualtieri, The Environmental Accountability of the World Bank 
to Non-State Actors: Insights from the Inspection Panel, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 333 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2009) (a positive outcome of the 
World Bank’s Inspection Panel is its inclusion of environmental norms into its 
procedures, thereby making states and the World Bank itself accountable through a 
soft-law and flexible procedure for their loan activities vis-à-vis certain non-state 
actors); see also Ellen Hey, The World Bank Inspection Panel and the Development of 
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF TULLIO TREVES 727 (Nerina 
2017 Soto Crespo 5:2 
317 
is one of the oldest actors in the field and the fact is that the IMF has 
acquired a key place in the new financial architecture through its 
surveillance powers, mainly. 
Given the participation of the IMF in the FSB, and the 
coordination of the latter in the international legal arena, both 
institutions have cooperated very strongly to conduct Early Warning 
Exercises for the analysis of systemic risk at the international level.49  
 3. Enforcement and Sanctioning 
The picture would not be complete without the governmental 
actors that behold the monopoly of the enforcement and sanctioning 
of financial institutions’ and banks’ deviations from the standards 
created and consented to by the FSB and member institutions: the 
national financial regulators. According to Gary Hufbauer, their 
power, and thus the absence of an international or external examining 
and disciplining scheme, can be attributed to two main reasons: First, 
prescriptive rules in international finance are much more probabilistic 
than trade or investment—in both of which regimes, dispute 
adjudication has been delegated to international bodies—and thus 
national regulators prefer to do so themselves because they have more 
information about their national financial markets; and second, 
because national financial regulators are not willing to cede their power 
to an international body—contrary to what trade and investment 
bureaucrats did—and their regulated financial entities prefer these 
domestic, national bodies over foreign international regulators.50 
This second reason could explain, in turn, the use of soft law 
norms for the other two levels: since the standard-setting agencies’ 
regulations are not legally binding, and therefore cannot be imposed 
upon states or financial institutions and banks, it seems reasonable that 
                                                 
Boschiero et al. eds., 2013) (appraising the World Bank Inspection Panel’s role in 
promoting an administrative form of accountability wherein private parties’ access is 
provided without the need of their home state, thereby departing from the classic 
rules of international law). 
49 See Charter of the Financial Stability Board, supra note 5, art. 2(h); see also 
Wouters & Odermatt, supra note 10, at 70-74 (arguing that since the IMF and World 
Bank are members of the FSB, they cooperate with it more than with the World 
Trade Organization, who is not a FSB member). 
50 Hufbauer, supra note 38, at 842. 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:2 
318 
the supervisory and coordinating entities would also apply soft-law. By 
doing so, they would have coordinating and supervisory functions 
through a more-narrow mandate, leaving the sanctioning of deviations 
to states once they voluntarily decide to implement the standards 
consented to. This analysis is well-explained in the words of Rosa 
Lastra: 
The development of international financial law has 
been a slow and patchy phenomenon because of three 
reasons: (i) the lack of a clear legal mandate; (ii) a 
reactive rather than a proactive character;51 and (iii) the 
vested interests national governments have in the 
supervision and regulation of their financial sectors.52 
Accordingly, (i) the absence of legally binding norms is 
explained by the use of soft-law standards, which in turn helps fathom 
the (ii) reactive character of the norms and the limited supervisory and 
coordinating role that the IMF and the FSB have. Since they cannot 
impose rules on states, reactive standards seem more suitable to be 
implemented ex post financial crises; at a time in which consensus on 
how to regulate the flaws for counteracting a crisis has emerged—as 
well as the (iii) lack of delegation of adjudicative and sanctioning 
functions for an international body.  
III. THE FSB EXPLAINED 
A. Path Dependency 
Why would states seek recourse to an international 
organization? Traditionally, through institutionalization, not only can 
                                                 
51 This aspect has been considered fundamental in explaining the reason 
why the trade regime has scored better in its objective of liberalizing trade than the 
financial regime has done to stabilize markets—although international financial 
institutions have also promoted liberalization, whenever it enters into conflict with 
stabilization, the latter will always prevail—particularly because GATT/WTO has 
worked prospectively, whereas the IMF does so at the moment the crash occurs and 
with “little power to compel appropriate macroeconomic policies and financial 
practices”. Gary Hufbauer & Erika Wada, Can Financiers Learn from Traders?, 2 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 567, 569-73 (1999). 
52 Lastra, supra note 4, at 796.  
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states act collectively and overcome their coordination problems,53 but 
they could also accomplish legally binding decisions derived from the 
treaty that created the organization.54 Furthermore, through an 
international organization they can also legitimize the whole rule-
making process, as they would have to be constrained by the rules of 
international law that protect non-powerful states through the 
sovereign equality principle.  
However, the need for consensus, and even the ability to 
afford the same voting rights to all states has changed, depending on 
the international organization concerned.55 And even in the aegis of 
the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions did not foresee 
equality of voting rights. Nevertheless, the legitimacy that being an 
international organization accrues might differentiate them with other 
informal venues, such as IIGOs. Dani Rodrik depicts this idea by 
contrasting the contemporary globalization world with the 
“multilateralism” that existed during the Bretton Woods system: 
Multilateralism meant that rule enforcement and belief 
systems would work henceforth through international 
institutions—the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT)—rather than through naked power 
politics or imperial rule. Even though the influence of 
the United States was undeniable, multilateralism 
endowed these institutions with a certain degree of 
legitimacy independent of the American power that 
backed them up.56  
                                                 
53 Wouters & Odermatt, supra note 10, at 52 (“While the whole 
international community has an interest in a ‘stable’ global financial system, 
individual states will continue to take steps that are in their own (short-term) 
interests, even if they remain precarious for the system as a whole. It is for this reason 
that states have looked to international institutions to help overcome this collective 
action problem and promote greater global cooperation.”). 
54 ÁLVAREZ, supra note 15, at 395. 
55 Id. 
56 DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND 
THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 70 (2011); see also Robert Howse, From 
Politics to Technocracy—and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 94, 94–95 (2002) (arguing that Bretton Woods was “concerned with the 
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Chris Brummer explains how the current globalization system 
not only meant an erosion of the dominance of the United States in 
the world arena—and thus of a more diffused world in terms of power, 
where “[e]merging markets have generally been the big winners”—but 
also that the current multi-polarity has made multilateralism more 
difficult and costly, thereby “giving way to new, innovative modes of 
cooperation” called minilateralism: strategic alliances with smaller 
groups; states turning away from treaties towards more soft law; and 
financial engineering in states’ dealings.57 Although effective, this new 
economic statecraft raises issues of fairness and democratic legitimacy, 
given its exclusive character and “sidestep[ping] [of] some of the 
multilateral values of universality and due process”.58 
Accordingly, Georges Baur argues that whereas international 
organizations respected the equality of states and other rules of 
international law through inclusiveness and consent, informal 
international task groups do not, such as the FSF, because they impose 
standards and sanctions that are created by the task group’s member-
states against other non-member states, with the purpose of advancing 
the former group’s economic and political interests at the cost of the 
latters’.59  
Nevertheless, this is the current paradigm of global finance 
today, and we cannot simply return to the Bretton Woods system.60 
On the contrary, the financial globalization created by deregulation, 
                                                 
interdependency of different states’ trade and other economic policies—i.e., 
managing or constraining the external costs that states impose on other states by 
virtue of their policies.”) (emphasis in original). 
57 CHRIS BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: HOW TRADE ALLIANCES, SOFT 
LAW, AND FINANCIAL ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 
16–19 (2014). 
58 Id. at 20.   
59 Georges Baur, Will New Developments in Global Economic and Financial Policy 
Erode International Law and the Sovereignty of States? – The Example of Liechtenstein, in 
PROMOTING JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION THROUGH 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LIBER AMICORUM LUCIUS CAFLISCH 1017 (Marcelo G. 
Kohen ed., 2007).  
60 See Rolf Weber & Douglas Arner, Toward a New Design for International 
Financial Regulation, 29 J. INT’L L. 391, 438 (“The Bretton Woods system was designed 
to support global trade but not global finance. As a result, we cannot simply return 
to the old system but must look towards the requirements of today’s reality.”). 
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technology and financial innovation has changed the regulatory space 
of the field.61 The reality is that states have decided to use the 
minilateralism strategy of soft law in international finance, at least since 
the Group of Ten (G-10)—composed of the most industrialized 
nations of that time62—established the BCBS in the aftermath of the 
failure of the German Herstatt Bank and the American Franklin 
National Bank of New York in 1974.63 In the words of Pierre-Hugues 
Verdier: 
When the fixed rate system collapsed in the 1970s, 
national regulators faced numerous new cross-border 
challenges. With no international framework to 
address them and no authority to create formal 
institutions or binding agreements, they instead created 
informal networks and non-binding standards.64  
Thereafter, cooperative informal initiatives in other financial 
sectors were created and their roles exacerbated in the demise of 
Bretton Woods system, which had a very limited role for international 
private finance where international capital mobility was not the norm,65 
and thus, “no provision was made for regulating private finance.”66 
Contrary to arguments that espouse the rationality of using soft law in 
international financial law as the ones depicted in the section above, 
the use of IIGOs and soft law norms in the international financial legal 
arena can be explained through what Verdier calls a historical path 
dependency:67 
In the absence of an international institution, national 
regulators took the initiative, but they faced several 
constraints. Their options were limited by their 
                                                 
61 CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: 
RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 10 (2015). 
62 See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, G10, (last visited Mar. 
1, 2016), https://www.bis.org/list/g10publications/index.htm. 
63 BRUMMER, supra note 57, at 99–100. 
64 Verdier, supra note 11, at 1408. 
65 Id. at 1411–12. 
66 Id. at 1416. 
67 Id. at 1427; but cf. BRUMMER, supra note 61, at 108–09 (analyzing an 
“institutional path dependency” in the structure and composition of the 
organizations). 
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domestic statutory authority, which they could not 
easily change. They did not have a clear mandate to act 
internationally, much less bind their state to legal 
obligations. They did not have a forum in which to 
meet; often they did not even know each other. In that 
context, regulators proceeded incrementally by 
creating informal networks to exchange ideas, 
coordinate their actions, and agree on nonbinding 
standards. 
B. Regulatory Zealousness 
Verdier’s explanation of a historical path dependency 
constraining national financial regulators’ options is persuasive on the 
central role that they have had in the field ever since the 1970s. Under 
this account, national financial regulators have had a zealous attitude 
towards “preserv[ing] their domestic autonomy, flexibility and 
discretion” vis-à-vis the national legislatures that create them and other 
international actors, including their own peers from other countries.68 
Accordingly, national financial regulators have tried to look for legal 
tools that neither diminish their power nor grant additional ones to 
other bodies that could supervise or check their work. “[F]rom the 
regulators’ private perspective, soft law and TRNs [transnational 
regulatory networks or IIGOs] reconcile their wish to achieve short-
term regulatory objectives with their desire to preserve their domestic 
authority and flexibility.”69  
This zealousness can be also seen in bilateral investment 
treaties and free trade agreements, where although historically both 
instruments “have covered financial services for decades, . . . they all 
tread gingerly on national regulators’ turf, separating financial 
liberalization from other investment and service commitments”.70 For 
                                                 
68 Verdier, supra note 11, at 1430. Verdier also contends that powerful 
states—such as the United States and the European Union—and private firms are 
the other two veto players that shape the agenda and outcome, along with national 
financial regulators, of the international financial legal regime.   
69 Id. at 1457.  
70 Anna Gelpern, Financial Services, in ASSESSING THE TRANS-PACIFIC 
PARTNERSHIP: VOLUME 1: MARKET ACCESS AND SECTORAL ISSUES 91 (Peterson 
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instance, “[n]either NAFTA nor other US bilateral trade and 
investment agreements curbed the unlimited discretion of financial 
regulators, so in this respect the TPP71 continues a well-established 
tradition.”72  
Likewise, it can even be fathomed in certain domestic contexts. 
For example, the use of informal venues that coordinate already 
existing institutions was pursued by the United States with the creation 
of the Financial Stability Oversight Council through the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act73 as an umbrella 
body that tightened cooperation among the existing federal banking 
and financial regulatory agencies.74 Therefore, there seems to be 
                                                 
Institute for International Economics, 2016) (last visited May 10, 2016), 
https://piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb16-1.pdf. 
71 Trans-Pacific Partnership.  
72 Jennifer Hillman, Dispute Settlement Mechanism, in ASSESSING THE TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, VOLUME 2: INNOVATIONS IN TRADING RULES 101, 110 
(Jeffrey Schott & Catleen Cimino-Isaacs eds., 2016), (last visited May 10, 2016), 
https://piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb16-4.pdf; see also Gelpern, supra note 
70, at 96 (“The TPP’s novel treatment of exceptions in dispute resolution evokes a 
broader pattern of deference to financial regulatory authorities and financial 
experts. . . . The TPP’s innovation is in the dispute settlement procedure that would 
apply to determine whether a measure is, in fact, there “for prudential reasons” or 
otherwise exempt. . . . In all, financial firms under the TPP are more limited than 
firms in other sectors in the relief they can get from taking their grievances to ISDS 
[investment system of dispute settlement].”). 
73 DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT; FINANCIAL STABILITY ACT OF 2010; ENHANCING 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS ACT OF 2010; 
PRIVATE FUND INVESTMENT ADVISERS REGISTRATION ACT OF 2010; 
FEDERAL INSURANCE OFFICE ACT OF 2010; NONADMITTED AND 
REINSURANCE REFORM ACT OF 2010; BANK AND SAVINGS 
ASSOCIATION HOLDING COMPANY AND DEPOSITORY INSTITUTION 
REGULATORY IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 2010; WALL STREET 
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2010; PAYMENT, 
CLEARING, AND SETTLEMENT SUPERVISION ACT OF 2010; INVESTOR 
PROTECTION AND SECURITIES REFORM ACT OF 2010.; CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION ACT OF 2010; IMPROVING ACCESS TO 
MAINSTREAM FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT OF 2010; MORTGAGE 
REFORM AND ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING ACT; EXPAND AND 
PRESERVE HOME OWNERSHIP THROUGH COUNSELING ACT, 111 P.L. 
203, Part 1 of 3, 124 Stat. 1377. 
74 Robert Thompson, Financial Regulation’s Architecture within International 
Economic Law, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 807, 811 (2014).  
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continuity from the domestic unto the international level of creating 
umbrella-coordinating forums for existing agencies, instead of creating 
new institutions.75 Seen in another light: the zealousness of financial 
national regulators to retain their power in the financial arena also 
affects the institutional building of domestic institutions.  
National regulators are the most important actors in the 
financial legal arena: not only do they behold the gates to the 
implementation of the rules, but they also participate in their creation 
and supervision. In other words, this is a “departure from traditional 
public international models of diplomacy, where political elites and 
heads of state participate. It injects technocratic skill at the highest level 
of the rulemaking process.”76 Even though they are ultimately 
constrained by national regulators from other countries, on the one 
hand, and their own domestic political organs, on the other,77 it is clear 
that they inform the shape of the whole process, and that without some 
external supervision, the regulators will not “internalize the costs of 
their regulatory decision making”, thereby reducing the compliance 
pull of international financial law.78 Accordingly, instead of retaining 
the current voluntary monitoring and surveillance programs, calls for 
third party enforcement of prudential standards have been raised.79   
C. Diversity 
As explained above, globalization and the subsequent 
liberalization of finance saw drawbacks in capital movement controls 
and financial crises, which for the most part occurred in the developing 
                                                 
75 See Id. at 808 (implying a continuity by arguing that the response to the 
2007–2008 crisis began with national responses, such as Dodd-Frank in 2010, but 
then saw the creation of the FSB “to play a coordinating role that seeks to meld the 
technocratic expertise in various international standard setting and supervision 
bodies and the political legitimacy from heads of government”); see also Robert 
Howse, The end of the globalization debate: continued, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
AND NATIONAL AUTONOMY 7, 18 (Meredith Kolsky & Susy Frankel eds., 2010) 
(arguing that state responses to the financial crisis have not been devised to stop the 
liberalization of capital movements, but rather to strengthen its regulation at the 
global level through the FSB). 
76 Brummer, supra note 26, at 274. 
77 Id. at 274–75. 
78 Id. at 326–27. 
79 Arts & Kerwer, supra note 21, at 162. 
2017 Soto Crespo 5:2 
325 
world.80 A tipping point occurred in the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
which led to the creation of the first overarching forum for financial 
stability: the FSF.81 
However, it was not until the 2008 financial crisis that a 
coordinated architecture for the whole international financial regime 
was created. The crisis highlighted the need to integrate the 
international financial legal regime, on one hand, and that developed 
nations could also be prone to catastrophic financial failures, on the 
other; all of which led to the displacement of the G-7 by the G-20 and 
the creation of the FSB.82  
Through its more inclusive nature and stronger powers, the G-
20 and FSB’s combined efforts’ have enhanced each other’s legitimacy: 
by “teaming technocratic pragmatism with democratic norms”.83 
Although there is a long way to go and the G-20 is still not universal, 
the transition from only like-minded countries in the G-7 to a more 
diverse membership in the G-20—in both the geographical and 
development level in terms of economic importance—is to be hailed.84  
                                                 
80 See, e.g., Stephen Zamora, Exchange Control in Mexico: Case Study in the 
Application of IMF Rules, 7 HOUS. J. INT’L. L. 103 (1984-1985) (analyzing the 
compatibility of Mexican exchange control measures after the 1982-83 crisis with 
Article VIII of the IMF Agreement); see also Stephen Zamora, Recognition of Foreign 
Exchange Controls in International Creditors’ Rights Cases: The State of the Art, 21 INT’L L. 
1055 (1987) (analyzing different legal doctrines by which an American court could 
give effect or recognition to the exchange controls of foreign governments in the 
United States, and concluding that the cases demonstrate some limited recognition 
of foreign governments’ acts on that regard, but noting that none of those cases used 
article VIII of the IMF Agreement). 
81 BRUMMER, supra note 57, at 102.  
82 Id. at 107.  
83 Id. at 193–98.  
84 But cf. Weber & Arner, supra note 60, at 453 (“a goal of the international 
financial architecture should focus on the increased integration of developing, 
emerging, and transition economies into the international financial system. However, 
this integration is not without its dangers and must be based on coherent sequencing 
of liberalization preceded as a necessary first stage by the development of an 
effectively functioning financial system in each country.”). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In regards to the recent international financial architecture 
created after the financial crisis, Robert Thompson summarizes its 
characteristics in the following manner: Focus on macro-prudential 
regulation through FSB’s coordination; prudential regulatory 
competition between states that puts them in a parallel position, as they 
all want to regulate banks and financial institutions, thereby suggesting 
that harmonization of national laws through soft law is a better strategy 
than an inter-state dispute settlement approach; need for technocratic 
experts at the national regulatory agencies; lack of enforcement, 
accountability and transparency; and a possible de-legitimization 
because of exclusivity in membership to the G-20.85 This sums up 
many of the challenges that the system must address. 
Although certain reforms have been advanced to harden the 
regime, path dependency leads to the belief that states will only regulate 
this area of the international legal system through soft law. Flexibility 
is preferred over strict long-term rules that could forestall the need to 
apply effective action in response to a crisis, as has occurred in the 
past. Likewise, apprehension by national financial regulators of the 
adjudicative, enforcement, and sanctioning procedures seems to 
suggest an aversion by states of delegating those functions to an 
international body, and thus losing their power. Probably for this 
reason the FSB will remain an IIGO and not become an international 
organization: the objective underlying its creation was to become an 
umbrella-coordinating venue for all existing standard-setting bodies, 
national regulators, and international financial institutions; not to 
encroach the existing institutions’ mandate by imposing another layer 
of institutionalization. G-20 member states explicitly denied granting 
an international legal personality to the FSB;86 they only wanted 
coordination.87  
                                                 
85 Thompson, supra note 74, at 818–22. 
86 See Charter of the Financial Stability Board, supra note 5, art. 24. 
87 See Wouters & Odermatt, supra note 10, at 55-56 (highlighting the fact 
that G-20 members have adapted and modified continuously the mandate of the 
FSB, which would be difficult to accomplish had it been created through a treaty 
charter). 
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As of late, powerful countries have regulated this area of the 
law and probably won’t cede that law-making power, particularly the 
states integrating the G-20. Further, it is not necessarily certain that 
rule-making in the international financial legal regime should be 
“democratized” and subjected to other state participants outside of the 
current G-20 members, as the safety and soundness of the 
international financial system relies purely upon technocratic expertise 
and legitimacy, not its democratic aspect. Hence, current G-20 
member states may be more effective in addressing these issues than 
other developing nations who struggle with structural problems, such 
as lack of accountability and transparency in resolving crises.88 
Nonetheless, the transition from the primordial role in the 
international financial space that the G-7 had to the current one held 
by the G-20 can be viewed as a positive step towards a more inclusive 
regime that, eventually, could lead to even more diversity, and perhaps 
even universality. 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 See, e.g., Sigmond, supra note 3 (contrasting the transparency and 
accountability in the American bailout of banks and financial institutions in the 
Obama administration with the opacity and corruption in the secretive bailout 
process of the 1995 Mexican crisis by then President Zedillo’s administration; at a 
time when Mexico was not considered that relevant, and thus was not part of the G-
20’s predecessor—the Group of Seven); but cf. Stephen Haber & Aldo Musacchio 
These Are the Good Old Days: Foreign Entry and the Mexican Banking System, NATIONAL 
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 3 (2013), (last visited May 10, 2016), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18713.pdf (contending that Mexico’s 1997 
liberalization of financial ownership to foreigners, which led to the ownership of 
more than half of the financial and banking industries to foreign capital very rapidly, 
actually helped increased the supply of credit, further the stability of the system, and 
not raise the credit cost). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When Benjamin Franklin pondered1 “When will mankind be 
convinced and agree to settle their difficulties by arbitration?” he probably did 
not expect that after over 300 years of successful arbitration history2 
the world is still not convinced. The storm of protest from all 
quarters of society and all corners of the world in regard to the new 
investment arbitration chapters in the Trans Pacific Partnership 
Agreement3 and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership4 
suggest the opposite - a deep mistrust in at least one field of 
arbitration: international investment arbitration.5 An illustrative 
example is the editorial of Wellington’s Dominion Post6: 
                                                 
 1 DAVE FARNHAM, SNIPPETS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (2014). 
2 For an overview of arbitration history (even predating 300 years), see 
GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §1.01 (Kluwer, Alphen 
aan den Rijn, 2nd ed., 2014). 
3 Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN AFFAIRS & 
TRADE, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaty-making-
process/trans-pacific-partnership-tpp/text-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2016). 
4 Documents and events, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-and-
events/index_en.htm#_documents (last visited Apr. 2 2016). 
5 Leon E. Trakman, Investment Dispute Resolution under the Transpacific 
Partnership Agreement: Prelude to a Slippery Slope? (2013); Leon E. Trakman Investor-State 
Arbitration: Evaluating Australia’s Evolving Position (2011); Jess Hill, TPP clauses that let 
Australia be sued are weapons of legal destruction, says lawyers, THEGUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/nov/10/tpps-clauses-that-let-
australia-be-sued-are-weapons-of-legal-destruction-says-lawyer (last accessed 4 May 
2016); George Monbiot, This transatlantic trade deal is a full-frontal assault on democracy, 
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/04/us-trade-deal-full-
frontal-assault-on-democracy; The arbitration game; Investor-state dispute settlement, THE 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2014; Martin Khor, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPPA): When Foreign Investors Sue the State, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Sept. 1, 2013), 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-tppa-when-
foreign-investors-sue-the-state/5357500; Daniel Kalderimis, Investor/state arbitration, 
the TPP and New Zealand, CHAPMAN TRIPP (July 28, 2015), 
http://leanz.org.nz/uploads/presentations/Kalderimis_LEANZ%20Presentation_
280715.pdf; Bianca Mueller, The Devil in the TPPA – Investor State Dispute Settlement, 
SCOOP (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL1503/S00196/the-
devil-in-the-tppa-investor-state-dispute-settlement.htm (last accessed 4 May 2016); 
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But the non-trade aspects of the deal are the most 
worrying. The worst is the mechanism allowing 
foreign companies to sue New Zealand in 
controversial offshore tribunals. This raises serious 
problems of sovereignty and fairness. 
These tribunals are not courts as we understand them. 
They are courts dedicated to the interests of investors, 
rather than countries. Appeals are very limited. 
Conflicts of interest among those on the tribunals are 
not rigorously controlled. Judgments are not required 
to be consistent. 
Responsibility for the public’s mistrust in investor-state 
arbitration lies partly with human rights lawyers’ and activists’ 
[“human rights lobby”] claims of lack of transparency, investor bias 
and the disregard of citizens’ human rights.7 The human rights lobby 
has painted the investors as the big bad wolves.  The state and its 
citizens are red riding hood and the arbitral tribunals, as the Brothers 
Grimm, are re-writing the happy end. The international arbitration 
profession, on the other hand, has shied away from a thorough 
engagement with human rights and seems to have a severe case of 
“Berührungsangst”.8  
                                                 
Julien Chaisse, The shifting tectonics of international investment law - structure and dynamics of 
rules and arbitration on foreign investment in the Asia-Pacific region, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L 
L. REV. 563 (2015). 
6 EDITORIAL: It’s too soon to celebrate the singing of this “free trade” deal, 
DOMINION POST, ed., Jan. 15, 2016.  
7 UN experts voice concern over adverse impact of free trade and investment 
agreements on human rights, UNITED NATIONS HOMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER (June 2, 2015), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=160
31; Andrew Geddis, Of TPP’s, ISDS’s and the Constitution, PUNDIT (Oct. 5, 2015), 
http://pundit.co.nz/content/of-tpps-isdss-and-the-constitution; Open Letter, TPP 
LEGAL, https://tpplegal.wordpress.com/open-letter/ (last accessed 4 May 2016).  
8 Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 573, 576 (2011); see also Ciaran Cross & Christian Schliemann-
Radbruch, When Investment Arbitration curbs Domestic Regulatory Space: Consistent 
Solutions through Amicus Curiae Submissions by Regional Organisations, 6 L. & DEV. REV. 
67, 87 (2013) (et seq. which show that arbitral tribunals have not taken the 
opportunity to clarify the role of human rights in investment arbitration); see also 
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The widespread absence of a discussion of investors’ rights 
by the human rights lobby and the general lack of willingness by the 
international arbitration community to engage with human rights 
issues is concerning.  It is concerning because, in particular for 
developing countries, sustainable economic development requires 
both: foreign direct investment and the protection of human rights.9  
The aim of this think piece is to provide a basis to fill the 
gaps in both discussions by firstly describing the international human 
rights framework and in particular discussing whether and which 
human rights are available to investors and a state’s citizens.  The 
paper will then examine how a human rights analysis is relevant in an 
investment arbitration and why there is no need for the investment 
arbitration community to have “Berührungsängste”. By doing so the 
paper proposes a framework that will allow for the consistent 
inclusion of the International Bill of Human Rights (“IBR”) and 
customary international human rights as a benchmark in investor-
state dispute settlement.  A consistent human rights benchmark is 
important since investor state dispute settlement can take place in 
competing jurisdictions, such as national courts, investment 
arbitration, regional human rights courts, or the International Court 
of Justice. There is therefore a need for promoting consistent human 
rights benchmarking among diverse national, regional and worldwide 
courts, and alternative dispute settlement proceedings.  
The paper is also a contribution against the fragmentation of 
international law.10 It is the thesis of this paper that the IBR and 
customary international human rights provide the international 
constitutional framework in which any investment treaty is situated 
and in which international arbitral tribunals have to operate. To 
                                                 
Yannik Radi, Realizing Human Rights in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Perspective from 
within the International Investment Law Toolbox, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1107, 
1116 (2011). However, as an exception to the rule discussion of art 14 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see Hersham Talaat v. Indonesia, 
UNCITRAL (Dec. 14, 2015). 
9 See Megan Wells Scheffer, Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe to 
Human Rights?, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 483, 483 (2011). 
10 See Ursula Kriebaum & Christoph Schreuer, The Concept of Property in 
Human Rights Law and International Investment Law, 
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/88_concept_property.pdf. 
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illustrate the difference, the proposed framework will make to the 
discussion of investors’ rights versus citizens’ rights, the new 
framework will be applied to a case scenario. It is noteworthy to 
stress that the investment treaty perspective on human rights 
significance is not the main focus of this paper,11 albeit some 
reference will be made.12 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the 
birthrights of all human beings; their protection and 
promotion is the first responsibility of 
Governments.13 
There are several human rights frameworks which could be 
used to determine the citizens’ and the investor’s rights: particular 
domestic human rights frameworks, regional frameworks in some 
parts of the world, and the international human rights framework. 
The international human rights framework encompasses the IBR 
containing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and 
the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”).14 As Stephen Gardbaum convincingly argues, the IBR 
has to be seen as part of the international constitutional order.15 It 
                                                 
11 See for very detailed discussion from the investment law perspective 
Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 573 (2011); Yannik Radi, Realizing Human Rights in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: A Perspective from within the International Investment Law Toolbox, N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1107 (2011); Vivian Kube & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 
Human rights law in international investment arbitration, EUI Working Papers (Law 
2016/02). 
12 See below II.D. 
13 Vienna Declaration, sec. 1.  
14 Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1), The International Bill of Human Rights, OHCHR, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf. 
15 Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights, 19 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 749 (2008); see also Erika de Wet, The International Constitutional Order, 
55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 51 (2006); see also, Andreas Paulus, The International Legal 
System as a Constitution in JEFFREY DUNOFF & JOEL TRACHTMAN, RULING THE 
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specifies the limits on how governments treat people within their 
jurisdictions. It enshrines and clarifies the distinct normative basis for 
the protection of fundamental rights as rights of human beings rather 
than as rights of citizens. That means international human rights do 
not make a difference between nationals and foreigners. The human 
rights obligations contained in the ICCPR and ICESCR have erga 
omnes effect to the extent that they have acquired customary 
international law status.16 That means that those rights enshrined in 
the IBR are  applicable whether or not states are member states to 
the IBR or its parts.17 As a result, the IBR is  applicable in every 
country around the world as part of the international constitutional 
order,18 laying down a global human rights standard19 for every 
                                                 
WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW & GLOBAL GOVERNMENT 
69 (CUP, Cambridge, 2009). 
16 JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 642 (8th ed., 2012); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, L’unité de 
l’ordre juridique international in RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL, vol. 297, 382-85 (2002); Erika de Wet, The International 
Constitutional Order, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 51, 61 (2006); for IESCR, see U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Poverty 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. No. 
E/C.12/2001/10, para 16 (May 2001). Ernst Ulrich Petersmann states: “Human 
rights have thus become part also of the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations (Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice)” in Time for 
Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations Lessons from European 
Integration Law for Global Integration Law, NYU INSTITUTES ON THE PARK, 
http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/01/012301-05.html. 
17 Based on the global recognition of those rights as the essence of what 
somehow natural right to every human being belongs just by being born as one, 
those rights cannot leave out any single individual, regardless of their nationality. 
See Horst Dreier, in: Dreier (Hrsg.), GG, Bd. 1, 2. Aufl., 2004, Vorb. Rdn. 25, 
Gerhard Herdegen in Maunz/Dürig, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, 78. EL September 
2016, Art. 1 Abs. 2, marginal no. 31, 32, Herbert Bethge in Maunz/Schmidt-
Bleibtreu/Klein/Bethge, Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, 49. EL Juli 2016, 
BVerfGG Rn. 90, marginal no. 65. 
18 Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights, 19 
THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 749, 768 (2008) (“international human rights law also 
functions to enshrine and clarify the distinct normative basis for the protection of 
fundamental rights as rights of human beings rather than as rights of citizens”). 
19 Compare with Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International 
Constitutional Rights, 19 THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 749, 768 (2008); see also Lucas 
Lixinski, Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Expansionism 
at the Service of the Unity of International Law, 21 THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 585 (2010).  
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human being notwithstanding whether they are a citizen or foreigner. 
The IBR provides the baseline global human rights protection.20 
Whether, or in which circumstances, (additional) human rights 
enshrined in regional and/or domestic human rights standards have 
to be taken into account in investor state dispute resolution, is not 
within the scope of this paper.  
How investment tribunals have to have regard to the IBR will 
be discussed under II.C.2. In the following the paper will outline the 
rights of the state’s citizens and that of the investor under the IBR.  
A. The Rights of the State Citizens  
The human rights lobby is claiming in particular the following 
rights as being jeopardized by investor state relationships and the 
resulting disputes: the right to health21, the right to water22, the right 
                                                 
20 As Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann points out “Dictatorial governments can 
no longer freely ‘contract out’ of their human rights obligations by withdrawing 
from UN human rights covenants or ILO conventions” in Time for Integrating 
Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations Lessons from European Integration 
Law for Global Integration Law, THE JEAN MONNET CENTER FOR INT’L AND REG. 
ECON. L. AND JUST., http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/01/012301-
05.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2016) (That must be true not only for dictatorial 
governments but generally in regard to the inability of states to contract out of 
“human rights”).  
21 The IECSR Committee has interpreted the “right to health, as defined 
in article 12.1, as an inclusive right extending not only to timely and appropriate 
health care but also to the underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe 
and potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food, 
nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions, and 
access to health-related education and information, including on sexual and 
reproductive health. A further important aspect is the participation of the 
population in all health-related decision-making at the community, national and 
international levels.” The right to health encompasses the control over one’s health 
and body, including sexual and reproductive freedom, and the right to be free from 
interference, such as the right to be free from torture, non-consensual medical 
treatment and experimentation; the right to a system of health protection which 
provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest attainable level of 
health, including, for example, access (non-discriminatory, economic, physical, 
information) to functioning public health and health-care facilities [ICESCR General 
Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12) 
Adopted at the Twenty-second Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
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to a sustainable or healthy environment23, the right of indigenous 
peoples to their ancestral lands24, and the right to development25 of 
                                                 
Cultural Rights, on Aug. 11, 2000 (Contained in Doc. E/C.12/2000/4), paras 8, 11, 
1). In regard to a comprehensive treatment of the right to health, see JOHN TOBIN, 
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012) and VALENTINA VADI, 
PUBLIC HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 
(2012). 
22 The right to water encompasses, inter alia, sufficient, safe, acceptable, 
physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses. States 
need to take steps on a non-discriminatory basis to prevent threats to health from 
unsafe and toxic water conditions. General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water 
(Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), Adopted at the Twenty-ninth Session of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, on Jan. 20, 2003 (Contained 
in Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, paras. 2, 8). With regard to a comprehensive treatment 
of the right to health, see EIBE RIEDEL & PETER ROTHEN, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO 
WATER (Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2006). 
23 The right encompasses the right to a non-polluted environment, which 
does not endanger health, life and development. The right also comprises the 
obligation of the state and the community of states to repair any damage done by 
pollution. Gheorghe Durac, Granting the Right to a Quality Environment -A Premise of 
Sustainable Development, 9 PESD 153, 154 (2015); John Lee, Underlying Legal Theory to 
Support a Well-Defined Human Right to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary 
International Law, 25 COLUM. J. OF ENVTL. L. 283. (2000). For an overview of the 
protection of the environment in regional and domestic human rights instruments, 
see Alan Boyle, Human Rights and the Environment: A Reassessment, UNEP, 
http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/documents/Events/
HumanRightsEnvironmentRev.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).  
24  UN Indigenous Peoples Declaration, Art 1(1): “Indigenous peoples 
have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally 
owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.” The central right is the right to 
the enjoyment of ancestral lands. Mihail Krephchev, The Problem of Accommodating 
Indigenous Land Rights in International Investment Law, 6 J. OF INT’L INVESTMENT L., 
42; see generally  JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(OUP, 1996).  
25 Declaration on the Right to Development (1986), Art 1(1): “The right 
to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human 
person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy 
economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.” The Declaration in its 10 articles 
requires states to guarantee rights in a manner applicable to globalisation, ie it 
compels states to cooperate with each other to the best of their abilities and 
resources to achieve development throughout the world: see for a general 
discussion DANIEL AGUIRRE, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN A 
GLOBALISED WORLD (2008); Stephen Marks, Beate Rudolf, Koen De Feyter, & 
Nicolaas Schrijver, The role of international law in U.N., OFFICE OF THE HUMAN 
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the citizens in the particular country.26  Those citizens’ rights, the 
human rights claims, are given no weight by investment tribunals. 
Tribunals were only concerned with the rights of investors.  
The right to health and the right to water are enshrined in the 
IBR.27 Thus, human beings have a right to health and to water 
notwithstanding the country they live in. The right to a sustainable or 
healthy environment and the right to development did not find their 
way explicitly into the IBR. Today, both rights are afforded at least 
near close to customary international law status.28 The right of 
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands is protected by the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The Declaration is 
                                                 
RIGHTS COMMISSIONER, REALIZING THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN 
COMMEMORATION OF 25 YEARS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON 
THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT  445, 454 (U.N. Publication, 2013). 
26 In regard to general criticism, see Investor State Dispute Settlement- The 
Arbitration Game, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756-
governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbitration; Claire 
Provost and Matt Kennard, The obscure legal system that allows corporations to sue countries, 
THE GUARDIAN, June 10, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-lets-
corportations-sue-states-ttip-icsid; Still not loving ISDS: 10 reasons to oppose investors’ 
super-rights in EU trade deals, CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY, July 14, 2014, 
http://corporateeurope.org/international-trade/2014/04/still-not-loving-isds-10-
reasons-oppose-investors-super-rights-eu-trade. 
27 ISECR Art 12, Art 11 (1); in addition, the U.N. General Assembly 
recognised the right to water and sanitation as a human right specifically in 
U.N.G.A. Res. 64/292, 64th Session A/RES/64/292 (July 28, 2010). 
28 For the right to a sustainable environment see John Lee, The Right to a 
Healthy Environment, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 283, 338 (2000); see Susan Glazebrook, 
Human Rights and the Environment, VUWLR: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PACIFIC 293 
(2009); Prue Taylor, From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New Dynamic in 
International Law?, 10 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL. L. REV. 309 (1997); For the right to 
development see Isabella Bunn, The Right to Development: Implications for International 
Economic Law, 15 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 1425, 1436 (2000). It also should be noted 
that due to human rights law establishes a responsibility on part of the state toward 
those under its jurisdiction, and not solely an obligation between states, the 
Restatement has drawn a subtle distinction between the manner in which 
customary human rights law is established from that which creates customary 
international law in general. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
§ 701 (1987), reporter’s note 2.  
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not binding law. The formulation of the rights therein, however, 
reflects emergent customary international law.29  
It is the nature of human rights law to create obligations on 
the part of the state towards those under its jurisdiction.  The IBR 
clearly stipulates states’ obligations, for example, Article 2 (1) of the 
ICESCR reads: 
[T]o take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, 
with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.  
Article 2(1) of ICESCR compels the community of states to 
work towards attaining the best standard of health possible for its 
citizens. It also requires every state to make every effort to provide 
for sufficient clean water. Of particular interest are the states’ 
obligations in regard to the right to development. The right to 
development encapsulates a resonance of the core principles of all 
human rights including, primarily, equity, non-discrimination, active 
and meaningful participation, accountability and transparency.30 For 
the right to be effective, another core part of the right to 
development is that states have a duty by themselves, and in 
                                                 
29 Mihail Krephchev, The Problem of Accommodating Indigenous Land Rights in 
International Investment Law, 6 J. INT’L. INVESTMENT L. 42, 52 et seq. (2015); see also 
James Anaya & Siegfried Wiessner, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: Towards Re-empowerment, JURIST.ORG (Oct. 3, 2007), 
http://www.jurist.org/forum/2007/10/un-declaration-on-rights-of-
indigenous.php; In regard to the general application under the American 
Convention on Human Rights see, Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human 
Rights System-Indigenous And Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and Natural 
Resources, INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://cidh.org/countryrep/Indigenous-Lands09/Chap.V-VI.htm (last visited Apr. 
16, 2016).  
30 See the reports of the Working Group on the Right to Development 
on its: Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/23, para. 43(a); Sixth session, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2005/25, para. 42; Seventh Session E/CN.4/2006/26, paras. 31, 40, 
46, 67(g). 
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conjunction with the community of states, to accomplish the utmost 
possible within their available resources to attain the highest level of 
development in their respective states, but also globally.31 The same is 
true for the right to a sustainable and healthy environment.32  
Even though there is no unified global understanding of 
whether and how an individual can assert the right to health, water, a 
healthy environment, and a right to development (which are 
categorized as second and third generation rights33), there is no doubt 
that in regard to those rights it is the state’s and the community of 
states’ obligation to constantly work towards the highest fulfillment 
and execution of those rights for its citizens and the global citizenry.  
The right of indigenous peoples to their ancestral land is 
different to the other rights discussed as it is first and foremost a 
negative right.  It obligates the states which are the home of 
indigenous peoples to provide them with the protection not to be 
deprived of their land.34 It does not compel the particular state to 
                                                 
31 Ibrahim Salama, The right to development at 25: renewal and achievement of its 
potential, in U.N., OFFICE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONER, REALIZING THE 
RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN COMMEMORATION OF 25 YEARS OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 485, 486 
(2013 ). 
32 John Lee, The Right to a Healthy Environment, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
283, 338 (2000); see also Draft Declaration on Human Rights and the Environment, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, Annex I (1994), art. 22 (“All States shall 
respect and ensure the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound 
environment. Accordingly, they shall adopt the administrative, legislative and other 
measures necessary to effectively implement the rights in this Declaration”). 
33 See PAUL O’CONNELL, VINDICATION SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCES (2012); HELENA 
ALVIAR GARCIA, KARL KLARE, & LUCY WILLIAMS, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: CRITICAL INQUIRIES (2015).  
34 Compare Kaliña y Lokono v. Surinam, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 25, 
2015), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_309_esp.pdf (last 
visited May 10, 2016) (The ACtHR found that Suriname had violated Art 3 ACHR 
by failing to recognize the collective legal personality asserted by the indigenous 
and tribal people in this case. It further noted that the lack of demarcation, 
delimitation, and failure to award legal title of the territory of Kaliña and Lokono 
violated the villagers’ collective right to property recognized under Art 21 ACHR), 
The Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No 148, paras. 169-200 (July 1, 2006) (The 
Court concluded that the State violated Article 21 (right to property) to the 
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progressively attain their ancestral land nor does the right require 
states to work as the community of states to attain those rights.  
In summary, the human rights at play on the side of citizens 
are the right to health, water, a healthy environment, and the right to 
development. It is generally recognized that in regard to those rights, 
states have the obligation to safeguard their citizens against human 
rights abuses, including those of (transnational) corporations.35 In 
particular, they are commissioned to work as part of the community 
of states towards the highest possible attainment of the fulfillment of 
those rights. The right of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands 
has been conceptualized as a negative right, thought of as rooted in 
the right to property. Its justiciability is unquestioned.36  
B. The Right of the Investor  
 1. Legal Persons as Human Rights Bearers  
Human rights are generally conceptualized as a safeguard for 
the individual against the state. If the investor is an individual there is 
no doubt human rights will extend to the investor.37  However, the 
                                                 
detriment of the fifty-nine victims because its agents collaborated with the 
paramilitary group to destroy the victims’ homes and steal their livestock, 
unlawfully depriving them of their property.). 
35 Human Rights Council, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International 
Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, U.N. Doc 
A/HRC/4/035, para. 19 (Feb. 19, 2007) (prepared by John Ruggie): “..the state 
duty to protect against non state abuses is part of the international human rights 
regime’s very foundation. The duty requires states to play a key role in regulating 
and adjudicating abuse by business enterprises or risk breaching their international 
obligations.” 
36 E.g., Kaliña y Lokono v. Surinami, supra note 34; Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, para. 113(a) (Mar. 29, 2006); Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 125, para 157(c) (June 17, 2005). 
37 See, e.g., Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 170 (Nov. 21, 2007),  
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_170_ing.pdf (last visited 
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extension of human rights protections to legal persons is less clear. 
The IBR does not afford legal persons38 protection.39 The exclusion 
of legal persons from the scope of the IBR, however, does not 
necessarily follow from the IBR’s purpose.40 It does correspond to 
the preamble though, which asserts that human rights derive from 
the inherent dignity of the human person, and with the intention of 
its drafters.41 
Looking more regionally, the Inter American Convention of 
Human Rights (“ACHR”) does not offer rights protection to legal 
persons either.42  On the other hand, the European Convention on 
Human Rights (“ECHR”)43 and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights (“ACHPR”)44 have extended rights protection, at least 
in part, to legal persons.45  
                                                 
May 10, 2016) (The individual investors were imprisoned and their property seized 
due to being suspected of drug trafficking.). 
38 The term “legal person” is used for the purposes of this paper in a 
rather broad sense, as including all natural entities.  
39 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, The Nature 
of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 9 (Mar. 29, 2004).  
40 Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global 
Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 17, 24-25 (1999).   
41 Universal Declaration of Human Rights preamble reads “Whereas 
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in 
the world,…”; see also Human Rights Council, Business and Human Rights: Mapping 
International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/4/035, para. 37 (Feb. 19, 2007).  
42 ACHR, Art. 61(1); ACHR, Art. 1(2); Cantos v. Argentina, Preliminary 
Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., para. 22 et seq. (Sept. 7, 2001); Perozo v. 
Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R., paras. 74, 399 (Jan. 28, 2009).   
43 ECHR, Art 34; see, e.g., Société Colas Est v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. 
No. 37971/97, para. 41 (Apr. 16, 2002) (right to privacy in Art 8 ECHR).    
44  Art. 19 v. The State of Eritrea, Decision on the Merits, Afr. Comm’n. 
on Human and People’s Rights 275/ 2003 (May 2007); Civil Liberties Organization 
v. Nigeria, Decision on the Merits, Afr. Comm’n. on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
101/93, para 37 (1995).  
45 For a full discussion on the protection of legal persons under 
international and regional human rights instruments albeit in regard to their 
criminal liability, see Piet Hein Van Kempen, The Recognition of Legal Persons in 
International Human Rights Instruments: Protection Against and Through Criminal Justice?, in 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:2 
342 
There is recognition that legal persons, in particular 
transnational or multinational companies, should be the bearer of 
(international) human rights.46 That recognition is anchored in the 
fact that two regional human rights instruments afford human rights 
protection to legal persons and that human rights duties of 
transnational corporations have developed through soft-law 
mechanisms, such as the UN Guiding Principles on Human Rights 
and Business47 and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises.48 Those soft law instruments contain express provisions 
on the human rights responsibilities of transnational corporations.49 
However, efforts are under way to convert those soft law instruments 
into legally enforceable standards. In 2014 the Human Rights Council 
with Resolution 26/9 established a working group which is tasked to 
develop an international legally binding instrument to regulate the 
activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
in regard to human rights.50 The Resolution clearly identifies the 
responsibility of transnational corporations and businesses to respect 
human rights.51 The European Union has directed that its member 
states implement the UN Guiding Principles through national action 
                                                 
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: EMERGENCE, CONVERGENCE, AND RISK, 9, 
355 (Mark Pieth & Radha Ivory, 2011).  
46 See Peter Oliver, Companies and their Fundamental Rights: A Comparative 
Perspective, 64 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 661 (2015); see also Louis Henkin, The Universal 
Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 17 (1999). 
47 Guiding Principles On Business And Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS 
HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_
EN.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2016) 
48 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD, 
http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/text/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).  
49 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Principle 17; 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Recommendations for 
Responsible Business Conduct in a Global Context, Part I, Chap IV Human 
Rights, No 5 (May 25, 2011).  
50 Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 
(July 14, 2014),  
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Pages/IGWGOnT
NC.aspx (last accessed April 17, 2016).  
51 Id.  
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plans and has incorporated the Principles in its external policy.52 The 
(growing) responsibility of transnational companies in regard to the 
implementation of human rights must go hand in hand with their 
right of being protected by human rights. In other words, the human 
rights lobby cannot have their cake and eat it, too.53  
 2. A legal person’s human rights 
(i) General introduction 
It is nearly trite to state that not every human right is 
applicable to legal persons. The IBR rights that could be applicable to 
legal persons are, inter alia, freedom of expression54, freedom from 
discrimination55, the right to freedom of movement, access to 
justice56, fair trial rights57, or the right not to be searched 
                                                 
52 European Commission,  Commission Staff Working Document on 
Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights - State of Play, 
SWD, 144 final (July 14, 2015).  
53 See H.R.C. Res. 26/9, supra note 50 (acknowledging the double role of 
transnational corporations and other business as having “the capacity to foster 
economic well-being, development, technological improvement and wealth, as well 
as causing adverse impacts on human rights”). 
54 The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 
6538/74 (1979); Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG v. Austria (no. 3), Eur. Ct. H.R. 
App. No. 39069/97 (2003); Matter of the “Golobvision” Television Station, 
Provisional Measure Regarding Venezuela, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 21, 2007).  
55 Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No 
18147/02 (Apr. 5, 2007); Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. App. No. 72881/01 (Oct. 5, 2006); also compare Alexkor Ltd. and Another v. 
The Richtersveld Community and Others, S. Afr. S.C. (2003).  
56 Access to justice encompasses the notion of denial of justice. Denial of 
justice has been recognised as jus cogens independent from being a right contained, 
as an aspect of access to justice, in the IBR. See Chevron Corporation (USA) and 
Texaco Petroleum Corporation (USA) v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Interim Award, at 
2-3 (Dec. 1, 2008). 
57 British-American Tobacco Company v. the Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
App. No. 19589/91 (Nov. 20, 1995); Central Mediterranean Development 
Corporation Ltd. v. Malta (no. 2), Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 18544/08 (Nov. 22,  
2011); Mevopal SA v. Argentina, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 39/99 (Mar. 
11, 1999).  
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unreasonably.58 The probably most important right for any investor 
is, however, the right to property.59 The right to property is only 
protected in the UDHR60; it is not directly protected in the ICCPR or 
ICESR.61 Until recently, it was general opinion that a right to 
property could only arise under national law.62 However, sweeping 
economic and political changes in recent decades have laid the 
foundation for recognizing a global right to property. The ideological 
opposition against property rights has disappeared with China, 
Russia, and other socialist states having transitioned to market 
economies which are premised on private property. In addition, the 
globalization of trade has enhanced international support for 
protecting property rights. Furthermore, the increasing recognition of 
(property) rights of indigenous people has also aided a change in 
                                                 
58 See Peter Oliver, Companies and their Fundamental Rights: A Comparative 
Perspective, 64 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 661 (2015), for an in-depth comparative 
discussion.   
59 “And while one could argue that human rights treaties are 
fundamentally different from investment treaties with regard to their purpose of 
the protection of individuals compared to the promotion of friendly economic 
relations between two states, it should not be forgotten that a fundamental investor 
right under investment treaties is the right to property, which is itself a human 
right, recognized in most international human rights conventions.” HELGE 
ELISABETH ZEITLER, in STEPHAN W. SCHILL (ed.), INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 199 et seq. 
60 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. 
Doc. A/810, Art. 17 (1948) (“(1) [e]veryone has the right to own property alone as 
well as in association with others” and “(2) no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
his property”). 
61 Eibe Riedel in THEORIE DER MENSCHENRECHTSSTANDARDS 39 
(Dunker & Humbolt, Berlin, 1986) concludes that the travaux préparatoires 
indicate that the non-inclusion of property rights in both Covenants originates in 
the antagonistic ideological views of the Western and Eastern blocs, as well as 
those of the North and South. See also John Sparkling, The Global Right to Property, 52 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 464, 469 (2014); Jacob Mchangama, The Right to Property 
in Global Human Rights Law, Cato Policy Report (Washington, June/July 2011), 
http://www.cato.org/policy-report/mayjune-2011/right-property-global-human-
rights-law (last accessed Apr. 18, 2016) (article maintains a certain political angle). 
62  Sparkling, supra note 61, at 464; see also Luis Valencia Rodriguez, The 
Right of Everyone to Own Property Alone as Well as in Association with Others, 90 U.N. 
Comm’n on H.R., UN Doc E/CN.4/1994/19 (Nov. 25, 1993).  
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finding that property is a customary human right.63 The three regional 
human rights treaties (the ECHR, the ACHPR, and the ACHR) all 
protect property.64 National constitutions and national laws 
overwhelmingly protect the right to property.65 Importantly, even 
though the right to property was not included in the ICCPR or the 
ICESCR the omission did not equate with the states’ denial of the 
right to property. As the Annotation to the Draft International 
Covenant on Human Rights clearly declares, “no one questioned the 
right of the individual to own property”.66 A close reading of the 
travaux préparatoires aids the conclusion that since the ideological 
obstacles in regard to property ownership have been “overcome”, a 
redrafted 2016 IBR would include the right to property; it would not 
only exist as a principle in the UDHR.67 Therefore, as Golay and 
Cismas conclude:68  
                                                 
63 In regard to the European Union countries, see: Case C-402/05 P and 
C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
European Commission, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351, at 355.  
64 Eur. Ct. H.R. Optional Protocol No. 1, art 1; African [Banjul] Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 
(1982), Art. 21; American Convention on Human Rights, 1114 U.N.T.S. 123, art 
21. That means that 2/3 of all nations are parties to regional human rights treaties 
that contain the right to property.  
65 In regard to extensive discussions on the protection of the right to 
property under national constitutions, see: THEO VAN BANNING, THE HUMAN 
RIGHT TO PROPERTY 139-46 (Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2002). See also TOM ALLAN, 
THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY IN COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTIONS 36-82(CUP, 
Cambridge, 2000); Luis Valencia Rodríquez, The right of everyone to own property alone as 
well as in association with others, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/19, at 64 et seq. (Nov. 25, 
1993); Christophe Golay/Ioana Cismas, The Right to Property from a Human Rights 
Perspective, International Center for Human Rights and Democractic Development, 
at 2.3 (legal opinion, 2010), http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/docs/publications/ESCR/humanright-en.pdf (last accessed Apr. 18, 
2016).  
66 See U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/SR.230-232; E/CN.4/SR.302, 303; 
E/CN.4/SR.413-418, para. 197, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/articles1920_iccpr/docs/A-
2929.pdf (last accessed Apr. 14, 2016). See also the concern expressed in U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/SR.413-418, para. 198 (“To omit [the right to property] might create the 
impression that it was not a fundamental human right”). 
67 U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/SR.230-232; E/CN.4/SR.302, 303; 
E/CN.4/SR.413-418, para. 197-212, available at 
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The review of provisions of international instruments, 
regional treaties and national constitutions reveal the universal 
recognition of the human right to property. It appears that 
generalized and consistent State practice and opinio juris reflect the 
customary nature of the first paragraph of Article 17 of the UDHR 
‘everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association 
with others’”.  
(ii) The ambit of the right to property 
An important question is what the right to property entails. 
Any attempt to discuss the ambit of the right to property in a 
comprehensive manner would go well beyond the scope of this 
article.69 The following sets out the basic features of the ambit of the 
right to property.  
The UN General Assembly has stated that the right to 
property extends to both “[p]ersonal property, including the 
residence of one’s self and family”70 and “[e]conomically productive 
property, including property associated with agriculture, commerce 
                                                 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/articles1920_iccpr/docs/A-
2929.pdf (last accessed Apr. 14, 2016). 
68 Christophe Golay/Ioana Cismas, The Right to Property from a Human 
Rights Perspective, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic 
Development, at 2.4 (legal opinion, 2010 ) http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/docs/publications/ESCR/humanright-en.pdf (last accessed Apr. 18, 
2016); see also Sparkling, supra note 61, who extensively and detailed discusses the 
right to property as a right recognized as international law. Denying the jus cogens 
quality of the right to property, Joern Axel Kaemmerer, Der Schutz des Eigentums im 
Voelkerrecht, (Apr. 20, 2016) (denying the jus cogens quality of the right to 
property), https://www.uni-
trier.de/fileadmin/fb5/inst/IRP/Bitburger_Gespraeche_Einzeldokumente/Bitbur
gerGespr_2004_I_Kaemmerer_151_175_geschuetzt.pdf.  
69 See, e.g., URSULA KRIEBAUM, EIGENTUMSSCHUTZ IM VOELKERRECHT 
(Duncker & Humbolt, Berlin, 2008); THEO VAN BANNING, THE HUMAN RIGHT 
TO PROPERTY (Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2002); RUDOLF DOLZER, EIGENTUM, 
ENTEIGNUNG UND ENTSCHÄDIGUNG IM GELTENDEN VÖLKERRECHT (Springer, 
Heidelberg, 1985); Adolph A. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 6 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 1-20 (1965); generally, FRIEDRICH CARL V. SAVIGNY, DAS RECHT DES 
BESITZES (Heyer, Gießen, 1803). 
70 U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/98, para. 3 (Dec. 14 1990).  
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and industry”71  In the absence of the right to property being 
stipulated by the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee has not dealt 
with the right directly.72 The Inter American Court of Human Rights 
and the European Court of Human Rights, on the other hand, have 
filled the relative void under the respective Covenants.73 According to 
their jurisprudence, the right to property encompasses a wide range 
of economic interests like movable and immovable property; tangible 
and intangible interests, such as shares, an arbitration award and 
intellectual property;74 pension rights75; a business operation76; a 
customer base77; vested, asset like, rights78; a license or concession79; 
and the right to exercise a profession80  
                                                 
71 Id. 
72 The Human Rights Committee dealt with the right to property in the 
negative. E.g., Kéténguéré Ackla v. Togo, Communication No. 505/1992, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/505/1992, 1996, para. 6.3 (“the Committee noted that, 
irrespective of the fact that the confiscation took place prior to the date of entry 
into force of the Optional Protocol for Togo, the right to property was not 
protected by the Covenant. Accordingly, the Committee decided that this claim was 
inadmissible ratione materiae, under article 3 of the Optional Protocol”). 
73 In regard to an overview of the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights, see: Helene Ruiz Fabri, Approach taken by the European Court of 
Human Rights to the Assessment of Compensation for Regulatory Exprorpriations of the 
Property of Foreign Investors, 11 N.Y.U. ENVIR. L. J. 148 (2012); in regard to the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: LAURENCE 
BURGORGUE-LARSEN & AMAYA UBEDA DE TORRES, THE INTER-AMERICAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (OUP, Oxford, 2011).  
74 Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 1986 ECHR 8 (1986); Ivcher Bronstein 
Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74 (Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://wwwl 
.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/74-ing.html; Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, (ser. C) No. 135, para. 96 (Nov. 22, 2005); Salvador 
Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections and Merits, (ser. C) No. 179 (May 6, 
2008). 
75 Azinas v. Cyprus, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 56679/00 (Apr. 28, 2004); 
Torres Benvenuto et al v. Peru (Five Pensioners Case), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
98 (Feb. 28, 2003); Acevedo Buendía et al (Discharged and Retired Employees of the 
Office of the Comptroller) v. Peru, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 198, para. 80–91 (July 1, 2009). 
76 Van Marle v. Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 8543/79; 8674/79; 
8675/79; 8685/79 (June 26, 1986) 
77 Latridis v. Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 31107/96, ECHR 1999-II 
75 (Mar. 25, 1999).  
78 Holy Monastries v. Greece,  Eur. Ct. H.R., 20 EHHR 1 (1995). 
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Importantly the ECHR has extended the concept of 
protected property to rights arising from contracts and other types of 
claims81, including, for example, claims to restitution under national 
law82  Furthermore, the Court has held that a legitimate expectation 
of a property right is protected under Article 1(1) Optional Protocol 
to the ECHR. In Slivenko v Latvia the Court stated:83  
[p]ossessions” can be “existing possessions” or assets, 
including claims by virtue of which the applicant can 
argue that he or she has at least a “legitimate 
expectation” of acquiring effective enjoyment of a 
property right. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has summarized 
the right to property as84  
                                                 
79 Tre Traktörer AB Garamond v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R., A159, para. 53 
(1989); Fredin v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R., 13 EHRR 784 (Feb. 18, 2991). 
80 Gospodinova v. Bulgaria, Eur. Comm’n H.R. App. No. 37912/97 
(Apr. 16, 1998) (decision on admissibility); Jantner v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. 
No. 39050/97, para. 34 (Mar. 4, 2003); Kopecký v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. 
No. 44912/98 (GC) 2004-IX, para. 35 (2004); von Maltzan et al v. Germany, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. App. No. 71916/01, 71917/01, 10260/02, para. 74 (Mar. 2 2005) (decision 
on admissibility).  
81 Compare, e.g., Pressos Compania Naviera SA v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
21 EHHR 301 (1995) (tort claim); Monica Carss-Frisk, A guide to the implementation of 
Artice 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights 
Handbooks, No. 4, para. 29 et seq. (Strasbourg, 2001). 
82 Compare, e.g., Kirilova and Others v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 
42908/98 et al: (June 9, 2005) (final, Sept. 9 2005), and (June 14, 2007) (final, Sept. 
14, 2007). 
83 Slivenko and Others v. Latvia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 48321/99, (GC) 
ECHR 2002-II, para. 121 (2002); see also, Vander Mussele v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
App. No. 8919/80 (ser. A) 70, para. 48 (1983); Pine Valley Developments Ltd.  v. 
Ireland, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 12742/87 (ser. A) 222 (1991).  
84 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of 
Aug. 31, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, para. 144; see also, Yakye Axa 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (June 17, 2005); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 29, 2006); Saramaka People v. 
Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 (Nov. 28, 2007).  
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those material things which can be possessed, as well 
as any right which may be part of a person’s 
patrimony; that concept includes all moveables and 
immovables, corporeal and incorporeal elements and 
any other intangible object capable of having value. 
What is not protected is the right or guarantee to acquire 
property in the future.85 
It is undisputed that the right to property protects the right’s 
bearer from the direct expropriation of their property.86 Right’s 
bearers are also protected from a de facto deprivation of property.87 
As the ECHR observed:88 
In the absence of formal expropriation, that is to say a 
transfer of ownership, the Court considers that it 
must look behind the appearances and investigate the 
realities of the situation complained of . . . Since the 
Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are 
“practical and effective” . . . it has to be ascertained 
whether th[e] situation amount[s] to a de facto 
expropriation…. 
(iii) Summary  
In the present day, not only individual investors but also 
corporations have to be afforded human rights. The inclusion of 
(transnational) legal persons in the protection sphere of international 
human rights has to be the consequence of requiring corporations to 
                                                 
85 Marckx v. Belgium,  Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 6833/74 (1979); X v. the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 8410/78 (1979).  
86 Ursula Kriebaum & Christoph Schreuer, The Concept of Property in 
Human Rights Law and International Investment Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY 
AND THE RULE OF LAW: LIBER AMICORUM LUZIUS WILDHABER 748 (Zurich, 
2007), available at 
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/88_concept_property.pdf (last 
accessed Apr. 18, 2016) (p. 5 of the linked publication) 
87 Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 7152/75 
(1982); Monica Carss-Frisk, supra note 81, para. 67 et seq.  
88 Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, supra note 87, para. 63.  
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be protectors of human rights. The most important right for an 
investor, the right to property, has attained customary international 
law status. At this point in time the ambit of the right has to be 
ascertained through the analysis of (especially) the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Inter American Court of Human Rights 
jurisprudence. Such an analysis reveals that the right to property 
extensively protects the economic interests of corporations in regard 
to direct, and importantly also de facto expropriation, and the 
curtailment of the use and enjoyment of their property.89 The right to 
property protects the physical assets of a corporation but also its 
intangible assets. Importantly, the right to property also protects the 
business operation including legitimate expectations.  
 3. Conclusion 
Both citizens as well as investors are afforded rights under 
international human rights law. However, at this point in time the 
state’s citizens’ enjoyment of human rights is on more solid 
foundations than those of legal persons in general and investors in 
particular. Citizens’ rights most likely to be at stake in an investor-
state dispute are so called second and third generation rights. Those 
rights are enshrined in the ICESCR or rights which have attained 
customary international law status. Even though generally their 
justiciability is not without doubt, it is generally accepted that those 
rights demand a constant progressive realization from states.90 For 
most investors, their human rights protection will depend on the 
acknowledgment that they can, as legal persons, be bearers of 
international human rights, in particular the IBR. Since 
(transnational) corporations are relied upon for the progressive 
realization of human rights, those obligations must come with the 
right to be a human rights bearer. A number of rights which have 
                                                 
89 See European Court of Human Rights, Factsheet: Companies-Victims or 
Culprits (July 2013); Ursula Kriebaum & Christoph Schreuer, supra note 86 
(discussing the differences between investment law and human rights law in regard 
to the issues arising in the limitation of the investor’s economic interest. However, 
the different treatment does not necessitates a different outcome in regard to 
protection).  
90 See above II.A. in regard to the concept of the states’ duty to 
progressive realization.  
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been or could be the focus of human rights violations by the state are 
ICCPR rights which are unquestionably justiciable. The right to 
property, which is undoubtedly the most important right to be 
upheld for the investor, has come into its own and has achieved at 
least near customary international law status. Therefore, international 
human rights law does afford investors protection in regard to the 
investment they have made.  
No human rights bearer, however, holds their rights 
absolutely. Article 29(2) of the UDHR generally acknowledges that, 
in the exercise of  
rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are determined by law solely for 
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect 
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting 
the just requirements of morality, public order and 
the general welfare in a democratic society.  
Some rights in the IBR have specific limitations.91 Whether 
specific limitations apply to the right to property is at this point in 
time not generally recognized since the right to property has just 
emerged on the international plane. Guidance can again be sought 
from the ECHR and the ACHR. Article 1 of the Optional Protocol 
No 1 to the ECHR92 grants the state the possibility to limit the 
individual’s right to property due to public interest. The ACHR also 
allows the limitation of the right to property due to public interest. 
                                                 
91 The right to freedom of expression (art. 19(2), ICCPR), for example, 
can be limited when it is necessary for the country’s national security (art. 19(3)(b)).  
92 Optional Protocol No 1, Art. 1 reads: “Every natural or legal person is 
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of 
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided 
for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding 
provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such 
laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties.” See  Yukos v. Russia, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 14902/04, 
para. 554 (Sept. 20, 2011), in regard to the general interpretation of Art. 1. 
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The ACHR only allows a limitation to the right to property for just 
compensation.93  
The citizen’s rights in question are rights that require a 
progressive realization by the state.94 To justify preventing the 
realization of one right at the expense of another right, the realization 
must be reasonable.95 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss 
the limitations on the right to property and the citizen’s rights at any 
length. For the purpose of this article it is important to state that 
neither the investor’s rights nor those of the citizens are absolute. 
Human rights law has developed internal limitation mechanisms to 
take account of the fact that the individual’s enjoyment of rights take 
place within the community of other rights holders.  
In addition to internally accepted limitations on a right, the 
commonly used analytical framework to balance the rights of human 
                                                 
93 ACHR, Art. 21(2) : “No one shall be deprived of his property except 
upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, 
and in the cases and according to the forms established by law.” In Salvador 
Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 179 (May 6, 2008), the city 
had expropriated applicant’s land for use as a public park but failed to pay any 
compensation. The Court held that the public interest or social utility standard was 
satisfied since the park provided a recreational and ecological protected area for the 
benefit of city residents. However, the Court found a violation of the right to 
property due to the city’s failure to comply with expropriation procedures required 
under domestic law (i.e., failure to pay compensation). The Court also observed that 
a restriction on the right to property must be proportionate to the legitimate 
interest that justifies it, which requires a fair balance between the interests of the 
public and owner. The ECtHR also generally requires compensation for a 
limitation of the right to property. James et al v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
App. No. 8793/79 (ser. A) No. 98, para. 54 (Feb. 21, 1986) (“[T]he taking of 
property in the public interest without payment of compensation is treated as 
justifiable only in exceptional circumstances not relevant for present purposes”); 
Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 9006/80 et 
al., para. 120 (July 8, 1986) (“[T]he taking of property in the public interest without 
payment of compensation is treated as justifiable only in exceptional 
circumstances”).. 
94 See above II.B.2.(i). 
95 The principle of reasonableness as an inherent limit of socio-economic 
rights has been best developed by the South African Constitutional Court, see 
Khosa v. Minister of Social Development, 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (Mar. 4, 2004); see 
also, Kevin Iles, Limiting Socio-Economic Rights: Beyond the Internal Limitation Clause, 20 
S. AFR. J. OF HUM. RTS. 448 (2004). 
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rights holders to allow for the fullest human rights fulfillment is 
proportionality. Proportionality has been received inter alia into the 
constitutional doctrine of courts in continental Europe96, the United 
Kingdom97, Canada98, New Zealand99, Israel100, South Africa101, and 
the United States102, as well as the jurisprudence of treaty-based legal 
systems such as the European Convention on Human Rights103, the 
American Convention on Human Rights,104  the European Court of 
Justice,105 and the ICCPR106107 The core proportionality analysis 
requires the following inquiries to be made:  
a) Is there a legitimate aim in regard to the measure in 
question?  
b) Is the measure suitable to achieve the aim? 
                                                 
96 E.g., Bundesverfasungsgericht 1 BvR 2378/98 (Mar. 3, 2004) (police 
surveillance powers in regard to living space). 
97 R (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 
26; Huang v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11; 
Kashmiri v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11. 
98 R v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.). 
99 R v. Hansen [2007] N.Z.S.C. 7, para. 102 (N.Z.).  
100 CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village  
49(4) PD 221, 353 (1995) (Isr.). 
101 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
102 In regard to the United States, see Iddo Porat, Mapping the American 
Debate over Balancing in GRANT HUSCROFT/BRADLEY MILLER/GREGOIRE WEBBER, 
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 397 (CUP, Cambridge, 2016).  
103 Handyside v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., [1976] ECHR 5 (Dec. 
7, 1976); Soering v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., 11 EHRR 439 (1989); Helene 
Ruiz Fabri, Approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights to the Assessment of 
Compensation for Regulatory Exprorpriations of the Property of Foreign Investors (2002) 11 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 148, 163 (2002).  
104 Compare IACHR, Art. 27(1) and discussion in YUTAKA ARAI-
TAKASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR 186 (intersentia, 
Antwerp, 2001).  
105 E.g., Sky Österreich, E.C.J. (GC) C-283/11, para. 50 et seq. (Jan. 22, 
2013).  
106 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, para. 6 
(Mar. 29, 2004).  
107 For an in depth discussion on the framework of proportionality in 
different jurisdictions, see GRANT HUSCROFT, BRADLEY MILLER and GREGOIRE 
WEBBER, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW (CUP, Cambridge, 2016).  
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c) Is the measure necessary to achieve the aim? 
d) Is the measure the least rights infringing means to 
achieve the aim? 
e) Considering the competing interests of the different 
rights bearers at hand is the measure proportional? 
The human rights framework demands a balancing of the 
investor’s rights with the rights of the citizens, i.e. the state’s right to 
make public policy decisions to safeguard its citizens’ rights. The 
human rights framework internally limits a state’s measure in regard 
to the realization of the rights in question, like the right to health or 
water. The proportionality paradigm gives the balancing a tested 
structure. It is therefore curious that a review of arbitral awards 
reveals that arbitral tribunals have turned a blind eye to the human 
rights of the state’s citizens, as an extensive study by Jason Fry 
determined.108 The argument generally advanced is that the arbitral 
tribunal gets its power by virtue of the parties set out in an 
investment treaty between the host state and the investor’s state. And 
as long as the investment treaty does not stipulate an authority for the 
investment tribunal to have regard to the citizens’ human rights, 
tribunals do not have the authority to do so.109 That has resulted in, 
as Bruno Simma put it:110  
a problem of aiming at two moving targets: for the 
foreign investor, how to accurately estimate the 
political risks of the investment before, or at the time 
of, its establishment in the host State so as to enable 
the investor to price the contract cost correctly 
according to its projected returns on investment; and 
for the host State, how to determine the optimal 
degree of police powers and regulatory authority to be 
retained during the life of the investment, needed to 
perform its international human rights obligations. 
                                                 
108 Jason Fry, International Human Rights Law in Investment Arbitration: 
Evidence of International Law’s Unity, 18 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT’L L. 77 (2007).  
109 Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human 
Rights?, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 573, 582 (2011). 
110 Id. at 579.  
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The non-use of the human rights framework by arbitral 
tribunals is problematic. The reason is that the right which is at the 
heart of investment arbitration – the right to access to justice – is the 
right which puts the investor, at least sometimes, in a better position 
than a state’s citizens. In a country with a non-functioning 
adjudication system111 the investors, unlike the citizens, have through 
investor-state arbitration an avenue open to them that allows access 
to justice to independent adjudicators who are outside that non-
functioning adjudication system. In this inequality lies the potential 
human rights violation of investor-state arbitration but also the 
potential for investor-state arbitration.  
C. International Arbitration Approaches  
Having set out the human rights framework applicable to the 
investor-state relationship the paper will briefly set out the currently 
proposed approaches of how tribunals can be compelled to take 
human rights into account.  
 1. Current Approaches  
Broadly speaking three approaches are advanced. All 
approaches are centered on the investment treaty. They have as their 
underlying premise that human rights can only be taken into account 
if, and as far as, an investment tribunal is allowed to consider rules of 
international law. They allow any kind of human rights analysis only 
in so far as human rights can be placed in a particular relationship 
with the investment treaty concerned.112 The core premise of those 
approaches is illustrated by the travaux prepartoires of Article 42(1) of 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID 
Convention) which refers to “such rules of international law as may 
be agreed by the parties.”113 
 
 
                                                 
111 “non- functioning” for the purposes of this article is meant in the 
widest sense including a legal system that does grant effective justice.  
112 See Bruno Simma, supra note 109, at 581-82.  
113 ICSID Report of the Executive Directors, I ICSID Rep. 31 (2006) 
(emphasis added) (cited in CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A 
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(i) Explicit Referencing Approach 
The first approach advanced is to draft (in the future) 
investment treaties that clearly state that a tribunal has to take the 
state’s human rights commitments into account.114 Among the rare 
investment treaties that do make reference to human rights already, 
human rights are addressed in two different ways none of which 
gives the tribunal an explicit mandate to incorporate a human rights 
analysis into its decision making process. First, certain treaty clauses, 
such as Article 1114(1) of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), allow a host state under its respective regimes 
to enact measures aimed at protecting human rights.115 However, 
such measures are only allowed to the extent that they are consistent 
with the terms of the investment treaty.116 Second, other treaty 
clauses provide that the provisions of the investment treaty do not 
limit the regulatory power of states regarding the protection of 
human rights. Article 10(1) of the Canadian BIT Model provides 
such an example.
117
 The Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
                                                 
COMMENTARY 609 (CUP, Cambridge, 2001)). Pursuant to the report by the 
Executive Directors, the term ‘international law’ as used in the context of the 
Convention has to be understood in the sense given to it by Article 38(1) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. In light of this statement, the 
applicable rules of international law are those contained in treaties, customary law, 
and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. Therefore, under the 
ICSID Convention the IBR has to be taken into account if the investment treaty 
makes reference to international law.  
114 Bruno Simma, supra note 109, at 579. 
115 See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 
1114(1), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].  
116  NAFTA, art 1114(1) (“Nothing in this Chapter [11] shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure 
otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that 
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental concern”) (emphasis added).  
117 Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
art. 10(1) (2004): “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in 
a manner that would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
investments or between investors, or a disguised restriction on international trade 
or investment, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party 
from adopting or enforcing measures necessary: (a) to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health.” Available at 
http://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf  (last 
accessed 3 April 2016); see also the Norwegian Draft Model BIT (2015), which has 
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Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union as a 
recent instance includes a clause which protects human rights 
explicitly.
118
 Those express references to the state’s ability to regulate 
with the aim to foster human rights are stating the obvious. As set 
out in the previous part of this paper states are compelled by the IBR 
to attain the highest standard in human rights compliance for their 
citizens. A reminder of that in an investment treaty is undoubtedly 
useful. In addition what is proposed is to clearly state in an 
investment treaty a tribunal’s ability to weigh the state’s aim to foster 
human rights compliance through its social and economic policy 
against the investor’s right to its investment.  
In regard to existing investment treaties two approaches have 
been proposed:  
(ii) Dynamic Interpretation Approach 
The first approach promulgates a dynamic interpretation as 
set out by the International Court of Justice in Kasiliki, Sedudu Island 
(Botswana v Namibia):119 where treaties use known legal terms whose 
content the parties expected would change through time,120 the 
meaning of these terms will be determined by reference to 
international law as it has evolved and stands at present, rather than 
to the state of the law at the time of the conclusion of the treaty.121 
                                                 
an equivalent to art. 10 in its art. 25. In addition, art. 31 reads: “The Parties agree to 
encourage investors to conduct their investment activities in  
compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and to participate in the United 
Nations Global Compact.” 
118 Consolidated Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Text, 
EU-Canada, Oct. 30, 2016, Annex 8-E (“. . . . the Parties confirm their 
understanding that measures that are ‘related to the maintenance of international 
peace and security’ include the protection of human rights”), available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf (last 
accessed Feb. 15, 2017). 
119 Kasiliki, Sedudu Island (Botswana v Namibia), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. 
Rep. 1045. 
120 Id. at 2 (Declaration of Judge Rosalyn Higgins).  
121 The same technic was utilized in Ronald Lauder v. Czech Republic, 
Final Award of Sept. 3, 2001, at para. 200, 
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The European Court of Human Rights applies this principle as a 
matter of routine, basing it inter alia on articles 31(1) and 31(2) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.122   
(iii) Interpretative Presumption Approach 
The other school of thought emphasizes the interpretative 
presumption that treaties are intended to produce effects which 
accord with existing rules of international law.123 This presumption is 
used to resolve issues of interpretation relating to the broader 
normative content of a treaty rather than to the meaning of a specific 
term. This argument is based on article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties124  which states that in the 
interpretation of a treaty between the parties has to take account of 
“[a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties.” However, as Bruno Simma points out article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention can only be employed as a means 
of harmonization qua interpretation, and not for the purpose of 
modification, of an existing treaty.  
 2. The Human Rights Centric Approach 
However, is the Vienna Convention on Treaties really the 
glue that prevents international law to disintegrate into a 1000 pieces? 
In domestic law the respective constitution (generally containing a 
human rights catalogue) is allowed comfortably to be the overarching 
umbrella that gives the law legitimacy and provides a framework in 
what the state but also its citizens can engage in and are allowed to 
                                                 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0451.pdf (last 
accessed Feb. 15, 2017). 
122 See, e.g., SE Golder v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No 
4451/70, Report of the Commission, CE doc. D-60-355, 25 (June 1, 1973); also Id., 
Judgment, 29-36 (Feb. 21, 1975).   
123 Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. 
India), Preliminary Objections, 1957 I.C.J. Rep. 142; Corfu Channel case (U.K. v. 
Albania), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 104.  
124 See also Ciaran Cross & Christian Schliemann-Radbruch, When 
Investment Arbitration curbs Domestic Regulatory Space: Consistent Solutions through Amicus 
Curiae Submissions by Regional Organisations, 6  L & DEV. REV. 67, 87 (2013).  
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do. On the international plane this paper argues the IBR provides 
this overarching umbrella. The IBR sets out the paradigm in which 
states but also the arbitrators and the investors have to operate in. If 
states would not have to adhere to the IBR (and as stated at the 
beginning since those rights embodied in the IBR are customary so 
every state has to adhere to them) then human rights protection 
would be illusory. The IBR has to be treated as jus congens by any 
tribunal in investment treaties decisions. Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that “a treaty is void if, 
at the time its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
general international law.” The general principle that is extrapolated is 
that domestic as well as international law follows a hierarchy whereby 
treaty obligations are of no effect in the event that they conflict with 
a fundamental jus congens.125 The IBR contains  the most globally 
recognized norms. International investment law itself should not be 
blind to human rights.126 By signing an investment treaty states 
cannot relieve themselves from any human rights obligation towards 
their citizens. It should not matter whether the state includes human 
rights protection in those treaties or not. It cannot lie in the hands of 
the states or the investors whether human rights are applicable.127 
Regarding that international investment law constitutes a public law 
discipline128, neither states nor investors can “flee into private law”129 
                                                 
125 Luke Eric Peterson & Kevin R. Gray, International Human Rights in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and in Investment Treaty Arbitration 18 (International 
Institute for Sustainable Development Research Paper, Apr. 2004), 
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_int_human_rights_bits.pdf (last 
accessed Feb. 15, 2017). 
126 Filip Balcerzak, Jurisdiction of Tribunals in Investor–State Arbitration and the 
Issue of Human Rights, 29 ICSID Rev. 216, at VI (2016), 
https://academic.oup.com/icsidreview/article/29/1/216/2356645/Jurisdiction-
of-Tribunals-in-Investor-State (last accessed Feb. 15, 2017). 
127 For a different opinion, see Tamar Meshel, Human Rights in Investor-
State Arbitration: The Human Right to Water and Beyond, 6 J. OF INT’L DISP. 
SETTLEMENT 277, 281 (2015), 
https://academic.oup.com/jids/article/6/2/277/819997/Human-Rights-in-
Investor-State-Arbitration-The (last accessed Feb. 15, 2017), who points out in his 
conclusion that the highest responsibility for human rights protection bears the 
state while building an investment treaty, even though he recognizes the possible 
influence of investment arbitration tribunals regardless of investment treaties 
clauses at least for the human right to water. 
128 STEPHAN W. SCHILL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 17 et al. (2010). 
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when it comes to violation of basic general law principles.130 The 
ability of states to contract out, even partially, of the IBR would 
seriously undermine human rights protection globally. As set out 
above under B the IBR provides not only protection for citizens but 
also for the investor. And also the arbitrator is part of the paradigm 
as Lalive so clearly pointed out:131  
While he is clearly not an organ of the State, the 
international arbitrator is not acting in a legal vacuum 
and is not called upon to decide, so to speak, as if he 
did not belong to this world! The question may be 
raised here, in passing [ . . . ] whether the arbitrator is 
not, perhaps, the organ of the international 
community, be it the community of States or the 
‘international community of businessmen’ (in which 
more and more States and State organs appear to be 
active) or both international communities. 
The investor-state relationship illustrates the private-public 
divide on the international plane. The private-public divide, i.e. when 
is a state action private when public, is one of the most contested in 
every jurisdiction.132 One of the fundamental issues is that the 
                                                 
129 Compare the principle in German Public Law “keine Flucht ins 
Privatrecht”, see Ferdinand Kirchhof, Art. 83, n.103, in GRUNDGESETZ-
KOMMENTAR, 78 (Maunz & Dürig eds., Sept. 2016); Thorsten Kingreen, AEUV 
Art. 36, n.111, in EUV/AEUV 5 (Calliess & Ruffert eds., 2016). 
130 Compare Wolfgang Friedmann, The Use of “General Principles” in the 
Development of International Law, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 279, 295 (Apr., 1963) (“The 
science of international law can no longer be content with the analogous 
application of private law categories. It must search the entire body of the ‘general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ for proper analogies. With the 
growing importance of international legal relations between public authorities and 
private legal subjects, public law will be an increasingly fertile source of 
international law”). 
131 Pierre Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and 
International Arbitration, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC 
POLICY IN ARBITRATION, ICCA Congress Series No. 3 at 258, 302 (1986).  
132 For an overview of the German discussion, See Ulrich Stelkens, The 
Public-Private Divide: Annual Report – 2010 – Germany, IUS PUBLICUM 
NETWORK REV. (Nov. 2011), http://www.ius-
publicum.com/repository/uploads/23_11_2011_10_39_Stelkens.pdf (last accessed 
May 28, 2016), for an overview of the German discussion. For an overview of the 
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arbitration community seems to view the investor-state relationship 
from a private law lens centering its analysis of the relationship 
between in the investor and the state solely on the investment treaty. 
The investment treaty, a treaty between two or more states, does 
have to be the starting point of the analysis. The object of an 
investment treaty is to attract investment, i.e. business, something 
commonly associated with private law. However, only because the 
subject matter of the treaty is private does not mean that public law 
principles, i.e. human rights, do not apply to its interpretation. As the 
German Constitutional Court has convincingly and regularly stated: a 
state cannot resort to a private measure to circumvent its human 
rights commitments since otherwise human rights protection would 
be illusive.133 
To accept the proposed paradigm in this article would mean 
that human rights, as enshrined in the IBR, have to be taken into 
account by the arbitral tribunal whether or not there is an 
interpretative “hole” or “hook” in the respective investment treaty. 
Human rights are the structure in which the investment treaty is fixed 
to and which ultimately limits it. In other words, the paradigm 
proposed is the opposite paradigm of, what is at this stage, the 
general opinion where the investment treaty provides the structure in 
which human rights have to find a hook to be able to find hold in 
that structure. Thereby, while balancing the interests of the investor 
against the interests of the citizens, arbitrators not only harmonize 
two potentially conflicting regimes of international law (investment 
law and human rights law) but, in substance, also highlight the human 
dimension of investment law.134  
                                                 
discussion regarding the United Kingdom, see Dawn Oliver, common values in public 
and private law and the public/private divide, in BA Rider (ed), LAW AT THE CENTRE 119 
(Kluwer, London, 1999); see generally Christine Chinkin, A Critique of the Public/Private 
Dimension, 10 EUR. J. INT’’L LAW 387 (1999); LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA, NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE (2007).  
133 See BVerfGE 15, 256, 262; BVerfGE 21, 362, 369, 370; BVerfGE 115, 
205, 237. 
134 Yannik Radi, Realizing Human Rights in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A 
Perspective from within the International Investment Law Toolbox, N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 1107, 1114 (2011). 
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D. Conclusion 
An analysis of the international human rights framework 
demonstrates that states’ citizens as well as the foreign investors are 
human rights bearers. Human rights methodology provides for a 
balancing of conflicting rights’ positions.  The current inclusion of 
human rights into the decision making of arbitral tribunals occurs 
through an investment treaty centered interpretation. That general 
approach limits the tribunal’s ability, if not discourages, to consider 
the relevant human rights of citizens and investors alike in its 
decision-making. Arbitrators are part of the international community 
and their mandate is not only determined by their appointment and 
the relevant investment treaty provisions but also by the international 
constitutional framework, i.e. the applicable human rights norms. 
Even if an arbitral tribunal would ignore an exciting investment treaty 
a human rights analysis would not disregard the rights of the investor. 
Therefore, if a human rights analysis does not differ in its outcome 
significantly from the analyses of tribunals under the relevant 
investment treaty then it evidences that an arbitral tribunal does not 
have to fear the inclusion of a human rights analysis in its decision-
making process. On the contrary, an inclusion of a human rights 
analysis will aid the decision-making process and most importantly 
will foster a constructive dialogue with the human rights lobby and 
thereby would promote the legitimacy of investment arbitration.   
III. THE CASE 
Investors have successfully sought relief in front of regional 
human rights courts135 and domestic courts136 for government 
interference with their investment. An analysis in light of the 
international human rights framework adds an important dimension. 
                                                 
135 See, e.g., Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) no. 170 (Nov. 21, 2007), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_170_ing.pdf (last accessed 
May 10, 2016); Oao Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. 
No. 14902/04 (Mar. 8, 2012).  
136 See Overview in Helene Brubowski, Internationale 
Investionsschiedsverfahren und nationale Gerichte, Jus Internationale et Europaeum 79 
(Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2013).  
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As set out earlier the international human rights framework provides 
the global human rights standard available to every international 
arbitral tribunal by virtue of being international. It provides the 
globally accepted minimum human rights standard.  
The general way human rights cases are approached are by 
defining the ambit of the right that is potentially infringed and once 
an infringement is established to balance the limiting of that right 
with the rights of other rights holders since it is accepted that rights 
can be justifiably limited by the rights of others.  In the following that 
methodology will be applied to TECMED v Mexico.137 The tribunals 
approach in the judgement was also followed by other tribunals later 
on, for example, in Azurix v Argentina.138 
A. The Investment Arbitration Tribunal Decision  
TECMED, a Spanish company with its two Mexican 
subsidiaries, brought a claim against Mexico alleging several 
violations of the Spain-Mexico BIT. The claim concerned 
TECMED’s investment in a hazardous waste landfill site acquired in 
1996. TECMED alleged that Mexico failed to renew a license for the 
site. 
In the investment arbitration proceedings TECMED alleged 
the failure to renew the license rendered the investment completely 
lost, as it did not have any economic value as an ongoing business. 
TECMED alleged violations of the BIT, including expropriation, fair 
and equitable treatment and full protection and security. The tribunal 
found that Mexico’s action in effect expropriated TECMED’s 
investment, and that it failed to provide fair and equitable treatment. 
The Tribunal interestingly did balance Mexico’s interest in its 
                                                 
137 TECMED v Mexico, ICSID Case no. ARB(AF)/00/2 (May 29, 2003) 
(the author chose this case as one of the earlier cases where the arbitral tribunal 
payed regard to balancing the rights of the investor against the rights of Mexico’s 
citizens).  
138 Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 
Award of July 14, 2006, para. 311, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0061.pdf (last accessed Feb. 15, 2017). 
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environment and the investor’s right to property. The Tribunal 
stated:139 
After establishing that regulatory actions and 
measures will not be initially excluded from the 
definition of expropriatory acts, in addition to the 
negative financial impact of such actions or measures, 
the Arbitral Tribunal will consider, in order to 
determine if they are to be characterized as 
expropriatory, whether such actions or measures are 
proportional to the public interest presumably 
protected thereby and to the protection legally 
granted to investments, taking into account that the 
significance of such impact has a key role upon 
deciding the proportionality. Although the analysis 
starts at the due deference owing to the State when 
defining the issues that affect its public policy or the 
interests of society as a whole, as well as the actions 
that will be implemented to protect such values, such 
situation does not prevent the Arbitral Tribunal, 
without thereby questioning such due deference, from 
examining the actions of the State in light of Article 
5(1) of the Agreement to determine whether such 
measures are reasonable with respect to their goals, 
the deprivation of economic rights and the legitimate 
expectations of who suffered such deprivation. There 
must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign 
investor and the aim sought to be realized by any 
expropriatory measure. To value such charge or 
weight, it is very important to measure the size of the 
ownership deprivation caused by the actions of the 
state and whether such deprivation was compensated 
or not. On the basis of a number of legal and practical 
factors, it should be also considered that the foreign 
                                                 
139 TECMED v Mexico, supra note 137, at para. 122. Also recently 
quoted in Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case no. ARB(AF)/10/7, para. 295 
(July 8, 2016), where it stressed that the tribunal relied on the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights, based on Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the 
Convention.. 
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investor has a reduced or nil participation in the 
taking of the decisions that affect it, partly because 
the investors are not entitle to exercise political rights 
reserved to the nationals of the State, such as voting 
for the authorities that will issue the decisions that 
affect such investors. 
B. The Human Rights Tribunal Decision  
This paper will limit its human rights analysis to the right to 
property.  
 1. Ambit of the right infringed? 
The first step in a human rights analysis is to define the ambit 
of the right that is potentially involved to determine whether the act 
or omission is protected by the right. As discussed under II.B.2.(ii). 
the right to property encompasses a license140 as well as legitimate 
expectations in proprietary positions141 In TECMED the investor 
sustained a complete loss of the profits and income from the 
economic and commercial operation of the landfill as an ongoing 
business. The damage sustained included the impossibility of 
recovering the cost incurred in the acquisition of assets for the 
landfill, its adaptation and preparation and, more generally, the 
investments relating to or required for this kind of industrial activity. 
That included, but was not limited to, constructions relating to the 
landfill; lost profits and business opportunities; the impossibility of 
performing contracts entered into with entities producing industrial 
waste. Thus the government’s action lead to the termination of such 
contracts and to possible claims relating thereto. Furthermore, the 
government’s action resulted in a loss of reputation for TECMED 
                                                 
140 Compare Tre Traktörer ABGaramond v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. 
No. 10873/84, para. 53 (1989); Fredin v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 
12033/86 (1991); Latridis v. Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 31107/96 (1999). 
141 Compare Slivenko v. Latvia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 48321/99 (2003), 
para. 121; see also Vander Mussele v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No.  8919/80 
(ser. A), para. 48 (1983); Pine Valley Developments Ltd.  v. Ireland, 222 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. App. No. 12742/87 (ser. A) (1991). 
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and to its subsidiaries in Mexico. The consequence was a negative 
impact on TECMED’s capacity to expand and develop its activities 
in Mexico. Even though the government did not expropriate 
TECMED its actions rendered the property of TECMED de facto 
useless. In addition, TECMED’s expectation in the license and the 
license itself are protected by the right to property. Therefore, 
TECMED’s activities and expectations in regard to the operation of 
the landfill were protected by the customary right to property.  
TECMED’s right to its property was infringed by the actions of 
Mexico’s government. As set out above under II.B.2.(ii). the right to 
property can be limited if the property owner is compensated fairly 
for the expropriation.142 If the state compensates fairly for the 
expropriation the right to property is not infringed.  
 2. Proportionality Analysis  
After establishing that TECMED’s right to property in the 
landfill was infringed through the government’s action the next 
inquiry is whether the government’s action is a justified limitation on 
TECMED’s right to property. That inquiry is particularly fact 
specific. Since the arbitral tribunal did not engage in a human rights 
analysis the government did not provide the facts to the standard 
needed for a proportionality analysis according to the record. The 
analysis is limited to the facts set out in the award.  
(i) Is there a Legitimate Aim in Regard to the Measure in Question?  
As set out under II.A. the right to health is a right protected 
by ICESCR which the state has to progressively realize.  The 
Tribunal itself observed that: 
the Arbitral Tribunal has to resolve any dispute 
submitted to it by applying international law 
                                                 
142 What constitutes a “fair”, “just”, or “reasonable” compensation is of 
course a matter of contention. It is beyond the scope of this article. For further 
reading in regard to the ECtHR: Helene Ruiz Fabri, Approach taken by the European 
Court of Human Rights to the Assessment of Compensation for Regulatory Expropriations of the 
Property of Foreign Investors, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J,., 148, 165 et seq. (2002). 
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provisions (Title VI.1 of the Appendix to the 
Agreement), for which purpose the Arbitral Tribunal 
understands that disputes are to be resolved by 
resorting to the sources described in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice 
considered, also in the case of customary international 
law, not as frozen in time, but in their evolution.143 
Interestingly, the Tribunal only applied international law and 
customary international law in regard to its understanding of the right 
to property and the question whether indirect de facto expropriation 
amounted to expropriation. It did not discuss international law or 
customary international law applicable to the citizens of Mexico. 
Instead the tribunal found that it was not concerned with whether 
non-renewal of the permit was legal under domestic law. It held:144 
The Arbitral Tribunal will not review the grounds or 
motives of the Resolution in order to determine 
whether it could be or was legally issued. However, it 
must consider such matters to determine if the 
Agreement was violated. That the actions of the 
Respondent are legitimate or lawful or in compliance 
with the law from the standpoint of the Respondent’s 
domestic laws does not mean that they conform to 
the Agreement or to international law. 
Even if the Tribunal is correct by not reviewing the legality of 
the non-renewal of the permit under domestic law the Tribunal in 
accordance with its own reliance on Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice has to take into account the 
international law and the international customary law applicable to 
the citizens of the state.  
The state is obligated under Article 12 ICESCR to safeguard 
and to progressively realise the highest attainable standard of the 
health of its citizens. To protect its citizens from the health effects of 
                                                 
143 TECMED v Mexico, supra note 137, at para. 116 n.133 (May 29, 
2003) (citing Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case no. ARB (AF)/99/2, 
para. 116 (Oct. 11, 2002)). 
144 Id. at para. 120. 
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hazardous waste is an obvious obligation. The denial to renew a 
permit for a landfill where hazardous waste is deposited due to the 
urbanisation of the area is a measure that is in accordance with the 
state’s duty to safeguard its citizens’ health and an aim the state is 
under an international obligation to realise.  
(ii) Is the Measure Suitable to Achieve the Aim?  
On the available facts the closure and relocation of the 
landfill is a suitable measure to avoid a hazard for the citizens of the 
close by urban centre. The municipality’s motivation was stated 
as:145“[to] secure environmental safety in view of the rapid urban 
growth of Hermosillo, provide a response to the concerns that had 
been expressed and guarantee,  in the long term, the environmental 
infrastructure to handle and dispose of industrial waste”.  
(iii) Is the Measure Necessary to Achieve the Aim?  
The facts indicate that TECMED operated the landfill in 
accordance with all safety regulations and that the operation and even 
a proposed extension of the operation did not and would not 
threaten the public health of the citizens of the nearby town or the 
environment.146 Therefore the non-renewal of the permit was not 
necessary to achieve the aim of safeguarding the citizens of 
Hermosillo from a public health threat and environmental disaster. 
However, it can be argued that a landfill that contains hazardous 
waste even if compliant with all safety regulations poses an inherent 
threat to the health of a nearby urban centre. By closing landfills 
containing hazardous waste close to urban centres is a preventative 
measure progressively realizing the right to health under Article 12 
ICESCR.  
                                                 
145 Id. at para. 110. 
146 Id. at para. 131.  
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(iv) Is the Measure the Least Rights Infringing Means to Achieve the 
Aim? 
If the non-renewal of the license is the only measure suitable 
to prevent a health threat to the citizens of the nearby urban centre. 
It has to be borne in mind, that the need to dispose of hazardous 
waste is a necessary by-product of modern civilisation. Therefore, the 
state would potentially breach its obligations under Article 12 
ICESCR by closing one landfill where hazardous waste can be 
disposed of without allowing for the hazardous waste to be disposed 
of somewhere else since it would risk the illegal dumping of 
hazardous waste.  With that in mind the question arises whether the 
blanket non-renewal of the license is the least infringing measure or 
whether the non-renewal of the license accompanied with either 
compensation for the loss of the business and/or the offer of a 
different site to resume TECMED’s business would have been a least 
infringing measure. According to the facts, it is worthy to note that 
negotiations in regard to relocating TECMED’s business to a 
different site had taken place during and after the non-renewal of the 
perm it but had ultimately ceased.147 The least infringing measure in 
regard to TECMED’s property interest would have been to either 
offer a new site for its operation or adequately compensate them for 
its loss of business. As noted above, II.B.3. (especially footnote 92), 
the right to property has the inherit limitation that generally 
expropriation has to be accompanied with fair compensation to be 
justified. Even though the facts are silent on the issue it seems that 
for the state to fulfil its obligation under ICESCR and its obligation 
towards TECMED the least infringing measure would have been to 
offer an alternative site for TECMED’s operation. However, it is 
acknowledged that the state can make choices in how to realize its 
obligations. Therefore, the state instead of relocating TECMED’s 
business could have compensated TECMED for its loss of property 
and organised the disposal of hazardous waste differently. By not 
doing either the state did not use the least infringing measure to 
achieve its aim. The non-renewal of the permit without either fair 
compensation or re-location of TECMED’s business is therefore 
disproportionate to the state’s aim to safeguard the health of its 
citizens. It is an justified limit on TECMED’s right to property.  
                                                 
147 Id. at para. 112. 
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(v) Considering the competing interests of the different rights bearers at 
hand is the measure proportional? 
Since the non-renewal of the licence is not the least infringing 
measure available to the state TECMED’s right to property is 
disproportionally limited in balance with the citizens’ right to health.  
 3. Conclusion 
Using a human rights methodology to analyze TECMED’s 
claim against Mexico in regard to the expropriation of its business 
demonstrates that a human rights analysis will take the rights of the 
investor into account. A human rights analysis will provide for an 
analytical framework that will allow a tribunal to balance the rights of 
the investor with that of the state’s citizens. The use of a human 
rights framework will lead to more fully developed arguments under 
international law. It is significant that in TECMED the Tribunal 
relied on Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice in regard to the investor but not in regard to the state’s 
citizens. Using the human rights framework in aiding its decision 
tribunals would combat what, commentators generally agree, that 
international investment law and arbitration have an adverse impact 
on the promotion and protection of human rights.148 
Having established a breach of the investor’s right to 
property the question becomes what the appropriate remedy for a 
breach of the human rights violation is. The question of 
compensation is without doubt of utmost importance for the victims 
                                                 
148 See Ryan Suda, The Effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Human Rights 
Enforcement and Realization 2 (N.Y.U. Global Law, Working Paper No. 1, 2005). 
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of human rights abuses.149 In regard to the violation of the right to 
property the ECtHR has generally held that:150  
the protection of the right to property … would be 
largely illusory and ineffective in the absence of any 
equivalent principle. Clearly, compensation terms are 
material to the assessment whether the contested 
legislation respects a fair balance between the various 
interests at stake and, notably, whether it does not 
impose a disproportionate burden on the applicant. 
The aim of this paper was to demonstrate that using a human 
rights framework to analyze an investor-state dispute will adequately 
address the rights of the investor and the state’s citizens. Using a 
human rights methodology will aid a tribunal’s analysis of the dispute 
and will contribute to the legitimacy of its decision. The question of a 
fair remedy is outside the scope of this paper.  
IV. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
There is no need for an arbitral tribunal in an investor-state 
dispute to have any “Berührungsängste” in regard to human rights. 
International human rights do provide a methodological framework 
that allows for a balanced consideration of both the investor’s 
position but also the respective state’s citizens’ rights which the state 
has to safeguard and/or progressively implement. The investor’s right 
to property which is at the center of the contention is not an isolated 
                                                 
149 See, e.g., DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW (2015); EWA BGINSKA, DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS (Springer, 
Heidelberg, 2015); JASON VARUHAS, DAMAGES AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Hart, 2016); 
JAGMOHAN MISHRA, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION: CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS & 
REMEDIES (Akansha Publishing, 2011); see also G.A. Res. 60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005).  
150 James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 54 (1986); 
see also Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 120 (1986); 
Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 301-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), paras. 70-75 (1994); 
Hentrich v France, 209-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 48 (1994); Pressos Compania 
Naviera SA v. Belgium, A332 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 38 (1995); Guillemin v. 
France, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R., paras. 52-57 (1997). 
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right but a right which is instrumental, in the company with other 
rights, in fostering socio-economic well-being151 Only the interplay 
and inclusion of all members of a society, natural and legal persons, 
nationals or foreigners, can society strive and attain the highest 
possible standard of well-being. The international human rights 
framework recognizes this and has tasked the state with the duty 
through fair and reasonable government, i.e. through balancing the 
rights of every member of society, to progressively achieve the 
highest possible standard of well-being.  
An international arbitral tribunal, as part of the international 
community, is charged with overseeing whether the state has 
balanced the rights at play justifiably. In essence, there can be no 
doubt that the state has to be able to take any measure which 
enhances the human rights of its citizens or safeguards them from 
harm. If that measure infringes the rights of the investor the measure 
will be justified if the investor is compensated. In other words, the 
state can do anything as long as it compensates the investor. There 
might be situations where the measure is of such importance that in 
balance the property infringement of the investor does not warrant 
compensation.152  
For an investment tribunal to include a human rights analysis 
into its decision-making process will increase its legitimacy. Even 
though desirable, there is no need for stronger human rights clauses 
in investment treaties. The investment tribunals bear the 
responsibility to implement the law, regardless whether states and 
investors felt before responsible for including a human rights clause 
in their investment treaties. Since human rights provide the 
overarching framework any investment treaty, bi-lateral or multi-
lateral, has to be interpreted in light of human rights and is limited by 
them. Accordingly, also lawyers should be aware that they enjoy the 
opportunity to introduce human rights considerations into the 
arbitral conversation153, as already mentioned no matter for which 
                                                 
151 Luis Valencia Rodríquez, The right of everyone to own property alone as well 
as in association with others, para. 116, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/19 (Nov. 25, 1993). 
152 As noted earlier, it is outside the scope of this paper to discuss what 
constitutes fair compensation.  
153 Luke Eric Peterson & Kevin R. Gray, International Human Rights in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and in Investment Treaty Arbitration 20 (International 
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side they argue. Then red riding hood and the wolf may have a break 
from playing tag and come more often together for a cup of tea on 
eye level. 
 
 
                                                 
Institute for Sustainable Development Research Paper, Apr. 2004), 
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_int_human_rights_bits.pdf (last 
accessed Feb. 15, 2017). 
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WATER AS A HUMAN RIGHT: A CASE 
STUDY OF THE PAKISTAN-INDIA WATER 
CONFLICT 
Waseem Ahmad Qureshi* 
 
The Indus Waters Treaty was signed between India and Pakistan in 1960, with the World 
Bank taking a mediatory role between the two countries. The treaty allocated the Ravi, Sutlej, 
and Bias Rivers to India, while Pakistan was assigned the water from the Chenab, Jhelum, 
and Indus Rivers. Nonetheless, Pakistan has alleged that India violated the Indus Waters 
Treaty by initiating the construction of Baglehar Dam in 1999. Pakistan further claimed that 
India exasperated the issue by proceeding to initiate new projects such as the Ratle Dam on the 
Chenab River and Kishan Ganga on the Neelum–Jhelum River. The completion of these 
projects, in addition to the modifications in the allocation of river waters to Pakistan, could 
deprive the people of the Indus Basin region the basic human right of access to water; a region 
strongly dependent on these rivers, and that basic right, for drinking, agricultural, and domestic 
purposes. Access to water is a “basic human right,” as endorsed in different international 
conventions and declarations. Therefore, India’s draconian act of restricting water flow to 
Pakistan could directly result in human rights violations.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Water is a basic human right1 because it is essential for human 
survival. This paper is focused on the distribution of water between 
India and Pakistan and the resulting conflict. The historical and 
contemporary nature of the conflict, alongside the human rights 
issues pertinent to the conflict, will be evaluated in the first section of 
this paper. The Indus Waters Treaty resolved this conflict to a great 
extent; however, the recent statements from Indian Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi, regarding blocking the rivers that flow from India to 
Pakistan, have reignited the conflict.2 India is also constructing the 
Kishan Ganga and Ratle Dams on the Jhelum and Chenab rivers, 
respectively,3 and has also completed the Baglehar Dam on the 
Chenab River. Pakistan has serious reservations about the 
construction of these dams. The implications of India’s construction 
of dams, its attempt to revoke or modify the terms of Indus Waters 
Treaty (“IWT”), and its threats to block rivers to Pakistan will also be 
discussed in the first section of this paper. The second section will 
include the interpretations and positions of the international 
conventions and declarations, which recognize “access to water” as a 
fundamental human right. The role of the World Bank as a 
“mediator” between India and Pakistan for resolving the water 
conflict and, consequently, protecting the “human right to water” will 
be explained in the third section. The fourth section will include the 
options available to Pakistan, along with the proposal of a suitable 
strategy to overcome the water conflict with India. 
II. SUMMARY OF THE CONFLICT 
A. The Historical Developments Toward Water Conflict and the 
                                                 
1 Amanda Cahil Ripley, The Human Right to Water and its Application in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, 14 (TAYLOR & FRANCIS, 2011). 
2 Hugh Tomlinson, Modi Threatens to cut Pakistan’s water in revenge for militant 
attack, THE TIMES, September 27, 2016, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/modi-
threatens-to-cut-pakistan-s-water-in-revenge-for-militant-attack-j2vsgn8jf (last 
visited December 22, 2016). 
3 Aziz Z. Azad, Indus Water Treaty and India’s Agitation, DAILY JANG 
NEWSPAPER, December 18, 2016. 
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IWT 
At the time of the partition of the subcontinent, the British 
rulers assigned an independent commission, named the “Radcliffe 
Award” and under the supervision of Sir Cyril Radcliffe, for drawing 
the international boundary between India and Pakistan.4 As a result, 
India became the upper riparian state, while Pakistan became the 
lower riparian region.5 The water of six major rivers in the lower 
riparian Pakistan comes from the upper riparian India. 
Immediately after partition, India suddenly suspended all the 
river water flowing to Pakistan, which threatened Pakistan’s 
agricultural and agrarian infrastructure because it was heavily reliant 
on the river water for irrigation.6 In response, Pakistan approached 
the international community and, eventually, after a decade of 
strained relations between India and Pakistan, the World Bank took 
the very noble initiative of mediating between India and Pakistan for 
the allocation and distribution of river water between the two 
countries. As a result of the mediation of the World Bank, the Indus 
Waters Treaty was signed by the rulers of both countries, Indian 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani Field Marshal Ayub 
Khan, in 1960.7 
The IWT allocated the eastern rivers—the Ravi, Sutlej, and 
Bias—to India, while the western rivers—the Sindh, Chenab, and 
Jhelum—were allocated to Pakistan. Both countries were also given 
the right of conditional usage of water of each other’s rivers for 
domestic reasons, such as power generation, agricultural, and other 
non-consumptive purposes; however, it was required that such usage 
                                                 
4 Lucy Chester, The 1947 Partition – Drawing the Indo-Pakistani Boundary, 
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, February 2002, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/ 
archives_roll/2002_01-03/chester_partition/chester_partition.html (last visited 
December 20, 2016). 
5 Miriam R. Lowi, Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the 
Jordan River Basin, 63 (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1995). 
6 Danta Caponera, National and International Law and Administration, 230 
(KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL, 2003) [hereinafter Caponera]. 
7 Michael Glantz and Igor Zonn, Scientific, Environmental, and Political Issues 
in the Circum-Caspian Region, 285 (SPRINGER, 1997). 
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must not lower the quantity and natural flow of the water in the river 
of the other country.8 
As a result of the IWT, the water conflict was resolved to a 
great extent until 1999, when India announced the construction of 
the Baglehar Dam on the Chenab River and completely disregarded 
Pakistan’s concerns over the design of the dam. According to 
Pakistani government sources, the design of the dam could affect the 
quantity of water in the Chenab River.9 Meetings of the Permanent 
Indus Commission — a commission comprising members from both 
countries to discuss issues related to the IWT — were also held, but 
no consensus was reached10 and eventually Pakistan had to rely upon 
the judgment of the neutral expert of the World Bank, whose final 
verdict did not prevent the completion of the dam11 
B.  The Contemporary Nature of the Conflict 
At present, the buried conflict of the past between India and 
Pakistan seems to have been reborn after aggravated statements from 
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi that he would be bringing 
Indus water back to India;12 he also announced the formation of a 
task force to “review” the Indus Waters Treaty.13 This has raised 
                                                 
8 Niranjan Das Gulhati, Indus Water Treaty: An Exercise in International 
Mediation, 148–312 (ALLIED PUBLISHERS, 1973). 
9 Laurence Boisson, Christina Leb, and Mara Tignino. International Law 
and Fresh Water: The Multiple Challenges, 417 (EDWARD ELGAR PUBLISHING LIMITED, 
2013); see also Aparna Pande, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India 
(ROUTLEDGE, 2011). 
10 UNECE, River Basin Commissions and Other Institutions for 
Transboundary Water Cooperation, 20 (UNITED NATIONS, 2009). 
11 2007: Neutral expert gives his judgement on Baglihar Dam, DAWN, 
July 02, 2011, https://www.dawn.com/news/640989, (last visited April 03, 2017). 
12 Varinder Singh, PM: Will Bring Indus Water Back. Tribune News Sources, 
THE TRIBUNE, November 26, 2016, http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/ 
nation/pm-will-bring-indus-water-back/328690.html (last visited December 5, 
2016). 
13 Hindustan Times Correspondent, India forms task force on Indus Water 
Treaty, HINDUSTAN TIMES, December 17, 2016, 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-forms-task-force-on-indus-
waters-treaty-pakistan-says-won-t-accept-changes-to-pact/story-
fuzmtjpvi94ivzggp3epzn.html (last visited December 20, 2016). 
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tensions for Pakistan as the Indus river was legally allocated to 
Pakistan under the IWT, and Modi’s statement about the Indus river 
has been regarded by Pakistan as very contentious. Reviewing the 
IWT, or even modifying or changing its clauses, is also unacceptable 
to Pakistan: the special assistant to the Pakistani prime minister 
confirmed that no changes or modifications of the IWT would be 
accepted by Pakistan.14 The Indian threat to revoke the IWT is also 
alive, which has concerned Pakistan. If the treaty is cancelled, there 
will be no consensus between the countries on the distribution of 
waters. As a result, the peace of the region could be at risk. 
Moreover, India has initiated the construction of dams on the 
western rivers—the Chenab, Jhelum, and Neelum rivers in occupied 
Kashmir and within the Indian territory. Pakistan has serious 
objections to the Ratle, Kishan Ganga, and Sawalkot Dams and the 
Wullar Barrage15 because they could impact the flow of the Chenab 
and Jhelum rivers to a great extent, which would put in danger 
Pakistan’s irrigation system and availability of water for drinking and 
domestic purposes. Although, the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 
verdict on the Kishan Ganga Dam partially favors Pakistan,16 it also 
allows India to build the Kishan Ganga dam in accordance with the 
IWT’s requirement of minimum level of water flow (9m3/s) in the 
Chenab river.17 However, the dispute still exists in relation to other 
dams. These contentions are strengthening the India–Pakistan water 
conflict. 
C. Human Rights Issues Related to the Conflict 
Water is a basic human necessity and recognized as a 
fundamental human right. India’s threats and its construction of 
dams on the western rivers are paving the way for the deprivation of 
                                                 
14 Anwar Iqbal, Pakistan not to accept alteration in Indus Water Treaty, 
DAWN, December 17, 2016, http://www.dawn.com/news/1302848 (last visited 
December 18, 2016). 
15 A.K. Chaturvedi, Water: A Source for Future Conflicts, 164 (VIJ BOOKS 
INDIA PVT LTD, 2013). [hereinafter Chaturvedi]. 
16 Robert G. Wirsing and Zafar Adeel, Imagining Industan: Overcoming Water 
Insecurity in the Indus Basin, 79. (SPRINGER, 2016). 
17 Gustaf Olsson, Water and Energy: Threats and Opportunities, 19 (IWA 
PUBLISHING, 2015). 
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the people of Pakistan of this basic right. India has also committed 
violations of human rights in Kashmir and it would feel no harm in 
repeating the same for the people of Pakistan by depriving them of 
adequate water supply. 
The main issue concerning the India–Pakistan water conflict 
is related to the “human right to access water.” The construction of 
dams by India on Pakistani-allocated rivers could lower the quantity 
of water in the western rivers,18 which will affect the “access to 
water” of the people who regularly consume the water of these rivers 
in Pakistan, especially in the Punjab region. Moreover, blocking the 
Indus and other rivers from India could cause a shortage of water in 
Pakistan, which would deprive a large number of people who are 
dependent on access to this river water for drinking, agricultural, and 
domestic needs. 
Agriculture is the only means of subsistence and earning for 
almost half of the Pakistani population. Forty-five percent of the 
Country’s labor force is associated with agriculture;19 therefore, any 
harm done to the agriculture of Pakistan will cause a direct negative 
effect on the lives of these people. Pakistan’s citizens’ well being, 
standards of living, employment, access to health care, food, water, 
and sanitation will all be directly affected. Moreover, around 70 
percent of the region’s agricultural area is in the Punjab;20 therefore, if 
India pursues its ambitions of constructing dams or barrages to 
deprive the Pakistani Punjab of the river water, then it would cause 
severe harm to the basic rights21 — the right to access water, food, 
sanitation, employment, health care, etc. — of the people who are 
dependent on the river water in Punjab.22 
Another issue is related to threatening the agricultural 
infrastructure of Pakistan. Almost the entire agricultural 
                                                 
18 Id. 
19 Aaron Marcus, Design, User Experience, and Usability: User Experience 
Design for Everyday Life Applications and Services, 574 (SPRINGER, 2014). 
20 Peter Blood, Agriculture – Pakistan: A Country Study. (U.S. LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, 1994). Chapter available at: http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/49. 
htm (page 1) (last visited December 22, 2016). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
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infrastructure of Pakistan follows the canals and barrage systems for 
irrigation,23 and all of the water in the canals and barrages comes 
from the western rivers,24 of which the Indus River shares the 
maximum quantity of water supply. Any hindrance caused by India to 
the flow of the Indus river will reduce the flow of water reaching to 
Pakistan, and blocking the flow of this river would cause a shortage 
or total lack thereof water available for irrigation; this would directly 
threaten the very survival of the entire Pakistan population because 
the absence of irrigation could result in crop failure, as well as food 
and water shortages. 
III. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS & DECLARATIONS ENDORSING 
THE “ACCESS TO WATER” AS A BASIC HUMAN RIGHT 
There are a number of internationally accepted declarations, 
conventions, and resolutions that shed light on the importance of the 
access to water for every human-being residing in any region or state. 
Some of these declarations explicitly mention the importance of the 
“right to access water,” along with other basic amenities of life, while 
others implicitly highlight it. In this regard, the United Nations has 
been an essential international body, providing a platform to the 
international community for issuing conventions. The notable clauses 
that discuss this basic human right are mentioned below with 
reference to the universally acclaimed declarations and conventions. 
A.  The United Nations Charter 
The United Nations Charter25 has essential goals for human 
development. For instance, Article 55 includes the following points:26 
a. Higher standards of living, full employment, and 
conditions of economic and social progress and 
development; 
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24 Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus rivers. 
25 Charter of the United Nations, 1945. 
26 Chapter IX, Charter of the United Nations, 1945. 
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b. Solutions of international economic, social, health, 
and related problems; and international cultural and 
educational cooperation; and 
c. Universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.27 
The need is to ensure all the required living conditions for 
realizing the aforementioned goals of human development, and these 
conditions must entail the right to water for basic life subsistence, 
because, the access to water is the fundamental requirement for not 
only the survival of life, but also human development.28  
On the other hand, the climactic changes, population 
increases, and conflicts between upper and lower riparian states over 
the distribution of water resources are some of the prominent 
challenges of the contemporary era that may hinder the progress to 
fulfillment of human development goals.29 
B. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the 
“Declaration”) was adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in 194830 This Declaration is a fundamental part of 
international law; a body of law that every state heavily weighs when 
deciding on matters related to international jurisdiction31 Article 25 of 
this declaration states: 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and 
                                                 
27 Id. 
28 Stephen M. Wheeler and Timothy Beatley, Sustainable Urban Development 
Reader, 217. (ROUTLEDGE, 2014). 
29 Shimon Anisfeld, Water Resources, 100 (ISLAND PRESS, 2010). See also 
Tamin Younus and Caitlin Grady, Climate Change and Water Resources, 146 
(SPRINGER. 2013). 
30 S.Prakash Sinha, Asylum and International Law, 93. (SPRINGER, 2013). 
31 Burns H. Weston and Richard Pierre Claude, Human Rights in the World 
Community: Issues and Action, 94. (UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS, 2006). 
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of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services.32 
This clause highlights the importance of the well-being of 
every human and their right to access the basic necessities of life. The 
word “water” has not been used explicitly in the Declaration, but it is 
a basic necessity for human life and well being, as human health and 
subsistence are impossible without it. As a result, “access to water” is 
required to ensure human rights.33 
C.  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”) 
The ICCPR has emphasized the importance of the right to 
life for every human being by stating: 
The ICCPR affirms the “right to life” which has 
conventionally been interpreted to mean that no 
person shall be deprived of his or her life in a civil 
and political sense.34 
This statement implies the notion that no state or individual 
should create circumstances that may harm an individual’s life 
through any means. The ICCPR also follows the Human Rights 
Committee’s (“HRC”) principle that emphasizes the “right to life” 
and access to water in the following words: 
[HRC] has noted that the right to life has been too 
often narrowly interpreted. The expression “inherent 
right to life” cannot properly be understood in a 
restrictive manner, and the protection of this right 
requires that States adopt positive measures. 
Disregarding this new development in the 
                                                 
32 Article 25, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
33 Phillip Aston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights, 369 
(OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2013). 
34 Angela Cassar, John Scanlon, and Noemi Nemes, Water as a Human 
Right, 4 (IUCN-UNDP, 2004). See also Taniya Malik, Recognition of Human Right to 
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understanding of Article 6 and assuming a narrow 
interpretation of such a right would nevertheless 
require the inclusion of the protection against 
arbitrary and intentional denial of access to sufficient 
water, because this is one of the most fundamental 
resources necessary to sustain life.35 
Here, the ICCPR, in accordance with the HRC, is 
recommending that states adopt the necessary measures for the 
protection of the “inherent right to life” for every human being, and 
classifies access to water as an integral part of the “right to life.” 
D.  The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) 
CEDAW is an organization that is pro-actively working for 
the well being and development of womens’ lives, and has also 
highlighted the access to water as a fundamental right and 
requirement for the quality of life for women.36 It also particularly 
articulates the importance of access to water for women residing in 
rural and under-developed areas where there could be fewer 
resources of water37 Women may require water not only for drinking, 
but also for essential child and family care, in addition to the other 
basic domestic needs. 
E.  The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child highlights the 
need to fulfill the fundamental necessities of life for the well-being of 
children. It mentions access to healthcare, food, and clean water, 
among other necessities set out in Article 24(2)(c) as follows: 
                                                 
35 Taniya Malik, Recognition of Human Right to Water under International Law 
Regime, 170 INTERNATIOANL JOURNAL OF APPLIED RESEARCH, 1(4). 
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[To] combat disease and malnutrition, including 
within the framework of primary health care, through, 
inter alia, the application of readily available 
technology and through the provision of adequate 
nutritious foods and clean drinking-water, taking into 
consideration the dangers and risks of environmental 
pollution.38 
Therefore, every child must have access to these fundamental 
necessities of life to ensure their health, stability, well-being, and 
survival.  
F.  The United Nations Watercourses Convention 
This UN Convention is focused on highlighting the 
importance of the “access to water” as a fundamental right for every 
human being. Above all, Article 10 of this Convention recognizes the 
right to access water for drinking purposes as being more important 
than the right to access water for agriculture or electricity generation, 
or any other use within a state, as well as in another riparian state.39 
In this regard, the states should observe this comparison and adhere 
to such in practice. 
In light of this Convention, one country cannot deprive 
another country access to drinkable water, and further, that specific 
right must be prioritized over building infrastructure for storage, 
hydroelectricity generation, irrigation, or any other non-consumptive 
purpose. This clause is relevant to the upper riparian states, from 
where rivers flow to the lower riparian states.40 If the former stops 
the water flow, then the availability of water in the latter will certainly 
decline. 
                                                 
38 Article 24(2)(c), Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
39 Takele Soboka Bulto, The Extraterritorial Application of Human Right to 
Water in Africa, 260 (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2014). See also Antoinette 
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Stephen McCaffrey, former Special Rapporteur on The Law 
of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses41, has 
further interpreted this clause and added the term “economic 
development,” stating that a country cannot stop water flow to a 
lower riparian state on the grounds of economic development, 
particularly when this could harm the subsistence of people 
dependent on that water in the lower riparian state.42 
H.  The Stockholm Declaration 
This declaration was approved during the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in 
1972.43 Stockholm Declaration explicitly mentioned the access to 
water as a fundamental right for present and future generations: 
The Declaration is one of the earliest environmental 
instruments that recognizes the fundamental right to 
an environment of a quality that permits a life of 
dignity and wellbeing [sic] and also that the natural 
resources of the earth including, the air, water, land, 
flora, and fauna … must be safeguarded for the 
benefit of present and future generations.44 
I. The Mar del Plata Action Plan 
The Mar del Plata Action Plan was approved during the 
United Nations Water Conference, held in March 1977 in Mar del 
Plata, Argentina. The main purpose of the conference was to evaluate 
the contemporary challenges related to water availability, 
                                                 
41 Stephen McCaffrey has been considered an expert in International Law 
of Watercourses and he has written on the geographical and other issues pertaining 
to the watercourses. For instance, see his book: The Law of International Watercourses, 
(OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2007). 
42 Id.; and see Caponera, supra note 7, at 41. 
43 David Weissbrodt and Connie de Vega, International Human Rights 
Law: An Introduction, 197 (UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS, 2007). 
44 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment. 
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management,45 efficiency of usage, cleanliness, and agricultural and 
socioeconomic uses, and to devise a plan to meet these challenges 
and avert future global water crises.46 The Mar del Plata Action Plan, 
presented by this conference, identified “water as a [fundamental 
human] right, declaring that all people have the right to drinking 
water in quantities and of a quality equal to their basic needs.”47 
J. The Dublin Statement 
The Dublin Statement was the result of the International 
Conference on Water and Environment held in Dublin, Ireland in 
January of 1992.48 The main purpose of this conference was to 
evaluate the scarcity and inefficient use of water, and any scarcity-
related threats to sustainable development.49 Experts from the 
varying states in attendance arrived at the mutual consensus that 
“access to clean water and sanitation” is among the basic rights of 
human beings.50 
The four principles of the Dublin Statement highlight the 
importance of water for all human beings51 The first principle 
evaluates the essentiality of water for life and environments and 
confirms that the resource is in-fact finite52 The second principle 
suggests a participatory approach for better management of water 
usage. The third principle discusses the role of women in the 
                                                 
45 Malin Falkenmark, UN Water Conference: Agreement on Goals and 
Action Plan, 222–227 (SPRINGER, 1977). 
46 WHO, United Nations Conference on Water (Mar del Plata 1977) (WORLD 
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47 United Nations Division for Economic and Social Information, Mar del 
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49 The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development – UN 
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management and usage of water. The fourth and final principle sheds 
light on the economic value of water, along with the importance of 
clean water and sanitation.53  
Hence, the Dublin Statement explicitly discusses the 
importance of water and urges states to evaluate the Statement’s 
suggestions and principles so that states may devise and implement 
effective measures to manage water resources and fulfill the basic 
water needs of humanity54 
K. Agenda 21 
“Agenda 21” is an international action plan that was devised 
by the United Nations for achieving sustainable human and 
economic development worldwide55 The Agenda includes the 
fundamental principles and requirements for sustainable 
development.56 It also mentions that adequate water resources are 
essential for achieving sustainable development.57 Agenda 21 further 
highlights the importance of maintaining good quality of pure and 
fresh water resources in order to fulfill the human needs related to 
water, and for the protection of the natural ecosystem.58 
In this regard, Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 considers “access, 
quality, and quantity” as the three basic elements of the “right to 
water.”59 It also highlights the importance of maintaining an adequate 
water supply for the entire population.60 
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55 Raymond Charles Rauscher and Salim Momtaz, Brooklyn’s Bushwick - 
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56 Delyse Springett and Michael Redclift, Routledge International Handbook of 
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L. The Political Declaration in 2016 
The last Political Declaration meeting held in accordance with 
Resolution 70/183 of the UN General Assembly took place at the 
United Nation’s New York headquarters in September of 2016.61 The 
main focus of this meeting was related to antimicrobial resistance.62 
In addressing antimicrobial resistance, the U.N determined that 
access to clean water, improved health care and sanitation facilities, 
antimicrobial medications, and the protection of biodiversity were 
considered among the essential goals for the millennium and 
recognized as basic human rights.63 
All of the aforementioned declarations and agendas classify 
“access to water” as a basic human right. This basic right should be 
implicit when considering other fundamental non-water related 
human rights, all of which having already been accepted in the 
Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Charter, and the various 
conventions discussed above.64 
In light of these declarations, India’s plan to block Indus 
waters to Pakistan is a direct threat to the fundamental human right 
of access to water for the people residing in those regions of Pakistan 
where the population is entirely dependent on the river’s accessibility 
and ability to provide consumable water. The resultant harm of such 
an act could also negatively impact domestic, agriculture, and 
sanitation initiatives effectuated by the harmed region65 More 
                                                 
61 Draft Political Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on 
Antimicrobial Resistance, 2 (UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 2016). 
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Antimicrobial Resistance and Implications for the 21st Century, (SPRINGER, 2007). 
63 Draft Political Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on 
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importantly, there are no alternate sources of water with the 
capability to fulfill the threatened region’s needs in terms of water 
usage and supply.66 
Therefore, India’s government should reevaluate the decision 
to construct dams on the western rivers of the Indus Basin and revise 
the language of the IWT to avoid modifying the rivers’ paths, as these 
actions can result in the deprivation of the fundamental human right 
of access to water for the rural populations of Pakistan as a whole.  
IV. THE WORLD BANK AND THE INDIA–PAKISTAN WATER 
CONFLICT 
The World Bank has an essential role related to the 
implementation of Indus Waters Treaty. The major responsibilities of 
the World Bank are discussed below. 
A.  Responsibilities: 
The World Bank is tasked with the role of “facilitator”67 for 
IWT related matters between India and Pakistan. The World Bank 
brokered the IWT between India and Pakistan in 196068 In addition, 
it also plays the role of mediator whenever a staunch conflict arises 
between India and Pakistan related to the IWT.69 Particularly, it 
follows a procedure suggested in the IWT to resolve water related 
conflicts between both countries through the following steps. 
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  1. Appointment of a Neutral Expert70 
The World Bank appoints a “neutral expert” when severe 
disagreements occur between the relevant parties and the Permanent 
Indus Commission becomes unable to resolve these disagreements.71 
After being appointed, the neutral expert obtains opinions from both 
parties and makes their determination on the matter at issue in 
accordance with the principles illustrated in the IWT that is the 
governing body of law for water related conflicts between the two 
states.72 In this type of scenario, the judgment of the neutral expert is 
considered binding on both parties.73 However, if the neutral expert 
is unable to resolve the disagreement between the two parties, the 
matter becomes a “dispute” and is then referred to the Court of 
Arbitration.74  
India has requested the World Bank to appoint a neutral 
expert for the IWT.75 In response, the World Bank has sent an 
official76 as its envoy, but has not appointed the neutral expert yet, to 
mediate between India and Pakistan77 The envoy will attempt to 
reduce tensions between the two countries in hopes of reestablishing 
some form of dialogue.78 
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71 See Article IX, Indus Waters Treaty, 1960. 
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73 Deepa Viswam, Role of Media in Kashmir Crises, 135 (KALPAZ 
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 2. The Expenses of the Neutral Expert 
The World Bank is also responsible for establishing and 
maintaining a trust fund for meeting the expenses of the neutral 
expert. Both India and Pakistan provide funds as reimbursements for 
that trust fund.79 
 3. The Establishment of a Court of Arbitration80 
The World Bank also facilitates both countries by referring 
cases to the Court of Arbitration when the neutral expert cannot 
reach a conclusion. For such cases, the World Bank provides 
assistance in selecting judges with relevant legal expertise to comprise 
the panel that will ultimately issue the final ruling in the dispute.81 
However, the World Bank does not participate itself in the hearings82 
3.2. Human Rights and the World Bank’s Role of “Mediator” 
The World Bank should effectively fulfill its role as the 
“mediator” between India and Pakistan, and should further 
“facilitate” in assuring the protection of basic human rights. For this, 
the World Bank should try to create an opportunity to arrive at a 
mutual consensus on the water conflict between India and Pakistan. 
It should prevent India from breaking or suspending the treaty and 
from blocking river water flowing to Pakistan. If successful this could 
help to protect the “right to access water” for people living around 
the Indus Basin. 
Moreover, if the World Bank is able to stop India from 
constructing dams on the western rivers, then the other basic human 
rights—the access to water for domestic, agriculture, and drinking 
purposes—as well as amenities such as sanitation and health care for 
the rural population, will be protected as well. This population is 
largely reliant on the river water for meeting their aforementioned 
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80 Annexure G, Indus Waters Treaty 1960. 
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needs. Therefore, the role of the World Bank is crucial in protecting 
the basic human rights of the population residing on the Indus Basin 
in Pakistan. The World Bank should take note of this situation and 
place importance on the protection of human rights over other 
economic needs, which are put forth by India as the basis behind 
constructing dams and as a rationale for the Country’s ambition to 
modify the IWT to change the course of rivers toward its lands. 
V. OPTIONS AND PROPOSED STRATEGIES FOR PAKISTAN 
A.  Options Available to Pakistan 
At the moment, there are three options available to Pakistan. 
 1.  Bilateral Talks 
The first option is that Pakistan can accept India’s offer83 and 
try to resolve the conflict bilaterally. For this purpose, Pakistan would 
need to provide opportunities for sessions of dialogues with India. 
Both countries can assign representatives for the discussions and 
decide on IWT related issues mutually. 
 2.  World Bank Mediation 
The second option that is available to Pakistan is approaching 
the World Bank to resolve the water conflict with India. The World 
Bank has the role of a mediator,84 but not an arbitrator or guarantor,85 
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for matters involving the IWT; therefore, the World Bank’s role is 
limited as it can only propose ways for the countries to resolve the 
water conflict as the mediator in negotiations, but ultimately lacks any 
real enforcement ability..86 
Currently, the World Bank has appointed a special envoy to 
hold meetings with officials of both countries in an attempt to 
establish a bilateral dialogue between the two regarding the IWT.87 
Pakistan can accept the suggestions of the envoy to maintain the 
dialogue with India so that both countries can agree on certain 
points; the envoy may also be present during the dialogue meetings, if 
both countries permit such, to avoid any severe disagreements 
between the officials of the two states. However, if consensus is not 
reached, Pakistan can either request the World Bank to appoint a 
neutral expert, whose judgment will be binding on both states, or 
alternatively, Pakistan may take its case to the Court of Arbitration. 
 3.  Approaching China 
The third and last option for Pakistan is to request its closest 
ally, China, to pressure India to not obstruct water flow in the 
western rivers. The water that flows into a major Indian river — the 
Brahamaputra — comes from the Yarling Tsango river in China.88 As 
a result, China has the upper riparian position and India is the lower 
riparian state in this river system.89 It is pertinent to mention here 
that China has already blocked one tributary, which had flows from 
China’s Tibet region and had previously reached the Brahmaputra, 
for the construction of a hydroelectricity project.90 If China stops all 
of the major tributaries’ flow of water to India this would threaten 
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India’s crop production in the Assam and Arunachal Pradesh states, 
both of which are dependent on these rivers’ for water.91 
Nonetheless, Pakistan can exercise its option to push China 
to stop the flow of its river water to India if favorable results do not 
come from World Bank arbitration attempts. Being a staunch 
supporter of human rights, Pakistan cannot deprive the population of 
India the basic human right of “access to water”; however, if India 
attempts to steal this basic human right from the Pakistani people, 
who are dependent on the Indus River and other western rivers, then 
Pakistan may have to utilize this third option to ensure its own 
survival. 
B. A Proposed Strategy for Pakistan 
To clarify its position, Pakistan should cooperate with the 
World Bank’s special envoy and show its willingness to hold talks 
with India. This will demonstrate a positive and peaceful image of 
Pakistan. 
Pakistan should officially provide notice to the World Bank 
of the human rights violations that could arise from India’s 
construction of dams and blockage of water flow from the western 
rivers, so that they may then appoint a neutral expert or refer the 
conflict to the Court of Arbitration to resolve it in accordance with 
the IWT’s principles under a proper jurisdiction.92 In this regard, 
Pakistan’s showing of the violation of human rights needs to be in 
accordance with the human rights endorsements provided by the UN 
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Stockholm 
Declaration, the Dublin Statement, and other international 
conventions, which categorize the “right to access water” as one of 
the most fundamental human rights; one which must be provided to 
all human beings. 
Furthermore, should share with the Court of Arbitration – if 
the dispute reaches to the Court for hearing – the current statistics 
                                                 
91 Aziz Zafar Azad, Indus Water Treaty and India’s Agitation, DAILY JANG, 
December 18, 2016. 
92 Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum rivers. 
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related to the total number of people that would lose access to water 
if India blocks river waters flowing into Pakistan.  
In addition, Pakistan must also stress the totality of the size 
of the Agrarian area of two million acres93 that will be directly 
affected by India’s harmful conduct; this conduct includes the 
construction of dams on the Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus rivers and 
the current work being done in the Ratle, Wuller, and Sawalkot 
projects.94 All of these projects have the potential to affect water flow 
in the Jhelum and Chenab rivers.95 Pakistan should emphasize the 
need to halt these projects or even just change the design of these 
projects so that affected rivers could still provide adequate quantities 
of water to the Pakistani people to use for drinking, domestic, and 
irrigation purposes. 
Pakistan should also express its fears related to the violations 
of human rights and international law arising from the revocation or 
cancellation of the IWT96 The Country should point out that the 
revocation of the treaty could give birth to another, and potentially 
even more intense, conflict between India and Pakistan. The 
unbearable severity of the conflict that would arise could create 
warlike situations with detrimental consequences for the South Asian 
region, especially because both countries possess nuclear weapons97 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The “access to water” has been universally recognized as 
being one of the most fundamental human rights. All human beings 
should have access to an adequate water supply for consumption, 
irrigation, sanitation, and domestic purposes. Most international 
                                                 
93 Bilal Shafiq, Atomic Pakistan and Indus Water Treaty, DUNIYA, December 
2016. 
94 A.K. Chaturvedi, Water: A Source for Future Conflicts, 164 (VIJ BOOKS 
INDIA PVT LTD, 2013). 
95 Id. 
96 Sartaj Aziz, Revocation of Indus Waters Treaty can be taken as an act of war, 
DAWN, September 27, 2016, https://www.dawn.com/news/1286437, (last visited 
2 April 2017). 
97 Id. 
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states have signed the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the Political Declaration, the ICCPR, the United 
Nations Watercourses Convention, and other relevant declarations;98 
therefore, these states should express their approval of basic human 
rights, including the right to access water, and no state should cause 
the hindrance of such for any other state’s residents.  
However, India is harboring ambitions that are otherwise in 
compliance with international declarations on human rights. For 
instance, India plans to build dams on its western rivers, which are 
allocated to its neighboring country, Pakistan, for hydroelectric 
power generation. Although, the power generation projects can be 
good for the public of India, simultaneously, these projects deprive 
the people of Pakistan, and residents of the Punjab region especially, 
the “right to access water.”99 Therefore, India’s actions constitute a 
human rights violation. 
The World Bank should play the role of “facilitator,” to 
mediate and lessen tensions between India and Pakistan, as it did in 
the past when the World Bank facilitated the promulgation of the 
IWT in the 1960’s100 Without mediation, it may be difficult for the 
two states to reach a consensus. However, resolution of this conflict 
is vital to the region for the retention of peace and to ensure the 
protection of residents’ fundamental human rights, including the 
fundamental human right to access water.  
 
                                                 
98 Draft Political Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on 
Antimicrobial Resistance, 2 (UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 2016). 
99 Russ Wellen, Will Pakistan Counter India’s “Water bomb” With a Nuclear 
Bomb? FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, December 31, 2011, 
http://fpif.org/will_pakistan_counter_indias_water_bomb_with_a_nuclear_bomb 
(last viewed December 24, 2016). 
100 Fact Sheet: the Indus Waters Treaty 1960 and the World Bank, THE 
WORLD BANK – WORLDBANK.ORG, January 24, 2017, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/brief/fact-sheet-the-indus-waters-
treaty-1960-and-the-world-bank, (last visited 3 April 2017). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(“RCEP”)1 is a proposed free trade agreement (“FTA”) between the 
ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(“ASEAN”) (Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and the 
six states with which ASEAN has existing FTA’s (Australia, China, 
India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand). The RCEP 
negotiations were formally launched in November 2012 at the 
ASEAN Summit in Cambodia, and the 10th round of negotiations 
ended in South Korea around early October 2015. 
RCEP members originally agreed to conclude all the 
negotiations by the end of 2015, but they failed to do so. As of May 
2017, they are still in the process of negotiating. Among the many 
working groups involved in the negotiations, the investment working 
group has showed the slowest progress; its members simply debating 
over the framework that should be chosen for listing the reservations 
of the investment treaty. That is, for the last four years, they have 
done nothing but debate the framework of the reservation list2 and 
have agreed on nothing in text. 
This raises the question of why host nations (i.e. countries 
inviting and receiving foreign investment) pay so much attention to 
the framework of the reservation list? They probably do so because 
the reservation list is the most realistic and practical instrument that a 
                                                 
1 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, DEPARTMENT OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE (2017), http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/ 
rcep/pages/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership.aspx (last visited May 
23, 2017). 
2 There are two approaches for preparing a reservation list. One is the 
negative list approach (“top-down” approach), which lists exceptions to the general 
obligation of the main text of a treaty; the other is the positive list approach 
(“bottom-up” approach or “GATS” approach), which lists the specific sectors to 
which the general obligation applies. An advantage of the positive list approach is 
that it gives a greater level of discretion over what to include and when. Politically 
sensitive industries can be kept outside the scope of the agreement. The negative 
list approach can automatically include new types of investment, while the positive 
list approach cannot. See Preserving flexibility in IIA’s: The Use of Reservation, 
UNCDAD series on International Investment Policies for Development, 2006. 
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host nation can use to carve out regulatory power, given their 
tendency for less developed negotiation skills and unequal bargaining 
power. The host nations are usually developing nations which do not 
have a legal department sophisticated enough to fully analyze and 
examine the investment treaties. Moreoever, they lack training 
programs and human resources to competently negotiate the treaties.3 
The beauty of the International Investment Agreement 
(“IIA”) lies in the way it balances the regulatory power of host 
nations with investor protection. The host nations do their utmost to 
carve out maximum domestic sovereignty, and home nations do their 
best to protect their investors.4 
                                                 
3 Zeng Huaqun, Balance, Sustainable Development, and Integration: Innovative 
Path for BIT Practice, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L, 299, 302-304 (2014) (explains that BIT 
gives home states a negotiating advantage since the party who drafts the model 
controls the negotiation. On the contrary, most of the host nations are suffering 
from unequal bargaining power and low negotiation skills in a negotiation because 
they have not prepared model BITs. Therefore, their position is merely accepting 
or slightly modifying to a model BIT prepared by home states’ negotiating partner. 
Only a few host states have prepared their model BITs and these are heavily 
influenced by the model BIT of home nations); see also M. Sornarajah, The 
International Law on Foreign Investment, 207-208 (Cambridge University Press, 
2004)(the book points out that it is hard to expect host nations to have a legal 
department sophisticated enough to understand and analyze the nuances in the 
variations of the terms used in IIA). 
4 See e.g. Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of 
International Investment Agreements 13 J. INT’L ECON. L, 1037, 1071 (2010)(Argues that 
general exceptions clauses and new preambular language provide flexibility. The 
article classifies three types of general exceptions clauses found in IIA’s. The new 
preambular languages could include some non-investment policy objectives such as 
labor or environment protection.); Zeng Huaqun, Balance, Sustainable Development, 
and Integration: Innovative Path for BIT Practice, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L, 299, 324 (2014) 
(Classifies three types of goals- 1) balance 2) sustainable development 3) 
integration- that IIA’s should pursue. The article introduces the idea that the 
Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (hereinafter “IPFSD”) 
emphasizes the insertion of “special and differential treatment (SDT)”. It pointed 
out that SDT provisions could be an option where a negotiating party to an IIA has 
significantly different levels of development, especially when one of the parties is a 
less developed country); Joshua Boone, How Countries Can Adapt Current Bilateral 
Investment Treaties to Provide Benefits to Their Domestic Economies 187 GLOBAL BUS. L. 
REV.187, 196-7 (2011) (explains the importance of modifying the Performance-
Based Requirement provisions. The article notes that Performance-based 
requirements such as technology transfers or limitations to technology licensing 
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However, there has been much criticism that many IIA’s 
which are being ratified are biased towards investor protection. The 
claim is that these ratified IIA’s are being drafted in favor of 
protecting investors rather than securing policy spaces in the host 
nations. This is due to home nations negotiating based on their 
model bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), aiming for a high level 
of market opening and liberalization.5 They try their best to persuade 
host nations not to deviate from any terms in the Model BIT, and ask 
them to carve out as little as possible. The host nations lack the 
bargaining power and negotiation skills necessary to modify the 
Model BIT and, thus, accept most of the terms therein. It is well 
                                                 
fees are probably the most powerful regulation methods for host nations. These 
help to establish new markets, increase efficiency and production within new 
domestic markets because they allow for the host nation to use, acquire, produce 
and adapt the foreign technology. All these can be done by not prohibiting 
performance based requirements through modifying IIA); Markus Wagner, 
Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law 36 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 3, 35-53 (2014) (The article compares the WTO dispute settlement system 
in cases concerning human, animal or plant life, or health protection with 
international investment regimes. The article suggests that international trade and 
investment law can offer insights for one another. While international trade has 
been more adept at incorporating health or environmental concerns, changes in 
IIA’s should close the gap. Particularly, the article argues that such policy space 
over health and environmental issues could be done through a provision of 
expropriation in IIA). 
5 Lei Cai, Where does China Stand: The Evolving National Treatment Standard in 
BITs? 13 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE, 373 384  (2012)(addresses how host 
nations merely accept the terms in the Model BITs due to their low bargaining 
power. “Based on Guzman’s “prisoner’s dilemma” theory, the host nations 
compete with each other to attract foreign investment. As a result, they are 
frequently at a disadvantaged position with poor bargaining power in the 
negotiation process and thereby compelled to accept the model BIT proposed by 
the home states”); Amit M. Sachdeva, International Investment: A Developing Country 
Perspective 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 533, 547 (2007)(Argues that IIA’s 
result in a substantial reduction in regulatory power in host nations. The article 
points out that well regulated national policy is what they actually needed. Neo 
liberalism policy through IIA leads a reduction of infant indigenous industry and all 
of these issues are difficult to overcome by host nations because of their low 
bargaining power in IIA negotiation). 
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known that most ratified IIA’s are extremely similar in appearance, 
and almost identical to the terms in the model BIT.6 
On this basis, host nations believe that the reservation list 
framework is a practical and realistic solution to carve out and 
protect their regulatory powers.  Host nations devote meticulous care 
to negotiating a reservation list,7 rather than the main text. In 
particular, their concerns focus on the framework or modality of the 
reservation list. 
The framework is either a positive,8 or negative list.9 A 
positive list inserts domestic measures that conform to the main 
obligations of the treaty, while a negative list inserts non-conforming 
measures (i.e. exceptions to the main text), with all other unlisted 
measures automatically following the obligations of the main text. In 
principle, these two frameworks should yield the same legal 
consequences.   
                                                 
6 Huaqun, Supra note 3 at 324 (explains that most BITs follow either the 
Draft International Convention on Investments Abroad or OECD 1967 Draft 
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. Because of the common 
origins, the terms used in BITs look remarkably similar across countries. This 
similarity is due to the ‘innate’ priority of home nations and also reflects the 
historically weak and passive positions of host nations as contracting parties in 
IIA’s); see also Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties 33 BROOKLYN J. INT’L. L. 405, 415-416 (2008) (explains 
that home nations have long been preoccupied with persuading host nations to 
provide certain treatments such as MFN, National Treatment, Fair and Equitable 
Treatment, which all yield a high level of liberalization). 
7 IIA’s consist of two parts: the main text and the reservation list. While 
the main text in the IIA’s determine the overall obligations (and rights) of both 
parties, the reservation list includes either conforming measures to the obligation of 
the main text (positive list) or non-conforming measures (negative list). 
8 A positive list approach means the positive listing of sectors, sub-
sectors and individual modes of supply in which countries voluntarily undertake 
liberalization commitments. The selective nature of liberalization under this 
approach implies that the treaties’ obligations apply only to the activities listed in a 
country’s schedule and solely on the terms described therein. 
9 Under the negative list, countries agree on a set of obligations in the 
main text and list all domestic measures for which such obligations do not apply. 
That is, the measures that do not appear in reservation lists are automatically under 
the effect of obligations in the main treaty text. Thus, this approach is most 
appropriate in countries aiming for a high degree of liberalization. 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:2 
404 
To address why this is so, this article employs a behavioral 
approach. This article seeks to answer the question of why 
negotiators have different preferences regarding the two frameworks. 
Fortunately, a few scholars have taken initial steps in determining the 
methodological foundations of behavioral international law and 
economics,10 and thus have examined how behavioral law and 
economics can be applied to international law.11 
Using the theoretical foundation of behavioral international 
law and economics, this article primarily argues that host nations 
strongly prefer a positive list over a negative list as they know that 
they have limited cognitive capacities to fully collect and analyze the 
existing domestic measures and determine which ones to carve out. 
Simply put, they know they are suffering from bounded rationalityin 
                                                 
10 Anne van Aaken, Behavioral International Law and Economics 55 HARV. 
INT’L L. J. 421,421-481 (2014); Tomer Broude, Behavioral International Law, 163 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 1099, 1099-1056 (2015). 
11 In fact, the rational choice approach to international law has been 
widely accepted and the rational approach was recently applied to the field of 
international investment law. However, while the rational choice paradigm has been 
thoroughly challenged in the field of economics since the 1970’s and has changed a 
significant part of economics, challenges to the rational choice paradigm have not 
been systematically explored in the field of international law. . The literature of 
international law never responded to this challenges of the rational choice and thus, 
there is no systematic analysis of international law using behavioral economics. For 
more references in applying rational choice to the field of international law. See 
generally Robert E. Scott & Paul Stephan, The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory 
and the Enforcement of International law (2006); Joel P. Trachtman, The 
Economic Structure of International Law(2008); Eric Posner & Alan O. Sykes, 
Economic Foundations of International law(2013), Andrew Guzman, How 
International Law works: A Rational Choice Theory(2008); For more reference in 
applying rational choice to the field of international investment law, See Anne van 
Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract 
Theory 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 507 (2009) (argues that Contract theory could be 
utilized in IIA’s. The author points out that Contract theory has been applied to 
international trade law, but investment law has not yet been applied to IIA’s. IIA’s 
may be regarded as a mechanism for overcoming commitment problems between 
investors and host nations for mutual and reciprocal benefits. Contract theory deals 
with the uncertainty problem and could solve this issue); For more references on 
the literature of behavioral economics, See generally, Nick Wilkinson & Matthias 
Klaes, An Introduction to Behavioral Economics (2012); Matthew Rabin, 
Psychology and Economics, 36 J. Econ. Lit. 11 (1998). 
2017 Park 5:2 
405 
the drafting of the negative list.12  This article does not seek to 
present a normative argument regarding the framework that should 
be used in BITs, it simply seeks to indicate why negotiating partners 
show different preferences regarding frameworks, which in theory, 
yield the same legal consequences. In addition, the article does not 
pinpoint the types of bounded rationality from which the host 
nations are suffering, it merely argues that the negotiators are 
experiencing trouble processing the limited information available to 
maximize their profits by drafting the reservation list under the 
negative list. 
II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
A.  Reservation Lists in IIA’s  
A positive approach means there is a positive listing of 
sectors, sub-sectors, and individual modes of supply in which 
countries voluntarily undertake liberalization commitments. The 
selective nature of liberalization under this approach implies that a 
treaty’s obligations apply only to the activities listed in a country’s 
schedule and solely to the terms described therein. 
Alternatively, negotiating partners may utilize a negative list 
approach. In this case, countries agree on a set of obligations in the 
main text and list all domestic measures for which such obligations 
do not apply. That is, the measures that do not appear in reservation 
lists are automatically subject to the obligations in the main treaty 
text. Thus, this approach is most appropriate for countries aiming for 
a high degree of liberalization. 
                                                 
12 Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 199 199 (2006); (Bounded rationality, an idea first introduced by 
Herbert Simon, refers to the obvious fact that human cognitive abilities are not 
infinite. We have limited computational skills and seriously flawed memories. 
People can respond sensibly to these failings; thus it might be said that people 
sometimes respond rationally to their own cognitive limitations, minimizing the 
sum of decision costs and error costs. To deal with our limited memories we make 
lists; to deal with our limited brain power and time we use mental shortcuts and 
rules of thumb; but even with these remedies, and in some cases because of these 
remedies, human behavior differs in systematic ways from that predicted by the 
standard economic model of unbounded rationality. Even when the use of mental 
shortcuts is rational, it can produce predictable mistakes). 
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In summary, in a positive list schedule, a party sets out the 
sectors it has agreed will be covered by the relevant rules in the main 
text and if a sector is not stated in the list, it is not subject to those 
rules. In a negative list schedule, a party sets out those sectors or 
measures that are not subject to the relevant rules in the main text 
and if a sector; activity; or measure is not listed, then it is 
automatically covered (unless it has been excluded in the text itself). 
In theory, both approaches yield the same result in terms of 
liberalization. 
 1. Positive List Approach  
This approach recognizes four “modes” of trading in 
services: across the border (e.g. the Internet); consumption abroad 
(e.g. tourism); establishing a commercial presence (foreign direct 
investment (“FDI”)); and temporary presence of a natural person to 
deliver a service. Governments can make different levels of 
commitment for each mode in relation to market access and national 
treatment rules. 
Sector or sub-
sector 
Limitations on 
market access 
Limitations on 
national treatment 
Additional 
commitments 
8. HEALTH-
RELATED 
SERVICES 
   
Hospital 
Services (9311) 
(1) None 
(2) None 
(3) Unbound 
(4) None 
(Registration and 
Certification) 
(1)None 
(2)None 
(3)None 
(4)None13 
 
 
  Different entries under numbers 1 to 4 indicate the approach 
the government is taking to each of the four “modes of supply‟ for 
each service. When a country does not wish to limit or restrict market 
                                                 
13 For a detailed explanation of drafting a positive list, see  
http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/CBP/GENERAL%20PRINCIPLES%20&%20GUIDE
LINES%20ON%20SCHEDULING%20SERVICES%20COMMITMENTS.pdf 
(accessed May 23 2017). 
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access or national treatment in a sector or subsector in any of the 
four modes of supply, it uses the word “None”, which indicates that 
there are “no limitations.” So, for instance, in the chart above, a full 
commitment using “None” means the country cannot restrict access 
to its market of foreign suppliers who want to supply any aspect of 
hospital services (9311) through modes 1 and 2 by using any of the 
market access measures that are specifically prohibited. If a country 
decides to restrict market access through Mode 3, thereby protecting 
the hospital services market, the word “Unbound”, meaning no 
bound commitments, is used in the column to block FDI by foreign 
investors looking to establish a hospital business. 
If a country wants to commit to a sector, but only under 
certain circumstances or in a particular way, it needs to clearly spell 
out the limitations that it wants to maintain. For instance, if a country 
wanted to open the market only with respect to the registration and 
certification of the hospital services, it could stipulate that limitation 
in a column. In that way, foreign investors with temporary stay 
authority would have an opportunity to work in the area of 
registration and certification in hospitals. As noted above, the 
obligations of the main text apply to the measures that are listed in 
the column. If the country decided not to list the hospital services 
area, then the government would have no obligations to comply with 
the main text with respect to hospital services.   
 2. Negative List Approach  
Under the negative listing approach, the main features of the 
non-conforming measures must be specified in detail. These 
measures include the following elements: the economic sector in 
which the reservation is taken; the specific industry in which the 
reservation is taken; the activity covered by the reservation; the 
substantial or procedural obligation to which the reservation is taken 
(e.g. MFN or national treatment); and a description of the specific 
law, regulation, or other measure for which the reservation is taken. 
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The following is an example of a reservation list in the Korea-India 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (“CEPA”).14 
Sector Manufacture of Chemical 
Products  
Sub-Sector Manufacture of Biological 
Products  
Industry 
Classification 
KSIC 24212 Manufacture of 
Biological Products 
Type of Reservation Performance Requirements 
(Article 10.5) 
Reservation Measure Pharmaceutical Affairs Act 
(Law No. 8552, February. 29, 
2008), Article 42 
Enforcement Regulations of 
the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act 
(Ordinance of the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare No. 71, 
October. 16, 2008), Article 21  
Description A person who manufactures 
blood products must procure 
raw blood materials from a 
blood management body in 
Korea.15  
  The above example shows that Korea reserves the right not to 
comply with the investment treaty obligations regarding performance 
requirements with respect to Indian investors’ manufacturing 
chemical products in Korea. Because of this reservation, foreign 
manufacturers of blood products in Korea must procure raw blood 
materials from a blood management body in Korea, . 
                                                 
14 The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (the CEPA) is 
a free trade agreement between India and South Korea. CEPA was signed on 
August 7, 2009. The signing ceremony took place in Seoul and the Agreement was 
signed by the Indian Commerce Minister, Sharma, and South Korean Commerce 
Minister, Kim Jong-Hoon. The negotiations took three-and-a-half years, with the 
first session being held in February 2006. The agreement was passed in the South 
Korean Parliament on 6 November 2009. Available at http://commerce. 
nic.in/trade/INDIA%20KOREA%20CEPA%202009.pdf (Last visited May 25, 
2017). 
15 Id. 
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The negative list may consist of several annexes and 
reservations for future measures.16 These may be listed in Annex II 
(reservations for future measures), in addition to the current domestic 
measures, which are usually listed in Annex I (reservations for 
existing measures). Annex II sets out the economic sector and the 
activities where new restrictive measures can be implemented in the 
future. For example, if a country believes that it may implement some 
laws within the steel industry in the future, they would list the sector, 
without having to provide any information about domestic measures 
in Annex II. 
B. Behavioral International Law and Economics  
Recent literature has reconciled international law with the 
field of behavioral economics to establish behavioral international 
law and economics (“BIntLE”). BIntLE is the study of “how states 
really behave.”17 It explains how behavioral assumptions may change 
the strategies of states and negotiators, as well as the outcomes of 
games. Some scholars employ three categories to explain the 
foundations of BIntLE: the economic analysis of international law, 
behavioral economics, and psychological approaches in international 
relations.18The scholars believe that the three areas can complement 
each other and reveal new insights into the behavior of actors in 
international law. For instance, behavioral economics can enrich the 
economic analysis of international law. 
                                                 
16 In addition to Annex I (Reservation for Existing Measures) and Annex 
II (Reservation for Future Measures), there are more annexes that can be drafted, 
as agreed by negotiating partners. For instance,  under NAFTA, Mexico has an 
Annex III (Activities reserved to the State) which reserves measures governing the 
regulations of activities reserved to the State as decreed in the Mexican 
Constitution (primarily in the oil and gas sector). The unique nature of Annex III is 
that it has no requirement to specify the exact nature of non-conforming measures 
maintained in sectors like Annex II. Another example is the Annex on Exceptions 
from MFN. This annex carves out a number of sectors from MFN treatment (as 
opposed to individual measures as per Annex I). Thus, this Annex gives greater 
flexibility of reservations, allowing host nations to secure whole industries (e.g. 
“steel”) without the level of specificity applied to Annex I. For more reference, see 
UNCDAD,  Supra note 2. 
17 Aaken, Supra note 9 at 439. 
18 Id. at 424. 
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Some caveats with respect to applying individual decision 
theory to international law should be discussed as a preliminary 
matter because generally, the actor in international law is assumed to 
be the state. 
The application of behavioral economics to international law 
depends on who the actor to be analyzed is. In other words, it is 
uncertain whether we could apply individual decision theory to the 
state and consider the factors in applying that theory to the 
international sphere. There is no clear answer to this problem in 
relevant literature since commentators are not sure who really acts in 
international law.19 Both international organizations and individuals 
contribute to the implementation of international law, but the direct 
applicability of individual decision-making is in question. Some argue 
that individual decision theory is directly applicable to international 
judges, arbitrators, and treaty negotiators since they are individuals.20 
However, others counter by saying that the behavior of elites in 
making decisions seems to be different from that of the normal 
population, where various types of biases are concerned. This is 
because elites tend to have higher levels of trust and cooperation 
skills.21 That is, the behavior of judges and treaty negotiators may 
differ from that of general participants in the experimental lab. 
The application of BIntLE to IIA’s is still at an early stage. 
Some analysts have begun research how the proliferation of IIA’s can 
be interpreted in the field of behavioral economics. They argue that 
host nations’ irrational decisions in signing IIA’s arise from their 
“over-optimism” that IIA’s will support their economic growth.22 
They want to believe that signing IIA’s will help attract FDI, which, 
in turn, will boost a country’s economy. However, once they face an 
                                                 
19 Id. at 441. 
20 Id. at 443. 
21 See Emily M. Hafner –Burton et al, The Cognition and the Political 
Psychology of Elite Decision Making, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 369 369 (2013) (Arguing that 
experienced policy elites differ from inexperienced subjects in how they make 
decisions, rooted in “sophistication,” a learned skill that is derived from experience 
and tends to be greater in elite than non-elite populations). 
22 Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Bounded Rationality and the Diffusion of 
Modern Investment Treaties, 58 INT’L STUD. Q. 1, 5 (2014) 
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investor-state dispute claim, they may realize that they made their 
decisions without any consideration of a cost-benefit analysis.23 
Historically, the literature for this subject has never touched 
on the application of the behavioral approach to the decision-making 
process of investment treaty negotiators. Investment treaty 
negotiators are imperfect, irrational human beings and behavioral 
economics would have many implications for the negotiations. This 
article is the first to raise the behavioral issue in the context of 
investment treaty negotiators. The following section will argue that 
the bounded rationality problem arises especially when host nations 
draft the reservation list in the form of a negative list. 
III. APPLYING THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW  
This section illustrates why home and host nations have 
different preferences regarding the reservation list framework. The 
first part argues that host nations prefer the positive list to the 
negative list because they know that preparing the negative list will 
result in self-suffering due to the bounded rationality problem. The 
second part of this section examines various real world examples of 
how host nations end up with incomplete and defective negative lists, 
and their negative consequences when attracting investments. These 
consequences explain why host nations avoid the negative approach. 
A.   Bounded Rationality in the Choice of Reservation List 
Framework   
Bounded rationality, an idea introduced by Herbert Simon, 
refers to the finiteness of human cognitive abilities. People have 
limited computational skills and seriously flawed memories, but they 
can respond sensibly to these failings. Thus, it could be said that 
people sometimes respond rationally to their own cognitive 
limitations, minimizing the sum of decision costs and error costs. 
People deal with limited memories, they make lists, and to deal with 
                                                 
23 Id. at 12. 
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limited brainpower and time, they use mental shortcuts and rules of 
thumb.24 
The point of bounded rationality is not that people might 
decide differently if they have more information or different 
information, or decide differently with different items in the utility 
function. Rather, the point is that they would not be able to process 
all of the information even if they had it. Thus, if we are to predict 
people’s actions, it is not enough to know the amount or quality of 
available information, we must also know what the cognitive process 
entails for selecting information and choosing rules of thumb. 
There are various types of bounded rationality. For instance, 
the framing effect25 relates to situations where people favor option A 
when a question or problem is posed in one way but favor option B 
when the same problem is posed in a different way. The endowment 
effect26 is another example of bounded rationality which leads 
                                                 
24 Jolls & Sunstein,  Supra note 12, 199. 
25 The framing effect is an example of cognitive bias in which people 
react to a particular choice in different ways depending on how it is presented; e.g. 
as a loss or as a gain. People tend to avoid risk when a positive frame is presented 
but seek risks when a negative frame is presented. Gain and loss are defined in the 
scenario as descriptions of outcomes (e.g. lives lost or saved, disease patients 
treated and not treated, lives saved and lost during accidents, etc.). See e.g. Tversky 
et al. The Causes of Preference Reversal, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 358-361 (1990); Wansink et 
al. Mindless Eating and Healthy Heuristics for the Irrational, 99 AM. ECON. REV 165-9 
(2009)(argues that people’s eating habits including quantity consumed, can be 
affected by the size of plates, packages or serving bowl used); Amos Tversky & 
Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 
453, 455 (1981); Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping 
Bounded Rationality  58 AM. PSYCHOL. 697, 703 (2003). 
26 In a traditional sense, the endowment effect is described as one’s 
preference to place a higher value on objects one owns relative to objects one does 
not own. This is evidenced by the experiment of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler. 
In other words, willingness to accept (“WTA”) as a seller is higher than willingness 
to pay (“WTP”) as a buyer. Many researchers have conducted experiments that 
support this finding using different goods such as wine, chocolates, and basketball 
tickets. The most common explanation for the endowment effect is loss aversion. 
Simply put, a disutility from losing something is greater than the utility from 
acquiring that same thing; therefore WTA is higher than WTP. See generally  
Kahneman, D. et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem 
98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325,1325-1348 (1990); For reference on experiment with wine, See 
Van Dijk, E., & Van Knippenberg, D., Trading Wine: On the Endowment Effect, Loss 
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individuals to value goods differently depending on whether or not 
they possess them. If they already possess the goods, the individuals 
value them higher than they would if they were not in their 
possession. In other words, the people who have the goods at their 
disposal show greater willingness to pay for them than the people 
who do not have them at their disposal. 
The “status quo bias” explains that individuals tend not to 
deviate from their original positions. Depending on how the default 
is set, people make different choices because they simply have a 
tendency to not change their decisions.27 Organ donation, for 
instance, can be set up on an opt-in (no donation by default) or an 
opt-out (donation by default) basis. For example, an empirical study 
has shown that an opt-in default leads to fewer individuals making 
donations than an opt-out design.28 Last but not least, “over-
optimism”29 shows that people are, on average, overconfident about 
their future and about their predictions for their future. This relates 
not only to their own situations and capacities, but also to their 
evaluations of their control over a given situation. 
Host nations are well aware of their limited capacity to fully 
analyze domestic measures and prepare the optimal reservation list in 
the form of a negative list. In order to prepare a negative list, they 
should have the full capacity to examine all existing domestic 
measures in their nations and precisely determine which measures to 
                                                 
Aversion, and the Comparability of Consumer Goods 19 J. Econ. Psychol. 579, 579-597 
(2009); For reference on experiment with chocolate, See Knetsch J.L., The 
Endowment Effects and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 
1277, 1277-1284 (1989); For reference on experiment with basketball tickets, See 
Carmon, Z. & Ariely, D., Focusing on the Forgone: Why Value Can Appear so Different to 
Buyers and Sellers, 27 J. Consumer Res. 360, 360-370 (2000). 
27 Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions 
About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008). 
28  Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives? 302 SCI. 
1338, 1338 (2003). 
29  See generally Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life 
Events, 39 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 806 (1980) For more detail on studies of 
excess optimism, see Marie Helweg-Larsen & James A. Shepperd,  Do Moderators of 
the Optimistic Bias Affect Personal or Target Risk Estimates? A Review of the Literature,  5 
PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 74 74 (2001). 
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list. In principle, under the rational choice model,30 rational 
negotiators would easily achieve this maximized result. With their 
infinite cognitive ability, the rational negotiators would analyze all the 
data and information regarding the domestic measures perfectly, and 
distinguish the non-conforming measures without error. They could 
produce an optimal reservation list by perfectly examining the 
domestic measures without any errors and figure out which one 
should be carved out from the present IIA. This optimal reservation 
list would maximize the gains of host nations and indicate to foreign 
investors exactly which measures had been carved out from the 
treaty. The imposition of carve-outs and specificities on the 
reservation list would be optimal for attracting foreign investments. 
However, host nations know they cannot produce the 
optimal reservation list under the negative approach. They fully 
recognize the variety of cognitive problems associated with 
processing the data and information. They know they have 
insufficient information available to create an optimal reservation list 
that would maximize domestic profits. The limited access of host 
nations to resources makes it difficult to collect all of the required 
data and fully predict what measures should be carved-out from the 
main text. For example, host nations may face extreme difficulties in 
obtaining cooperation from other line ministries.31 Of course, there 
                                                 
30 The research of applying rational choice perspective under Contract 
theory to International law is accelerating. A classic definition of rationality by Gary 
Becker: “All human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who 
maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal 
amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets”. The central 
principles of Rationality are thus, utility maximization, stable preferences, rational 
expectations and optimal processing of information. Applying Rational choice to 
international law is basically transferring these principles to collective actors such as 
states or international organizations. It is assumed that potential biases cancel each 
other out on the aggregate level or do not even occur within corporate actors) See 
generally Kenneth Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for 
International Lawyers (1989) 14 YALE J. INT L L. 335, 348-54 (discussing 
methodology in international relations theory that is relevant for this paper); Jeffrey 
L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law (1999) 24 
YALE J. INT’L L. 1 ; Jack L. GoldSmith & Eric A. Posner, The limits of 
International law (2005); Anne van Aaken, To Do Away with International Law? Some 
Limits to ‘The Limits of International Law’ 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 289 (2016). 
31 People debate whether trade representatives should be placed under 
the Ministry of trade (or foreign affairs) or a part of the executive office of the 
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are exceptions when the negotiation team has strong political power 
and is prioritized, such as the United States Trade Representative 
(“USTR”),32 which is a part of the Executive Branch of the United 
States Government. However, almost all negotiators from host 
nations experience difficulties in cooperating with line ministries, 
especially with respect to collecting measures for the preparation of a 
reservation list. For instance, a negotiation team under a Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs or Trade may send a request to the Ministry of Land 
to prepare a reservation list, with respect to land measures, because it 
has no expertise in this area. However, in many cases, the Ministry of 
Land frequently postpones submitting the reservation list to the 
negotiation team because it is simply not one of its principal 
functions. Thus, even if the domestic measures are easily obtainable 
by line ministries, the administrative inefficiencies and lack of 
cooperation between ministries may become big hurdles to listing the 
measures in the reservation list. 
Because of their incapacity to fully analyze and prepare the 
reservation list, negotiators frequently fail to insert the reserving 
sector that they would otherwise have to insert in the reservation list. 
They sometimes leave blank the domestic measures section of the 
reserving sector or stipulate unspecified domestic measures such as a 
law without specific article numbers. 
                                                 
President. Many suggest host developing countries conduct structure reform of the 
trade representative so that it becomes an independent entity under the executive 
office of the President see e.g. Kim, supra note 20, at 69 (argues that Korea’s 
current negotiation agency under Ministry of Trade lacks: the mechanism through 
which the opinions of the interested-party are transmitted to the agency; the 
mechanism of checks and balances between the parliament and the agency; the lack 
of a horizontal decision-making process. The article ultimately argues that Korea’s 
negotiation agency should follow the US model and establish a Korea trade 
representative). 
32 The USTR is the United States Government agency responsible for 
developing and recommending United States trade policy to the President of the 
United States, conducting trade negotiations on bilateral and multilateral levels, and 
coordinating trade policy within the Government through the interagency Trade 
Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) and Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG). 
Established as the Office of the Special Trade Representative (STR) under the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the USTR is part of the Executive Office of the 
President. With over 200 employees, the USTR has offices in Geneva, Switzerland, 
and Brussels, Belgium. The current U.S. Trade Representative is Michael Froman, 
who assumed the office on June 21, 2013.  
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These incomplete reservation lists represent a significant loss 
for host nations. The unlisted measures may be critical policy 
measures that should have been carved-out. The unspecified 
measures or blanks in the reservation lists make it difficult for foreign 
investors to draw permissible boundaries for their investments, which 
can reduce transparency and predictability for foreign investments. 
In short, host nations are fully aware of their limited capacity 
to conclude a benefit-maximizing reservation list in the form of the 
negative list. They also recognize the negative consequences 
associated with an incomplete and defective reservation list in the 
form of the negative list. 
In this regard, the positive list is less burdensome because 
host nations do not face any significant pressure in the analysis of 
their measures. If they fail to find a measure, the missed measure 
does not have to comply with the highly liberalized main text. Thus, 
it avoids a high level of liberalizations. There are also no unspecified 
or blank measures in the positive list since the positive list does not 
require the parties to specify the domestic measures. The positive list 
mainly requires the parties to stipulate whether they will open or 
close the market in a certain sector. 
By contrast, home nations strongly prefer the negative list 
because they believe the benefits of such outweigh its costs. Home 
nations expect host nations to open more markets in various sectors 
of the economy so that their foreign investors can make informed 
investment decisions. Knowing that the host nations will fail to 
include many economic sectors in the reservation obligations list of 
the highly liberalized text, home nations will automatically bind all of 
those sectors. They expect all unexamined sectors or measures to 
conform to a main text that aims for high liberalization and market 
openings. 
For instance, if a host nation forgets to list a biotechnology 
sector, this is clearly an advantage for the relevant home nations 
involved because they know that the sector will automatically 
conform to the main text of the treaty, thus achieving high 
liberalization and market openings in the host nations. Of course, the 
negative list has a downside for home nations being that the 
incomplete and defective domestic measures may potentially confuse 
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the investors. For example, if host nations successfully insert the 
biotechnology sector in the negative list, but fail to put the domestic 
measures of the biotechnology sector in the reservation list, foreign 
investors have difficulty finding out which exact local rules have been 
carved-out. However, home nations generally believe that this is a 
minor cost because they anticipate additional benefits from 
unexpected market openings within different sectors of the economy, 
which the host nations failed to take into account. Moreover, home 
nations believe that, to a certain extent, inserting a renegotiation 
clause could cure the incomplete and defective domestic measures in 
the reservation list. In fact, the home nations frequently include the 
renegotiation clause for the host nations to specify and update the 
reservation list.33 
In this respect, home nations do not prefer the positive list 
because their unlisted measures do not have to conform with the 
main text of the relevant treaty. Home nations can no longer 
anticipate the unexpected market opening from host nations’ failure 
to carve-out certain terms that they would get under a negative list 
approach. 
So far, this article has concluded that host nations prefer the 
positive list and avoid selecting the negative list because they suffer 
from the bounded rationality problem, which makes it difficult to 
examine and identify local domestic measures. 
B. Issues with the Negative List – The Incomplete Reservation List  
This section illustrates host nations’ poor drafting tendencies 
with reservation lists and the negative consequences of such, which 
                                                 
33 e.g. Trilateral Investment Agreement between ASEAN, Australia, and 
New Zealand: 
Article 16 Work Program 
1. The Parties shall enter into discussions of 
(a)  schedules of reservations to this Chapter; a 
(b)  treatment of investment in services which does not qualify as commercial 
presence in Chapter 8 (Tradein Services). See also Japan-India Economic 
Partnership Agreement:Article 90.  Reservation and Exceptions. 5. Each Party shall 
endeavour, where appropriate, to reduce or eliminate the exceptions specified in its 
Schedules in Annexes 8 and 9 respectively. 
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in turn, explains why they prefer the positive list. The article will 
classify two types of incomplete reservation lists. 
The first is the missing measures problem which comes in 
two forms, and involves a failure to insert domestic measures. One 
way this may occur is through a host nation’s failure to carve out the 
economic sector itself, for instance, land acquisitions, so the number 
of reservations is less than intended. When this is the case, the host 
nation has no way to insert domestic measures with respect to land 
measures. The other way this occurs is when, even if they do 
successfully carve out a sector, host nations fail to insert domestic 
measures in the reservation list. That is, the domestic measures 
section of the reservation list is left blank. This type of incomplete 
reservation list is the unspecified measures problem. This is the case 
when host nations successfully carve out the economic sector and 
even insert the domestic measures, but the measures are not clear or 
specific enough to draw a clear boundary for permissible 
investments. 
The third type of incomplete reservation list arises from the 
failure to continuously update treaties and their text to reflect any 
amendments. Even if host nations successfully carve out the sector 
and specify the measures, they frequently fail to reflect the 
specifications in the later treaty. This section illustrates these three 
types of problems through examples of IIA’s that demonstrate how 
incomplete reservation lists negatively impact host nations’ ability to 
attract foreign investment. Consequently, this illustration is best 
understood by considering why host nations avoid the negative list. 
 1.  Missing Measures 
The missing measures problem is the predominant reason 
why host nations choose to avoid using the negative list. The 
problem appears when countries leave a blank space in the domestic 
measures section for the reserved sector. The following is an example 
of missing measures in the Singapore-New Zealand Closer Economic 
Partnership (“CEP”): 
Sector:                 Printing & Publishing 
Manufacture & Repair of 
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Transport Equipment 
Power/Energy                                        
Types of Limitation:    National treatment (Article 
29) 
Legal Citation:  
Description:           More favourable treatment 
may be accorded to Singapore 
nationals and the permanent 
residents in the above 
sectors.34                      
  In this reservation list, Singapore tried to carve-out regulatory 
power in the area of Printing & Publishing, Manufacture & Repair of 
Transport, and Equipment Power/Energy. However, a legal citation 
section is missing indicating that Singapore failed to insert the 
domestic laws that reflect the reservation, creating many problems. 
For one, its absence reduces transparency and predictability for 
foreign investors, especially when these investors have no idea what 
domestic measures they should look at before making an investment. 
Also, the legal consequences of the missing measures are not clear. 
Suppose Act A is the law that should be inserted in the above 
reservation list. Should this Act A be covered by the main text? The 
answer is unclear. One may even argue that Act A is not carved-out 
because it was not listed in the reservation list, so it should therefore 
conform with the main text. All these uncertainties make it difficult 
for host nations to attract foreign investment. 
 2. Unspecified Measures  
Host nations sometimes insert domestic measures that are 
not clear or specific enough. For example in the CEP Singapore 
                                                 
34 The CEP entered into force on 1 January 2001. It is the most 
comprehensive trading agreement, outside of the Closer Economic Relations with 
Australia, that New Zealand has negotiated. The CEP aims to build on the close 
historical ties between Singapore and New Zealand by improving opportunities for 
trade in goods, services and investment. The two governments announced their 
intention to negotiate an agreement in September 1999 and negotiations were 
completed within one year. 
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carved out their Companies Act with respect to the establishment, 
reporting, and filing of accounts. However, the legal citation is not 
clear as the article numbers are missing: 
     In the present example, the unspecified measures may 
have a negative effect for the Governments of both Singapore and 
New Zealand. For example the unspecified measures reduce 
transparency and predictability for investors from New Zealand, the 
main readers of the reservation lists, and thus, the Singapore 
Government may have difficulty attracting FDI from New Zealand.36 
New Zealand investors may have difficulty ascertaining legally 
permissible boundaries for investments in Singapore. The Companies 
Act of 1994 includes all sorts of laws and regulations about 
companies, which creates uncertainty in determining whether 
                                                 
35 Id. 
36 See generally UNCTAD, Transparency (UNCTAD Series on Issues in 
International Investment Agreements II) (Unite Nation 2012) (The report has a 
comprehensive analysis of how IIA could enhance transparency and predictability 
for investors. The report examines: the way in which traditional transparency issues 
have been addressed in IIA’s since 2004; the emergence of investor responsibilities 
as a consideration within transparency issues; and the introduction of a 
transparency dimension into investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). In analyzing 
these issues, this report outlines possible sustainable development implications of 
the different transparency-related formulations used in IIA’s and points to some of 
the most progressive provisions that are appearing more frequently in investment 
instruments. The report reviews transparency regarding investor conduct, 
transparency in ISDS, and other obligations that are related to transparency in 
IIA’s. This report does not address transparency relating to reservation lists. This 
article is the first piece to argue the ways to enhance transparency and predictability 
in IIAs) 
All Sectors  
Type of Limitation:  National treatment (Article 
29) 
Legal Citation:      Companies Act, Cap 
50(1994) 
Description:         Compliance by Foreign 
Companies with the 
Companies Act as in 
establishing, reporting and 
filing of accounts.35 
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Singapore only carved-out measures related to establishing, reporting, 
and filing of accounts. Thus, the question remains: Did the Singapore 
Government reserve the right to adopt all of the provisions in the 
Companies Act, or just the provisions relating to establishing, 
reporting, and filing accounts? 
IV. A HYBRID APPROACH AND A RENEGOTIATION CLAUSE 
As home and host nations display dramatic differences in 
their preferences for reservation list frameworks, it can sometimes be 
very difficult to reach a consensus. To resolve the conflict, both 
parties often conclude the treaty with a combined approach for 
reservation lists: negative and positive. The Australia-Chile FTA is a 
good example of such.37 The Agreement first grants market access 
for all investments, then adds a reservation list in the market access 
column. It is uncertain whether this complex structure really confers 
transparency to the measures, but its intent is to combine the best 
aspects of both frameworks. 
Another method involves simply deciding to renegotiate the 
reservation list when host nations have prepared their measures.38 
                                                 
37 The Australia–Chile FTA is a trade agreement between the countries 
of Chile and Australia. It was signed on July 30, 2008 and went into effect in the 1st 
quarter of 2009. The FTA is available at http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/ 
aclfta/pages/australia-chile-fta.aspx (accessed on Mar 6 2016). 
38 Some international agreements are renegotiated while others remain 
stable. Despite growing interest in agreement flexibility and design, the literature 
has not addressed this question in depth. Some provide a theoretical framework for 
explaining why some treaties contain limited duration and renegotiation provisions, 
while others are rigid. Others explore the more general question of why states 
design agreements with flexibility allowing obligations to be adjusted over time, 
temporarily or permanently. The issue of renegotiation in the field of IIA is still in 
an early stage. Some argue that the negotiating partners renegotiate when they have 
learned something new about the state of the world, for instance faced a investor-
state dispute settlement. That is, a direct experience with investment disputes, 
which reveals new information about the consequences of the IIA, is associated 
with a greater propensity to renegotiate. However, the literature has not examined 
in depth why nations renegotiate after the ratification of the treaty. See Koremenos, 
Barbara, Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility 55 INT’L 
ORG. 289 289-325 (2001); Koremenos, Barbara, Contracting around International 
Uncertainty, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 549, 549-565 (2005); Helfer, Lawrence R. 
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Singapore and New Zealand recognized the problems associated with 
unspecified measures in the reservation list, and as a result, put the 
following clause in the main text to renegotiate the narrowing-down 
of the measures: 
Article 32 Limitations 
2.  As part of the reviews of this Agreement provided 
for in Article 68, the Parties undertake to review at 
least every two years the status of the limitations set 
out in Annex 3 with a view to reducing the limitations 
or removing them. 
This allows Singapore to narrow-down the measures by 
specifying the relevant article numbers. If the stated measures do not 
reflect the “description,” then Singapore should reduce or eliminate 
such measures in the reservation list. 
The following is the renegotiation clause of the trilateral 
investment agreement between ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand 
(“AANZFTA”). 
Article 16 Work Programme 
The Parties shall enter into discussions on: 
(a)  schedules of reservations to this Chapter; 
and..[…] 
3.  The Parties shall conclude the discussions referred 
to in Paragraphs 1 and 2 within five years from the 
date of entry into force of this Agreement unless the 
Parties otherwise agree. These discussions shall be 
                                                 
Flexibility Mechanism in International Agreements in International law and 
International Relations (Jeffrey Dunoff &Mark A. Pollack eds., 2012); Kal 
Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreement, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581,581-
614 (2005); Yoram Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, When Do States Renegotiate 
International Agreements? The Case of Bilateral Investment Treaties (Univ. Of Maryland 
Presentation Working paper, 2013). 
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overseen by the Investment Committee established 
pursuant to Article 17 (Committee on Investment). 39 
As can be seen above, this is a different renegotiation clause 
from the one found in the CEP in the sense that the three parties 
signed the treaty without including a reservation list. Australia and 
New Zealand successfully persuaded the 10 ASEAN host nations to 
choose the negative list, but they all agreed to draft the list after the 
ratification of the Treaty. Paragraph 2 states that the three parties 
decided to start drafting and to conclude the negotiations on the 
reservation list within five years of the ratification of the Treaty. 
V. CONCLUSION  
In reality, host nation negotiators are not rational agents 
because they are just normal human beings. 40 They do not have 
sufficient cognitive capacity to accurately examine the measures and 
determine which domestic measures should be protected from the 
highly liberalized text of a treaty. Because of this, host nations 
frequently fail to put domestic measures that should otherwise be 
inserted in the negative reservation list. They sometimes fail to insert 
the name of a certain domestic measure in the reservation list and 
frequently insert unspecified domestic measures (i.e. domestic laws 
without article numbering). 
Host nations are fully aware that these incomplete and 
defective lists, which fall under the negative approach, will have 
                                                 
39 The AANZFTA was executed on 27 February 2009 and entered into 
force on:1 January 2010 – Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand;12 March 2010 – Thailand;1 January 2011 – 
Laos; 4 January 2011 – Cambodia; and 10 January 2012 – Indonesia. (accessed on 
Mar 6 2016, at http://www.thaifta.com/engfta/Home/FTAbyCountry/tabid/ 
53/ctl/detail/id/75/mid/480/usemastercontainer/true/Default.aspx ). 
40 Herbert Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99, 
99 (1955) (argues that individuals do not seek to maximize their benefit from a 
particular course of action because they have no capacity to digest all the 
information that would be needed to do such a thing. They do not have the 
capacity to access all the information required and even if they did, their mind 
would not be able to process it properly). 
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negative consequences. This awareness leads the parties to have 
different preferences over the modality of the framework of the 
reservation list. 
This article is merely the beginning of the efforts to apply the 
behavioral approach to international investment law. This article 
examined the issues from the perspective of the bounded rationality, 
however  there are many other issues in the international law regime 
that can be described from the behavioral economics viewpoint. For 
instance, bounded self-interest may explain the existence of a 
question and answer session during the negotiation phase.41 This 
would involve the negotiators from the home nations giving the 
negotiators from the host nations brief lectures about the terms of 
international investment agreements and answering the questions of 
the host nations’ representatives. Why would negotiating partners 
cooperate each other, instead of compete each other? Why are the 
developed countries so altruistic that they would give a lecture to the 
host developing countries? This may be able to be explained from the 
perspective of bounded self-interest. More research should be done 
in reconciling behavioral economics with international investment 
law and international law in general. 
 
                                                 
41 Surprisingly, for most of the readers of this article, negotiators with 
expertise from home nations frequently hold question and answer (Q & A) sessions 
parallel to main investment negotiations in order to facilitate the negotiation. 
Apparently, this shows a dramatic inequality of bargaining power between 
negotiating parties. The Q&A sessions usually consist of discussions about the 
meanings of provisions or articles and the consequences of adopting them. The 
lecturers - negotiators from home nations- would have the maximum amount of 
bargaining power depending on how they shape their Q & A sessions. 
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I.INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam made a joint submission to 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (“CLCS”), to 
establish outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.1 China 
immediately objected to the submission, and sent a note verbale to the 
United Nations General Secretary to be delivered to the UN member 
States.2 In its note verbale, China alleged that the insular features and 
maritime areas within the nine-dash line belonged to China and 
added “it has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South 
China Sea and the adjacent waters.”3 China said it enjoys “sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed 
and subsoil thereof.”4 The language used by China in the note verbale 
was ambiguous and did not indicate what kind of maritime 
jurisdiction China was claiming. There was also ambiguity in China’s 
position regarding the status of the insular features in the South 
China Sea (“SCS”) whether they are low tide elevations, rocks or 
islands. In another note verbale, China claimed sovereignty over the 
Spratly Islands and added they were islands under Article 121 of 
                                                 
1 “Receipt of the joint submission made by Malaysia and the Socialist 
Republic of Viet Nam to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,” 
CLCS.33.2009.LOS (Continental Shelf Notification) (7 May 2009). Article 4 of the 
Annex II of the Law of the Sea Convention provides: 
Where a coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with article 76, the outer 
limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it shall submit particulars 
of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical 
data as soon as possible; but in any case, within 10 years of the entry into force of 
this Convention for that State. The coastal State shall at the same time give the 
names of any Commission members who have provided it with scientific and 
technical advice.  
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted December 10, 1982, 1883 UNTS 
396, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_con
vention.htm [hereinafter “LOSC”]. 
2 People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale CML/17/2009 of May 7, 
2009. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. (China reiterated its position in the note verbal of 14 April 2011).  
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UNCLOS, therefore they were entitled to territorial sea, exclusive 
economic zone and continental shelf.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 1. The nine-dash line map which China attached its note verbal in 
2009 
                                                 
5 The nine–dash line if connected would cover ninety percent of the SCS. 
Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes 
Involving China: Issues for Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 21 (Dec. 
22, 2015); see People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale CML/8/2011 (April 14, 
2011).  
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Assuming China owns all of the insular features in the SCS, 
this paper evaluates the China’s nine-dash line claim under 
international law in light of the ruling by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration over the dispute between the Philippines and China 
(“South China Sea Arbitration”),6 and evaluates the effect of the 
ruling on the delimitation of the maritime areas in the SCS. The 
ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration about the SCS is the 
first decision by an international tribunal attempting to clarify the 
difference between islands, rocks and low tide elevations. 
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHINESE CLAIMS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
‘HISTORIC TITLE’ THEORY 
 Some scholars argue that the Chinese claims can be justified 
in the perspective of “historic title” theory.7 Gao argues that “support 
for this view may be found in the resolution adopted at the 1947 
inter-ministry meeting; the expression “limits of territory in the South 
China Sea” was employed in the resolution,” and that “the precise 
meaning of the reference in Chinese Note I [note verbale of 2009]8 to 
“adjacent waters” over which it has sovereignty (…) has never been 
defined by China.”9 
The Arbitration Tribunal in Government of the State of Eritrea and 
Government of the Republic of Yemen has made an important distinction 
between the doctrine of “historic title” and “historical consolidation.” 
It goes as follows: 
The notion of historic title is well known in 
international law, not least in respect of ‘historic bays’, 
which are governed by rules exceptional to the 
normal rules about bays. Historic bays again rely upon 
a kind of “ancient title”: a title that has so long been 
                                                 
6 The South China Sea Arbitration, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION 
(July 12, 2016), https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-
CN-20160712-Award.pdf.  
7 Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: 
History, Status, and Implications, 107 Am. J. of Int’l. L. 98, 109 (Jan. 2013). 
8 Note Verbale CML/17/2009, supra note 2. 
9 Id. 
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established by common repute that this common 
knowledge is itself a sufficient title. But an historic 
title has also another and different meaning in 
international law as a title that has been created, or 
consolidated, by a process of prescription, or 
acquiescence, or by possession so long continued to 
have become accepted as law as a title. These titles 
too are historic in the sense that continuity and the 
lapse of a period of time is of the essence.10 
This implies that 1) historic title is based on “common 
repute” that has been established since time immemorial, meaning 
that whoever inquires the existence of historic title will focus on 
historical documents documenting the perception of States and 
individuals in different historical times, and will be less focused on 
material evidence of effective control. 2) Whereas in historical 
consolidation a combination of modern titles, such as prescription 
and occupation, that has existed over long periods of time will be the 
determinant in a State’s land claim. So the doctrine of historical 
consolidation is more related to modern territorial titles recognized in 
international law today; this is probably why the International Court 
of Justice, in its Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and 
Nigeria decision, noted that “The Court notes that the theory of 
historical consolidation is highly controversial and cannot replace the 
existing modes of acquisition of title in international law.”11 Brownlie 
refers to historical consolidation as being “not much more than a 
compendium of pre-existing modes of acquisition”, and says that 
“the accepted view is that consolidation does not exist as a concept 
independent of the established rules governing effective occupation 
and prescription.”12 
                                                 
10 Eritrea v. Yemen, Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of Dispute, Reports 
of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XXII pp. 209-332, para. 106 (Oct. 9, 1998). 
11 Land and Maritime Boundry between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. 
Nigeria: Equitorial Guinea Intervening), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Reports 303, para. 103 
(Oct. 10, 2002). 
12 JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 236 (8th ed., Oxford University Press, 2012); See also 
MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 520 (6th ed., Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
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A. Historic Title: Common Repute 
A state’s claim to historic title, otherwise called “original 
title”13 or “ancient title,”14 as mentioned above, depends upon 
whether that State can establish that there was a common perception 
since time immemorial that a certain area of territory or water were 
within their possession. Examining a series of arbitral and judicial 
decisions on this issue reveals that courts take the following factors 
into account when examining whether a state’s claim to historic title 
is valid: 
 1. Whether the Parties Involved had a Common Perception of the 
Island’s Existence 
The International Court of Justice (“IC”) in its Sovereignty Over 
Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge case 
examined whether the islands under dispute between Malaysia and 
Singapore were terra incognita in the colonial periods when Britain and 
the Sultan of Johor were in existence as predecessor states to the 
disputing parties.15 This is important because in order to have a 
common perception that a certain piece of land or maritime territory 
belongs to some party, that piece itself has to be at least recognized 
as existing to all parties involved.   
2. The Territorial Regime of the Region and Time 
In the Eritrea v. Yemen case, the arbitral court noted that the 
“concept of territorial sovereignty was entirely strange to an entity 
such as medieval Yemen,” and henceforth dismissed the Yemeni 
claims that it had “ancient title” over the disputed islands.16 This 
implies that in order for a State to claim ancient title over a land or 
maritime territory, the parties involved must share, at the very least, a 
common perception that a state have also been used by other States, 
                                                 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Sovereignty Over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South 
Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), Judgment, 2008 ICJ Reports, 27 (May 23, 2008), available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14492.pdf. 
16 Supra note 11, at 248. 
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whether there was something similar to a condominium arrangement or 
not.17 
3. The Existence of Rival Claims 
In the Pedra Branca case, the ICJ took into account that there 
was no challenge to the Sultanate of Johor’s claim to the island, citing 
the lack of Norwegian claim to the lands in Eastern Greenland in the 
Permanent Court of International Justice’s infamous Legal Status of 
Eastern Greenland case.18  
B. Historical Consolidation 
We have established above19 that historical consolidation is a 
mixture of pre-existing modes of territorial acquisition, namely 
prescription and occupation. The question to be raised here is could 
maritime territory be acquired in the same way as land territory? And, 
this question arises due to the following reason: In land territory, it is 
established that any piece of land that is not terra nullius belongs to a 
particular State, and that even terra nullius can be occupied by a State 
if that State fulfills all requirements of occupation prescribed in 
international law.20 The concept of “res communis” or the modern 
“common heritage or mankind” has little place in land-territorial 
regimes, unless some States establish condominium agreements or 
other sui generis regimes in some of their territories.21  
However, when it comes to maritime territory, or internal 
waters or territorial sea in terms of modern international law of the 
sea, there was always a conflict between the doctrine of open seas, 
known as the doctrine of mare liberum, which dictates that maritime 
                                                 
17 Andrea Gioia, Historic Titles, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, para. 13 (Oxford University Press, 2013); D.P. 
O’CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA: VOLUME 1 423(Oxford 
University Press, 1982).  
18 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) 
No. 53, 27 (Apr. 5, 1933). 
19 See p. 5.  
20 Malcolm Shaw, supra note 12, at 503.  
21 Lea Brilmeyer and Natalie Klein, Land and Sea: Two Sovereignty Regimes in 
Search of a Common Denominator, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 703, 704 (2001). 
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areas be open to all States for navigation and economic activities, and 
that of mare clausum, which argued for occupation of the seas by 
certain States. Dutch jurist Huig de Groot (known in common 
literature as Hugo Grotius) argued in his infamous booklet, Mare 
Liberum, that the sea must be free and not susceptible to occupation.22 
Grotius, on the premise that only what is subject to occupation be 
subject to possession, made the aforementioned distinction between 
the land and the sea, saying that the limitlessness of the latter,23 as 
well as the fact that the sea belongs to “all things which can be used 
without loss to anyone else.”24 In contrast, John Selden published in 
1635 a treatise named Mare Clausum, the main argument of which is 
that the territorial sea is indeed subject to occupation by a State.25 
The Grotian conception of the open seas was accepted in 
international law by the 18th and 19th centuries. In the 19th century 
Huebner tried to justify maritime blockades by championing a 
“territorial-occupation theory of blockade” Neff explains it to mean 
that “a blockading squadron occupies the portion of the sea which is 
enclosed within the line of the ships and consequently that a 
blockade involves a ‘substitution of sovereignty’ over the enveloped 
sea area.”26 This notion, that enclosure might actually mean 
occupation of a certain patch of ocean water, is heavily criticized by 
British and American commentators such as Hall.27 The consensus 
was actually possible due to the proposal of Cornelius van 
Bynkershoeck- in his book, De Dominio Maris Disseratatio, he based 
his argument on the premise that ‘no sea was (currently) possessed by 
anyone, and went on to suggest that “the control of the land extends 
as far as cannon will carry.” Bynkershoeck’s proposal was accepted in 
State practice as the so-called “three-mile rule,”28 which Great Britain, 
                                                 
22 RALPH VAN DEMIAN MCGOFFIN, FREEDOM OF THE SEAS: A 
DISSERTATION BY HUGO GROTIUS 32 (1916).  
23 Id. at 34.  
24 Id. at 27.  
25 John Selden, MARE CLAUSUM: THE RIGHT AND DOMINION OF THE 
SEA IN TWO BOOKS 72 (London, 1663).  
26 STEVEN J. NEFF, THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRALS: A 
GENERAL HISTORY 92 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).  
27 Id. at 93.  
28 “The old rule of the cannon-shot, crystallized into the present three 
marine miles measured from low water mark, may be modified at a later period 
inasmuch as certain nations claim wider jurisdiction […]. There is an obvious 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:2 
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the United States, and France accepted.29 The Grotian concept still 
lives on in the modern law of the sea, subject to a few tweaks, such as 
the introduction of the “twelve-nautical-mile rule” and the 
introduction of the sovereign rights concept on the resources of the 
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, which is a limitation 
of the States’ high-sea rights but actually conforms to the Grotian 
notion of the separability of dominium and imperium.30 Also, the 
sovereign rights of States do not rely on occupation; they rely on 
rights ab initio and the proclamations of States, as established by the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).  
An overview of this history on the of the seas reveals that (i) 
the seas are, not in principle, subject to any forms of occupation; (ii) 
whatever sovereignty enjoyed by states due to the seas derives from 
the concept of “the land dominates the sea” – in other words, it is 
the occupying of land, and the resulting need to assume control of 
some of the waters around it, that is the basis of sovereignty over the 
waters. Occupation of the waters themselves does not ensure 
sovereignty over the waters.31 Historical consolidation, as well as its 
subcomponents, cannot serve as the territorial title for oceans. This 
notion also applied to China when it was incorporated into the 
international legal order in the mid-19th century.  
C. Customary International Law 
Even though occupation or prescription cannot themselves 
serve as territorial title over the oceanic waters, there remains the 
                                                 
reason for that. The marginal strip of territorial waters based originally on the 
cannon-shot, was founded on the necessity of the riparian State to protect itself 
from outward attack, by providing something in the nature of an insulating zone, 
which very reasonably should be extended with the accrued possibility of offense 
due to the wider range of modern ordnance.” North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case 
(Great Britain, United States), Arbitral Award of Sept. 7, 1910, Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards (RIAA) XI, 167, 205. 
29 ROTHWELL ET AL., OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 26 
(Oxford University Press, 2015).  
30 Id. 
31 Lea Brilmeyer and Natalie Klein, supra note 21, at 707; ee Report of the 
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., Supp. 
No. 9, art. 68, Commentary, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956). 
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possibility that even without the existence of historic rights 
recognized by the relevant parties since the beginning of their 
respective nations, the relatively recent sovereign claim over the seas, 
accompanied by explicit or implicit acceptance by the relevant States, 
can alter the existing territorial sea regime and allow for additional 
patches of ocean water to fall under the sovereignty of a State. This 
possibility was recognized in the ICJ’s Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case in 
1951, in which Norway’s argument that its straight-baseline system 
was acquiesced by the government of Britain and accepted by the 
Courts of other States.32 Shaw has confirmed that this case is 
irrelevant to the doctrine of historical consolidation.33   
Since this way of assuming sovereign control over a patch of 
water depends on the implicit consent or acquiescence of other 
States, the Claimant State’s claims must satisfy a number of criteria to 
ensure that the other States can genuinely consent to that State’s 
claim.  Before jumping into the contents of each criterion one has to 
recognize the unique nature of acquiescence in modern law of the 
sea. On land, acquiescence or explicit acceptance is usually done by 
the state with competing claims to the particular piece of land in 
question; this means that the legal relationships arising under 
acquiescence tend to be bilateral. However, when it comes to 
expanding the internal waters or territorial sea, the relationship is 
rarely bilateral; all nations have an interest in the freedom of the high 
seas.34 This means that the law of the sea is more general in nature 
than the system of land boundaries – which implies that changing 
this regime is akin to changing general rules of customary 
international law. So the scope of acceptance for a sui generis regime 
when it comes to internal waters or territorial sea has to be extensive 
and substantially uniform35 – if one is to borrow from the 
terminology used in the North Sea Continental Shelf case.  
The three commonly recognized criteria for acquiescence to 
the State’s historic waters claim is stated as follows: (i) the claim has 
to be formally made by the appropriate governmental authorities and 
                                                 
32 Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), 1951 ICJ Reports 137 (1951).  
33 Shaw, supra note 12, at 507.  
34 CLIVE R. SYMMONS, HISTORIC WATERS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA: A 
MODERN RE-APPRAISAL 55 (2008).  
35 Id. at 57.  
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must be clear and consistent,36 (ii) the claim has to be made public to 
other states,37 (iii) the claim has to be continued long enough for 
other states to make implicit acceptance of that claim.38 The first 
requirement is in place because no state can make implicit acceptance 
of another state’s territorial claim if the original State never made an 
official claim to the international community. The United Nations 
study on the juridical regime of historic bays says that the 
declarations “must emanate from the State or its organs;”39 and I) the 
claim must come from the authorities competent to state the official 
positions of that government, preferably the executive branch,40 II) 
The official claim must be clear in its content- “the coastal State must 
leave no doubt about its intention to claim the water area as part of 
its national territory,”41 III) The claim must be consistent- the ICJ 
based its decision on the El Salvador/Honduras case on the 
“consistent claims of the three States.”42  
Second, the claim must show sufficient “notoriety.” If the 
claim is not made public, the other states, with a certain interest in 
the freedom of the seas in that area, would miss the chance to be 
aware of the other State’s claim. This means that the fellow States 
would not develop the will to implicitly accept that other State’s 
claim. Therefore, I) a claim has to be made public enough for States to 
make effective protests; claimed buried in domestic documents or 
voluminous pleadings is not sufficient to make a claim “public”43; II) 
the claim may be made in bilateral notifications to other states, or by 
unilateral declarations;44 III) Open exercise of jurisdiction might suffice, given 
that other states have other ways to be aware of the legal nature of 
that claim.  
                                                 
36 Supra note 34, at 117. 
37 Id. at 141. 
38 Id. at 151.  
39 United Nations, Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143, 14 (1962) 
40 Supra note 34, at 121. 
41 Id. at 128.  
42 El Salvador/Honduras, 1992 ICJ Reports 601. 
43 Supra note 34, at 140.  
44 Id. at 144. 
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Third, the claim must have continued for a certain period of 
time long enough for acquiescence to occur. “Mere sporadic 
enforcement of sovereign rights in allegedly historic waters will not 
suffice.”45 The exact extent of the time requirement is not clear, 
although, as the United Nations Juridical Regime study confirms, the 
extent is closely related to the “extent that an inference of 
acquiescence may be drawn from it.” If international reaction to the 
historic claim is strongly pointing toward implicit acceptance of that 
claim, then only a relatively short passage of time might be required. 
The ICJ accepted this interrelationship between the passage of time 
requirement and the acceptance of states requirement when it 
confirmed in the seminal North Sea Continental Shelf case that a 
norm of customary international law might be formed in a relatively 
short period of time if the States with an interest in that particular 
norm made an “extensive and virtually uniform” acceptance of that 
norm.46 
The logical questions that follow entail (i) the extent of 
knowledge that the States must have in acquiescing to the historic 
waters claim, and (ii) the number of the States that must be involved 
in the acquiescence. The accepted premise is that full knowledge of 
the claim’s ‘nature’ and ‘geographical extent’ must be known by the 
states making implicit acceptance. Libya argued during its 
Tunisia/Libya case before the ICJ that Tunisian actions on its 
claimed historic waters reflect[ed] substantial variations and 
fluctuations in the size of the territorial sea, methods of establishing 
baselines, and designations of a reserved and contiguous fishing 
zones47 and therefore argued there could not be acquiescence on the 
part of Libya. As Regarding the requirement on the extent of the 
participation, since the historic waters claim entails an encroachment 
of the high seas and therefore means a limitation of fishing and 
navigation rights within that area, the states with a navigational or 
fishing interest in the area claimed as historic waters by another state 
must, at minimum, participate in the implicit acceptance.  
                                                 
45 Id. at 152. 
46 North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 ICJ Reports 38.   
47 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. 
Reports 45. 
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D. The Relationship Between the Historic Waters Regime and 
UNCLOS 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) makes only few statements on historic waters – Article 
10(6) of UNCLOS refers to historic bays, and Article 15 refers to 
historic title as constituting one of the “special circumstances” that 
allow states to derogate from the “equidistance” or “median” rule in 
territorial sea delimitation. In other rules regarding the territorial sea, 
UNCLOS sets quite clear and uniform rules on the extent of the 
territorial sea that coastal states may enjoy, meaning that exceptions 
to such uniform rules should be limited to those explicitly accepted in 
UNCLOS. Failure to limit such exceptions would result in 
unacceptable variations of claims in regard to baselines, which would 
mean a loss of limits on the states’ claims to its Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf areas, leading to uneven 
encroachment of the res communis principle. So this means that the 
historic waters regime would only have meaning in UNCLOS 
regimes with regard to (i) “historic bays” and (ii) territorial sea 
delimitation. 
Even though Article 15 allows States to account for historic 
rights or waters in territorial sea delimitation, this provision actually 
limits the scope in which historical waters claims might be articulated. 
The premise of Article 15 is that states have overlapping claims in 
regard to its territorial sea, even when said claims are limited by 
Article 3 of UNCLOS, which limits its scope to 12 nautical miles 
from its baselines. So Article 15 would not apply when the length of 
maritime areas between states extends beyond 24 nautical miles 
between their respective baselines. A State might argue that their 
historic waters constitute internal waters, a scheme accepted by the 
ICJ in its Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland) case 
(which would mean that its historic waters would be actually “within” 
the baselines of that State). Even so, Articles 5 and 7 of UNCLOS 
explicitly limit the ways in which baselines are drawn with Article 7 
accepting the formula developed by the ICJ in its Fisheries Case 
(United Kingdom v. Norway). So any historic “internal waters” claim 
that does not fit with the baselines regime developed by UNCLOS 
would be incompatible with the UNCLOS regime. These two 
limitations seriously limit the scope in which historic waters claims 
2017 Korkut & Kang 5:2 
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could be made in regard to internal waters or territorial sea. Even if 
one could pass through these limitations, the historic waters claim 
would only serve as “special circumstances” in delimiting the 
territorial sea in which overlapping claims exist, meaning that such 
claims are subject to negotiations between two countries or judicial 
review based on equity.  
One could argue that since Article 10(6) allows states to 
derogate from the definition of juridical bays, as defined in Article 
10(2),48 might fall into the scope of bays and thus be included in the 
list of historical waters regimes that UNCLOS explicitly proposes. 
Even though this might be true, especially with bays that do not have 
low-water marks of the natural entrance points that are more than 24 
nautical miles apart, it would be satisfactory for our discussion here 
to point out that the most traditional definitions of bays was based 
on the so-called headland theory.49 This theory requires bays to be 
enclosed “by reference to straight lines linking the headlands 
wherever the geographical situation really withdrew the waters within 
them for the traffic of nations.”50 This is in line with the Grotian 
argument that enclosed features of the sea are exceptionally subject 
to occupation and, therefore, imperium by individual States.51 This 
means that maritime features not encompassed by straight lines 
between headlands cannot be regarded as bays, even in terms of 
Article 10(6) of UNCLOS. 
A further argument is that the UNCLOS regime co-exists 
with the customary law regime regarding baselines and the territorial 
sea, which means that historic title may coexist with normal or 
straight baselines drawn up by UNCLOS. If this argument is to be 
valid, there has to be no legal conflict between the historical waters 
regime put forward by China and the regime for internal waters and 
                                                 
48 “For the purposes of this Convention, a bay is a well-marked 
indentation whose penetration is of such proportion to the width of its mouth as to 
contain land-locked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. 
An indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, 
or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the 
mouth of that indentation.”  
49 Supra note 17, at 380. 
50 Id. at 382.  
51 Supra note 22. 
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territorial sea. However, such a proposition suffers from the fact that 
if the territorial sea boundaries of supposed historic waters exceed 
that of the 12-mile limit set from the normal or straight baselines 
drawn up by UNCLOS, it conflicts with Article 3 of UNCLOS which 
has a clear intent of forbidding that exact phenomenon. This can be 
seen as a conflict between customary international law and new treaty 
law, in which the principle lex posterior derogate legi priori would apply. 
One might argue that the lex specialis principle would apply and so 
the special regime of historic waters might prevail over the general 
regime defined by UNCLOS, but UNCLOS, as stated above, is 
clearly intent on limiting the scope of historical regimes that could be 
used to derogate from its rules. Thus, rules that contradict this 
limitation of scope cannot be considered lex specialis rules that can 
derogate from UNCLOS.  
Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Article 311(2) of 
UNCLOS stipulates “this Convention shall not alter the rights and 
obligations of States Parties which arise from other agreements 
compatible with this Convention and which do not affect the 
enjoyment by other States parties of their rights and the performance 
of their obligations under this Convention.” As the Philippines v. China 
arbitral tribunal accurately pointed out, the logical corollary of this 
provision is that if the rights and obligations of a particular State 
Party are “incompatible with the Convention” or “affects the 
enjoyment by other States parties of their rights and the performance 
of their obligations,” those rights and obligations are altered by the 
provisions of UNCLOS.52  
E. An Analysis of the Chinese Claim 
The arbitral tribunal in the Philippines v. China case did not rule 
on the possibility that China might be claiming the waters within the 
nine-dash line as part of their historical waters because China 
declared an optional exception according to Article 298(1)(a)(i) of 
UNCLOS on disputes regarding “historical bays or titles.”53 The 
tribunal moved on to establish its jurisdiction (by virtue of its 
                                                 
52 South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 6, para. 252.  
53 Id. at 21.  
2017 Korkut & Kang 5:2 
441 
competence de a competence (French) or Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
(German) on this case by declaring that China’s claims are actually 
claims concerning historical rights, not historic title or historic 
waters.54 In examining the validity of China’s potential historic waters 
claims, therefore, it is not necessary to make an examination of the 
specific findings of the arbitral tribunal. However, some of the points 
made by the tribunal, such as the tribunal’s findings on whether 
China’s claims satisfied the criteria for acquiescence is worth a glance. 
1. Does China Have Historic Title Over the Waters Within the 
Nine-dash Line? 
China has never clearly explained the legal nature it holds on 
the islands or waters within the nine-dash line. Even though its 
reference to historic rights in its notes verbales simply that China is 
indeed making a historic waters or rights claim over the waters within 
that line, China, perhaps in an attempt to keep strategic ambiguity, 
never made clear whether it was claiming “historic rights” in the 
meaning similar to “sovereign rights” recognized under UNCLOS on 
its EEZ regime, or referring to the “historic waters” regime of 
internal waters or territorial sea. As a corollary, China has never 
officially presented evidence that backs up its claims for historic title 
over the waters within the nine-dash line. 
Even though official presentations by the government of 
relevant evidence is scarce, a number of Chinese scholars have tried 
to back up its claims by presenting historical evidence that the waters 
in the SCS were perceived as Chinese waters since time immemorial. 
These scholars cite (i) records on fishing; (ii) records on sporadic 
military expeditions, particularly the one conducted by Zheng He 
during the Ming era; (iii) records on naming; and (iv) records on 
administrative boundaries.55 The main weakness in the Chinese 
scholars’ works is that they are only focused on records kept by the 
Chinese imperial government; it does not show enough records from 
neighboring countries, or countries that shared the maritime routes at 
                                                 
54 Id. at 31.  
55 Jianming Shen, China’s Sovereignty Over the South China Sea Islands: A 
Historical Perspective, 1 CHINESE J. OF INT’L L. 103, 107 (2002). 
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time, to show that there was a “common perception” among China 
and other countries that the waters in question belonged to China.  
Indeed, records on expeditions show that these expeditions 
were rather sporadic, and China did not amass a stationary army to 
solidify their new occupation; rather, the expeditions often resulted in 
a tributary relationship between the Chinese imperial house and the 
local residents residing in the islands in question. Zhang He’s 
expeditionary fleet carried presents that were presented to the so-
called “nomads,” a tradition which was a distinctive feature of the 
Chinese tributary system in which the “Son of the Skies,” the Chinese 
emperor, presented gifts to its underlying nomads in order to spread 
the culture of Chinese civilization to the so-called “uncivilized” 
areas.56 Also, Zhang He’s expeditions did not result in continuous 
military rule over the areas he covered; maritime expeditions were 
suspended shortly after the expeditions, allowing new influential 
civilizations to grow on the outer areas.57 
 2. The Problem of Acquiescence 
The other way China can justify its historic waters claims over 
the waters within the nine-dash line is to claim that other States 
surrounding the area have acquiesced its claims. This differs from the 
historic waters claim that mainly relies on recent evidence of implicit 
acceptance, opposed to the ancient evidence of common perception 
that traditional historic waters claims rely upon, which accompany 
the relatively recently formulated claim that the waters are historically 
part of that State’s sovereignty.  
Taking into account the above-mentioned criteria, there are a 
few problems that significantly undermine the persuasiveness of the 
possible Chinese claim of acquiescence. First, the Chinese claim of 
historic waters has not been geographically consistent, nor has it 
clearly identified the legal nature of its claim. The Atlas of the 
Administrative Areas of China, published by the Kuomintang 
                                                 
56 JOO KYUNG-CHUL, THE AGE OF MARITIME EXPANSION 13 (Seoul 
National University Press, 2002). 
57 Id. at 17.  
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government in 1948 refers to an “eleven-dash line,”58 which differs 
from the “nine-dash line” published in Notes Verbales to Vietnam and 
the Philippines in 2009.59 These are the only two times in which 
China has officially identified the geographical scope of its claims, 
and they do not match each other geographically. The very notion 
that a series of dashes, and not a straight line, can mark a maritime 
territorial boundary seems odd and causes geographical ambiguity.  
Even if one accepts that China was actually consistent 
geographically when making aforementioned claims, one needs to 
note that China has never made clear the legal basis on which it 
placed its claims. China, in its Notes Verbales to Vietnam and the 
Philippines claimed that waters within the nine-dash line are within 
its “sovereignty,” but it is not clear whether this means that the 
waters within the nine-dash line are China’s internal waters or 
territorial sea. Indeed, some Chinese scholars acknowledge that the 
Chinese claims can be interpreted as a case for historic “fisheries 
rights,”60 not historic waters; which means that the notion of 
“sovereignty” in the Chinese documents can actually be interpreted 
to mean “sovereign rights,” which is based on the Grotian separation 
of dominium and imperium. Unless China makes its legal basis clear, 
it is difficult for other States to provide effective acquiescence to its 
claims.61 
Second, the time in which China has placed its historic claims 
is insufficient for other States to make effective acquiescence. As 
mentioned above, only in 2009 did China clarify that its claims on the 
waters within the nine-dash line is subject to its “sovereignty”(subject 
to more ambiguity).  
Third, there were actually serious protests by other States 
after the 2009 claim. Here, one has to note the previous discussion 
that acquiescence of maritime claims is different from the 
                                                 
58 United States State Department, Limits in the Seas: No. 143, Maritime 
Claims in the South China Sea, 3 (Dec. 5, 2014), available at 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf. 
59 Id. 
60 Zou Keyuan and Liu Zinchang, The Legal Status of the U-Shaped Line in 
the South China Sea, 14 CHINESE J. OF INT’L L. 57, 63 (2015). 
61 Supra note 58, at 22.  
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acquiescence of land claims because, unlike land claims, the interests 
involved are barely bilateral and many states share a common interest 
in maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight in the particular 
sea area. This is especially true in the case of the SCS, given its large 
proportion of global shipping that passes through this area and 
proximity to the Malacca Strait. This means that the position of 
global shipping power States, such as the United States, is of 
significance; the US, however, in its Limits in the Seas report, made 
clear that if the Chinese claims are based on the notion of 
acquiescence, then China does not have a legal basis to support its 
claim.62  
 3.  UNCLOS 
Even if the Chinese claim of historic waters can be justified 
by the traditional rules of acquiescence and historic title, it is 
reasonable to interpret this regime to have been overridden by the 
UNCLOS regime. First, the nine-dash line is not encompassed by 
headlands that mark the lands surrounding it, which means that the 
area is not an example of a “bay” in customary international law. This 
strips the area of the eligibility to be qualified as a “historic bay” in 
the meaning of Article 10(5) of UNCLOS. Second, the historic 
waters claim that the nine-dash line represents stretches far beyond 
the twelve-mile territorial sea zone that can be drawn up from its 
baselines, even if one assumes that all the islands and rocks within the 
nine-dash line belong to China and that the low-tide elevations that 
China claims to be “islands” are actually islands in the meaning of 
Article 121(1) of UNCLOS. This means that the overlapping 
sovereignty claims between China, Philippines and Vietnam are not 
overlapping twelve-mile claims envisioned by Article 15 of 
UNCLOS, which means that the “historic circumstances” cannot 
serve as “special circumstances” in territorial sea delimitation 
between these countries.  
Article 311(2), explained above, reinforces this conclusion. 
The historic waters claims of China, for reasons explained above, is 
indeed incompatible with the territorial sea regime put forward by 
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UNCLOS, and seriously affects the navigational rights of States 
within the area.  
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHINESE CLAIMS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
‘HISTORICAL RIGHTS’ THEORY 
A. Legal Basis for Historical “Sovereign Rights” 
Claims to historical sovereign rights means “a State is 
claiming to exercise certain rights, usually fishing rights, in what is 
usually deemed to be international waters.”63 This means that the 
State is not claiming exclusive sovereignty over the disputed waters, 
but arguing for historical rights over the resources of those waters. 
This lack of exclusivity in their claims makes historical rights claims 
different from those of the historical waters claims. As a logical 
corollary, this leads to two further differences: (i) the lack of 
exclusivity means that several “historical sovereign rights” can exist 
within the same body of water; (ii) claims to historic rights tend to be 
specific in its scope, such as specific rights to fish specific species or 
catch specific resources.  
Despite the differences, any historical rights claims put 
forward by a State, just like historic waters claims, must be supported 
by customary international law. With both types of claims, the 
consent of the interested parties is rarely given explicitly through the 
form of a treaty. Even if relevant treaties are concluded, the treaties 
usually only mean a post facto acceptance of the historical right 
already established such as the boundary agreement between 
Australia and Papua New Guinea.64 Therefore, the practice of the 
Claimant State must be supported by non-action or acceptance of the 
parties involved, followed by opinion juris of the involved parties. 
This consideration makes the criteria for acquiescence important for 
                                                 
63 Leonardo Bernard, The Effect of Historic Fishing Rights in Maritime 
Boundaries Delimitation, in Securing the Ocean for the Next Generation, LOSI Conference 
Papers, 2012. 
64 Id. at 9. 
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recognition of historic rights as well, which means the Claimant State 
must establish the criteria of acquiescence.  
B. The Relationship Between UNCLOS and the Historical 
“Sovereign Rights” Claim 
Even if a States’ historical rights claims are established by 
international law, the question still arises as to whether the impending 
imposition of UNCLOS, and the resultant activation of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf regimes, actually 
nullifies States’ title to aforementioned historical rights. This question 
relates to the topic of legal conflicts between the EEZ or Continental 
Shelf regimes, and States’ historical rights Claims. If there is no 
conflict, Article 311(2) of UNCLOS ensures that the historical rights 
regime remains intact. If there is a conflict, as a reverse induction of 
the same article, the EEZ and Continental Shelf systems prevail over 
individual State’s continental shelf claims’.  
In order to determine whether such a conflict exists, a deep 
probe is required on whether the sovereign rights over the natural 
resources in the EEZ or Continental Shelf is exclusive to the rights 
of other states. One can argue that since Article 56 of UNCLOS 
ensures that States enjoy sovereign rights over the totality of 
“resources” within the EEZ, and, since Article 62 allows the coastal 
State to determine its capacity to “harvest the living resources of the 
exclusive economic zone,”65 and only allows other States to intervene 
when the coastal State “when the Coastal state does not have the 
capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch,” the EEZ regime 
envisions a total replacement of the pre-UNCLOS historical rights to 
that of the rights stipulated to in the EEZ regime. The same line of 
reasoning can be applied to the relationship between historical rights 
claims and the continental shelf regime because Article 77 of 
                                                 
65 “The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living 
resources of the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have 
the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or 
other arrangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions, laws and regulations 
referred to in paragraph 4, give other States access to the surplus of the allowable 
catch, having particular regard to the provisions of articles 69 and 70, especially in 
relation to the developing States mentioned therein.” Article 62(2), LOSC. 
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UNCLOS guarantees coastal states sovereign rights over the entirety 
of resources within its continental shelf, without the same type of 
limitations stipulated to in Article 62 in case of the EEZ. This is the 
exact line of reasoning adopted in the Philippines v. China case, where 
the Arbitral Tribunal concluded that even if China’s historical rights 
claims over the resources within the nine-dash line are valid, any 
historical rights held by China are overridden by the EEZ and 
continental shelf regimes envisioned by UNCLOS.66 
This argument suffers from two weaknesses. First, even 
though the sovereign rights envisioned in the EEZ and continental 
shelf regimes are deemed to be exclusive, there is nothing that stops 
the coastal state from entering into agreements that allow non-coastal 
state parties to harvest some of the non-living or living resources 
within the EEZ.67 This is addressed in Article 62, where the coastal 
State can determine its own capacity to harvest the living resources 
within its EEZ, and allocate the leftover resources to other States. 
Article 62 essentially means that the coastal state enjoys wide 
discretion in the distribution of its resources to other States. If new 
distribution agreements are allowed under UNCLOS, maintaining old 
arrangements that are solidified under customary international law is 
permissible as well. Even though the provisions on the continental 
shelf lack distributive arrangements like those envisioned in Article 
62, there is nothing in those provisions that blocks such 
arrangements from remaining intact under UNCLOS.68  
Secondly, in EEZ cases, UNCLOS envisions a regime of 
functional distribution of resources, signified by Article 62. In giving 
access to the EEZ, Article 62(3) stipulates that “the coastal State shall 
take into account all relevant factors, including, inter alia, … the need 
to minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have 
habitually fished in the zone or which have made substantial efforts 
in research and identification of stocks.” This means that the 
historical rights of States must to be taken into account when 
allocating any living stock within the EEZ. Thus, the legal 
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67 Supra note 63, at 18.  
68 Supra note 63, at 18. 
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significance of historical rights held by a State remains a relevant 
consideration.  
The Tribunal left open the possibility of the EEZ regime 
being amended or modified by customary international law after the 
conclusion of UNCLOS, adding, “such a claim would require the 
same elements discussed above with respect to historic rights.”69 This 
also leaves open the possibility that the regime could be modified by 
way of treaty, provided that the treaty satisfies the conditions aligned 
in Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.70 
C. An analysis of the Chinese claims  
As in the analysis of whether China’s claims are acceptable 
under the jurisprudence of historic waters, two determinative issues 
arise in establishing whether China has historical rights over the 
waters resources within the nine-dash line: (i) whether China’s 
historical rights’ were part of customary international law due to 
explicit acceptance or acquiescence by other States, and (ii) whether 
China’s historical rights, even if accepted under customary 
international law, are not overridden by the EEZ and Continental 
Shelf regimes envisioned by UNCLOS. 
As to the first question, the criteria required to establish 
acquiescence in historic waters claims also applies to China’s claims’ 
for historical rights. As noted above,71 China’s historic waters Claims 
lack the requisite level of clarity, notoriety, and longevity to be 
accepted by other states adopting the theory of acquiescence. As it 
follows, the criteria for acquiescence will not be met for historical 
rights as well. In the Philippines v. China case mentioned above, the 
                                                 
69 Supra note 6, para. 275.  
70 Article 41(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reads: 
Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement to 
modify the treaty as between themselves alone if: (a) the possibility of such a 
modification is provided for by the treaty; or (b) the modification in question is not 
prohibited by the treaty and; (i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties 
of their rights under the treaty and performance of their obligations; (ii) does not 
relate to a provision, derogation from which it is compatible with the effective 
execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.   
71 See page 17. 
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Arbitral Tribunal stated that China’s historical rights claims lack 
sufficient historical grounds to be justified under international law.72 
The Tribunal ruled that the little evidence that exists can be evidence 
of sovereignty over the islands within the nine-dash line, but not 
evidence of historical rights.73 
Up to this point, the Tribunal’s reasoning is acceptable. 
However, the Tribunal made an error by oversimplifying the situation 
when it declared that any historical rights China potentially had prior 
to UNCLOS are overridden by the EEZ and Continental Shelf 
regimes of the 1982 convention. The Tribunal based its judgment on 
the premise that UNCLOS establishes an exclusive sovereign rights 
regime that is wholly incompatible with the regime riddled by 
historical rights.74 However, as demonstrated above, the Tribunal’s 
reasoning was flawed: historical rights that predate the adoption of 
UNCLOS may still co-exist with the sovereign rights guaranteed 
under the EEZ and continental shelf.75 
The question remains of whether any historical rights held by 
China over resources within the nine-dash line stay intact under 
UNCLOS. To answer this question, one must look to the intent of 
the Chinese and Philippine delegations, the point at which the two 
parties acceded to the UNCLOS regime. Negotiation records show 
that China’s delegates, unlike delegates from Australia and New 
Zealand, argued for a strong EEZ with little possibility of 
preservation of historical rights.76 This was one of the decisive points 
                                                 
72 Supra note 6, para. 275.  
73 Id. at para. 267-271.  
74 Id. at para. 278.  
75 See page 23. 
76 Summary Records of Meetings of the Second Committee, 24th Meeting, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.24 at para. 2 (Aug. 1, 1974), Official Records of the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume II, 187 (Summary Records of 
Meetings of the First, Second and Third Committees, Second Session); see also Summary Records 
of Meetings of the Second Committee, 26th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.26 
at para. 108 (Aug. 5, 1974), Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, Volume II, 120 (Summary Records of Meetings of the First, Second and Third 
Committees, Second Session); Summary Records of Meetings of the Second Committee, 30th 
Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.30 at para. 22 (Aug. 7, 1974), Official 
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(Summary Records of Meetings of the First, Second and Third Committees, Second Session); 
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that led the tribunal to deny China the opportunity to invoke 
historical rights. According to the tribunal, China “was resolutely 
opposed to any suggestion that coastal States could be obliged to 
share the resources of the exclusive economic zone with other 
powers that had historically fished in those waters.” 
IV. AFFECT OF THE RULING BY PERMANENT COURT OF 
ARBITRATION ON THE DELIMITATION OF THE MARITIME 
AREAS IN THE SCS 
A. The Insular Features of the SCS 
The SCS is a semi enclosed or enclosed sea surrounded by 
Taiwan, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Philippines.77 The SCS 
measures about 550-650 nautical miles East-to-West and more than 
1200 nautical miles North-to-South.78 There are five bulks of insular 
features located in the SCS, which are disputed by the riparian States 
regarding the their ownership, status and the maritime entitlenments 
of such features: the Spratly Islands, the Paracel islands, Scarborough 
Reef, Pratas Islands and Macclesfield Bank.79 
The Spratly Islands are located in the southern quadrant of 
the SCS, and composed of 140 islets, rocks, reefs, shoals and 
sandbanks; all of which currently claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, 
                                                 
Summary Records of the Meetings of the Second Committee, 48th Meeting, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.48 at para. 29 (May 2, 1975), Official Records of the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume IV, 77 (Summary Records, Plenary, 
General Committee, First, Second and Third Committees, as well as Documents of the 
Conference, Third Session). 
77 Because status of Taiwan is disputed as a state, it is excluded all of the 
procedures relating to the South China Sea. Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu, Semi-enclosed 
Troubled Waters: A New Thinking on the Application of the 1982 UNCLOS Article 123 to 
the South China Sea, 41 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 281, 301 (2010) (between riparian 
states to the SCS only Taiwan is not a party to UNCLOS). 
78 Robert Beckman, The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 
Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea, 107 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 142, 143 (2013). 
79 South China Sea, LOWY INSTITUTE, 
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/south-china-sea (last accessed Mar. 6, 2017) 
2017 Korkut & Kang 5:2 
451 
the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.80 The largest of the Spratly 
Islands is Itu Aba is a mere 0.56 km2 in size.  
The Paracels, which are under Chinese control, are located in 
the northwestern quadrant of the SCS and consists of 35 islets, 
shoals, sandbanks and reefs. Woody Island is the largest of the 
Paracel Islands and has an area of 2.1 km2.81  
The Scarborough Shoal, another feature in the SCS, is a 
“large atoll with a lagoon of about 150 km2 surrounded by reef” and 
located 124 nautical miles from the Philippines and is claimed by 
China, Taiwan and the Philippines.82 The Pratas Islands are located in 
the northern quadrant of the SCS and currently occupied by Taiwan. 
The Macclesfield Bank is in the middle of the SCS, “a large atoll that 
is totally submerged at low tide,” claimed by Taiwan and China.83  
B. Status of the Islands, Rocks and Low Tide Elevations under 
UNCLOS  
According to Article 121(1) of UNCLOS, “an island is a 
naturally formed area of land, surounded by water, which is above 
water at high tide.”84 Because of the word naturally, “artificially 
wrought changes in its elevation will not entitle a rock of naturally 
lower elevation to serve as a base point to generate various maritime 
zones (unless it qualifies, in its natural state, as a low tide elevation, in 
which case it may have a limited effect on the baseline).”85 China has 
been piling sand onto reefs and low tide elevations located within the 
Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal. In addition, China has 
constructed military bases, airstrips, ports and radar facilities on those 
features.86 Since these changes to the reefs are artificial and man-
                                                 
80 Supra note 78, at 143. 
81 Id. at 144. 
82 Id. at 145. 
83 Id. 
84 Art. 121(1), UNCLOS. 
85 Jonathan I. Charney, Rocks that cannot Sustain Human Habitation, 93 AM. 
J. OF INT’L L. 863, 867 (1999). 
86 For an interactive feature that show construction activities by China in 
the SCS, see Derek Watkins, What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea, 
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made, they will not change their legal status to “islands” or “rocks” as 
defined under UNCLOS. 
Like a land territory of a State, an island has the capacity to 
produce its own maritime zones: the territorial sea, the contiguous 
zone, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf.87 
An island is distinguished from a low tide elevation based on 
how water covers the land. A low tide elevation is under water at a 
high tide but above water at low tide. An island is never submerged 
under water during a low or high tide. A low tide elevation is not 
entitled to any maritime zones. Nevertheless, a low tide elevation can 
be used as a baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea if 
it is situated within the territorial sea of the mainland or an island.88 A 
low tide elevation may not be appropriated because they are part of 
the territorial sea or the continental shelf of a State. 
UNCLOS states that “rocks which cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own” do not produce any 
economic zone or continental shelf.89 On the other hand, they have 
the capacity to produce a territorial sea and a contiguous zone. It can 
be understood that an island is capable of sustaining human 
habitation or economic life of its own.90 A rock does not need to 
satisfy both requirements of “human habitation” and of “economic 
life of its own” to be called an island because the Article 121(3) uses 
the word “or” instead of “and” between these two requirements.91 
While some commentators have argued that the key factors in 
determining if a rock constitutes status an island are “if it can provide 
fresh water, food, and shelter to human inhabitants and if the island 
possesses sufficient resources of its own to sustain economic life.”92 
Additionally, Van Dyke and Brook look to “whether the island can in 
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87 Art. 121(2), UNCLOS. 
88 Art. 13, UNCLOS. 
89 Art. 121(3), UNCLOS. 
90 CRAIG H. ALLEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SEAGOING OFFICERS 70 
(6th ed., New York: Naval Institute Press, 2014). 
91 Marius Gjetnes, The Spratlys: Are They Rocks or Islands?, 32 OCEAN DEV. 
& INT’L L. 191, 199 (2001); Charney, supra note 85, at 868. 
92 Id. at 199 
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fact support a stable population” as a key factor, further stating that, 
“islands should generate ocean space if stable communities of people 
live on the island and use the surrounding ocean areas.”93 
Charney opposes those standards on the ground that nothing 
in the travaux preparatoires mentions such an interpretation.94 
Moreover, Charney infers from the travaux preparatoires of UNCLOS 
that “human habitation does not require that people reside 
permanently on the feature or that the economic life be capable of 
sustaining a human being throughout the year.”95 He further stated 
that economic activity of a rock may be met by the exploitation of 
the living and non-living resources found in its territorial sea.96 
The case between the Philippines and China decided by the 
Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII to UNCLOS is the 
first decision by an international tribunal to elaborate on Article 
121(3) of UNCLOS.97 Accordingly, the Arbitral Tribunal concluded 
that the use of the term “rock” in Article 121(3) does not require a 
feature be composed of rock in the geologic sense.98 The Tribunal 
also tried to explain the intent behind the use of the word “cannot” 
in Article 121(3) of UNCLOS as following: 
The use of the word “cannot” in Article 121(3) 
indicates a concept of capacity…it (the enquiry) is 
concerned with whether, objectively, the feature is 
apt, able to, or lends itself to human habitation or 
economic life. That is the fact that a feature is 
currently not inhabited does not prove that it 
                                                 
93 Jon M. Van Dyke and Robert A. Brooks, Uninhabited Islands: Their 
Impact on the Ownership of the Oceans’ Resources, 12 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 165, 286 
(1983). 
94 See Charney, supra note 85, at 870. 
95 Id. at 868. 
96 Id. (“Consequently, a feature would not be subject to Article 121(3) 
disabilities if it were found to have valuable hydrocarbons (or other characteristics 
of value, e.g., newly harvestable fisheries in its territorial sea, or perhaps even a 
location for a profitable gambling casino) whose exploitation could sustain an 
economy sufficient to support that activity through the purchase of necessities 
from external resources”). 
97 South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 6. 
98 Id. at paras. 480-482. 
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uninhabitable. The fact that it has no economic life 
does not prove that it cannot sustain an economic 
life. 
Nevertheless, historical evidence of human habitation and 
economic life in the past may be relevant for establishing a feature’s 
capacity. If a known feature proximate to a populated land mass was 
never inhabited and never sustained an economic life, this may be 
consistent with an explanation that it is uninhabitable. Conversely, 
positive evidence that humans historically lived on a feature or that 
the feature was the site of economic activity could constitute relevant 
residence of a feature’s capacity.99 
Regarding the “human habitation” requirement, the Tribunal 
said that “at a minimum, sustained human habitation would require 
that a feature be able to support, maintain and provide food, drink 
and shelter to some humans to enable them to reside there 
permanently or habitually over an extended period of time.”100 The 
term “habitation” is said to imply “the habitation of the feature by a 
group or community of persons.”101 The Arbitral Tribunal said that 
the military or governmental personnel stationed on the Spratly 
Islands do “not suffice to constitute ‘human habitation’ for the 
purposes of Article 121(3)” because “these groups are heavily 
dependent on outside supply, and it is difficult to see how their 
presence on any of the SCS features can fairly be said to be sustained 
by the feature itself, rather than by a continuous lifeline of supply and 
communication from the mainland.”102 The Tribunal pointed out 
military or governmental personnel are actually deployed “in an effort 
to support the various claims to the sovereignty that have been 
advanced.”103 
Like the scholars mentioned above, the Tribunal came to the 
conclusion that an island would be given an EEZ and a continental 
shelf if it is able sustain either human habitation or an economic life 
                                                 
99 Id. at paras. 483-484. 
100 Id. at para. 490. 
101 Id. at para. 491. 
102 Id. at para. 620; see also para. 550. 
103 Id. at para. 620. 
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of its own.104 The Tribunal however indicated: “humans will rarely 
inhabit areas where no economic activity or livelihood is possible. 
The two concepts are thus linked in practical terms, regardless of the 
grammatical construction of Article 121(3).”105 
Regarding the criteria of “economic life of its own,” the 
Tribunal concluded that economic life must “pertain to the feature as 
‘of its own’.”106 According to the Tribunal, economic life of its own 
does not cover activities from a possible EEZ or continental shelf, 
however economic activities from the territorial sea may be part of 
economic life of a feature.107 It was pointed out in the award:  
Distant fishermen exploiting the territorial sea 
surrounding a small rock and making no use of 
feature itself, however, would not suffice to give the 
feature an economic life of its own. Nor would an 
enterprise devoted to extracting the mineral resources 
of the seabed adjacent to such a feature and making 
no use of the feature itself.108 
China has not released any information regarding the status 
of insular features in the SCS. In the note verbale of 2011, China said its 
Nansha (Spratly) Islands are “fully entitled to territorial sea, exclusive 
economic zone (“EEZ”) and Continental Shelf” without 
differentiating low tide elevations, rocks or islands from each other.109 
Since these insular features include low tide elevations, rocks and 
islands, they cannot produce the same maritime zones. The Arbitral 
Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration concluded the high tide 
elevations in the Spratlys were not capable of sustaining human 
habitation or economic life of their own, therefore they were rocks.110  
Indeed, most of the features in the SCS are low tide 
elevations. For example, all the formations in the Macclesfield Bank 
                                                 
104 Id. at para. 496. 
105 Id. at para. 497. 
106 Id. at para. 543 
107 Id. at paras. 502-03.  
108 Id. at para. 503. 
109 For the note verbal of 2011, see supra note 4. 
110 South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 6, para. 622. 
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are permanently submerged.111 Hence they may not be entitled to any 
maritime zones. The Arbitral Tribunal in the SCS Arbitration, said 
that Hughes Reef, the Gaven Reef (South), the Subi Reef, the 
Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal were low tide elevations.112 
With regard to the Scarborough Shoal, the Tribunal concluded it was 
a rock which can not sustain human habitation or economic life of its 
own and went on saying:  
The protrusions above high tide at Scarborough Shoal 
are minuscule… They obviously could not sustain 
human habitation in their naturally formed state; they 
have no fresh water, vegetation, or living space and 
are remote from any feature possessing such features. 
Scarborough Shoal has traditionally been used as a 
fishing ground by fishermen from different States, but 
the Tribunal recalls that economic activity in the 
surrounding waters must have some tangible link to 
the high tide feature itself before it could begin to 
constitute the economic life of the feature. There is 
no evidence that the fishermen working on the reef 
make use of, or have any connection to, the high tide 
rocks at Scarborough Shoal. Nor is there any evidence 
of economic activity beyond fishing. There is, 
accordingly, no evidence that Scarborough Shoal 
could independently sustain economic life of its 
own.113 
Similarly, the Tribunal reached the same conclusion regarding 
the Curteron reef, the Fiery Cross Reef, the Johnson Reef, the 
McKennan Reef, the Gaven Reef (North), accordingly it concluded 
that they were rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or 
                                                 
111 “The submerged bank at its shallowest is covered by some 30 feet of 
water. Of course China may claim it as part of its extended continental shelf but it 
has not yet done so.” Mark J.  Valencia, China’s Maritime Machinations: The Good, the 
Bad and the Ugly, THE DIPLOMAT (Dec. 10, 2014), available at  
http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/chinas-maritime-machinations-the-good-the-
bad-and-the-ugly/. 
112 South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 6, paras. 358, 366, 373, 378, 
380. 
113 Id. at para. 556. 
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economic life of their own.114 Therefore, they may not be entitled to 
any EEZ or continental shelf.  
Chinese position against Japanese claims over the 
Okinotorishima is worth to be mentioned at this point. Japan claims 
EEZ and continental shelf around the Okinotorishima Atoll.115 Its 
area at high tide is “one size of a twin bed and of a small 
bedroom.”116 Since 2004, China opposes Japanese claims concerning 
legal status of the Okinotorishima on the ground that it is a rock, 
which “on its natural conditions” cannot sustain human habitation or 
economic life of its own, and therefore can not be entitled EEZ or 
continental shelf.117 Most of features in the SCS does not allow “on 
its natural conditions” to sustain human habitation or have economic 
activity of its own. This situation actually highlight China’s 
inconsistent position taken with respect to its interpretation of Article 
121(3) of UNCLOS. Smith said: “Yet, if China claims all the islands 
in the Spratly group with a view to claiming EEZs and continental 
shelves from them, then there must be some inconsistency in its 
position on Article 121, paragraph 3.”118  
                                                 
114 Id. at paras. 557-570. 
115 See Yann-huei Song, Okinotorishima: A “Rock or an “Island”? Recent 
Maritime Boundary Controversy between Japan and Taiwan/China, in MARITIME 
BOUNDARY DISPUTES, SETTLEMENT PROCESSES, AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 145-
76 (eds. Seoung-Yong Hong and Jon M. Van Dyke, 2009) (the writer said the island 
was unsuitable for human habitation and was not able to economic activity of its 
own); see also Robert W. Smith, Maritime Delimitation in the South China Sea: Potentiality 
and Challenges, 41 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 214, 223 (2010). 
116 Herber Smith, A Rock or an Island? The significance of Okinotorishima and 
its Status under the International Law of the Sea, PUB. INT’L L. E-BULLETIN, available at 
http://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/-
/media/HS/HKTSIBEBASHL0407122110.pdf (last accessed May 2, 2016) 
117 See China’s Note Verbale to the U.N. Secretary General, 
CML/2/2009 of Feb. 6, 2009, available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/chn_6feb09_e.
pdf; Note Verbale CML/59/2011 of Aug. 3, 2011, available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/chn_3aug11_e.
pdf 
118 Robert W. Smith, supra note 115. 
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C. Practice of States Regarding Status of Insular Features and 
Effects of the SCS Arbitration over the Practice of States 
The Arbitral Tribunal stated, “there is no agreement based 
upon State practice on the interpretation of the Tribunal of Article 
121(3) which differs from the interpretation of the Tribunal as 
outlined in the previous sections.”119 Several countries have claimed 
fully fledged EEZs around high tide elevations, which are actually 
incompatible with the SCS Arbitration award. Mark E. Rosen, in a 
published article in a magazine, gave examples of such proclamations 
established by the United States and France.120 The United States 
claims an EEZ of 407, 635 sq km around the Johnson Atoll, which is 
an uninhabited atoll and located 860 miles south of Hawaii.121 
Accordingly, this feature has never had any indigenous populations 
and has no fresh water and tillable soil.122 Similarly Howland and 
Baker Islands, located in the equatorial Pacific, have no fresh water or 
arable land however they have phosphorite and guano deposits, and 
they have an EEZ of 434, 921 sq km.123 Jarvin Island, another US 
uninhabited island located in the South Pacific have scant vegetation 
but have no fresh water and it is alleged that the island has never 
supported “a self sustaining population.”124 Yet, it produces an EEZ 
of 316, 665 sq km.125 
Similarly, France has some tiny, uninhabited features, yet they 
generate fully entitled EEZs. Although Austral Islands in French 
                                                 
119 South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 6, para. 553. 
120 Mark E. Rosen, China Has Much to Gain From the South China Sea Ruling, 
THE DIPLOMAT (July 18, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/china-has-
much-to-gain-from-the-south-china-sea-ruling/; Peter Coy, Is it an Island or a Rock? 
Ruling Could Cost U.S. a Huge Swath of Ocean?, BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2016), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016-07-28/u-s-japan-and-other-
nations-could-lose-exclusive-economic-zones. 
121 Id., Rosen. 
122 Id. 
123 The US District Court for the District of Guam in 2008 said that an 
insular feature does not have to satisfy both the requirement of “human habitation” 
and “economic life” to be called an island and ruled that Howland and Baker were 
islands in terms of Article 121(1) of the LOSC. United States v. Marshalls 201, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38627 (D. Guam May 8, 2008). 
124 Rosen, supra note 120. 
125 Id. 
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Polynesia are uninhabited, they were given effect in the EEZ 
generation.126 Rosen argued these features nearly gave rise to an 
increase of 4.7 sq km in the EEZ generation.127 The French 
Clipperton Island, located in 671 miles southwest of Mexico, is a ring 
shaped atoll, which have no freshwater and arable land, yet it has an 
EEZ of 431, 263 sq km.128 Similarly French Crozet Islands, 
uninhabited tiny features between Africa and Antarctica, does not 
have any arable land or fresh water. However their EEZs amount to 
574,558 sq km.129  
Japan claims a 200 nautical miles EEZ zone around tiny 
Okinotorishima and the Senkakus features. As mentioned above the 
Okinotorishima Island is uninhabited and does not have economic 
activity of its own. Japan has an EEZ of over 400,000 sq km around 
this feature.130 Senkakus are also uninhabited islets, which have no 
fresh water and tillable soil.131 
Most of the features above do not sustain human habitation 
in their natural conditions. Although some of them seem to have 
economic resources like seabed mining and fishing,—as Arbitral 
Tribunal in the SCS arbitration put it—”economic activity in the 
surrounding waters must have some tangible link to the high tide 
feature itself before it could begin to constitute the economic life of 
the feature.”132 People who make use of these resources actually have 
no connection to those features. The Arbitral Tribunal also stated: 
“Purely economic activities, which accrue no benefit for the feature 
or its population, would not amount to an economic life of the 
feature as ‘of its own’.”133 Therefore those insular features do not 
sustain economic activity of their own. Following the Arbitral 
Tribunal decision, it is likely that most of the aforementioned States 
will get objections from the international community about their 
EEZs around these insular features. However, a writer said that “it 
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seems higly unlikely that these states will revise their legal position in 
light of the tribunal’s award in the South China Sea Arbitration and treat 
these ‘islands’ in future as mere ‘rocks’ without an EEZ and 
continental shelf.”134 
Even if we assume the features in the SCS are regular islands 
under Article 121(1) of UNCLOS, maritime delimitations are 
required with States whose coasts are opposite or adjacent.   
D. Maritime Delimitations Involving Islands 
UNCLOS has parallel provisions regarding the delimitation 
of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 
According to UNCLOS, “the delimitation of the continental shelf 
(and the EEZ) between States with opposite or adjacent coast shall 
be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred 
to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in 
order to achieve an equitable result.”135 Unlike the 1958 Convention 
on the Continental Shelf, which applies the median line method, 
UNCLOS does not regulate a standard delimitation method but asks 
to come to an equitable result.136 
                                                 
134 Stefan Talmon, The South China Sea Arbitration and the Finality of ‘Final’ 
Awards, 8 J. OF INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 388, 400 (2017). 
135 Art. 74 and 83, UNCLOS. 
136 Art. 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf provides: 
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more 
States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf 
appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the 
absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special 
circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant 
from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial 
sea of each State is measured.  
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent 
States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement 
between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is 
justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application 
of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.  
3. In delimiting the boundaries of the continental shelf, any lines which are drawn 
in accordance with the principles set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article should 
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According to UNCLOS, the outer border of the EEZ and 
the continental shelf may extend up to 200 nm from the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.137 A State’s 
continental shelf may be wider than 200 miles if its continental 
margin extends beyond 200 nm, although such extension may not be 
longer than 350 nm from the baselines or longer than 100 nm from 
the 2,500-meter isobaths.138 States that claim an extended continental 
shelf shall submit relevant information and data to the CLCS.139  
Article 2 of China’s “Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone 
and the Continental Shelf” establishes a 200 nm limit of continental 
shelf and EEZ from the baselines.140 The dash lines lays much closer 
to the coasts of other coastal States rather than China’s coastal line. 
For example, in the Philippines situation, the nine-dash line is 50 nm 
far away from the island of Luzon and 30 nm away from the island of 
Palawan.141 At its farthest point, the nine-dash line is 800 nm away 
from the Chinese mainland.142 Therefore, China’s claims extend 
beyond the entitlement under UNCLOS. The ICJ said: “no maritime 
delimitation between States with opposite and adjacent coasts may be 
affected unilaterally by one of those States.”143 As Tanaka put it: 
“maritime delimitation is international by nature.”144  
                                                 
be defined with reference to charts and geographical features as they exist at a 
particular date, and reference should be made to fixed permanent identifiable 
points on the land.  
137 Art. 57 and 76(1), UNCLOS. 
138 Art. 76(6), UNCLOS. 
139 See supra note 2. 
140 Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, supra note 9, at 105 (citing to the “Law 
on the EEZ and the Continental Shelf of China” of June 26, 1998).  
141 Emma Kingdon, A Case for Arbitration: The Philippines’ Solution for the 
South China Sea, 38 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 129, 157 (2015) (citing Audio tape: 
A Discussion on the Philippines’ South China Sea Arbitration Case, held by the 
Center for Strategic & International Studies (Dec. 3, 2013), available at 
https://csis.org/multimedia/audio-discussion-philippines-south-china-sea-
arbitration- case, archived at http://perma.cc/5XE7-SY35).  
142 Id. 
143 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgment, 
1984 I.C.J. Reports 299, para. 112. 
144 YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 197 
(2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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Regardless of the issue surrounding whether insular features 
are islands or rocks, international tribunals gave less or even no effect 
to islands in maritime delimitations, on the ground that situation of 
the islands affected maritime delimitations disproportionally. In 
general, international tribunals avoided addressing the issue if an 
insular feature is an island or a rock. The following are some of the 
decisions reached by the ICJ and arbitral tribunals regarding maritime 
delimitation involving an island. 
The Arbitral Tribunal in the Anglo-French maritime 
delimitation case applied a median line between the French and 
British mainland without taking into consideration the British 
Channel islands located in front of the French mainland and giving a 
12 nm continental shelf area to the Channel Islands.145 
In the Tunisia-Libya maritime delimitaiton case,146 the 
Kerkennah Islands were given half effect, as was the Seal Island in 
the Gulf of Maine Case.147 In the 1985 Libya-Malta maritime 
delimitaion case, the court stated that dependent islands would be 
given less effect than independent island States in maritime 
delimitation.148  
In the 1992 Canada-France maritime delimitation case, the 
Arbitral Tribunal observed that with respect to “western seaward 
projection (of the French islands located in front of the Canadian 
mainland), it is unavoidable that any seaward extension of the French 
coasts beyond their territorial sea would cause some degree of 
encroachment and cut off the seaward projection towards the south 
from points located in the southern shore of Newfoundland (the 
                                                 
145 Case concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, 18 REP. OF INT’L 
ARB. AWARDS 3, para. 202 (June 30, 1977), available at 
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XVIII/3-413.pdf.  
146 Supra note 47, para. 129. 
147 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, supra note 
143, para. 222. 
148 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/ Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 1985, para. 53 (June 3, 1985), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=353&p1=3&p2=3&case=68&p3=5. 
2017 Korkut & Kang 5:2 
463 
Canadian coast).”149 The French islands St. Pierre and Miquelon, 
located in front of the Canadian mainland, were given a 24 nm 
maritime area and a narrow 200 nm EEZ towards the high seas.150   
In the Romania-Ukraine maritime delimitation case, the 
Ukrainian Serpents’ Island was only entitled to a 12 nm territorial sea 
and the court did not take into account the Serpents in the maritime 
delimitation.151 The status of Serpents as to whether it was a rock was 
not addressed or event taken into consideration by the ICJ because 
the Court said that any reliance on the Serpents would create a 
disproportionate effect in the delimitation line.152 
V. CONCLUSION 
All the above-mentioned islands in the delimitation cases 
satisfy the definition of an island under Article 121(1) of UNCLOS. 
Even so, they were not given a fully-fledged EEZ or continental shelf 
or sometimes they were given no EEZ or continental shelf. Since 
most of the features in the SCS are disputed as an island and since 
most of them are barely above water at high tide, they should not be 
taken into consideration in the maritime delimitation. Giving full 
effect to these features would affect the maritime delimitations 
disproportionally in the SCS. After the South China Sea Arbitration, 
in which the Tribunal decided most of the insular features are not 
island for the purposes of Article 121(3), even the 
equidistant/median line method may not be a defensible claim for 
China since most of the features will barely produce a territorial sea. 
Because the Chinese nine-dash line does not comply with UNCLOS 
nor prior and current decisions by the international tribunals, it is 
invalid under international law norms and should not be given any 
recognition or effect. 
                                                 
149 Court of Arbitration for the Delimitation of Maritime Areas Between Canada 
and France: Decision in Case Concerning Delimitation of Maritime Areas (St. Pierre and 
Miquelon), 31 I.L.M. 1145, para. 67 (Sept. 1992), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20693736. 
150 Id. 
151 Serpents’ Island has a 0.17 km2 land area.  Maritime Delimitation in the 
Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, 61. 
152 Id. at 110. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
“My dream is to attend university in the United States!” 
These are words I heard countless times while teaching law as a 
Fulbright Scholar in China for two years. My initial reaction was that 
he or she must want to study, travel, and experience life in the United 
States (U.S.).  I soon realized that my colleagues on the faculties of 
Chinese universities, students’ parents, and nearly every educated 
Chinese person I spoke with yearned to study in the United States. 
Our system of higher education is a precious commodity that we 
must not squander. Education is not an area where one may rest on 
one’s laurels. In the words of Bob Dylan, “that he not busy being 
born is busy dying”2 – a country must move ahead in education or 
risk falling behind. 
The U.S. is clearly a global leader in higher education, and it is 
essential that we maintain our edge, both for the benefit of American 
students and for the export of our educational system to international 
students. Most U.S. universities have discovered that Chinese 
students help their bottom line economically, but the true benefit is 
so much greater than just that. Currently, China has the world’s 
largest economy and is home to one-fifth of the worldwide 
population.3 Due to economic reforms in China over the past ten 
years, 203 million people are now included in their middle class. As a 
result, the demand for a world-class education has increased with the 
growth of this middle class. 
II. CHINESE STUDENT ENROLMENT IN US UNIVERSITIES 
Chinese students have been enrolling in higher education 
institutions of the United States in record numbers since 2010.4 From 
                                                 
2 BOB DYLAN, IT’S ALRIGHT, MA (I’M ONLY BLEEDING) (Columbia 
1965). 
3 Rakesh Kochhar, Mapping the Global Population: How Many Live on How 
Much, and Where, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (2015). 
4 Open Doors Fact Sheet: China, INST. OF INT’L EDUC., 2015, 
http://www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/Fact-Sheets-
by-Country/2015#.WBI53pMrLdc .; Glen M. Vogel, A Study of the Language & 
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2007 to 2015, there has been a 166 percent increase in the number of 
students from China studying in the U.S.5 In 2015, Chinese students 
made up over 30 percent of the total international students enrolled 
in higher education institutions within the U.S.6 Even the daughter of 
the President of China, Xi Mingze,  attended and graduated from 
Harvard College in 2015.7 In the past five years, applications to 
Boston University alone from Chinese students increased by a 
whopping 236 percent.8 The University of Illinois (Urbana-
Champaign) has the largest number of international students of any 
public higher education institution in the U.S., and “nearly 5,000 of 
whom are Chinese.”9 There has also been a “remarkable growth of 
foreign attorneys enrolled at U.S. law schools and particularly in 
LL.M. programs.”10 
Previously, Chinese students “tended to be graduate students 
living on tight budgets,”11 but recently the number of undergraduate 
students has surged, and now there are more undergraduate Chinese 
students than graduate Chinese students.12 Although many of these 
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10 Lmindie Lazarus-Black & Julie Globokar, Foreign Attorneys in U.S. 
LL.M. Programs: Who’s In, Who’s Out, and Who They Are, 22 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 3, 5 (2015).  
11 Matt Schiavenza, The Tenuous Relationship between American Universities and 
Chinese Students, THE ATLANTIC, May 30, 2015 (Magazine), http://www.theatlantic. 
com/education/archive/2015/05/american-universities-are-addicted-to-chinese-
students/394517/. 
12 Open Doors Data: International Students: Academic Level and Place of Origin, 
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION, http://www.iie.org/Research-and-
Publications/Open-Doors/Data/International-Students/By-Academic-Level-and-
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:2 
468 
students are from affluent families who own Lamborghinis and flashy 
clothes,13 a growing number are from lower middle-class families.14 
The number of international students has grown so dramatically that 
the University of California Regents voted “to cap the number of 
out-of-state and international students at UCLA and UC Berkeley at 
their current levels – about 30%.”15 The number of out-of-state and 
international students has become so high that two California 
legislators introduced Assembly Bill No. 1711 to the California 
legislature on January 26, 2016; if passed, this bill will “limit the 
percentage of undergraduate nonresident students enrolled at the 
University of California system-wide to 15.5% of total undergraduate 
student enrollment.”16 Similar measures have been enacted in Iowa 
and Washington.17 Although in the past students from China were 
enrolling in post-graduate education, now Chinese students are 
applying to attend U.S. high schools and even primary schools.”18 
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The top six states with foreign students are California, New York, 
Texas, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Pennsylvania.19 
There are a number of reasons for this rapid increase in the 
number of Chinese students attending U.S. universities. The United 
States is considered to have the best higher education institutions in 
the world. Of the several published best university rankings in the 
world, each of them shows the U.S.’s dominance over the rankings. 
The U.S. News and World Report rankings published near the end of 
2015 rates eight U.S. universities in the top ten of universities 
worldwide.20 Of the top 100 universities, the U.S. houses 53.21 The 
Times Higher Education World University Rankings for 2015-2016 
lists the U.S. as having 39 of the top 100, and six of the top ten 
higher education institutions.22 The Center for World University 
Rankings for 2015 lists the U.S. as having eight of the top ten 
institutions and 54 of the top 100 universities.23 The CS World 
University Rankings for 2015/16 shows U.S. universities as six of the 
top ten and 30 of the top 100 institutions in the world.24 Clearly, the 
United States is the global leader in higher education. 
Conversely, Chinese universities are ranked relatively lower in 
global rankings of universities according to the above-referenced 
rankings. The U.S. News and World Report rankings include three 
Chinese universities in the top 100 global university rankings, where 
Peking University is tied for #41, Tsinghua University is #59, and 
Fudan University at #96.25 The Times Higher Education World 
University rankings show two Chinese universities in the top 100: 
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Peking University at #42 and Tsinghua University at #47.26 The 
Center for World University Rankings lists two Chinese universities, 
Peking University at #56 and Tsinghua University at #78.27 Finally, 
QS World University Rankings include four Chinese universities in its 
top 100 with Tsinghua University at #25, Peking University at #41, 
Fudan University at #51, and Shanghai Jiao Tong University at #70.28 
The rankings are certainly uppermost in the minds of Chinese 
students and their parents,29 but Chinese students are interested in 
U.S. universities for more reasons than the prestige of the top 
universities.30 “The ambitions of Chinese students are shifting. No 
longer are they attracted just by the glittering names. Pursuit of 
education abroad is becoming an end in itself.”31 The growing 
Chinese middle class prefers a “well-rated university overseas to a 
second-tier option at home.” As noted above, only Peking University 
and Tsinghua University are ranked in the world top 100. These two 
schools have room for only 6,000 new students a year.32 That is one-
twentieth of one percent of the Chinese college entrance exam 
takers.33 
Chinese students and their parents are also attracted to 
American methods of teaching. In the U.S., students are encouraged 
to be curious, which is generally not true of Chinese higher 
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education.34 Many Chinese find their higher education system “too 
rigid and ideologically stifling.”35 There is a great difference between 
the American style of critical thinking (particularly in law school) 
versus the Chinese style of rote memorization.36 “In China, people 
often humorously compare the traditional method of conveying 
information to a student to “feeding a duck’: you feed it, and feed it, 
and feed it until the duck is full, and then you’re done.”37 Chinese 
students and their parents find that study abroad “is more student-
centered and individualized.”38 Some residents of China believe the 
education in China, which rewards rote-style learning, stifles students’ 
creativity and critical thinking abilities.39 
One important difference between the U.S. and Chinese 
higher education systems is the flexibility of choice in the U.S. The 
American education system gives students the freedom to choose 
their field of study.40 My students in China were astounded by the 
fact that my son changed his major four times in college. In China, a 
student’s test score determines his or her field of study.41 In fact, only 
the highest scoring students are able to study lucrative majors such as 
finance and economics.42 According to one student, “Chinese 
education makes you memorize a lot of things but don’t let [sic] you 
have your opinion to exercise your mind.” Indeed, the U.S. education 
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system has been described as offering “the freedom to be indecisive 
and the ability to change your mind.”43 
The price of a U.S. university education far exceeds the price 
of a Chinese education.44 In China, Tsinghua University charges 
40,000 CNY (Chinese Yuan Renminbi), or $6,140 USD, while Fudan 
University charges 25,000 CNY, or $3,838, for tuition.45  On the 
other hand, an international student is charged $45,000 per year for 
tuition at Harvard College and anywhere between $32,096 and 
$41,376 for tuition at the University of Illinois.46 Additionally, most 
Chinese students are ineligible for federal financial aid.47 
Nevertheless, “Chinese parents see American education as the most 
valuable of commodities and are willing to make sacrifices to get it.”48 
A sacrifice it is. The tuition is “the equivalent of nearly ten times the 
average annual disposable income of urban households” in China.49 
In somewhat of a win-win situation for U.S. universities and Chinese 
students, “foreign students have become crucial to many public 
universities” because the universities may charge these students full 
tuition.50 The Greater Boston Convention & Visitors Bureau 
President referred to this as “a Super Bowl of education spending.”51 
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In a move that bucks the recent trend of limiting the number of 
international students, lawmakers in Colorado “passed a law in 2010 
that exempts state colleges from a 45% cap on out-of-state 
students.”52 
III. THE TROUBLE WITH CHINESE EDUCATION 
A. Chinese Entrance Exam – the Gaokao  
There is only one road to a university education in China – a 
certain passing score on the gaokao, the National College Entrance 
Exam (NCEE).53 “Unlike in the U.S., no amount of community 
service, interview prep, or athletic heroics will help you get into a top 
school.”54 A high score on the gaokao means entry into a prestigious 
university with an expected lucrative major.55 The Chinese Ministry 
of Education sets two “cutoff” points.56 There is a higher cutoff 
point for prestigious universities and a lower cutoff point for general 
university admission.57 Additionally, students’ gaokao score determine 
their major.58 The Chinese entrance exam is referred to as “the SAT 
on steroids.”59 The top scorers on the gaokao are referred to as the 
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zhuangyuan, or principal graduate, and “often become brief media 
darlings.”60 
The gaokao was first administered in 1952. The exam is 
loosely based on the imperial exam system that was used to reward 
merit rather than birthright for job opportunities as government 
officials from 1644 to 1911.61 Between 1911 and 1949, universities 
had their own individual tests for admission.62 This system was 
replaced by a uniform exam given across the country (the test does 
vary by province). The exam was seen as a way to “countervail 
nepotism and inherited wealth.”63 The use of the gaokao was 
suspended from 1966 through 1976 during the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution, commonly known as the Cultural Revolution.64 
In fact, during the Cultural Revolution, schools and universities were 
closed from 1966 through the beginning of 1970.65 When schools 
reopened, “revolutionary purity” was the basis of college admissions 
from 1970 until 1973.66  
The Cultural Revolution ended in 1976 with the death of 
Chairman Mao Zedong, China’s supreme leader, and the arrest of the 
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“Gang of Four.”67 When the gaokao was first reinstated, 5.7 million 
students took the exam and only 278,000 were placed in universities, 
constituting a placement rate of approximately one half of one 
percent of all those who took the exam.68 Opportunities improved 
slightly by 1984, when 1.6 million students took the exam and 
430,000 won spots in Chinese universities, an increased chance of 
nearly three percent.69 By 2011, the Chinese higher education system 
had grown so substantially that one’s chance of being accepted to a 
higher education institution increased to nearly 69 percent.70 Today, a 
Chinese student’s chances are greatly improved. China now has 
approximately 1,145 universities.71 In June of 2015, 9.42 million 
students took the gaokao, a number close to the entire population of 
the state of Michigan.72 During the same year, 7.5 million students 
graduated from Chinese colleges. Although data is not available for 
the percentage of those taking the gaokao who were admitted to 
Chinese universities, it currently appears to be close to 80 percent, 
quite a change from the 1970’s. Nevertheless, the chance of being 
admitted to a top-100 globally ranked university in China is still 
extremely slim. One must also keep in mind that for those who do 
not pass the gaokao, a university education in China is impossible and 
the individual is essentially relegated to a low-income job.73 There is a 
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lot at stake. Moreover, Chinese teenagers’ chances of university 
education depend upon where they reside in China.74  
B. The Chinese Registration System – the Hukou  
A major barrier to higher education in China is the hukou, the 
country’s registration system.75 “Chinese students from rural China 
are at a great disadvantage compared to their urban counterparts 
when taking the gaokao and have lower chances of gaining admission 
to top tier universities.”76 The hukou system began in 1958 and was 
designed to ensure the country’s agricultural system.77 Prior to the 
hukou system, China experienced a large influx of rural peasants to 
the cities.78 Officials were fearful that the mass migration could 
destabilize the relatively new system of government.79 The hukou 
system was borrowed from the Soviet Union, which had a “model of 
rapid industrialization, political organization, and legal institutions.”80 
Under the system, every citizen in China “inherits a household 
registration at birth, which may be altered only under very limited 
exceptions.”81 From 1958 until the late 1970’s, rural to urban 
migration was “essentially halted.”82 Beginning in the late 1970’s, the 
ban on migration was eased.83 
During the 1980’s, 1990’s, and early 2000’s, approximately 
140 million Chinese citizens migrated from rural villages and towns 
to cities.84 Despite their new homes, they are not entitled to public 
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services available to urban residents.85 They are treated as second-
class citizens and are referred to as liudong renkou, or the “floating 
population.”86 Though millions of workers have migrated to larger 
cities for jobs,87 children of migrant workers must return to their 
home provinces to take the university entrance exam.88 Due to a 
quota system, it is much easier for a student who has a Beijing or 
Shanghai hukou to attend the universities considered the best in 
China.89 The two top ranking Chinese universities, Peking University 
and Tsinghua, both located in Beijing, admit Beijing resident students 
at a much higher rate than students from other provinces.90 The score 
required by a Beijing-based test-taker may be much lower than the 
qualifying score for a rural test-taker.91 The top two universities 
admitted an average of 84 students out of every 10,000 Beijingers and 
two out of every 10,000 from the Guangdong province in 2014.92 
Due to the hukou system, “an examinee from wealthy Beijing or 
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Shanghai may gain admission to elite education with a lower score 
than someone from impoverished Anhui.”93 
China has announced that it plans to change the hukou system 
in order to “promote greater equality between urban residents and 
migrant workers and their children.”94 On February 1, 2016, Chinese 
Premier Li Keqiang stated that the government would improve the 
permit system.95 In the meantime, an increasing number of Chinese 
students are opting out of the gaokao and instead taking the American 
SAT, the U.S. standard test for college admission.96 
IV. THE US ENTRANCE EXAM – THE SAT 
The precise number of Chinese students who have taken the 
SAT is unknown, although the College Board, the non-profit agency 
that owns the exam, indicated it will publish the number in the 
future.97 One online test preparation company estimates that 55,000 
Chinese took the SAT in 2014.98 It is known that overseas registrants 
for the SAT have increased dramatically since 2009.99 The number of 
registrants from “East Asia and Pacific” has increased by 76 percent 
in just the past five years.100 This trend may not continue. The SAT 
exam has been recently revised and the changes are viewed as 
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97 Nick Anderson, How Many Chinese Take the SAT Every Year? We May 
Soon Learn, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2014,  https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
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98 Alexa Olesen, China’s Hot New Luxury Product: the SAT, FOREIGN 
POLICY, June 8, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/08/chinas-hot-new-
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99 Te-Ping Chen and Abby Schultz, Cheating Concerns in Asia Cloud SAT 
Testing, THE WALL ST. J., June 5, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/cheating-
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disadvantageous to Chinese students.101 The new SAT includes more 
reading passages, passages from US founding documents, no 
mandatory writing section, and “wordier math problems.”102 
Interestingly, China’s new official China News Agency criticized the 
change in the SAT due to “worries [that] the materials may impose 
the American values system on students.”103 A Chinese student may 
opt to take the ACT instead of the SAT, as American universities 
accept students based on ACT scores as well. A very small number of 
U.S. universities accept scores on the gaokao in lieu of the SAT or 
ACT.104 
The record number of foreign students taking admission 
exams to gain entry to U.S. universities has unfortunately resulted in 
increased cheating on these entrance exams. On May 21, 2015, a 
federal grand jury in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania indicted fifteen Chinese 
nationals on charges of conspiracy, counterfeiting foreign passports, 
mail fraud, and wire fraud by having imposters take college and 
graduate school standardized entrance examinations.105 The United 
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States Attorney in the Western District indicated that he “believed 
the issue extended beyond the 15 people charged.”106  
In 2015, the College Board, which administers the SAT 
“delayed thousands of scores in Asia.”107 The College Board 
cancelled the SAT exam in five countries, including 43 sites in China 
in January 2016.108 Previously, Chinese students needed to travel to 
Hong Kong to take the SAT,109 but in August of 2012, the test was 
made available to Chinese students who attended one university prep 
school in mainland China.110 Currently, the SAT is offered at “select 
international schools” in China.111 The exam was cancelled however 
in January of 2016 because some students “may have already seen 
copies of the tests.”112 A magazine based in Beijing demonstrated in 
an article from September of 2015 just how easy it is to cheat on the 
SAT in China.113 
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V. FIERCE COMPETITION PROMOTES UNETHICAL MEASURES 
It is not surprising that, given the importance of exams, and 
the fact that “one exam determines one’s life,” unethical tactics 
abound.114 Moreover, there is a perception that “the system is 
rigged.”115 Students and schools are “getting a lot of community and 
parental pressure” for students to attend a top-ranked school.116 
Application materials to U.S. universities may be forged and falsified. 
By one estimate, “90 percent of Chinese applicants submit fake 
recommendations, 70 percent have other people write their essays, 50 
percent have forged high school transcripts, and 10 percent list 
academic awards and other achievements they did not receive.”117 
Undoubtedly, these estimates are high, but “when Chinese students 
are taught by their parents, teachers, and governmental officials to 
cheat in order to succeed on the gaokao and their admissions 
endeavors in their homeland, it is not surprising that the dishonesty 
would spill over to their efforts to get accepted into an American 
college or university.”118 
Universities in the U.S. are taking notice. At the 2015 
Overseas Association for College Admission Counseling (OACAC) 
conference, the participants discussed the problems, the reasons, and 
the need “to make [the application process] safe for honest 
applicants.”119 One of the main reasons for the unethical conduct is 
the use of agencies to assist in the application process. There are over 
400 educational consulting firms that are certified by the Chinese 
Ministry of Education and thousands more that are unlicensed.120 
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These agencies often promise to help a student gain acceptance to a 
Top-50 U.S. university, and may be paid partially on a success basis, 
increasing the incentive to falsify applications.121 One prominent 
agent estimated that one half of the transcripts were “doctored” to 
make the candidate more competitive.122 In one instance, ten 
different applicants from the same school claimed to be the top 
student in the class.123 It is no small wonder that honest students 
believe they are unable to compete with students who use agents. 
One student interviewed stated, “I did feel slightly guilty but all my 
friends did the same thing.”124 
Another reason for unethical behavior is that there is virtually 
no punishment if one is caught cheating on U.S. exams or on their 
application materials. One participant at the OACAC Conference 
stated “it blows my mind that students who cheat on the SAT get to 
take the test again – why aren’t they outed to all of your schools?”125 
In China, students “face expulsion and even jail time for cheating on 
their country’s rigorous college entrance exam.”126 However, there is 
essentially no price to pay if one is caught cheating on the SAT.127 
Finally, the entire U.S. university application process is 
perplexing for Chinese citizens. In a country that sees test scores as 
the only way to get ahead (“in rural China a top gaokao score can lift 
the fortune of an entire family, promising a life beyond the fields for 
generations to come”),128 the listing of extracurricular activities is 
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quite foreign. Also, many times the students’ teachers are not 
sufficiently proficient in English to write letters of 
recommendations.129 Further, Chinese students are not particularly 
familiar or comfortable with admission essays.130 If a family has the 
financial means, of course they consult these “expert” agencies. 
The falsification of application material hurts both potential 
students and students who do in fact “make it” to U.S. universities. 
In the period between 2012 and 2015, U.S. universities expelled 8,000 
Chinese students due to low grades and cheating.131 Schools in the 
U.S. have recently begun to verify information through U.S. agencies 
and Skype interviews with students to combat the fraudulent 
applications.132 American universities must ensure Chinese candidates 
are submitting accurate application materials in order to maintain the 
integrity of U.S. universities. Perhaps U.S. and Chinese authorities 
would be willing to work together to monitor questionable 
application agents operating in China. This equally benefits China, as 
approximately 75 percent of Chinese students who study abroad 
return to China.133 
VI. INVESTMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
During the same time frame as the increased demand for 
higher education, U.S. state support for higher education has 
decreased significantly.134 In fact, since my first year teaching in 
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China, “forty-seven states are spending less per student in the 2014-
15 school year than they did at the start of the recession,” in 2008.135 
Conversely, the Ministry of Education in China has increased 
spending on an average of 20 percent per year over the past 
decade.136 Certainly the spending in China improves access to basic 
education in its developing economy, but it also indicates 
government priorities. Recently, the budget cuts of many U.S. higher 
education institutions has been dramatic. State appropriations for 
higher education has decreased by 14.6 percent since 2007.137 The 
States’ budget choices will determine whether they can successfully 
rebuild their higher education systems.”138 
The U.S. is currently the global leader in higher education, 
but efforts must be made to continue this leadership. In 2010, 
Richard C. Levin, the President of Yale University predicted the rise 
of Asia’s universities.139 He correctly indicated the Chinese goal of 
creating world-class universities as a benefit to all economies. The 
President further stated, “Competition in education, like the 
phenomenon of globalization itself, is a positive sum game.”140  
China is investing approximately $250 billion annually in 
higher education, and the number of Chinese universities had 
doubled over the past decade.141 According to former Yale President 
Levin, “in 25 years, only a generation’s time, these universities could 
rival the Ivy League.”142 In a new book published by the Institute of 
International Education and the American Institute for Foreign Study 
Foundation, “leading scholars, practitioners, and education policy 
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experts from 10 different countries” predict that Asia will be the next 
higher education superpower.143 In an interview with Inside Higher 
Ed, Mark S. Ferrara, the author of Palace of Ashes: China and the Decline 
of American Higher Education, Ferrara compares the “substantial and 
enduring investments in higher education” in China with America’s 
decline in spending on higher education.144 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Without question, increased access to higher education and 
the improvement of universities, no matter where situated, mutually 
benefit every society. Nevertheless, if the quality of education in the 
United States continues to decrease, the U.S. will be harmed. In the 
past five years, Congress has cut federal funding for elementary and 
high school education by 20 percent.145 If higher education in the 
U.S. becomes less desirable, other counties will fill the void. It would 
be a shame if the United States lost its place as the world leader of 
higher education. Education must not go the way of the steel 
industry. This Author hopes to be able to return to China again and 
continue hearing “My dream is to attend university in the United 
States!” 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
This article presents an overview of the benefits of an 
enterprise legal risk management (“ELRM”) Framework when 
deployed as a tool by multinational companies (“MNCs”) to 
strengthen their corporate U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) 
compliance programs.1 The article identifies and discusses important 
benefits of the Framework, including improved effectiveness and 
efficiency in in-house and related outside legal costs.2 According to 
Forbes magazine, legal services costs associated with FCPA 
                                                 
1  R. Walker, International Corporate Compliance Programs, 3 INT’L J. OF 
DISCLOSURE AND GOVERNANCE 70, 70-81 (2006) (explaining the increased 
importance of compliance and ethics programs both outside and within the United 
States). See also Evan Peterson, Compliance And Ethics Programs: Competitive Advantage 
Through The Law, 17 J. OF MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 1027, 1027–1045 (2013) 
(advocating that corporate compliance programs offer a sustainable competitive 
advantage from the law by assisting organizations in achieving a better 
understanding of the law, a cost-effective approach for coping with an 
organization’s legal issues, as well as aiding organizations by preventing these legal 
issues from occurring in the future and by supporting organizations in reframing 
legal issues as business opportunities.). See also Shaun Cassin, The Best Offense Is a 
Good Defense: How the Adoption of An FCPA Compliance Defense Could Decrease Foreign 
Bribery, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 19, 19-58 (2014) (providing a brief historical overview 
of FCPA, arguments for and against adding a compliance defense to the FCPA, a 
five-part compliance defense proposed by the former assistant chief of FCPA 
enforcement at the U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) William Jacobson and 
options available to a company for designing of a compliance program).  
2 Garrick Apollon, The Intersection between Legal Risk Management and Dispute 
Resolution in the Commercial Context, 15 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.  284, 284-285 (2015) 
[Hereinafter Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR] available at 
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol15/iss2/2 (last visited Jan. 28, 
2017) (explaining that the implementation of an ELRM Framework promotes: 
strong corporate governance for the client organization by reducing the negative 
impacts of legal risk across the organization; gives access to better insurance; 
enables the client to make informed decisions and avoid surprises; accomplishes its 
corporate policies and objectives using more objective and reliable information; 
improves client’s engagement and intake management vis-à-vis legal issues for a 
better working relationship between lawyer-client; reduces monetary and other 
possible impacts of litigation; improves cost control and cost effectiveness of legal 
fees; assists in taking “calculated” or smart risks that are balanced against possible 
benefits; fosters necessary controls and due diligence; promotes better business 
planning; and generally enhances decision making from an organization-wide 
perspective.).  
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compliance incurred by MNCs run to several million dollars every 
year without necessarily achieving the desired legal compliance 
results. 3 FCPA compliance is a very lucrative business for law firms 
because MNCs are paying several million dollars in legal fees while 
often still paying several million dollars in fines to U.S. regulators.4 
Forbes magazine also went so far as to label the FCPA as the “milk 
cow” for the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).5 In light of the 
foregoing, this article presents ELRM Framework as the solution for 
MNCs looking to prioritize their FCPA legal services efforts in a risk-
based approach and as a means of keeping a tighter rein on their in-
house and outside legal costs.6 After all, a Chief Legal Officer 
(“CLO”) or General Counsel (“GC”) in the legal department of a 
MNC is responsible not just for supervising the delivery of excellent 
legal services, but also for justifying and controlling the cost of legal 
                                                 
3 Lisa Prager, FCPA Compliance: Don’t Blow Your Budget Just Yet, FORBES 
MAGAZINE, Mar. 27, 2012, available at 
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol15/iss2/2 (last visited Jan. 28, 
2017) http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2012/03/27/fcpa-compliance-dont-
blow-your-budget-just-yet/#3e88127c7e89  
4 The anti-bribery business, THE ECONOMIST, May 9, 2015, available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21650557-enforcement-laws-against-
corporate-bribery-increases-there-are-risks-it-may-go (last visited Jan. 28, 2017). See 
also Nathan Vardi, The FCPA Fiasco: Pressure Tactics In Corruption Cases Backfiring, 
Forbes Magazine, Jan. 17, 2012, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2012/01/17/the-fcpa-
fiasco/#454e7e55be45 (stating that the Government’s track record on FCPA cases 
in court has been terrible. For many years the FCPA, which prohibits bribery of 
foreign government officials, was hardly been enforced. But for the last decade the 
federal government has greatly increased its FCPA enforcement, threatening to 
bring an indictment against any company that does not cooperate and act harshly if 
companies don’t voluntarily report any potential sins. This game has been cheered 
on by lawyers and accountants, even journalists, who benefit immensely from the 
expensive internal investigations companies initiate to deal with this new reality). 
5 Forbes, supra note 3 (explaining that FCPA enforcement has long been 
considered a cash cow for the Department of Justice.  It should not be a surprise, 
therefore, that complying with the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws comes 
with its own hefty price tag.).  
6 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, at 
284-285 (discussing the key advantages and challenges of using legal risk 
management to help lawyers manage substantive matters related to commercial 
negotiations and disputes).  
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fees for the MNC.7 In practice, GC get fired not only for poor 
delivery of legal services but also over excessive legal billing against 
the MNC.8 
As Susskin’s best-selling book The Future of the Law mentions, 
the next generation of lawyers will have to embrace a proactive 
perspective focused on dispute prevention rather than just dispute 
resolution, as well as legal risk management rather than just legal 
problem-solving.9 Susskind’s message in the Future of the Law remains 
a stark one: in order to guarantee a stake in the legal and regulatory 
system of the future, lawyers must adapt their work practices or die.10 
A recent article in the Harvard Business Review went as far as to say 
that “Technology Will Replace Many Doctors, Lawyers, and Other 
Professionals” by asserting that “within decades the traditional 
professions will be dismantled, leaving most, but not all, 
professionals to be replaced by less-expert people, new types of 
experts, and high-performing systems.”11 As an illustration, Thomson 
Reuters, the world’s leading source of intelligent information for 
businesses and professionals, and Blue J Legal (company owned by 
University of Toronto tax law professor Benjamin Alarie) are 
launching Tax Foresight, a new suite of artificial intelligence-based 
                                                 
7 E. NORMAN VEASEY AND CHRISTINE T. DI GUGLIELMO, 
INDISPENSABLE COUNSEL: THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER IN THE NEW REALITY 56 
(Oxford University Press, 2012).  (discussing the challenges of budget constraints 
and the financial dependence of GC on a single client).  
8 This statement is based on conventional wisdom, but see Frederic S. Ury, 
Jordan Furlong, What The Future Legal Market Means For Lawyers And Bar Associations, 
ABA JOURNAL, Vol. 37 No. 6 (2013), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/bar_leader/2012_13/july_august/what
_future_legal_market_means_lawyers_bar_associations.html (last visited Jan. 28, 
2017) (asserting that too many clients, both consumer and corporate, believe that 
attorneys drive up the cost of legal transactions without adding commensurate 
value).  
9 RICHARD E. SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF LAW: FACING THE 
CHALLENGES OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 
(theorizing on the future of the law in the face of the technological evolution of the 
world). 
10 Id.  
11 Richard Susskind and Daniel Susskind, Technology Will Replace Many 
Doctors, Lawyers, and Other Professionals, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 11, 2016), available at 
https://hbr.org/2016/10/robots-will-replace-doctors-lawyers-and-other-
professionals. 
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tax case outcome predictors, to Canadian corporate tax professionals; 
tax preparers; accountants; and tax lawyers. Tax Foresight leverages 
the power of machine learning and artificial intelligence (“AI”), 
enabling practitioners to rapidly receive a legal risk assessment to 
predict how courts will rule in new tax decisions, based on facts 
provided by users and analysis of prior judicial decisions.12 In other 
words, we can expect in the future that routine work can be taken on 
by machines with AI or “robot lawyers”13, and that human experts 
will only be needed for the tricky stuff that calls for judgment, 
creativity, and empathy.14  
It is in this context that the implementation of ELRM 
Framework has risen to the top of the list of priorities of companies’ 
in-house legal departments.15 CLO or GC are now directed by the 
Chief Risk Officer (“CRO”) and/or Chief Compliance Officer 
(“CCO”) to supervise the implementation of mandatory ELRM 
Framework in their companies.16 Accordingly, the idea behind this 
article is based on the fact that the largest in-house public legal 
department in Canada (the Department of Justice Canada) has 
recently established a mandatory ELRM Framework with a business 
analytics software called iCase to modernize the delivery of legal 
services for all litigation, legislative and advisory legal files for the 
Government of Canada.17 This framework is mandatory and supports 
the day-to-day practice of law in all federal departments and agencies 
                                                 
12 Thomson Reuters and Blue J Legal Deliver Artificial Intelligence-Based Tax 
Foresight, THOMSON REUTERS, Nov. 15, 2016, available at 
http://thomsonreuters.com/en/press-releases/2016/november/thomson-reuters-
and-blue-j-legal-deliver-artificial-intelligence-based-tax-foresight.html  
13 Chris Sorensen, Big Law is having its Uber Moments, Maclean’s Magazine, 
Jan. 16, 2017, available at http://www.macleans.ca/economy/business/big-law-is-
having-its-uber-moment/ (last visited Feb 7, 2017).  
14 Supra note 11.  
15 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, 
at 271.  
16 Id.  
17 Legal Risk Management in the Department of Justice, CANADA 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cp-pm/eval/rep-rap/08/lrm-grj/p2.html (last 
modified Jan. 7, 2015) (presenting the legal risk management initiative and an 
overview of legal risk management today within the Government of Canada). 
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of the Government of Canada.18 The International Organization for 
Standardization (“ISO”) is currently working on the development of 
international standards named the ISO/AWI 31022 Guidelines for 
Implementation of Enterprise Legal Risk Management to respond to 
the shift in public and corporate sector accountability.19 These ISO 
standards aim to strengthen and modernize the practice of legal risk 
management in private and public organizations around the world 
and as a result improve the rule of law and anti-corruption and 
regulatory compliance.20  
The FCPA is now the top legal risk facing American 
multinational companies.21 The FCPA is a United States (“U.S.”) 
federal criminal law known primarily for two of its main provisions; 
one that addresses accounting transparency requirements under the 
U.S. Securities Exchange Act (“SEC”) and the other concerning bribery 
of foreign officials.22 The FCPA applies to any person who has a 
                                                 
18 Id.  
19 See ISO/AWI 31022, Guidelines for Implementation of Enterprise 
Legal Risk Management, available at 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber
=69295  
20 Lalonde, C., & Boiral, O., Managing risks through ISO 31000: A critical 
analysis, 14 RISK MGMT. 4, 272-300 (explaining that the ISO 31000 standard is 
intended to help organizations to manage in a systematic and comprehensive 
manner diverse types of risk, by offering a universal framework to assist the 
organization to integrate risk management into its overall management system).  
21 GORDON E. KAISER, CORPORATE CRIME AND CIVIL LIABILITY 587 
(Lexis Nexis, 2012) (stating that for the past 50 years, the greatest threat to 
multinational corporations in terms of criminal liabilities fell under the competition 
and anti-trust laws. Serious enforcement of the U.S. FCPA by U.S. prosecutors 
have led to fines to the tune of 3.6 billion from 2012-2009 alone, and U.S. 
prosecutors continue to aggressively enforce the FCPA.).  See also R. Christopher 
Cook & Stephanie Conner, Jones Day LLP, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Recent 
Enforcement Trends, THOMSON REUTERS (2010), http://us.practicallaw.com/ 
(explaining recent trends in actions against individuals, sector-wide investigations, 
record fines that include large amounts of disgorged profits, anti-corruption 
enforcement outside the US because jurisdictions like the U.K., Germany and 
Canada have strengthened their own anti-corruption legislation and activities, 
increasing mutual enforcement and legal assistance, impact on cross-border 
transactions such as M&As and increase in civil actions (while civil actions are rare, 
they present an expensive risk of additional litigation)).   
22 A Resource Guide to The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, THE CRIMINAL 
DIVISION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE ENFORCEMENT 
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certain degree of connection to the United States and engages in 
foreign corrupt practices.23 The Act also applies to any act by foreign 
corporations trading securities in the U.S.24 Therefore, the FCPA has 
strong extraterritorial reach25 and, like most anti-corruption 
legislation based on the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 
can apply to foreign companies and individuals.26 FCPA enforcement 
in the recent years by DOJ and SEC has been marked by record 
prosecutions against companies, often resulting in multi-million 
dollar financial penalties and a greater prosecutorial effort leading to 
fines and imprisonment against individuals.27 By focusing on 
prosecution against individuals, DOJ and SEC attract more 
                                                 
DIVISION OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 2 (2012), 
available http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf (last visited 
July 19, 2015).  
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
25 Nicholas M. McLean, Cross-National Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, 121 
YALE L.J. 1970 (2012). (providing an empirical examination of U.S. enforcement 
actions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in order to explore the 
cross-national patterns associated with United States’ international antibribery 
enforcement).  
26 Robert D. Tronnes, Ensuring Uniformity in the Implementation of the 1997 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 97, 97-130 (2001) (discussing that since 
the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977, the United States 
has worked to persuade other nations to forbid bribery of foreign public officials in 
an effort to secure business abroad. As a result of pressure from the United States 
and the increased costs associated with corruption, the international tide is turning 
against transnational bribery. 3 In order to capitalize on this global shift towards 
condemnation of corruption, twenty-nine Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) member countries and five non-member countries 
signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (Convention) on December 17, 1997. The 
Convention is an effort to cut off transnational bribery at its source. Consequently, 
in signing the Convention all signatory countries made the commitment to “pass 
legislation necessary for [the Convention’s] ratification and implementation into 
national law.”).  
27 Kaiser, supra note 21, at 587-588 (discussing bribery and anti-
corruption).  
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cooperating witnesses and generate even more investigations.28 The 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Act”) 
grants significant protections and rewards to whistleblowers.29 
Whistleblowers who provide original information that leads to the 
assessment of monetary sanctions in excess of $1 million are entitled 
to receive between 10% and 30% of the sanction amount as a 
reward.30 For instance, a record award of $30M was recently obtained 
by a foreign whistleblower pursuant to the Dodd-Act.31  
An ELRM Framework serves as a continuous, proactive and 
systematic or integrated process to understand, manage and 
communicate legal risk from an organization-wide or enterprise-wide 
perspective in a cohesive, consistent and cost-efficient manner.32 It is 
about supporting strategic decision-making that contributes to the 
achievement of an organization’s overall objectives.33 Legal risks 
cannot be managed effectively in silos; hence an ELRM Framework 
must be part of an Integrated or Enterprise Risk Management 
Framework (IRM or ERM).34 It requires an ongoing assessment of all 
risks such as financial, corporate and reputational at every level and in 
every sector of the organization, and aggregating these results at the 
                                                 
28 Murdock, Charles W., The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future 
Crises, 64 S.M.U. L. REV. 1243 (2010). 
29 Id.  
30 See Rachel Louise Ensign, SEC to Pay $30 Million Whistleblower 
Award, Its Largest Yet, WALL STREET J., Sept. 22, 2014, available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-to-pay-30-million-whistleblower-award-its-
largest-yet-1411406612 (last visited July 19 2015).  
31 Supra note 24.  
32 Garrick Apollon, the intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, at 
283-287 (explaining that based on international standards (ISO 31 000) a risk 
management framework serves as a set of components that provide the 
foundations and organizational arrangements for designing, implementing, 
monitoring, reviewing and continually improving risk management through the 
organization).  
33 Id.  
34 Integrated Risk Management Framework, TREASURY BOARD OF 
CANADA SECRETARIAT, 
http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?section=text&id=12254#appA (last 
modified Apr. 1, 2001) (discussing shared leadership-suggested roles and 
responsibilities in risk management). 
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corporate level, communicating them and ensuring adequate 
monitoring and review.35 
ELRM Framework has four main objectives: 1) identifying 
issues early and assessing potential legal risks; 2) avoiding and 
mitigating legal risks; 3) managing legal risks as they occur for an 
organization in consistent; enterprise-wide and cost-efficient manner; 
and 4) using business analytics software to modernize the ELRM 
practices and ensuring the use of data and business analytics as a 
means to improve organizational performance.36 In this current 
context, this article encourages MNCs to strengthen their anti-
corruption and anti-bribery (“ABC”) compliance program with an 
ELRM Framework.37 The main goal is to further “prevent FCPA 
violations prior to their occurrence, quickly detect any violations and 
mitigate penalties if violations occur.”38 “The DOJ and SEC have 
indicated that the existence of an ABC compliance program is a 
significant factor taken into account in deciding whether to bring 
charges, what charges to bring and what penalties to impose”.39 As 
observed, “despite increased FCPA enforcement, U.S. corporations 
continue to pay bribes out of business necessity because of the 
leniency of other countries”.40 For instance, President Donald Trump 
in a national television interview with CNBC in 2015 made the 
controversial comment that “this country is absolutely crazy” to 
                                                 
35 Id.  
36 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, 
at 284-285.  
37 See Daniel L. Goelzer, Designing an FCPA Compliance Program: Minimizing 
the Risks of Improper Foreign Payments, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 282 (1998) 
(explaining the importance of a FCPA compliance program), available at 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1474
&context=njilb (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) (this article asserts that a FCPA 
compliance program must be complemented by an ELRM Framework).  
38 Kaiser, supra note 21, at 593 (explaining the goals of an anti-corruption 
compliance program).  
39 Id.  
40 Id. See also the academic work of Professor Eugene Soltes, Jakurski 
Family Associate Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business 
School, author of the celebrated book Why They Do It: Inside the Mind of the White-
Collar Criminal (Hachette, 2016). Professor Soltes research focuses on corporate 
misconduct and fraud, and how organizations design cultures and compliance 
systems to confront these challenges. 
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prosecute alleged FCPA violations in places like Mexico and China.41  
Moreover, President Trump said that the FCPA is a “horrible law 
and it should be changed” and that it puts U.S. business at a “huge 
disadvantage.”42 As pointed out by Professor Koehler (founder and 
editor of the FCPA Professor website43), the FCPA is here to stay 
because “the FCPA’s legislative history makes clear that in passing 
the FCPA Congress intended to capture only a narrow category of 
payments and chose not to capture so-called facilitating payments 
given the difficult and complex business conditions encountered in 
many foreign countries”.44  
Legal scholarship emphasizes the power of reframing and the 
manner in which a legal practitioner frames or describes legal 
problems to help create a new dynamic and achieve better results.45 
In a similar vein, this article presents the implementation of an 
ELRM Framework as a necessary additional step for MNCs to ensure 
effective and cost-efficient anti-corruption compliance program for 
the MNC. This article argues that MNCs should reframe their 
problems with FCPA and anti-corruption compliance as not just a 
compliance risk but also a legal risk that needs to be managed with an 
ELRM Framework.  
                                                 
41 CNBC SquawkBox interview (beginning at the 14-minute mark) 
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000089630&play=1 and FCPA Professor 
(FCPA Professor website is the website of Professor Koehler, respected authority 
in the field of FCPA), see Donald Trump: The FCPA Is a “Horrible Law and It 
Should Be Changed”, August 6, 2015, available at 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/donald-trump-the-fcpa-is-a-horrible-law-and-it-should-
be-changed/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).  
42 Id.  
43 Id. See also F. Joseph Warin, Michael Diamant, Patrick Doris, Mark 
Handley and Melissa Farrar,  
Gibson Dunn Offers Update on Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 
Columbia Law School’s Blog on Corporations and the Capital Markets, Jan. 16, 
2017 (explaining Donald J. Trump assumes the Presidency on January 20, 2017, 
and his inauguration will bring inevitable changes to the composition and mandate 
of DOJ).  
44 Id.  
45 Ran Kuttner, The Wave/Particle Tension in Negotiation, 16 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 331, 359-60 (2011) (discussing the power of reframing in 
scholarship for the practice of law).   
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This article explains the general steps and benefits to a GC 
and its legal department in MNCs in implementing an ELRM 
Framework specifically designed for FCPA compliance and risk 
management. An ELRM Framework helps in-house and outside legal 
counsel to move away from a specific and narrow legal analysis 
focused on problem-solving to a more preventative style. This allows 
them to better select which FCPA risk management strategy to apply 
to better prevent FCPA liability and help their clients to achieve 
better decision-making in their international business transactions.46  
ELRM is also all about linking the practice of the law with 
technology.47 For instance, an ELRM should incorporate business 
analytics software to assist the GC and senior management of the 
MNC with monitoring the number of hours and lawyers involved in 
a FCPA files based on their legal risk and complexity level.48 This 
means in practice that in-house lawyers, and most importantly 
outside lawyers, will be accountable for the legal risk and complexity 
level of the FCPA file and the numbers of hours they spend on it 
based on objective criteria.49 Therefore, “an ELRM Framework 
presents as its main advantage the prevention of lawyers who score 
highly on Machiavellianism and who are process-oriented from 
manipulating legal risk communication and assessments to get their 
client to perceive what they want them to perceive, and for the 
benefit of their own unethical agendas, such as overbilling or from 
raising their profiles by ranking legal risks high when in reality the 
level of complexity and risk is medium or low.”50   
Above all, the implementation of an ELRM Framework is 
designed to avoid making the ABC compliance program a “paper 
                                                 
46 Supra note 7, at 56 (explaining that the GC and in-house counsel are 
the managers of legal and reputational risk and educators for the company. They 
need to perform the increasingly important function of assessing legal risks and 
translating those risks into business terms in order to facilitate decision-making 
considering those risks).  
47  Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, 
at 285-286. 
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
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program”.51 This is achieved through the implementation of a strong 
legal risk assessment process for the delivery of day-to-day FCPA 
legal services that will help the lawyers to play their role as 
gatekeepers of corporate integrity and as problem solvers in the 
execution of international business transactions for the MNC.52 
I. WHAT IS AN ELRM FRAMEWORK?  
The author defines an ELRM Framework as a compliance 
management system for the effective and cost-efficient delivery of 
legal services in an organization.53 The ISO 19 600 international 
standard broadly defines a compliance management system such as 
an ELRM Framework as a set of interrelated or interacting elements 
of an organization to establish policies, objectives, processes and 
tools to achieve legal (regulatory) compliance requirement that an 
organization must comply with and chooses to voluntary comply 
with.54 Therefore, an ELRM Framework aims to go beyond the 
                                                 
51 Patrick Head, The development of compliance programs: one company’s 
experience, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 535 (1997) (explaining that companies have run 
into the difficulty for having a FCPA compliance program fully conceived on 
paper, but no real compliance or financial controls. A “paper program” means a 
failure to implement a culture of legal compliance and ethics).  
52 David Nersessian, Business Lawyers as Worldwide Moral Gatekeepers: Legal 
Ethics and Human Rights in Global Corporate Practice, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1135, 
1135-1188 (2015).  See also, Joseph W. Yockey, FCPA Settlement, Internal Strife, and the 
Culture of Compliance, WIS. L. REV. 689 (2012) (explaining that though cooperation 
generally remains the prerequisite to obtaining a DPA or NPA, regulators also 
stress that they are more likely to offer leniency to firms with a strong “culture of 
compliance.” Like before, this follows from the use of the OSG as a framework for 
settlement negotiations. The OSG was amended in 2004 in response to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to allow for lower sanctions for firms that have 
“effective compliance and ethics programs” in place. Programs that meet this 
requirement will be found in firms that “exercise due diligence to prevent and 
detect criminal conduct” and “otherwise promote an organizational culture that 
encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law.) 
53 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, 
at 306-307.  
54 See ISO 19600:2014 Compliance management systems – Guidelines, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO), available at 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber
=62342 (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).   
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required legal compliance by building an organization’s approach to 
legal compliance that is ideally shaped by objective standards and an 
ethical leadership and corporate culture that apply core anti-
corruption values and the highest corporate governance standards in 
decision-making.55 The long term goal of an ELRM Framework is to 
contribute to building an exemplary “compliance culture”56 in an 
organization. As a result, an ELRM Framework should never be 
perceived as unnecessary red tape or a burdensome internal 
administrative process, but instead an organizational design built to 
promote a real dialogue and partnership between lawyer-client 
towards ethical leadership. 
The need to implement objective standards with an ELRM 
Framework for the day-to-day practice of FCPA risk communication 
in an organization arises from the fact that risk is emotionally, 
socially, culturally, economically and politically constructed and is 
therefore subjective by nature.57 For instance, an international VP of 
sales might prefer to see an international business transaction as low 
risk for corruption because the business benefit outweighs the legal 
threat for him and his unit. However, this same international business 
transaction might be assessed as high risk by his compliance officer 
and in-house counsel. The goal of an ELRM Framework in practice 
is to improve the legal risk communication between the VP of sales 
and counsel so that they can share the responsibly to manage the 
FCPA risk in order for a sound legal and ethical decision risk 
response commensurate to the corruption risk level that the MNC is 
facing. FCPA risk management is not only the business of 
compliance officers or lawyers but this is a shared responsibility for 
all employees in an organization.58 However, we live in an 
                                                 
55 Barbara Mescher & Bryan Howieson, 1 Beyond Compliance: Promoting 
Ethical Conduct by Directors and Corporations, CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV., 93-114 
(2005) (examining the relationship between legal and moral perspectives of 
directors’ behaviour and corporate governance).  
56 Sow Wei Wong, A Culture, Not a Programme, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (2010) 
(explaining that a compliance culture is where the management and all the 
employees share the common belief, value or goal that doing the right thing, even 
when no one is looking is an important part of what defines the organization.).  
57 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, 
at 275. 
58 Id.  
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individualist culture where the collective interests of the organization 
do not always come first.59 An ELRM Framework serves to 
standardize and objectify the organizational ELRM practices in order 
to mitigate the risk that the self-interest of the individuals involved in 
the compliance process supersede the collective interests of the 
organization.60 The author also argues that the implementation of an 
ELRM Framework specific to FCPA risk is the first step for a MNC 
to later develop a more comprehensive ELRM Framework that will 
be applied to all their advisory and litigation files and covers all the 
legal risks facing the MNC every day.  
An ELRM Framework also helps to deal with the inherent 
complexity of FCPA risks.61 FCPA is a complex legal risk that is 
influenced by many factors such as foreign legal, economic, cultural 
and political environments.62 For instance, the MNC must take into 
consideration that the vast majority of anti-corruption laws such as 
U.K. Bribery Act or Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act 
(“CFPOA”) have an extraterritorial reach just like the FCPA.63 This 
means a FCPA risk assessment must also assess the likelihood of 
adverse outcomes with other anti-corruption foreign laws such as the 
U.K. Bribery Act and CFPOA. For instance, an American company 
registered and trading stocks on the London Stock Exchange is also 
                                                 
59 GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING 
VALUES, BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS 
(2nd ed., Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2010). 
60 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, 
at 309-310 (explaining that lawyers who score highly on Machiavellianism and who 
are process-oriented can manipulate communications and assessments to get their 
client to perceive what they want them to perceive for the benefit of their own 
unethical agendas, such as overbilling or raising their profiles by ranking legal risks 
high when they are in reality medium or low).  
61 Adam Seligman, Role Complexity, Risk, and the Emergence of Trust, 81 B.U. 
L. REV. 619, 619-634 (2001) (theorizing that trust emerged as a dimension of social 
relations in modern society along with risk. Risk became inherent in behaviours 
when, with the segmentation of social roles, there developed an in-built limit to 
systemically based expectations. Potential dissonance between the different aspects 
of roles increased, revealing these two new phenomena characteristic of modern 
forms of social relations: risk and decided trust).  
62 See McLean, supra note 21.  
63 Anna Simonova, Extraterritorial Reach of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 8 
J. COMP. L. 211, 211-231 (2013) (discussing the Extraterritorial Reach of the 
FCPA).  
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subject to the U.K. Bribery Act.64 The U.K. Bribery Act sets out in 
Section 7 the corporate offence of failure to prevent bribery in the 
course of business; the section legally obligates companies to 
maintain an effective ABC compliance program, as the only statutory 
defence to this offence is to prove the existence of adequate systems 
and controls.65 This strict liability corporate offence (Section 7 - 
failure of commercial organizations to prevent bribery) is unique to 
the U.K. Bribery Act.66 The U.K. Bribery Act also prohibits facilitation 
payments that are somewhat permitted under the FCPA.67 Therefore, 
the breadth of the application of the new U.K. Bribery Act is generally 
seen as part of a global trend of requiring higher ethical standards and 
is broader in scope than the FCPA in a number of respects.68  
II. ADVANTAGES TO AN MNC OF HAVING AN ELRM FRAMEWORK 
SPECIFIC TO FCPA RISK 
If MNCs are spending millions on FCPA compliance, they 
are not spending enough money and resources on developing an 
ELRM Framework to ensure the effective and cost-efficient delivery 
                                                 
64 Jessica Lordi, The U.K. Bribery Act: Endless Jurisdictional Liability on 
Corporate Violators, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 955, 955-998 (2012), available at 
http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1139&context
=jil (last visited Feb. 7, 2017); see also Sharifa G. Hunter, Article & Essay: A 
Comparative Analysis Of The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act And The U.K. Bribery Act, And 
The Practical Implications Of Both On International Business, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
89 (2011).  
65 The Bribery Act, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL UK, available at 
http://www.transparency.org.uk/our-work/business-integrity/bribery-act (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2017).   
66 Id.; See also Kaiser, supra note 21, at 627 (explaining the U.K. Bribery 
Act). 
67 Kaiser, supra note 21, at 637 (explaining that FCPA accepts as a 
defence the grating of facilitation payments but these payments are not allowed 
under U.K. Bribery Act).  
68 See Natalie Shu Ying Wee, The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials and the Impact of the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act 2010 on 
Corporations: Is the Act Too Harsh, 17 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 126 (2014). See also 
Dominic Saglibene, U.K. Bribery Act: A Benchmark for Anti-Corruption Reform in the 
United States, 23 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 119-146 (2014).  
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of day-to-day FCPA legal services in their organization.69 As 
evidence, the United Nations (“UN”) Global Compact published in 
2013 a Guide for Anti-Corruption Risk Assessment, where it noted 
that the principal weakness of ABC compliance programs is often the 
absence of process to establish robust measures and practices for 
day-to-day anti-corruption legal risk assessment.70 It specifically 
observed that “The Global Corporate Sustainability Report 2013 
shows that only 25% of UN Global Compact business participants 
conduct anti-corruption risk assessments, and there are substantial 
differences in implementation levels among large and small 
companies.”71  
Risk management principles and frameworks are nothing new 
to other professionals such as actuaries, accountants, engineers or 
medical doctors, but they are a new discipline for lawyers.72 In 
practice, a ELRM Framework that brings objective standards and 
guidelines into decision-making in international business transactions 
is needed because anti-corruption legal risk assessments are 
dependent on three basic determinants: 1) lack of information and 
knowledge; 2) lack of power and control; and 3) lack of time and 
resources in relation to the execution of international business 
transactions for all companies operating globally.73 
                                                 
69 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, 
at 271 
70 United Nations Global Compact, A Guide for Anti-Corruption Risk 
Assessment (2013) (explaining that the Global Corporate Sustainability Report 2013 
shows that only 25% of UN Global Compact business participants conduct anti-
corruption risk assessments, and there are substantial differences in implementation 
levels among large and small companies), available at 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/Anti-
Corruption/RiskAssessmentGuide.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).  
71 This article focuses on the implementation of LRM Framework for 
large companies such as MNCs. 
72 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, 
at 287 (explaining that ELRM is relatively new in the legal profession—as with 
anything new, a period of adjustment is expected, and senior management of law 
firms and legal departments must support the implementation of an ELRM 
Framework in their organizations. This means change management is required, 
especially since lawyers usually do not like to be managed and told what to do).  
73 Id. at 306 (explaining that social-psychological measures are also 
important because lawyers do not have the information necessary to accurately 
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As part of the advantages already discussed, an ELRM 
Framework provides technological, financial and corporate 
compliance value to an organization by offering the following 
strategic and monetary benefits to an organization.74 It: 
• promotes ethical leadership and an integrity-based corporate 
compliance culture where unethical and illegal bribery and 
corruption activities and other white-collar crimes such as 
fraud, insider trading, money laundering are anticipated, 
detected and prevented; 
• allows the CRO and/or CCO to implement a ELRM 
Framework in accordance with the IRM or ERM Framework 
of the organization to ensure more cost-certainty, efficiency 
and business value for corporate decision-making in the 
management of legal risks (i.e. deter a culture of risk taking or 
risk aversion to encourage a culture of smart risk-taking based 
on an integrity-based corporate compliance culture); 
• the main driving force for organizations to implement a legal 
risk management framework is to ensure more cost-certainty, 
efficiency and business value for corporate decision-making 
(i.e. deter a culture of risk aversion to encourage a culture of 
smart risk-taking); 
• allows the GC to generate customized timekeeping legal risk 
reports (in real-time) for senior management and the Board 
of Directors (i.e. the GC is in a better position to explain the 
legal risks that the company is facing (risk profile of the 
company) and justify its budget and the legal expenses/legal 
costs for the organization); 
                                                 
judge the legal risks of the bargaining or dispute resolution situation. A lawyer’s 
ability to complete an accurate legal assessment may be dampened by several 
factors, such as lack of information, lack of time, situational constraints based on 
resources or power, and self-selection processes. The lawyer and the client’s 
judgments are biased, and biases are associated with inefficient performance.) 
74 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, 
at 285.  
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• improves the overall quality and objectivity of lawyers’ legal 
services (the risk and complexity level must be assessed on 
the basis of objective criteria based on the universally 
accepted risk management principles of ISO 31000); 
• contributes to mitigating the risk of lawyers overbilling by 
manipulating the risk level or complexity of a legal file (the 
subjective elements of risk perception and treatment are 
mitigated); 
• improves information sharing and eliminates the duplication 
of work through enhanced information governance by the 
use of business analytics software;  
• enables the use of a common language in communicating 
FCPA risks;  
• enhances the ability of lawyers to manage legal risks from an 
IRM or ERM perspective, where they can see the ‘big picture’ 
(all legal and non-legal consequences are assessed such as the 
operational/corporate, financial, values and ethics, and 
reputational) and concentrate energy and attention to areas of 
highest legal risk facing the organization (risk-based 
approach);  
• increases the respect of governmental regulators and helps to 
attract shareholders, investors and stakeholders by showing 
that the company has a strong corporate compliance program 
for the management of legal risks; and  
• helps the organization to attract investors and secure better 
rates and/or prices from lenders and insurance companies by 
showing that it has a strong corporate compliance program 
for the management of its legal risks.  
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III. BENEFITS OF ELRM FRAMEWORK FOR LAWYERS AND LAW 
FIRMS 
Legal risk management has been identified by the Canadian 
Bar Association (sister organization of the American Bar Association 
in Canada) as the future of the law for lawyers.75 While an ELRM 
Framework helps MNCs to manage FCPA risk and keep legal 
services providers accountable, ELRM Framework also helps lawyers 
and law firms to highlight their good work and justify their legal fees 
billed to their clients (or the legal costs associated with an in-house 
legal department). Therefore, ELRM Framework should not be 
perceived as a threat for law firms and lawyers (providers of outside 
legal services to MNCs) because an ELRM framework aims to 
improve the lawyer-client relationship and is equally beneficial for 
lawyers and law firms by doing the following:  
•   improves the overall quality and objectivity of lawyers’ legal 
services (the risk and complexity level must be assessed on 
the basis of objective criteria based on the universally 
accepted risk management principles of ISO 31 000). It 
contributes to mitigating the risk of clients questioning the 
risk level or complexity of a legal file to avoid paying a legal 
bill (the subjective elements of risk perception and treatment 
for the client is mitigated). Therefore, this reduces the time 
lawyers spend to explain or justify invoices to their clients. It 
also prevents against disputes and complaints at the Law 
Society (bar) for overbilling, thus preserving the integrity 
reputation of the law firm and its lawyers;   
•   the general practice of ELRM for lawyers is legal work and 
therefore billable time. For instance, lawyers have a financial 
incentive to insert all the ELRM information such as 
timekeeping, risk and complexity level in ELRM business 
                                                 
75 The Future of Legal Services in Canada: Trends and Issues, Canadian Bar 
Association, 6 (2013) (explaining that emerging fields of competency may include 
legal risk management, legal project management, legal process analysis, and legal 
knowledge engineering), available at 
http://www.cba.org/CBAMediaLibrary/cba_na/PDFs/CBA%20Legal%20Future
s%20PDFS/trends-isssues-eng.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
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analytics software. This is because tasks completed in relation 
to ELRM should always be considered as billable legal work 
and not administrative work (since ELRM is the main 
responsibility of a lawyer to his client and ELRM information 
such as legal risk assessments should always be shared with 
his client);  
•  ISO 31 000 standards help to protect lawyers and law firms by 
ensuring that all key legal risks are documented and 
communicated (also increase efficiency, save time and effort 
by eliminating duplication); 
•  enables the use of a common language in communicating 
risks among colleagues from the same law firm or legal 
department; and consistency among clients and other 
stakeholders; 
•  improves reliability, consistency and timeliness of 
organizational legal risk information, thus providing more 
accurate and reliable contingent liability reports, and 
standardized and effective ELRM services to clients. It 
ensures effective reporting to clients, improves cost-control 
and cost-effectiveness, assists in the allocation of financial 
and human resources, and attention and effort to each file; 
improves capacity to plan, forecast and manage high-risk and 
high-profile files in a risk-based management approach (i.e. 
priority to high risk files is guaranteed); and improves the 
communication of legal risk and leadership of files;  
•  leads to better working lawyer-client relationships because the 
ELRM framework facilitates communication between lawyer 
and client and legal risks are managed from an IRM or ERM 
standpoint (in other words counsel would always consider not 
just the legal consequences but also the non-legal 
consequences such as operational, financial, ethical and 
reputational impacts when they assesse a legal risk – this 
generates more relevant and practical legal advice for senior 
management and corporate decision-makers); 
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•  provides a competitive advantage for a law firm by helping to 
standardize the delivery of their legal services and using 
technology such as business analytic software;    
•  allows access to business analytics for benchmarking and 
performance management (allows the law firm to improve 
internal processes and rank its effectiveness and efficiency in 
delivering solutions compared to other market competitors); 
and 
•  reduces the costs of professional liability assurance (or 
insurance). 
IV. HOW AN ELRM FRAMEWORK IS IMPLEMENTED IN A MNC?   
Overall, just like a house alarm system detects security risks, 
an ELRM Framework or system helps the MNC to detect, deter, and 
prevent the occurrence of FCPA risk.76  
The full implementation of an ELRM Framework can be 
estimated to take up to 1-2 years because this requires a change of 
corporate culture. However, the implementation time is always 
dependent on the personal endorsement and commitment of senior 
management (Tone at the Top)77 along with an appropriate allocation 
of financial and human resources.78 For optimal results, it is 
recommended that implementation plan be based on the 
Transparency International (“TI”) Business Integrity Toolkit79 for 
                                                 
76 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, 
at 285 (using the analogy that a LRM and compliance system for a company should 
be viewed as an alarm system for your house. Just like your house alarm system 
detects security risks, your LRM system will works to detect, deter, and prevent the 
occurrence of legal risks in an organization.) 
77 ISO 19600:2014 Compliance management systems—Guidelines, supra 
note 54. 
78 Id.  
79 Business Integrity Toolkit, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 
https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/tools/business_integrity_toolkit/0/ 
(last accessed Dec. 6, 2015). 
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building an effective ABC program.80 The complete six steps and 
their sequence are summarized below: 
   
  Commit ‘Tone at the top’ to a strong corporate compliance 
agenda in managing FCPA legal risks and the implementation of the 
ELRM framework.81 The ‘buy-in’ and full participation of senior 
management, board of directors and other stakeholders is critical to 
success. The “Tone from the Top”82 is often the greatest challenge 
                                                 
80 Id.  
81 ISO 19600:2014 Compliance management systems – Guidelines, supra 
note 54, at 8-10 (explaining the importance of senior management support in the 
development of a corporate compliance system). Mark S. Schwartz, Thomas W. 
Dunfee & Michael J. Kline, Tone at the Top: An Ethics Code for Directors?, 58 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 79 (2005) (explaining that legal reforms without proper attention to ethical 
obligations will likely prove ineffective. The ethical role of directors is critical. 
Directors have overall responsibility for the ethics and compliance programs of the 
corporation. The tone at the top that they set by example and action is central to 
the overall ethical environment of their firms).  
82 Id.  
1. 
COMMIT
2. 
ASSESS 
3. PLAN
4. ACT
5. 
MONITOR
6. 
REPORT
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for the implementation of an ELRM Framework in practice because 
the CEO is often more focussed on profit and strategic planning 
than risk management. However, with the example of corruption 
scandals such as Siemens83, Wal-Mart84, SNC Lavalin85, etc., this 
article argues that in this new era where “reputation rules”86 CEOs 
should be equally concerned by managing, not just the legal risk, but 
the reputational and financial risk that FCPA poses to their MNC 
rather than just focusing on making profit. These corruption scandals 
also reinforce that an ELRM Framework is even more necessary in 
time of crisis management. For instance, Wal-Mart, reported that it 
spent $439 million in FCPA compliance (i.e. legal fees, forensic and 
investigative fees) only in the first two years of the scandal (2012 
                                                 
83 Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, At Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line 
Item, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.html 
(covering the largest corruption scandal in the corporate world. Siemens, one of the 
world’s biggest companies, ended up paying $1.6 billion in the largest fine for 
bribery in modern corporate history).  
84 Tom Schoenberg & Matt Robinson, Wal-Mart Balks at Paying $600-
Million-Plus in Bribery Case, BLOOMBERG,  Oct. 6, 2016, available at  
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-06/wal-mart-said-to-balk-at-
paying-600-million-plus-in-bribe-case (last visited Feb. 10, 2017) (discussing the 
possibility that officials have proposed that the world’s biggest retailer pay at least 
$600 million to resolve probes by the Justice Department and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission into whether it bribed government officials in markets from 
Mexico to India and China. Such a settlement would rank among the largest in four 
decades under a U.S. law against bribing foreign officials to obtain business. The 
Justice Department and the SEC have spent half a decade investigating allegations 
that Wal-Mart representatives paid government officials over the course of 10 years 
to fast-track store openings). See also Ben W. Heineman, Jr, Who’s Responsible for the 
Walmart Mexico Scandal?, HARV. BUS. REV., May 15, 2014, available at 
https://hbr.org/2014/05/whos-responsible-for-the-walmart-mexico-scandal (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2017) (discussing that the Walmart bribery scandal is one of the 
most closely-watched cases of alleged malfeasance by a global company. It broke 
into the open in April, 2012, when the New York Times published a lengthy 
investigative piece alleging Walmart bribery in a Mexican subsidiary and a cover-up 
in its Bentonville, Arkansas, global headquarters).  
85 See Snc Lavalin Corruption, HUFFINGTON POST, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/news/snc-lavalin-corruption/ (last visited Feb. 10, 
2017).  
86 DANIEL DIERMEIER, REPUTATION RULES: STRATEGIES FOR 
BUILDING YOUR COMPANY’S MOST VALUABLE ASSET (2011) 
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2013), making it one of the most expensive probes in U.S. history.87 
The Economist, reported that “by the time bribe-busters at America’s 
Department of Justice (DOJ) are done with their own investigation, 
which began in 2012, Walmart’s bill for lawyers’ and forensic 
accountants’ fees will be well above $1 billion—and perhaps closer to 
$2 billion”.88 
Assess the organization’s current risk environment and risk 
exposure using ELRM Framework to detect areas of the greatest 
inherent risk in order to prioritize and allocate resources (financial 
and human) appropriately to these areas.89 Assess also refers to 
benchmarking the current ELRM practices of the organization to 
identify its strengths and weaknesses.90  
Plan the scope and activities that the organization will 
undertake to prevent, detect, avoid, transfer/shift if possible, mitigate 
and in general strategically manage legal risks by using ELRM 
framework.91  
Act by implementing internal checks and balances, as well as 
documenting with business analytics software and communicating 
legal risks, to promote an integrity-based corporate compliance 
culture where unethical and illegal activities are prevented and 
detected and FCPA risks are mitigated in a risk-based approach.92   
                                                 
87 David Voreacos & Renee Dudley, Wal-Mart Says Bribe Probe Cost $439 
Million in Two Years, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 26, 2014, available at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-26/wal-mart-says-bribery-
probe-cost-439-million-in-past-two-years (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).  
88 The Economist, supra note 4.  
89 ISO 19600:2014 Compliance management systems – Guidelines, supra 
note 54, at 11 (explaining that senior management should allocate adequate and 
appropriate resources to establish, develop, implement, evaluate, maintain and 
improve the compliance management system and performance outcomes).   
90 Id. at 24-25 (asserting the importance of report-keeping for compliance 
management).  
91 Id. at 7 (asserting the importance of identification, analysis and 
evaluation of compliance risks for compliance management). 
92 Id. at 24-25 (asserting the importance of report-keeping for compliance 
management). See also Id. at 16-17 (discussing the concept of compliance culture or 
integrity-based compliance that aims to establish a culture of ethical leadership and 
goes beyond required legal compliance).  
DOCUMENT10 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2017 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:2 
512 
Monitor processes to ensure that strengths and weaknesses 
are identified and that the ELRM framework is continuously 
improved to remain effective and up to date.93  
Report on the sincerity of the organization’s commitment to 
an effective FCPA compliance program to raise awareness among 
employees and positively influence the organization’s reputation in 
the marketplace.94 ELRM Framework presents a performance 
management plan for continuous monitoring and improvement 
designed on the basis of ISO 19600:2014 - Compliance Management 
Systems.95 This performance management plan provides guidance for 
establishing, implementing, evaluating, monitoring, maintaining and 
improving an effective and responsive compliance management 
system within an organization.96 
V. CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING AN ELRM FRAMEWORK IN AN 
ORGANIZATION  
First, like any corporate compliance program the “Tone from 
the Top” is crucial and senior management must support the ELRM 
Framework implementation.97  
Second, lawyers must remain vigilant and not provide legal 
risk assessment on a corporate decision that is illegal or immoral like 
in the case of the infamous Ford Pinto case.98 Law and morality 
cannot be separated and a strong commitment to business ethics and 
integrity must remain present at all times when legal risk assessments 
                                                 
93 Id. at 21-22 (discussing monitoring to ensure performance 
management).  
94 Id. at 22-23 (discussing information analysis and classification).  
95 Id. at 22 (discussing the sources of feedback on compliance 
performance).  
96 Id. at 23 (discussing compliance reporting and that the compliance 
function should ensure that they are effectively informed on the organization’s 
compliance performance).  
97 Id. at 8-10. (explaining the importance of senior management support 
in the development of a corporate compliance system). 
98 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, 
at 286 (disusing Pinto case in the context of legal risk management)  
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are conducted by lawyers for corporate decision-makers.99 Lawyers 
must have strong legal advisory and legal advocacy skills to facilitate 
corporate decisions that are based on integrity.100 In other words, the 
role of the lawyers is not to find legal “loopholes” but to help their 
client to manage their legal risks in a spirit that promotes ethical 
leadership and an integrity-based corporate compliance culture where 
unethical and illegal activities are prevented and detected by the 
lawyer to the benefit of its client’s reputation.101  
Third, while it assists in objectifying and standardizing legal 
practice, ELRM is not a science (a decision of a court can never be 
predicted with complete certainty).102 The ELRM approach must be a 
flexible one that relies on the legal virtuosity of the lawyer, but also 
the honesty, business judgment and conventional wisdom of each 
participant.103 This means risk reports and risk profiles based on 
business analytics software rely on the accuracy of the FCPA risk 
assessments conducted by lawyers when human errors are frequent, 
and also all information are not always shared with the lawyer.  
Fourth, change management is required.104 The ELRM 
Framework like any corporate compliance program is mandatory and 
professionals (especially lawyers) don’t like to be told what to do.105 
                                                 
99 M.E. Stucke, In search of effective ethics & compliance programs, 39 J. CORP. 
L. 769, 769-832 (2014) (explaining that the US Sentencing Commission’s 
Organizational Guidelines provided firms strong financial incentives to have 
effective ethics and compliance programs (“ethics programs”). Since then, 
compliance has become big business. To incentivize compliance, some statutes 
require public firms to disclose their compliance efforts. Directors of Delaware 
corporations owe a duty “to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate 
information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists.” 
Companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ must have an 
ethics code. But unethical and illegal corporate conduct is still pervasive. The 
economic crisis heightened concerns of widespread unethical and illegal conduct 
among financial institutions, ineffectual compliance, and corporate crime).  
100 Id.  
101 Id.  
102 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, 
at 286.  
103 Id.  
104 Id at 287.  
105 Id.  
DOCUMENT10 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2017 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:2 
514 
As with any new initiative within an organization, a period of 
adjustment is expected.106 
Finally, an ELRM Framework must be developed by ELRM 
experts working in close collaboration with the compliance and legal 
departments of the MNC to benchmark their current practices. A 
consultation committee chaired by the CRO or CCO with as many 
representatives of the legal team led by the CLO or GC and his 
senior counsel, senior and middle management of the MNC should 
be created to ensure the buy-in of all organizational players for the 
implementation of the ELRM framework, while also consulting with 
external stakeholders.107  
VI. FOUR MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE ELRM FRAMEWORK  
The ELRM Framework applies international risk 
management standards to FCPA risk such as ISO 31 000 Risk 
Management108 and ISO 19600:2014 Compliance Management 
Systems109 The utilization of the ISO 37 001 Anti-Bribery 
Management System should also be considered.110 The 
implementation of an ELRM Framework should include the 
following four elements: 
                                                 
106 Id.  
107 See Mark Bandsuch, Larry Pate, Jeff Thies, Rebuilding Stakeholder Trust 
in Business: An Examination of Principle‐ Centered Leadership and Organizational 
Transparency in Corporate Governance, 113 BUS. & SOC. REV. 99, 99-127 (2008).  
108 See ISO 31000 - Risk Management, International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso31000.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 
2017). 
109 ISO 19600:2014 Compliance management systems – Guidelines, supra 
note 54.  
110 Id.  
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A. FCPA risk assessment process or how the FCPA legal 
services are delivered to assist the day-to-day execution of 
international business transactions for the MNC;111 
B. ELRM Toolbox;112 
C. Business analytics software utilized by the MNC for FCPA 
risk management and reporting;113 and  
D. Implementation of a performance measurement plan for 
the ELRM Framework.114   
A. FCPA risk assessment process or how the FCPA legal services 
are delivered in the day-to-day execution of international business 
transactions for the MNC 
First, the MNC needs to benchmark and compare their 
approach to FCPA risk assessment against the well-tested ISO 31 000 
LRM process115 and the anti-risk management guidelines developed 
by the UN Global Compact116, while highlighting any gaps in their 
anti-corruption legal risk assessment process approach. For instance, 
the ISO 31 000 process is used by the Department of Justice Canada 
for the Government of Canada Legal Risk Management (LRM) 
Framework.117  
Based on the ISO 31 000 model and the LRM Framework at 
the Department of Justice Canada, the LRM Framework for FCPA 
                                                 
111 ISO 31000, supra note 108, at 2 (explaining that a risk management 
policy is a statement of the overall intentions and direction of an organization 
related to the daily practice of risk management).  
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
114 ISO 19600:2014 Compliance management systems – Guidelines, supra 
note 54. 
115  ISO 31000, supra note 108, at 13 (explaining risk management 
process).  
116 United Nations Global Compact, A Guide for Anti-Corruption Risk 
Assessment, supra note 70.  
117 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, 
at 288-290. 
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risks should be based on a five- step approach that can be illustrated 
by the following graphic:118 
   1. FCPA Risk Identification [step 1] 
The employee needs to identify FCPA risk by using the e-
library of pre-identified and pre-assessed FCPA risks.119 In practice, 
these pre-identified and pre-assessed FCPA risks are called “red 
                                                 
118 Id.  
119 ISO 31 000, supra note 108, at 11 (explaining the need to be creative in 
developing resources for risk management).  
FCPA Risk 
Communication and 
Consultation [Step 4 - 
ongoing] 
 
 
 
Communication includes 
reporting to facilitate 
corporate decision 
making. Consultation 
means that the lawyer 
will seek proactively his 
client’s intake 
management. This step 
is also linked with the 
use of business analytics 
software and the 
electronic risk recording 
of all the FCPA legal 
information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FCPA Risk Identification  
[step 1] 
Process of finding, recognizing and 
describing events which may generate 
FCPA risks as the top legal risk for 
companies operating globally 
  
FCPA Risk 
Monitoring and 
Review [Step 5 - 
ongoing]  
Ensure FCPA 
risk information 
remains relevant 
and review FCPA 
risk response 
accordingly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
FCPA Risk Assessment [step 2] 
Exercise of assessing the likelihood of 
adverse outcome pursuant to the 
FCPA (also, other anti-corruption 
legislation such as U.K. Bribery Act 
must, due to the extraterritorial reach 
of other anti-corruption laws of the 
MNCs, ensure legal compliance with 
all anti-corruption laws). In practice, 
FCPA risk assessment is done by using 
the FCPA Matrix and Table of 
Consequences.   
 
  
 
  
 
FCPA Risk Response [step 3] 
Measures of risk mitigation or control 
that are developed and implemented to 
respond to an identified FCPA risk. 
 
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flags”.120 ISO 31 000 recommends using tools to identify the risk.121 
The tools need to address the particular foreign bribery risks faced by 
the MNC, including but not limited to, the following:122  
(i) Tools and Sources for Analyzing the Risk of Corruption by 
Country 
The UN Global compact anti-corruption risk assessment 
guide provides an appendix with a list of tools and their brief 
description for analyzing the risk of corruption by country such as 
the well-known Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency 
International123 or the Governance Indicators from the World 
Bank.124  
(ii) Nature of the International Business Contract being Negotiated 
As MNCs are often involved in cross-border strategic 
alliances, due diligence is crucial for these transactions.125 As noted, 
                                                 
120 Charles Kenny & Maria Musatova, Red Flags Of Corruption’ In World 
Bank Projects: An Analysis Of Infrastructure Contracts, WORLD BANK E-LIBRARY, 
(2010), available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-
5243 (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).(discussing “Red flags” are indicators of potential 
issues regarding governance failure, collusion or corruption in projects). 
121 ISO 31 000, supra note 108.  
122 Transcript of Proceedings Taken in the Court of Queen’s Bench of 
Alberta, Calgary Courts Centre, Calgary Alberta, Her Majesty the Queen v. Niko 
Resources Ltd., E-File No.: CCQ11NIKORESOURCES (June 24, 2011). This this 
list is based on Niko Probation Order, Appendix A par. C., available at 
https://www.scribd.com/document/61566823/Niko-Resorces-Probation-Order 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2017). See Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act: Niko 
Resources Ltd. Receives a $9.5 Million Fine for Bribery, MILLER THOMSON (Oct. 2011), 
available at http://www.millerthomson.com/en/publications/communiques-and-
updates/criminal-law-regulation-enforcement/october-2011-criminal-law-
regulation-enforcement/canadas-corruption-of-foreign-public/ (last visited Feb. 
10, 2017). 
123 Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, available 
at http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).  
124 Worldwide Governance Indicators, WORLD BANK, available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
125 Niko Probabtion Order, supra note 122.  
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“the U.S. regulatory authorities have made it clear through their 
FCPA enforcement activity that extensive FCPA due diligence is 
expected in connection with any merger, acquisition, joint venture or 
other cross-border business transactions involving entities subject to 
the FCPA.” 126 In the case of cross-border M&As due diligence 
serves not only to avoid unwanted FCPA liability but also to avoid 
the risk of overpaying for the target’s business.127 This is particularly 
important if the country and industrial sector have a reputation for 
corrupt practices, “which the DOJ views, in and of itself, as potential 
“red flag” from a compliance standpoint".128  
The DOJ has instituted an FCPA opinion procedure to assist 
MNC in their legal risk assessment and due diligence prior to the 
execution of their cross-border business transaction, particularly 
M&A, because of successor liability.129 The request must be related to 
a real (not hypothetical) transaction and creates a rebuttable 
presumption applicable in a subsequent enforcement action.130 
However, requests for an opinion have not been frequent and the 
reluctance may be partly due to a concern that the request for an 
opinion may open a Pandora’s box and trigger a DOJ investigation, 
as the opinion does not in any way limit the enforcement intentions 
or the litigating positions of the U.S. authorities. 131 
                                                 
126 Id.  
127 A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE AND SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Nov. 2012), available 
at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2017) (discussing 
Mergers and Acquisitions: Pre-Acquisition Due Diligence and Post-Acquisition 
Integration).  
128 Id.  
129 Id.  
130 Id.  
131 Id.  
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(iii) Third Parties or Intermediaries are Involved in the International 
Business Transaction  
In accordance with an OECD report, intermediaries were 
involved in 3 out of 4 foreign bribery cases.132 75% of cases were 
agents, such as local sales and marketing agents, distributors and 
brokers, in 41% of cases.133 Another 35% of intermediaries were 
corporate vehicles, such as subsidiary companies, local consulting 
firms, companies located in offshore financial centres or tax havens, 
or companies established under the beneficial ownership of the 
public official who received the bribes.134 It is important to also 
consider local foreign accountants and lawyers as agents.135 A foreign 
agent is a “red flag” and the overwhelming use of intermediaries in 
foreign bribery cases demonstrates the need for enhanced and 
effective legal due diligence and risk assessment.136 ELRM 
Framework should obligate an individual/separate FCPA risk 
assessment to be conducted on all foreign agents.137  
 
 
                                                 
132 OECD Foreign Bribery Report, An Analysis of the Crime of Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials, OECD (2014), available at  
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/scale-of-international-bribery-laid-bare-by-new-
oecd-report.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).  
133 Id.  
134 Id.  
135 Id.  
136 A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 127.  
137 Id. at 34.   
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(iv) The Perceived Legal Culture of the Counterpart: American 
Universalism Versus Particularism (Rules Versus Relationships):  
American Universalism is based on Rule of Law, while 
Particularism is based on Rule of Men138  
The need to identify if the legal culture of the foreign 
counterpart is Universalist or Particularistic is a highly practical 
one.139 Despite the influence of culture and cultural factors which are 
controversial to measure corruption in specific countries.140 This 
                                                 
138 Nicole Hines, Cultural Due Diligence: The Lost Diligence That Must Be 
Found by U.S. Corporations Conducting M&A Deals in China to Prevent Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Violations Duquesne Business Law, DUQ. BUS. L.J. BLOG, 9-19 (May 16, 
2007) (discussing the importance of cultural due diligence to prevent FCPA 
liability).  
139 CHARLES HAMPDEN-TURNER & FONS TROMPENAARS, RIDING THE 
WAVES OF CULTURE: UNDERSTANDING CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN GLOBAL 
BUSINESS 252-64 (2d ed. 1998). Trompernaars and Hampden-Turner’s statistical 
approach and empirical results are explained in detail in Appendix 2 of their book. 
For instance, the data for the Universalist/Particularist dimension were collected 
from the results of a hypothetical dilemma presented to approximately 70,000 
managers across 65 countries. See also Garrick Apollon, Sino-American Contract 
Bargaining and Dispute Resolution, 13 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. Iss. 3, 396-397 (2013) 
(discussing the application of this theory for comparative law and management 
with foreign cultures).   
140 Kathleen A Getz & Roger J. Volkema, Culture, Perceived Corruption, and 
Economics A Model of Predictors and Outcomes, 40 BUS. & SOC. 7, 7-30 (2001) (asserting 
that corruption can impede commerce and economic development, yet it seems to 
be tolerated in many countries. The purpose of this study was to develop and test a 
model that integrates socioeconomic factors related to corruption. The analysis 
revealed that a negative relationship between economic adversity and wealth was 
mediated by corruption. Economic adversity was positively related to corruption, 
and corruption was inversely related to wealth. Uncertainty avoidance moderated 
the relationship between economic adversity and corruption, whereas power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance were positively associated with corruption. The 
implications of these results for enhancing the effectiveness of international 
agreements are discussed). See also Abigail Barr and Danila Serra, Corruption and 
culture: An experimental analysis, 94 J. OF PUB. ECON., 862-869 (2010) (discussing: why 
do some people choose corruption over honesty and others not? Do the social 
norms and values prevailing in the societies in which they grew up affect their 
decisions? In 2005, we conducted a bribery experiment and found that, among 
undergraduates, we could predict who would act corruptly with reference to the 
level of corruption in their home country. Among graduate students we could not. 
In 2007, we replicated our result and also found that time spent in the UK was 
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article argues that based on Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws the 
“state of law is a state of mind (l’état de droit est un état d’esprit)”141 that a 
wise lawyer should first conduct anti-corruption legal risk assessment 
that aims to uncover not just the “law-in-book” and “law-in-action” of its 
foreign counterparts, but most importantly their “law-in-minds.”142 To 
achieve this lawyers should use the well-tested empirical comparative 
management tool by Trompenaars-Hampden-Turner called the Seven 
Cultural Dimension with the Universalism Versus Particularism 
dimension. 143 The empirical data for this cultural dimension where 
collected from “Did the Pedestrian Die?” as an accumulation of a 
decade of research into cultural diversity across the globe144: 
The title is taken from a hypothetical dilemma 
Trompenaars presents to managers - so far to about 
70,000 managers in over 65 countries. He asks them 
to consider the situation in which they are a passenger 
                                                 
associated with a decline in the propensity to bribe, although this does not explain 
our inability to predict graduate behaviour. We conclude that, while corruption 
may, in part, be a cultural phenomenon, individuals should not be prejudged with 
reference to their country of origin). See also Eugene Soltes, Why they do it: inside the 
mind of white-collar criminals (PublicAffairs, 2016) at 133-135 (discussing the immunity 
from parking violations in New York City for United Nations diplomats.  
Explaining that a study found that the numbers of tickets received from diplomats 
was the highest from high-perceived corruption countries such as Chad, Sudan, 
Pakistan, Mozambique, and Bulgaria. Diplomats from low-perceived corruption 
countries like Norway and Canada received the least). See also, John Bruner, 
Forbes Magazine, The World's Most Corrupt Diplomats, As Told Through Parking Tickets 
(Jul. 2011), available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonbruner/2011/07 
/12/the-worlds-most-corrupt-diplomats-as-told-through-parking-tickets-
map/#c8395c82a3b7 (last visited June 21 2017).  
141 See also Garrick Apollon, Sino-American Contract Bargaining and Dispute 
Resolution, supra note 138, at 393-394 (arguing with inspiration from Montesquieu’s 
Spirits of the Laws, that “l’état de droit est est un état d’esprit” (the rule of law is a rule 
of mind) that Montesquieu’s mirror theory has some practical relevance. Yet to 
truly understand a foreign negotiator, a skilled negotiator should not just aim to 
superficially enter the mind of the foreign negotiator, but rather aim to uncover the 
deeper multilayers of their minds).   
142 Id. at 394.  
143 FONS TROMPENAARS, DID THE PEDESTRIAN DIE?: INSIGHTS FROM 
THE GREATEST CULTURE GURU (Capstone 2003) (explaining an accumulation of a 
decade of research into cultural diversity across the globe with a wide range of 
client organizations). 
144 Id. 
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in a car driven by a close friend. That friend knocks 
down a pedestrian. The friend was travelling well 
above the speed limit - say 35 miles an hour in a 20-
mile-an-hour-zone. There are no witnesses. The 
friend’s lawyer suggests that testifying under oath on 
the friend’s behalf that he was only doing 20 miles an 
hour may save him from serious consequences. 
Trompenaars asks whether the friend has a definite 
right, some right or no right at all to expect someone 
(the manager being as asked the question) to testify to 
the lower figure. He also asks whether - irrespective 
of such right - the manager would testify to the lower 
figure. The answers received have varied around the 
world and, to some extent, comply with existing 
stereotypes. The American and Swiss almost 
unanimously feel that the friend has no right to 
expect his friend to perjure him/herself, and that in 
no circumstances should this be considered. 
However, in Venezuela and, interestingly, in China, 
less than 35 per cent of people agree with this line.145 
In sum, for particularistic cultures the application of the Rule 
of Law is influenced by societal or relational ethical considerations at 
the expense of the application of the universal legal principles of the 
Rule of Law. 146 Therefore, while Americans, Canadians or the British 
follow the rule of law, in contrast Asian, Africans, Arabs or Latin 
Americans tend to follow the Rule of Men.147 It is important to note 
that certain European cultures like the French or Italians are more 
oriented towards Particularism.148 This cultural orientation does not 
necessarily explain the propensity for a particularistic party to be 
corrupted but if corruption is defined as complying with the rule of 
law and honoring the terms and conditions of a contract that can be 
enforced by a court-of-law, as the Governance Indicators also known 
                                                 
145 Id.  
146 See also Garrick Apollon, Sino-American Contract Bargaining and Dispute 
Resolution, supra note 138, at 393-396-398 (discussing the principle of Rule of Law 
vs. Rule of Men).  
147 Id. at 396.  
148 Id.  
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as the Rule of Law Ranking from the World Bank149 defines it, it is 
conventional wisdom to assert that particularistic cultures could 
present a higher risk of engaging in corrupt practices. However, “the 
Rule-of-Law and Rule of Men distinction should not be based on a 
philosophy of law comparison that is too moralistic and too black–
and–white in order to keep its practical “analytic utility.”150 It is 
important to remember that “sometimes culture matters a lot, 
sometimes not at all”.151 Also, a legal ethnocentric approach that will 
see all foreign Particularistic counterparts as corrupt will “foreclose 
the possibility of meaningful cross-cultural relationship between 
American’ and its foreign Particularistic counterparts”.152  
(v) Due Diligence or Audit on the Foreign Counterpart by the 
American Party (MNC must acquire intelligence on the field about 
their foreign business partners or third parties)   
MNCs are starting to conduct active, often intrusive, due 
diligence or ethical audits not just on their prospective foreign 
business partners, but also on the foreign third parties they do 
business with.153 The goal is to avoid corporate scandals like the case 
of Nike with child labor.154  
A good example of ethical due diligence is presented in the 
documentary “The Factory” showing an ethical audit conducted by 
Nokia on the labor practices of their suppliers in China.155 U.S. 
                                                 
149 Worldwide Governance Indicators, WORLD BANK, available at 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/databases/rule-of-law (last visited Feb. 10, 
2017).  
150 Garrick Apollon, Sino-American Contract Bargaining and Dispute Resolution, 
supra note 138, at 397.  
151 Garrick Apollon, Cross-Cultural Deal Mediation as a New ADR Method for 
International, 20 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 255, 283 (2014).  
152 Id.  
153 Kristen Bell DeTienne & Lee W. Lewis, The pragmatic and ethical barriers 
to corporate social responsibility disclosure: The Nike case, 60 J. OF BUS. ETHICS, 359-376 
(2005) (discussing the benefits of CSR audits). See also World Economic Forum, 
Third party audits to prevent bribery by agents or third parties, available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_PACI_ConductingThirdPartyDueDiligenc
e_Guidelines_2013.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
154 Id.  
155 A DECENT FACTORY (2004). 
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Department of State with their American embassies and consulates 
abroad also provide useful information about the foreign party. 
However, it is crucial for the MNC in practice to conduct their own 
ground “ethical audits or investigations” by hiring a lawyer for the 
investigation or audit to remain confidential (preserve the attorney-
client privilege). The MNC should also make sure to send 
representatives on international business trips in the field in order to 
interview third parties and various stakeholders (e.g. local chambers 
of commerce or local authorities). This approach can be related to 
Sun Tzu’s concept of “foreknowledge”.156 According to Sun Tzu, 
such knowledge “cannot be gotten from ghosts and spirits, cannot be 
had by analogy, and cannot be found out by calculation. It must be 
obtained from people, people who know the conditions of the 
enemy.”157 Experienced international business people know that 
because of the complexity of cross-cultural communication and 
relationship-building there is so much that can be accomplished in 
the home office without actually going to the “field” and meeting 
people “face-to-face”.158 
 2. FCPA Risk Assessment [Step 2], FCPA Risk Assessment 
Comprises Two Fundamental Components: Likelihood and 
Consequences 
Following the international standard ISO 31 000, Risk Assessment 
[Step 2], risk assessment is defined by two components of a risk: 1) 
likelihood adverse outcome159 or strength of legal position;160 and 2) 
                                                 
156 Garrick Apollon, Sino-American Contract Bargaining and Dispute Resolution, 
supra note 138, at 402.  
157 Id.  
158 Id.  
159 The “likelihood of adverse outcome” means the likelihood that a 
point of law in accordance with the FCPA, should it be litigated, would yield an 
unfavorable result for the MNC. This means the likelihood of adverse outcome 
needs to be conceptualized on the basis that the FCPA investigation or legal 
challenge (prosecution) is already taking place. The likelihood of being challenged 
(odds of being investigated or sued/prosecuted), however, is a practical and 
relevant consideration that influences the level of detail for the legal risk assessment 
(step #2) and the proposed legal risk response (step #3) by the counsel. When 
counsel is privy to information that helps them to predict the likelihood of being 
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consequences or impacts.161 If these two components are not 
assessed, then it is not a comprehensive legal risk assessment.162 
Therefore, for the purpose of the proposed ELRM process in this 
article, FCPA risk assessment is the exercise of assessing the 
likelihood of adverse outcome (FCPA liability) in the international 
business transaction and the negative potential consequences (such as 
legal, corporate, financial, ethical and reputational) of noncompliance 
with the FCPA.163 The legal risk assessment is conducted with the 
assistance of tools, methods, and principles developed by the 
international standard ISO 31 000 and customized by the MNC for 
their own specific needs, such as the FCPA Matrix: 
                                                 
investigated or challenged pursuant to the FCPA before a court and communicates 
this information to his client, the legal risk assessment should clearly indicate that 
the likelihood of being investigated or prosecuted does not influence the risk 
ratings that result from using the FCPA risk assessment grid.  In other, this is a 
separate information practical to determine the level of efforts that should be 
invested to manage the FCPA risk.  
160 Counsel may alternately use the “strength of legal position” when 
assessing the likelihood of an adverse outcome occurring in commercial advisory 
context. This alternative way to define likelihood of an adverse outcome reinforce 
the communication of the legal risk and prevent the confusion that the legal risk 
will be conceptualized in terms of the likelihood of being challenged. The strength 
of a legal position will be inversely proportional to the likelihood of an adverse 
outcome. This means in accordance with the FCPA Grid if the likelihood is remote 
(0-20%) the legal position will be very sound, if the likelihood is unlikely (21-40%) 
the legal position will be sound but may have some vulnerabilities, if the likelihood 
is possible (41-60%) the legal position is vulnerable, if the likelihood is likely (61-
80%) the legal position is very vulnerable and if the likelihood is almost certain (81-
100%), the legal position is extremely vulnerable.  This alternative wording also 
help to avoid to prevent confusion by avoiding that decision-makers understand 
the FCPA risk in terms of the odds of the company facing an FCPA investigation 
or prosecution.   
161 ISO 31 000, supra note 108. 
162 Id.  
163 ISO 19600:2014 Compliance management systems – Guidelines, supra 
note 54. 
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Graph 1: FCPA Legal Risk Assessment Grid 
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 
Criminal liability for 
the corporation or 
directors or officers 
Severe Major  Moderate  Minor  Insignificant  
Contractual liability 
for the corporation 
(breach of anti-
corruption 
representations and 
warranties made)  
Severe Major  Moderate  Minor  Insignificant  
Tort liability for the 
corporation or 
directors or officers 
(e.g. negligence)  
Severe Major  Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
Debarment of the 
company from public 
contracts   
Severe Major  Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
Liability pursuant to 
foreign laws anti-
corruption laws (e.g. 
U.K. Bribery Act or 
Canada’s Corruption of 
Foreign Public Officials 
Act (CFPOA)) that 
could lead to an anti-
corruption 
Severe Major  Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
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investigation and 
prosecution from a 
foreign regulator. 
CORPORATE/OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES 
Damage to 
viability of 
corporate 
policies 
Severe Major  Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
Business 
planning, 
resources and 
operations 
affected 
Severe Major  Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
Horizontal 
consequence on 
the operations 
of the 
organization 
(e.g. the 
subsidiaries of a 
multinational 
corporation will 
be affected). 
Severe Major  Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
Damage to the 
viability of the 
corporate 
programs, 
projects or 
initiatives 
affected 
Severe Major  Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES 
Stock 
devaluation 
Severe Major  Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
Fine, award or 
penalty to be 
paid 
Severe Major  Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
Legal and 
forensic 
accounting cost 
incurred  
Severe Major  Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
Loss of 
business 
customers and 
investors 
Severe Major  Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
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Overall 
profitability and 
productivity 
reduced 
Severe Major  Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
ETHICAL CONSEQUENCES (CONSEQUENCES ON VALUES AND 
ETHICS FOR THE ORGANIZATION)  
Breach of the company’s 
anti-corruption program 
Severe Major Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
Breach of the company’s 
ethical code of conduct 
or code on conflict of 
interests 
Severe Major Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
Corporate social 
responsibility practices 
questioned internally and 
externally 
Severe Major Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
Damage on the tone-at-
the-top or exemplary 
ethical leadership to be 
showed by senior 
management 
Severe Major Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
Damage to the 
organizational ethical 
leadership climate 
affecting the compliance 
culture that may cause 
the recurrence of illegal 
and unethical behaviors 
in the organization 
Severe Major Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
Damage to the 
organizational ethical 
leadership climate 
affecting the compliance 
culture that may cause 
the recurrence of illegal 
and unethical behaviors 
in the organization  
Severe Major Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
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  In conclusion, it is important to understand that the level of 
effort and detail for each FCPA risk assessment will vary and is 
primarily based on the judgment of the lawyer.164 This will also 
depend on many other factors such as FCPA risk and complexity 
level (more effort and detail will be put in a high risk or complex file), 
importance of the file for senior management or the client 
department in order to meet client’s expectations, what is possible 
within the time and resources allowed by the client to the lawyer, 
                                                 
164 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, 
at 308.  
REPUTATIONAL CONSEQUENCES  
Loss of respect 
of the 
stakeholders, 
investors and 
public through 
negative media 
coverage.  
Severe Major Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
Loss of trust of 
employees and 
other 
stakeholders 
Severe Major Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
Reputation or 
brand affected 
 Severe Major Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
External 
relations with 
U.S. 
government 
enforcement 
agencies 
affected 
Severe Major Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
Stockholders 
affected 
Severe Major Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
Potential 
partners or 
buyers for 
mergers and 
acquisitions or 
strategic 
alliances are 
scared away.  
Severe Major Moderate  Minor  Insignificant 
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information available, and complexity or novelty of the corruption-
related legal issue in question.165  
  3. FCPA Risk Treatment and Response [step 3] 
Following the international standard ISO 31 000, Risk 
Treatment Risk Response [step 3], is the process of selecting and 
implementing measures to determine the appropriate course of action 
to follow in responding to the identified FCPA risk and managing its 
potential negative consequences.166 Usually, a legal risk management 
strategy is proposed by the lawyer and it is the responsibility of the 
corporate client as the decision maker to select the best risk response 
option (FCPA risk management is a shared responsibility).167 The 
four common risk treatments or responses are: 1) risk avoidance, this 
means to avoid or cancel the transaction because the likelihood of 
adverse outcome is too high and the MNC was unable to mitigate the 
FCPA risk to an acceptable risk tolerance level;168 2) risk mitigation 
means improving the legal position of the MNC to a risk tolerance 
level that is acceptable;169 3) risk shifting/transferring is a usual risk 
response in ELRM but this is not a valid option with FCPA risk 
because of third party liability and successor liability;170 4) risk 
acceptance (status quo) is not a valid option unless the FCPA risk has 
been identified as insignificant by the lawyer. A FCPA risk is a 
serious risk that should always be mitigated to an acceptable risk 
tolerance level for the MNC.171   
                                                 
165  Id. at 306 (discussing that a lawyer’s ability to complete an accurate 
legal assessment may be dampened by several factors, such as lack of information; 
lack of time; situational constraints based on resources or power; and self-selection 
processes. etc.).  
166 Id. at 289.  
167 Id. at 275 (discussing that legal risk management is shared 
responsibility between lawyer-client).  
168 Id. at 289. 
169 Id. at 289. 
170 Id. at 289.  
171 ISO 31 000, supra note 108. 
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4. FCPA Risk Communication and Consultation [Step 4-ongoing] 
Following the international standard ISO 31 000, Risk 
Communication and Consultation is an integral and on-going part of 
the decision-making process because legal risk management is a 
shared responsibility between lawyer-client.172 It refers to the efficient 
communication and consultation of the FCPA risk between the 
lawyer-client, to ensure that the client as the decision-maker is aware 
of the identified FCPA risks and will respond to it appropriately.173 
Lawyer-client risk communication and consultation is on-going.174 
Risk communication and consultation is challenging because this is 
not just a technical task but also a human one.175 Risk communication 
and consultation is intrinsically linked with negotiation and dispute 
resolution because it aims to resolve issues that the company is facing 
due to FCPA risk.176 Therefore, there is not just the objective to deal 
with substantive issues such as legal compliance issues that are 
subject to legal interpretation, but also crucially the non-substantives 
issues such as issues in relation to the organizational culture and 
conflicts that can cause bad emotions.177 For instance, it is obvious 
that when a huge bonus, promotion or performance appraisal is at 
stake for an employee, such employee might be biased in his or her 
perception and assessment of the FCPA risk.178  
The effectiveness of the ELRM communication and 
consultation process is based on good negotiation and dispute 
                                                 
172 Id.  
173 Id.  
174 Id.  
175 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, 
at 298 (explaining that LRM is primordial because negotiations and disputes are 
formed by rational arguments based on the law and facts. However, in negotiation 
and dispute resolution, there is always more than rational argument based on what 
the law and facts present because human beings are not computers or robots that 
can be programmed. Even though LRM exists to objectify and rationalize the 
practice of law, we cannot stop having emotions any more than we can avoid all 
risks at all times).  
176 Id. at 276.  
177 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, 
at 297-303 (discussing the importance for the legal to manage emotions in relation 
to the legal risk).  
178 Id. at 309-310.  
DOCUMENT10 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2017 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:2 
532 
resolution skills.179 Therefore, this article also invites MNCs to 
reframe FCPA compliance as a negotiation and dispute resolution 
issue and provide training in this field to their employees.180 First, this 
will help employees to resolve internal conflicts in relation to the 
application of the ABC compliance program and ELRM Framework. 
Second, this will help the international business negotiators and deal 
makers for the MNC on the field to resolve FCPA compliance issues 
with foreign public official requesting bribes by finding creative and 
ethical solution to this problem. After all, corruption and bribery is as 
an illegal and immoral bargaining tactic occurring during the 
negotiation of international deals or settlement of international 
disputes (e.g. environmental or tax disputes with local foreign 
governments). Therefore, an international negotiator needs great 
cultural intelligence181 and a lot of creative negotiation and dispute 
resolution skills to comply with the FCPA at all times while securing 
international deals.182 This means that employees need training and 
skills in the field of cultural intelligence and negotiation ethics.183  
Finally, this step is linked with the use of business analytics 
software and the electronic risk recording of all the FCPA legal 
information. Counsel should be mandated to enter timekeeping, 
complexity and risk information in the business analytics software 
within a determined number of days of the legal file being opened, 
and to select one of the option buttons in the software for risk 
recording such as: 1) “FCPA risk is insignificant” (i.e. the risk is so 
low that it is not considered negligent to not conduct a 
comprehensive legal risk assessment and avoid the cost/time 
                                                 
179 Id. at 314 (explaining that risk communication between lawyer and 
client, and with the other party, is key to a successful commercial mediation 
because it contributes to defining both the substantive and non-substantive issues 
and interests, generating options, and working on a more durable and efficient 
settlement agreement.).  
180 Garrick Apollon, MMA Negotiation, 15 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 
3, 11-12 (2013) (theorizing that MMA Negotiation should be viewed and practiced 
on the foundation of four core disciplines, like the four elements of nature, to allow 
the negotiator to reframe his reality).  
181 Id. at 19 (theorizing on the cross-border and cross-cultural discipline). 
182 Id.  
183 Id. (theorizing on the cross-border and cross-cultural discipline that 
must be aligned with the discipline the legal risk management discipline).  
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associated with it– e.g. an international contract is signed by a 
Delaware company with the Government of Canada); 2) “FCPA risk 
may materialize now or in a near future” (i.e. FCPA risk must be 
managed and monitored on an on-going basis and updated when 
necessary). When the FCPA risks may materialize now or in the near 
future should it be mandatory to conduct the legal risk assessment. It 
is also key to have a third option button for “Unauthorized or Illegal” 
(i.e. the international business transaction is unauthorized following 
the ABC policies of the MNC (e.g. in the context of a political 
contribution to a foreign political party for an act against the ABC 
policies or an expensive gift or lavish dinner that could be interpreted 
as ‘illegal’ in accordance with the FCPA).184  
  5. FCPA Risk Monitoring and Review [Step 5 - ongoing] 
Following the international standard ISO 31 000 FCPA Risk 
Monitoring and Review, the ongoing monitoring by the lawyer and 
his client is essential to ensuring that FCPA risk information remains 
relevant and up-to-date.185 FCPA risk-reviewing and monitoring must 
be based on analytic software to store the risk information “before 
evidence is lost and panic sets in.”186 The goal is to establish an 
advanced secured internet repository to insert, review and report on 
the FCPA risk.187 Overall, business analytics software facilitates data 
acquisition and analysis by using the most up-to-date analytic 
software to measure and monitor the performance of the ABC 
                                                 
184 A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 127, 
at 15 (explaining that FCPA does not ban gifts and travel. It prohibits payment of 
bribes, including those disguised as gifts. Most companies and their employees are 
clear that large payment for gifts, travel and entertainment can constitute FCPA 
violations, if they are given to government officials or to employees of state-owned 
enterprises to obtain or retain business).  
185 ISO 31 000, supra note 108, at 20 (theorizing on risk monitoring and 
review).  
186 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, 
at 286 (asserting that LRM is about effective business intelligence, business 
analytics, and electronic file management—more generally referred to as law 
practice management and technology).  
187 Id.  
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compliance program and ELRM Framework in the day-to-day 
international business transactions of the MNC.188  
Review can occur every five (5) days or every day for high 
risk international business transaction.189 If no change, the lawyer will 
simply indicate and click on the business analytics software option 
button “no change” but at least this will protect him and his client by 
showing that he is diligently monitoring the FCPA file for the benefit 
of his client and organization.190 This means a policy should be 
established for lawyers to know when to open and close their FCPA 
files in the business analytics software in order to ensure compliance 
but also avoid unnecessary workload such as monitoring inactive files 
that should be closed.191  
B. ELRM tools 
It is important to have a friendly ELRM user Toolbox on the 
organization’s secured website that is translated into other languages 
so that all employees and third parties can easily gain access to it. 
ELRM Toolbox must offer flexible tools to account for 
distinctiveness between the legal advisory function of preventing 
FCPA risk and the function of reacting to a corruption risk that 
might cause an investigation or worse a conviction pursuant to the 
FCPA.192 The ELRM Toolbox must be customized to the reality and 
needs of the organization.193 The ELRM Toolbox should include but 
not be limited to, the following tools:  
                                                 
188 Id.  
189 ISO 31000, supra note 108, at 20 (explaining that both monitoring and 
review should be a planned part of risk management process and involve regular 
checking or surveillance. It can bed periodic or ad hoc. Therefore, the idea of five 
days is just an example). 
190  Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 
186.  
191 ISO 31 000, supra note 108, at 21 (explaining that recording the risk 
management process should provide the foundation for improvement in methods 
and tools, as well as in the overall process).  
192 Id. at 20. 
193 Id.   
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1) A guide with frequently asked questions (FAQs) on the ELRM 
Framework; 
2) A one-pager explaining the FCPA risk assessment process; 
3) A guide for with the FCPA risk assessment techniques for lawyers;   
4) FCPA Matrix and Table of Consequences (see Graph 1 in this 
article); 
5) E-library of pre-identified and assessed FCPA risks by country, 
industrial sector of operations, legal foreign culture, interactions with 
various types and levels of government officials, involvement in 
strategic alliances (e.g. IJV, M&A, R&D, etc.), importance of licences 
and permits in the company’s operations, degree of governmental 
oversight and inspection, and volume and importance of goods and 
personnel clearing through customs and immigration; 
6) FCPA Consequences Assessment Sheet (i.e. standard E-form for 
legal counsel to obtain necessary factual information and intake from 
their clients to conduct an appropriate FCPA risk assessment with all 
the non-legal consequences, a good lawyer usually understands the 
business of their clients but clients are often best placed to know 
more about the corporate, financial, ethical and reputational 
consequences); 
7) ELRM Committee (to review and approve high FCPA risk 
international business transactions);  
8) A Guide that will serve as core training tool for the MNC similar 
to RESIST194 with real-life FCPA scenarios collected over the years 
from the MNC corporate memory;  
                                                 
194 RESIST: Resisting Extortion and Solicitation in International 
Transactions. A company tool for employee training, TRANSPARENCY 
INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 21, 2011) available at 
https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/resist_resisting_extortion_a
nd_solicitation_in_international_transactions. 
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9) FCPA Communication Guide- provides legal counsel with 
practical tips on how to communicate FCPA risk to their clients in an 
effective manner for better results.195 
C. Business analytics software utilized by the MNC for FCPA risk 
management and reporting  
ELRM is all about effective business intelligence, business 
analytics, and electronic file management—more generally referred to 
as law practice management and technology.196 The goal is to use a 
business analytics software to bring periodic FCPA risk reports to 
senior management, the Board, but also to stockholders, insurers, 
investors, lenders, regulators or stakeholders in order to build trust 
and show that the MNC is managing its FCPA risk in international 
business transactions in a proactive, diligent, ethical, transparent, 
accountable and cost-efficient manner.197 
D.     Performance measurement plan for the ELRM framework  
The international standard ISO 19 600 – Compliance 
Management Systems provides useful guidelines for the performance 
evaluation of the monitoring, measurement, analysis and evaluation 
of a compliance system such as an ELRM Framework.198 The 
monitoring of the ELRM Framework should include effectiveness of 
the ELRM training199, effectiveness of the controls and inspections 
(audits)200, effectiveness of the audits conducted with the FCPA 
reports from the analytic software on the performance of lawyers in 
managing their FCPA files (e.g. quantitative reports about the 
                                                 
195 ISO 31000, supra note 108, at 14-15 (discussing risk communication 
and consultation). 
196 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 
186. 
197 Evan Peterson, supra note 1 (explaining the strategic advantages of 
effective corporate compliance).  
198 ISO 19600:2014 Compliance management systems – Guidelines, supra 
note 54, at 21-25.   
199 Id. at 15-16.  
200 Id.  
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compliance rate for the insertion of the FCPA risk information in the 
system and qualitative reports on the quality of the legal advice 
provided by the lawyers for their FCPA files), effective allocation of 
the ELRM role and responsibilities for the lawyer-client, surveys 
about the practicality and acceptance of the ELRM Framework in the 
organization, effectiveness in addressing failures of ELRM 
Framework previously identified, etc.201 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This article shows that it is not too difficult for a MNC to 
implement an ELRM Framework specific to FCPA risk. This article 
also demonstrates that the strategic and economic benefits of an 
ELRM fFramework outweigh the cost of its implementation in order 
for the MNCs to better control their in-house and outside legal fees 
and strengthen their FCPA compliance program.202 Generally, this 
article shows that an ELRM Framework helps legal departments to 
not just improve their FCPA compliance but also modernize their 
legal practices.203 This article, shows like my mother always says, that 
“an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure”!  
                                                 
201 Id.  
202 Garrick Apollon, The intersection between LRM & DR, supra note 2, 
at 307  
203 Id. at 271 (Susskind’s message for lawyers remains a stark one: in 
order to guarantee a stake in the legal system of the future, lawyers must adapt their 
work practices or die. Therefore, the importance of effective legal risk management 
has risen to the top of the list of priorities of many law firms and in-house legal 
departments). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Taxation is unique as the single most consistent function of 
government. For as long as the world has needed governments, 
governments have needed taxes. There have been few options 
available for governments to raise money that have been as successful 
and as simple. The word ‘tax’ itself first appeared in English in the 
14th century. The Latin word Taxare means “to assess.” In England, 
the related words ‘tax’ and ‘task’ were commonly used referring to 
labour and money as a ‘duty’ respectively.1 Because of their 
compulsory nature – as long as there have been taxes – there have 
also been strategies to avoid them. The imposition of duties has 
driven mass migrations, transitions in governments, riots and even 
wars.  
Under the Egyptian Pharoahs ‘scribes’ raised funds however 
possible, including a tax on cooking oil. To ensure that the citizenry 
was using the taxed cooking oil and not a substitute, these early 
scribes conducted regular ‘audits’ of the citizens’ homes.2 
Governments have also emphasized one type of tax over another, 
relying on the value system of their citizenry, or even political goals in 
funding government operations. For example, some jurisdictions like 
the member states of the European Union rely more heavily on a 
consumption tax (or “Value Added Tax”). A consumption tax has 
the advantage of being easier to levy than an income tax or estate tax, 
because a consumption tax is collected automatically by a merchant 
whereas an income or estate tax requires a semi-voluntary declaration 
to be issued by the party being taxed.  
  In the world of tax, not only the rules, but also the 
enforcement mechanisms are varied based upon the values of the 
people. As people have run from taxes, governments have run after 
people. Governments around the world have taken different 
positions on which avoidance strategies are legal and which are 
forbidden. As an example of enforcement leniency, the Swiss 
authorities have implemented a system that is quite different than 
                                                      
1 A Short History of Taxation, NEW INTERNATIONALIST MAGAZINE (2008), 
https://newint.org/features/2008/10/01/tax-history/ (last visited May 1, 2015). 
 2 Id.  
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what is applied in much of the rest of the world. In Switzerland, 
failure to disclose a taxable event is an infringement that is among the 
lowest categories of criminal offenses and only subject to a fine.3 In 
the United States, the use of tax enforcement is at the extreme 
opposite, drawing criticism over its alleged use as a political tool. 
Across the Atlantic, former tennis star, Boris Becker was accused of 
living in Germany while claiming tax residency in Monaco whereby 
he avoided paying 1.7 million Euros in taxes to the German 
government from 1991 to 1993. After admitting to evasion and being 
sentenced to pay a $500,000 fine and serve 2 years of probation in 
Germany, Becker moved to Switzerland.4  
The stakes are of course much higher among Corporate 
Multinationals. Boards of Directors owe a fiduciary duty to their 
shareholders, and that duty embraces obligations to deliver bottom 
line performance and yield.5 This is counterbalanced by external 
obligations to ensure that the company meets its tax and regulatory 
obligations. These obligations are inversely correlated. As the board 
errs on the side of safety in its tax strategy, it returns less to its 
shareholders. This also drives down stock price and makes the 
company less competitive in cash draining activities like Research and 
Development. Contrarily as companies take greater risks in their tax 
strategies, they better meet their obligations to effectively manage the 
individual company’s capital, optimize its competitiveness, and of 
course – its returns. This is directly reflected on the financial 
statements of the largest publicly traded companies. In 2013, Apple, 
Inc. made headlines when the United States Senate reported that 
America’s largest company had avoided paying tax on $102 billion of 
profits anywhere in the world by exploiting rules that made income 
                                                      
 3 Pietro Sansonetti, Tax evasion: The evolution of the Swiss Criminal Tax Law 
Tax evasion: The evolution of the Swiss Criminal Tax Law, INT’L TAX REV. (Mar. 12, 
2013), http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3167155/Tax-evasion-The-
evolution-of-the-Swiss-Criminal-Tax-Law.html (last visited Apr 1, 2015). 
 4 Ex-Tennis Star Given 2 Years' Probation, N.Y. TIMES (2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/25/world/ex-tennis-star-given-2-years-
probation.html (last visited Mar 15, 2015). 
 5 William M. Lafferty, Lisa A. Schmidt & Donald J. Wolfe, A Brief 
Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of Directors Under Delaware Law, 116 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 837, (2012), 
http://www.pennstatelawreview.org/116/3/116%20Penn%20St.% 
20L.%20Rev.%20837.pdf. 
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from its European operations “sourceless,” and thus, not subject to 
tax anywhere.6  
The realities of the varied sovereign tax opportunities are no 
surprise to authorities around the world. Tax systems have grown up 
organically and selfishly. In order to accommodate business in a 
rapidly globalizing world, governments have needed to make 
agreements with one another to preserve fairness in the way their tax 
systems interact; namely to avoid or limit double-taxation and to 
preserve equity by taxing all income as equally and fairly as possible. 
In January 2003, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (“OECD”) introduced the Model Tax Convention, 
which was designed to provide a framework by which countries were 
to mitigate the effects of double taxation.7 Apple was nonetheless 
ultimately able to accomplish its tax plan by manipulating tax treaties, 
residency rules and the specific treatment of certain types of income 
in different jurisdictions.8 
  Governments are held politically accountable through the 
ballot box and their leaders want to earn votes and political capital by 
attracting large corporations to their geographic and economic bases. 
In response to these pressures, leaders of high-tax countries like the 
United States, Germany and the United Kingdom in particular, have 
called for a treaty system to limit tax jurisdiction competition of this 
nature.9 This war cry resulted in the creation of a project. 
Spearheaded by the OECD, this project is known as the Action Plan 
on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) and it was issued by 
the OECD on July 19, 2013 with the goal of reviewing the 
                                                      
 6 Emily Cohn, Apple Paid Little Or No Taxes To Any Government On Billions 
In Profits: Senate Report, HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/20/apple-senate-report-offshore-tax-
structure_n_3308741.html (last visited Mar 1, 2015). 
 7 OECD, Articles of the Model Convention With Respect to Taxes on Income and 
on Capital (2003), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/1914467.pdf (last visited Feb 
12, 2015). 
 8 Supra note 6. 
 9 Who are the BEPS supporters?, TAX ADVISER MAGAZINE (2014), 
http://www.taxadvisermagazine.com/article/who-are-beps-supporters (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2015). 
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interaction of nations’ tax systems and proposing changes in 
international taxation laws.10 According to the OECD: 
Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) is a global 
problem which requires global solutions. BEPS refers 
to tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and 
mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to 
low or no-tax locations where there is little or no 
economic activity, resulting in little or no overall 
corporate tax being paid. BEPS is of major 
significance for developing countries due to their 
heavy reliance on corporate income tax, particularly 
from multinational enterprises (MNEs). 
In an increasingly interconnected world, national tax 
laws have not always kept pace with global 
corporations, fluid movement of capital, and the rise 
of the digital economy, leaving gaps that can be 
exploited to generate double non-taxation. This 
undermines the fairness and integrity of tax systems. 
Fifteen specific actions are being developed in the 
context of the OECD/G20 BEPS Project to equip 
governments with the domestic and international 
instruments needed to address this challenge. The 
first set of measures and reports were released in 
September 2014. Combined with the work to be 
completed in 2015, they will give countries the tools 
they need to ensure that profits are taxed where 
economic activities generating the profits are 
performed and where value is created, while at the 
same time give business greater certainty by reducing 
disputes over the application of international tax 
rules, and standardising [sic] requirements. For the 
                                                      
 10 OECD BEPS Project - EY Canada, EY CANADA - EY - CANADA 
(2016), http://www.ey.com/CA/en/Services/Tax/Tax-BEPS (last visited Jun 20, 
2017). 
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first time ever in tax matters, non-OECD/G20 
countries are involved on an equal footing.11 
  As tax jurisdiction competition becomes limited, the central 
questions presented by our modern world is (i) can tax still drive 
business decisions for multinational corporations and (ii) to what 
extent does tax drive those decisions in today’s globalized 
environment? 
II. TAX JURISDICTION COMPETITION AS A THEME 
In tax planning it is easy to become myopic — only seeing tax 
as a reason to make a decision about where to locate a business 
component. However, a number of factors drive major business 
decisions and more often there is a balancing act between the 
interests and value proposition of each business driver especially in 
choosing a venue for a business headquarters, operation, subsidiary 
or branch. Consider the non-tax reasons driving these decisions. 
These include preserving logical group and legal structure that 
appeals to simplicity and predictability, which is something appealing 
prospective investors. They also include preserving the subsidiaries’ 
balance sheets and thus their financing capabilities. Decision makers 
cannot ignore political and economic stability in the jurisdiction nor 
the regulatory requirements. 
In 2009 McKinsey Consulting conducted a global study 
entitled How companies make good decisions in which 34% of executive 
respondents cited “expansion into new products, services or 
geographies” as the driving factor in decision making compared to 
21% citing “organizational change for other reasons,” which based 
upon the alternatives would encompass tax and regulatory reasons. 
When asked about the “general goal of [any] given type of decision,” 
78% cited revenue growth as the driving factor, while only 22% cited 
cost savings, which would likewise encompass tax planning.12 
                                                      
 11 About BEPS and the inclusive framework, OECD 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps-about.htm (last visited Jun 20, 2017). 
 12 Massimo Garbuio, Dan Lovalla & Patrick Viguerie, How companies make 
good decisions, McKinsey Global Survey Results, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Jan. 2009), 
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The implications of these results show that in essence tax 
jurisdiction competition can have a marginal impact on business 
decisions, however the implications of even the most favorable 
structure is limited because of competing drivers influencing 
executive decision making. Based upon the McKinsey study and the 
OECD BEPS response to tax jurisdiction competition, we can draw 
the conclusion that if we assume for the sake of discussion that the 
risk factors among different tax strategies are the same, then the 
attractiveness of a tax regime will drive a business decision toward a 
tax strategy encompassing that regime: 
(1) to the extent it doesn’t compete with other factors; 
(2) is relatively simple to implement; and  
(3) provides for a real and appreciable tax savings. 
A. How Tax Jurisdiction Competition Works 
  There are several tax-oriented factors that can drive a tax 
strategy and the corresponding establishment of basic holding 
structures implicating low-tax and no-tax jurisdictions.  
  The first and most obvious goal is that companies seek to 
reduce withholding taxes, or the combined income taxes that the 
company must pay on its operations both locally in the investors’ 
country and in the country which hosts the operations by using tax 
treaties. The second goal is to protect corporate profits from local 
capital gains tax by using tax treaties. These factors are what the 
OECD BEPS project has addressed in what is called BEPS Actions 2 
(Hybrid mismatch arrangements) and 6 (Preventing Treaty Abuse).13  
                                                      
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/strategy/how_companies_make_good_decisi
ons_mckinsey_global_survey_results (last visited May 1, 2015). 
 
 13 BEPS - Frequently Asked Questions, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-frequentlyaskedquestions.htm (last visited Mar 1, 
2015); BEPS Action 2 - Branch Mismatch Structures, OECD (2016), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/Discussion-draft-Action-2-Branch-mismatch-
structures.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
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  The third goal is to provide tax efficiency for the movement of 
cash, and the fourth is to implement tax-efficient financing 
structures. This fourth factor is addressed by the OECD BEPS 
project in BEPS Actions 8 (Transfer pricing of intangibles) and 13 
(Transfer pricing documentation).14  
1. Tax Treaties and Source and Residency Rules 
  People move around, but have the advantage for tax purposes 
of only being able to be in one place at a time. If a miner mines for 
gold in South Africa, most would agree that the source of that gold is 
South Africa. Let’s assume that miner is paid for his work and work-
product (the gold) in South Africa; he of course is subject to tax in 
South Africa. This is called his “Source Income” and is taxed at the 
source.15 If however, it happens that this miner is a resident of 
neighboring Zimbabwe then he is also subject to tax on his income 
on the basis of his residency in Zimbabwe.16 This is called “Residency 
Income.” To go a step further, if it happens that this miner is a 
citizen of the United States as defined by the United States tax code, 
the United States tax code provides that his income wherever in the 
world it may be sourced will be taxed by the United States.17 This is 
where the OECD model convention comes into play. Article 23 
governs how to handle the above scenario. There are two basic 
options Article 23A, known as the “Exemption Method” and Article 
23 B, known as the “Credit Method.”18 As the names indicate, the 
Exemption Method involves exempting income from taxation in one 
of the two contracting states from any tax whatsoever. The Credit 
Method involves crediting the tax paid in one state against the tax 
paid in the other contracting state. The model treaty distinguishes 
income derived from various types of activities and allocates the 
income to more closely align with the source country.  
                                                      
 14 Id.  
 15 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed.). 
 16 Clive Mphambela, Residence-based tax system commendable, THE 
ZIMBABWE INDEPENDENT (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/03/01/residence-based-tax-system-
commendable (last visited Mar 12, 2015). 
 17 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, § 7701(b). 
 18 Supra note 7. 
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  Unfortunately for our miner, there is no double-taxation treaty 
between the United States and Zimbabwe. As a result the miner must 
pay tax on the income “in the same way and at the same rates shown 
in the instructions for the applicable U.S. tax return.”19 In other 
words, our miner will be subject to taxation on the same income, 
both at the applicable rate in Zimbabwe and the United States. 
  If however, our miner moves across the border to South 
Africa, his income is taxed only once in South Africa and pursuant to 
Article 23 of the Tax Convention with South Africa, our Miner 
would be able to apply as a credit, the tax paid in South Africa against 
the tax due in the United States.20 
  Unlike a natural person, an entity such as a Corporation, 
Limited Liability Company or Trust is much more difficult to locate 
geographically for residency purposes when these entities operate on 
a global level. Consider that a Corporation might be formed in one 
jurisdiction, but have operations in many foreign jurisdictions and be 
managed in yet another jurisdiction. Out of 23 major economies 
surveyed by the accounting firm Deloitte, four placed their residence 
in the place of incorporation and sixteen placed it by using some 
form of a “place of effective management” standard.  
Incorporation Place of 
effective 
management  
Incorporation and place of 
effective management 
Registration  
Estonia, Hong 
Kong, Russia, 
United States  
Denmark  Austria, Canada, China, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Malta, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, 
Romania, South Africa  
Denmark, 
Sweden, 
Ukraine 21 
                                                      
 19 United States Income Tax Treaties - A to Z, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International-Businesses/United-States-Income-
Tax-Treaties---A-to-Z (last visited July 2, 2015). 
 20 Tax Convention With South Africa, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Jan. 1, 
1998), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/safrica.pdf (last visited July 2, 2015). 
 21 Survey into substance, place of residence and tax avoidance, DELOITTE (Dec. 6, 
2012), http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/nl/Documents 
/tax/deloitte-nl-nederland-geen-belastingparadijs.pdf (last visited June 10, 2015). 
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As discussed in the Deloitte survey: 
When a company is subject to tax because the place 
of effective management is in the state concerned, 
most countries take into account facts and 
circumstances. This usually is an open standard, but 
several factors can be taken into account. In almost all 
cases it would be decisive where the central 
management is performed and the main business 
decisions are taken. This is not necessarily the place 
where the day-to-day management takes place. Other 
relevant factors that can be taken into account are the 
place where the directors reside or, more formally, the 
place of the registered office. Some countries apply 
only one of above criteria to determine the tax liability 
of a company, other countries apply both criteria 
besides each other.  
* * * 
In addition to this table, please note that most countries stated 
the place of effective management under bilateral tax treaties to 
be decisive for determining the place of residence in the event of 
dual resident companies.22 
It is the very nature of this difference in establishing tax 
residency that tax planners have traditionally sought to take 
advantage of in planning zero-tax strategies like those employed by 
Apple, Inc. identified and discussed generally above.  
 2. Intra-Europe and International Tax Competition 
  One of the broadest differences between the European Union 
and the United States is the federal/supranational competency to levy 
taxes. Although such a power is contemplated within the EEA treaty, 
it has never been exercised by European Authorities and has 
otherwise been left to the Member States.23 The United States 
however, has exercised its direct authority to tax and levy pursuant to 
                                                      
 22 Id. 
 23 EEA Treaty art. 115, opened for signature May 2, 1992. 
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the United States Constitution, which has been powerfully 
implemented from the beginning.24  
  This distinction is significant because these factors give the 
European Union a powerful pro-jurisdictional competition slant. The 
United States on the other hand consolidates its power through its 
tax base and collects the lions share of corporate and personal 
income taxes paid by its subjects through its Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”), as opposed to the much smaller rates collected by the states. 
  Thus, while certain states are more attractive because they levy 
no corporate income tax, all U.S. Corporations are subject to tax at 
35% for their 2014 taxable income at or above $18,333,333, which 
covers every major U.S. Corporation.25 In the United States, as in 
most parts of the world, a Corporation is taxed as an entity itself on 
its annualized taxable gross income. The income that it distributes to 
its shareholders is subsequently taxed a second time at the 
shareholder level as a dividend. The dividend tax is calculated on a 
bracket scale that corresponds to that person’s ordinary income tax 
bracket.26 There are two scales divided into Ordinary Dividends and 
Qualified Dividends, which are subject to a lower level of taxation, 
provided that the investor held the shares in the company for a 
minimum holding period prior to the ex-dividend date. The 
maximum ordinary dividend tax is 39.6% and the maximum qualified 
dividend tax is 20%.27  
                                                      
 24 U.S. CONST. ART. I § 8. 
 25 Internal Revenue Service, 2014 Instructions for Form 1120, Ctat. No. 
11455T (Jan. 8, 2015). 
 26 For the purposes of discussion all references to “Person” or “person” 
unless specified as applying only to “natural person(s)” shall mean an individual, a 
trust, estate, partnership, agency, branch or corporation organized or incorporated 
under the laws of the relevant jurisdiction. 
 27 Tax Law Changes for 2008, KIPLINGER'S (2009), 
http://www.kiplinger.com/features/archives/2008/11/tax-planning-tax-law-
changes4.html?kipad_id=44 (last visited Jun 20, 2017); Supra note 19. Qualified 
Dividends must (a) be paid after December 31, 2002, by (i) a U.S corporation, (ii) a 
foreign corporation located in a jurisdiction subject to a U.S. tax treaty or (iii) on 
stock in a foreign corporation traded on a U.S. exchange by way of an American 
Depository Receipt (A.D.R.), and (b) the stock must have been held by the investor 
for more than 60 out of the 121 days preceeding the ex-dividend date.   
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III. SURVEY OF LOW TAX JURISDICTIONS 
  The nominal corporate tax rate, although a significant 
consideration in tax planning, is often neither the central operative 
factor in a tax planning strategy for a multinational corporation nor is 
it a business driver. Instead it is more often the special tax treatment 
of certain types of income in a certain jurisdiction that plays a major 
factor. However, it is important in understanding basic structures to 
evaluate the nominal rate of a jurisdiction to provide a baseline for 
understanding the tax efficiency of the given strategy. 
 
                                                      
 28 Tax tools & resources, KPGM,  
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/services/Tax/tax-tools-and-
resources/Pages/corporate-tax-rates-table.aspx (last visited Jun 20, 2017). 
High Tax Medium-
High 
Medium-
Low 
Low Tax No Tax 
Japan 
(33.06%) 
Australia 
(30%) 
China (25%) Bulgaria (10%) British 
Virgin 
Islands 
USA (40%) Brazil (34%) Hungary 
(19%) 
Cyprus (12.5%) Cayman 
Islands 
 Canada 
(26.5%) 
Poland (19%) Ireland (12.5%) Estonia 
 France 
(33.33%) 
Romania 
(16%) 
Latvia (15%) Jersey 
 Germany 
(29.65%) 
Russia (20%) Netherlands 
(25%) 
UAE28 
 India 
(34.61%) 
Slovenia 
(17%) 
Switzerland 
(17.92%) 
 
 Malta (35%) UK (20%)   
 Spain (28%)    
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IV. PAST: TRADITIONAL TAX STRUCTURES 
A. Limited Liability Companies and Corporations 
  As a preamble to understanding basic holding structures, it is 
important to understand the tax distinction in business entity types 
and how tax rules evolved organically to permit these types of 
arrangements. For tax purposes, most places in the world classify 
business entities into two types: pass-through or disregarded entities, 
and entities with a corporate personality; the two most common 
American varieties being the Limited Liability Company29 and the 
Corporation, respectively.30 These types of forms have an equivalent 
structure in most jurisdictions, for example, in Switzerland and 
Germany the Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH)31 (Farlex) and 
Aktiengesellschaft (AG).32 
  The primary feature shared by both Limited Liability 
Companies and Corporations is “Limited liability.”  
Limited liability is a type of liability that does not exceed the 
amount invested in a partnership or limited liability company. The 
limited liability feature is one of the biggest advantages of investing in 
publicly listed companies. While a shareholder can participate wholly 
in the growth of a company, his or her liability is restricted to the 
amount of the investment in the company, even if it subsequently 
goes bankrupt and racks up millions or billions in liabilities. 
In a partnership, the limited partners have limited liability, 
while the general partner has unlimited liability. The limited liability 
feature protects the investor's or partner's personal assets from the 
                                                      
 29 Small Business/Self-Employed Topics, Limited Liability Company (LLC), 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-
self-employed/limited-liability-company-llc (last visited Jun 20, 2017). 
 30 Id. 
 31 The Free Dictionary, GMBH, 
http://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/GmbH (last visited Jun 26, 2015). 
 32 The Free Dictionary, AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, http://financial-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Aktiengesellschaft (last visited Jun 24, 2015). 
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risk of being seized to satisfy creditor claims in the event of the 
company's or partnership's insolvency.33  
  Civil Law jurisdictions generally have differing capitalization 
requirements for the Limited Liability Company versus the 
Corporation. The Italian Società per azioni (S.p.A.) for example carries 
an initial capitalization requirement of €50,000. Like an AG or 
Corporation, the capital is split amongst the shares “azioni” that can 
be transferred by endorsement or bought and sold on a stock 
exchange. In Italy, only an SpA can be quoted in a stock exchange, 
issue corporate bonds, and other financial instruments.34 The SpA is 
also the required form for protected businesses such as banks, leasing 
companies, etc. The Italian Civil Code also provides for the Società a 
responsabilità limitata (Srl). An Srl has a lesser initial capitalization 
requirement of €10,000. Like a Limited Liability Company or GmbH, 
in an SrL capital is split into stakes “quote” which can be traded by 
notarial act in Civil Law countries or by Contract in Common Law 
Countries. In the United States for example, no notarial act is 
required for the transfer of shares.35 As in an Italian SrL, a United 
States Limited Liability Company traditionally could not be listed on 
most public exchanges including the New York Stock Exchange or 
NASDAQ because of the added uncertainty associated with a 
Limited Liability Company by virtue of its “Operating Agreement.” 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, an LLC Operating Agreement 
is: 
[A] document that customizes the terms of a Limited 
Liability Company (LLC) according to the specific 
needs of the owners, and outlines the financial and 
functional decision-making in a structured manner. 
Though writing an Operating Agreement is not a 
mandatory requirement for most states, it is 
                                                      
 33 Limited Liability, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/ 
limitedliability.asp#ixzz3fhHLZ1Vn (last visited Jun 26, 2015); supra note 15.  
 34 Italian Civil Code of 1942 (as amended by Government Act 6/2003). 
 35 Gesuato Elisabetta, La S.p.A. si costituisce con capitale minimo di 50.000 €, 
FISCO E TASSE (July 3, 2014), 
https://www.fiscoetasse.com/approfondimenti/11929-la-spa-si-costituisce-con-
capitale-minimo-di-50-000.html (last visited June 25, 2015). 
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nonetheless considered a crucial document that 
should be included when setting up a Limited 
Liability Company. The document, once signed by the 
members (owners), acts as a binding set of rules for 
them to adhere. The document is drafted to allow 
owners to govern the internal operations according to 
their own rules and specifications.36 
  These provisions fill in for state law, which would govern a 
Corporation. In popular states for corporate formations like 
Delaware, the body of law is well developed and provides a level 
playing field for prospective investors.37 Traditionally the uncertainty 
associated with varying terms in LLC operating agreements could not 
be overcome by the rather substantial tax benefits a Limited Liability 
Company could sustain through the elimination of double-taxation. 
However, so called “widely held partnerships” or “publicly traded 
partnerships” (“PTPs”) have become more of a reality; specifically in 
oil, gas and natural resource projects. The rise of PTPs lead to the 
implementation of rules that cause these types of entities to be 
treated as corporations by the United States Internal Revenue Service 
in most instances.38 
                                                      
 36 LLC Operating Agreement, INVESTOPEDIA 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/ 
llc-operating-agreement.asp (last visited June 26, 2015); How To Change Ownership Of 
A Limited Liability Company, THE LAW DICTIONARY, 
http://thelawdictionary.org/article/how-to-change-ownership-of-a-limited-
liability-company/ (last visited Jun 26, 2015). 
 37 Facts and Myths, STATE OF DELAWARE 
http://corplaw.delaware.gov/eng/facts_myths.shtml (last visited June 26, 2015). 
 38 Daniel M Dunn, Michael Hirschfield & Michael A Lehmann, Publicly 
traded partnership proposed regulations, LEXOLOGY (2015), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=0af9fa15-9a54-40ea-ad4d-ae780edfe247&utm_source=Lexology%2B 
Daily%2BNewsfeed&utm_medium=HTML%2Bemail%2B-%2BBody%2B-
%2BGeneral%2Bsection&utm_campaign=Lexology%2Bsubscriber%2Bdaily%2Bf
eed&utm_content=Lexology%2BDaily%2BNewsfeed%2B2015-06-25&utm_term 
(last visited Jun 26, 2015); Internal Revenue Bulletin: 2015-21, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking Qualifying Income from Activities of Publicly Traded Partnerships With Respect to 
Minerals or Natural Resources, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (May 26, 2015), 
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2015-21_IRB/ar14.html (last visited June 26, 2015). 
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  The elimination of double-taxation is the largest tax distinction 
between a Corporation and a Limited Liability Company. The 
Limited Liability Company is treated by default as a pass-through or 
“disregarded” entity, which means that the profits and losses flow 
through the entity as if the owners had engaged in those activities 
personally. The Corporation on the other hand is treated as a 
“person” which is subject to taxation independent of its shareholders 
on the basis of a corporate income tax and its shareholders are 
subject to a second tax when the profits of the corporation are 
distributed in the form of a dividend.39  
B. Basic Holding Structures 
1. Reduction of Withholding Taxes 
  Consider the following scenario. Investors in Sweden invest in 
an active operating company in Canada that manufactures cars. The 
Canadian company is a corporation for the purposes of the Canadian 
Revenue Code and thus taxed at 26.5%.40 The company retains a 
small amount in reserves and distributes the remainder of its profits 
to the Swedish company in the form of a dividend. Pursuant to 
subsection 215(1) of the Canadian Income Tax Act, dividends to non-
resident shareholders would normally be taxed at a rate of 25% to be 
withheld and paid to the Canadian Revenue Authority. However, 
because of the Canada-Sweden Tax Treaty, the Canadian company 
would only be required to apply the reduced rate of 15%. 
Consider now that the Swedish company takes on a partner 
in the United Kingdom and this partner desires to invest into 50% of 
the shares of the Canadian company. If the British company acquired 
50% of the shares of the Canadian company directly, it would be 
subject to a reduced rate of taxation of 10% pursuant to the Canada-
United Kingdom Tax Treaty. However, the Swedish company and the 
                                                      
 39 Classification of Taxpayers for U.S. Tax Purposes, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/classification-
of-taxpayers-for-u-s-tax-purposes (last visited Jun 26, 2015); Limited Liability 
Company (LLC), INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/limited-
liability-company-llc (last visited June 26, 2015); supra note 29. 
 40 Id. 
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British company decide instead to form a jointly-owned subsidiary 
holding company that will own the Canadian company. This 
company would be formed in the Netherlands and consist merely of 
a post office box and have no employees. The Swedish and British 
companies agree as shareholders to pay 80% of all profits of the 
Dutch company to the Swedish and British shareholders by way of a 
dividend. Thus, the applicable tax treaties would become the Canada-
Netherlands Tax Treaty, which provides for a reduced rate of 5%. The 
Dutch company is not subject to Income Tax on the foreign 
dividends received and Dutch law provides for certain credits 
reducing the tax on re-distributed dividends which originate from 
dividends received from other countries reducing the Dutch tax to 
virtually zero.41  
                                                      
41 Joseph Peters, Netherlands: A Dutch Tax Credit For Foreign Dividend 
W/H Tax, Even Though The Dividend Received Is Not Taxed In The 
Netherlands, Due To The Dutch Participation Exemption, MONDAQ (2013), 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/228050/Corporate+Tax/A+Dutch+Tax+Credit+Fo
r+Foreign+Dividend+WH+Tax+Even+Though+The+Dividend+Received+Is+
Not+Taxed+In+The+Netherlands+Due+To+The+Dutch+Participation+Exemp
tion (last visited Jun 7, 2015); Dutch withholding taxes on outbound payments, 
TAX CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL, https://www.tax-consultants-
international.com/read/Dutch_withholding_taxes (last visited Jun 7, 2015); 
Dentons, Landmark treaty case: Prévost Car Inc. v. The Queen, LEXOLOGY, 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=50700034-20f4-4677-826b-
a36d4ee3923e (last visited June 20, 2017); 2008 TCC 231 (CanLII), Prevost Car 
Inc. v. The Queen, http://canlii.ca/t/lwpfq (last visited June 7, 2015). 
Without Holding Company With Holding Company Structure 
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  Thus by shifting profits from Canada through a Dutch 
Holding Company, the result is that the total effective tax on the 
dividends can be reduced from 25% assuming no treaty is in place to 
approximately 5%. These types of structures have been subject to 
attack by revenue-losing governments. Many governments have put 
into play “substance requirements,” which require that the entity 
have some purpose and basic existence in the host country other than 
mere incorporation.  
  The OECD Model Treaty and the Canada-Netherlands Tax Treaty 
also contain provisions in Article 10, Section 2 which made the treaty 
benefits only applicable if the person was the “beneficial owner,” to 
wit: “if the recipient is the beneficial owner of the dividends the tax 
so charged shall not exceed . . . .” However, this scenario was based 
upon a 2008 Canadian case in which the Canadian Revenue authority 
had ruled that the Dutch company was not the “beneficial owner” of 
the dividend and that the term “beneficial owner” is in fact not 
defined anywhere in the treaties.42 This is inapposite to the UK High 
Court’s finding in the case of Indofood International Finance Ltd. V. 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, London Branch. In Indofood, the English High 
Court held “that a newly interposed Dutch company used purely to 
take advantage of the treaty would not be the beneficial owner of the 
interest and, therefore, the purported tax objective of any theoretical 
restructuring to avoid the 20% withholding would not be effective”.43 
Contrarily in Prevost, in rendering the Court’s decision, Justice Rip 
held that Indofood was distinctive from Prevost because in Indofood, there 
was no discretion left to any party as to whether income could be 
passed through the structure making the Dutch company merely a 
“conduit.” Alternatively, in Prevost, the Dutch company was not 
bound by its articles of formation to make a subsequent dividend 
payment to the UK Company and the Swedish Company. The 
Swedish and UK Companies did in fact however have a side 
agreement to which the Dutch company was not a party agreeing to 
                                                      
 42 Id. 
 43 Indofood Decision: UK Tax Authorities' Guidance on Treaty Claim, (Oct 23, 
2006), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-
listing/indofood-decision--uk-tax-authorities--guidance-on-treaty-claims9 (last 
visited June 28, 2015) 
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vote in favor of at least an 80% dividend. Justice Rip determined that 
because the Dutch company was not a party to the side agreement 
the remedies for failure to issue a dividend would be decided in 
litigation amongst the shareholders directly and not by suing the 
Dutch company. The Court held this distinction sufficient to 
distinguish the facts before it from Indofood in finding that the Dutch 
company was in fact the beneficial owner of the dividends issued by 
the Canadian company for the purposes of treaty benefits.44 
  The tax imposed by Canada on the Dutch company is what is 
known as “inbound” taxation, while the tax imposed by Holland on 
the Dutch company’s dividends paid to foreign entities is what is 
known as “outbound” taxation. Each term is so defined based upon 
the direction of the movement of capital. This example is not the end 
of the story with respect to what Governments are doing to limit 
these types of structures. Substance Requirements and CFC Rules 
will be further addressed in Article V. 
2. Protection from Local Capital Gains Taxation 
   Taxation on income from operations of a business is taxed as 
ordinary income at the applicable rate for that business. As discussed 
supra at Ch. III, Art. A, such income is either taxed at the corporate 
level applying the applicable corporate income tax rate or at the level 
of the individual owners in the case of a pass-through entity like a 
Limited Liability Company. When a person engages in investment 
into a capital asset, such as an investment or real estate that: 
gives it a higher worth than the purchase price. The 
gain is not realized until the asset is sold. A capital 
gain may be a short term (one year or less) or long 
term (more than one year) and must be claimed on 
income taxes. A capital loss is incurred when there is 
a decrease in the capital asset value compared to an 
asset’s purchase price.45 
                                                      
 44 2008 TCC 231, supra note 41.  
 45 Investopedia, Capital Gain, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/ 
capitalgain.asp (last visited June 1, 2015); supra note 15. 
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   In Ch. 1 Art. 2 supra we analyzed the Qualified vs. Ordinary 
dividend tax rates in the United States. These rates are mimicked by 
the rates imposed for Long-Term Capital Gain and Short-Term 
Capital Gain taxes. Long-Term Capital Gains are capital gains on 
assets which are held for longer than one-year. These types of capital 
gains are subject to taxation at the lesser amount of 20% for most 
types of transactions.46  
  These types of capital gains are particularly applicable to 
investment companies and private equity funds which trade assets 
regularly. Private equity funds typically have a longer horizon for 
their investments and hold them for longer than a year making most 
of their income subject to long-term capital gains tax. Moreover, 
private equity funds are typically structured as pass-through entities 
and its managers are paid by receiving a share of the profits, thus 
receiving the vast majority of their compensation in capital-gains and 
subject to a lesser tax than the 40% they would otherwise be subject 
to at normal U.S personal income tax rates.47 
  The OECD conducted a survey of Long-Term Capital Gains 
taxation by country in 2011, resulting in the following with a few 
additions for discussion purposes:48 
High Tax Medium-
High 
Medium-
Low 
Low Tax No Tax 
Italy (44.5%) Norway 
(28%) 
United States 
(19.1%) 
Japan 
(10%) 
Mexico 
Denmark 
(42%) 
Germany 
(25%) 
Israel (20%) Hungary 
(16%) 
Luxembourg 
France (31.3%) Finland 
(28%) 
Estonia 
(21%) 
 Portugal 
                                                      
 46 Internal Revenue Service, Topic 409 Capital Gains and Losses, 
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc409.html (last visited June 1, 2015).  
 47 MARK JICKLING & DONALD MARPLES, TAXATION OF HEDGE FUND 
AND PRIVATE EQUITY MANAGERS (2014). 
 48 Robert Carroll & Gerald Prante, Corporate Dividend and Capital Gains 
Taxation: A comparison of the United States to other developed nations, (2012), 
http://www.theasi.org/assets/EY_ASI_Dividend_and_Capital_Gains_Internation
al_Comparison_Report_2012-02-03.pdf (last visited June 25, 2015) 
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Sweden (30%) UK (28%) Iceland 
(20%) 
 Austria 
 Australia 
(22.5%) 
Poland 
(19%) 
 Netherlands 
 Spain (21%) Slovak 
Republic 
(19%) 
 Korea 
 Canada 
(22.54%) 
Chile (20%)  Switzerland 
 Ireland 
(25%) 
  Greece 
    Slovenia 
    Turkey 
    Czech 
Republic 
    Cayman 
Islands49 
    Bermuda50 
    Mauritius51 
   
  The OECD model convention addresses Capital Gains in 
Article 13, which provides the following in substance: 
                                                      
 49 Cayman Island Government, Taxes, (2011), 
http://www.gov.ky/portal/page/portal/cighome/cayman/theeconomy/taxes (last 
visited June 24, 2015). 
 50 Trading Economics, Bermuda Corporate Tax Rate, 
https://tradingeconomics.com/bermuda/corporate-tax-rate (last visited Jul 22, 
2017). 
 51 Gary Gowrea, Standard Chartered – Publicised tax avoidance strategy, 
ACTIONAID (Jan. 2015), 
http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/standard_chartered-
_publicised_tax_avoidance_strategy_0.pdf (last visited June, 25 2015) 
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1. Gains derived by a resident of a State A from 
alienation of immovable property State B may 
be taxed in State B.  
2. Gains derived by resident of State A forming 
part of the “business property of a permanent 
establishment” which an enterprise of State A 
has in State B, including gains from the 
alienation of the permanent establishment 
itself may be taxed in State B. 
3. Gains from the alienation of ships or aircraft 
operated in international traffic, or movable 
property pertaining to the operation of ships, 
aircraft or boats shall be taxed in the state 
“where place of effective management is 
situated.” 
4. Gains derived by resident of State A from 
alienation of shares deriving more than “50 
per cent of their value directly or indirectly 
from immovable property” situated in State B 
may be taxed in State B. 
5. All other gains than in Paragraphs 1-4 shall be 
taxable only in the state where the alienator is 
a resident.52 
  Consider the following scenario. A Chinese company wishes 
to invest in a Mozambique Company that holds immovable property 
in Mozambique. Pursuant to Mozambique law capital gains are taxed 
at a rate of 32%. In 2014, Texas-based Andarko, an oil and gas 
company paid Mozambique $520 million USD in capital gains after a 
transaction yielded a capital gain of $1.625 billion USD.  
  Instead, if the Chinese company interposes a holding 
company in Mauritius that owns 100% of the shares in the 
                                                      
 52 Supra note 7. 
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Mozambique Co., the capital gains tax can be eliminated per the tax 
treaty between Mauritius and Mozambique, which states to wit:  
Mauritius has the exclusive right to tax any gains 
derived by the Mauritius Holding Company on the 
sale of shares held in the Mozambique Company.  
As opposed to other tax treaties signed by 
Mozambique, Mauritius has exclusive rights to tax 
capital gains on the sale of shares held in the 
Mozambique Company even if the assets of the 
Mozambique Company consist (sic) principally of 
immovable property.53 
“As per the tax treaty between Mauritius and Mozambique, 
dividend [sic] paid to the Mauritius Holding Company will be subject 
to a reduced withholding tax rate of 8% in Mozambique.”54 Capital 
Gains are also not taxed in Mauritius on this type of transaction 
because the Mauritius-Mozambique double taxation treaty excludes 
Paragraph 4 of the Model Convention applying to immovable 
property, thus pushing this transaction into the catchall Article 13, 
Paragraph 5 of the OECD Model Convention.55  
 
 
 
 
                                                      
 53 Supra note 51. 
 54 Gary Gowrea, Mauritius: Investment Gateway to Africa in Maximising 
Business Opportunities in Asia, Africa and the Middle East – a Treasury Guide, CIM TAX 
SERVICES (2014), https://www.cim.mu/files/cgb/mauritius%20-
%20investment%20gateway%20to%20africa%20(insights%20201314)%20a%20pu
blication%20of%20standard%20chartered%20bank.pdf (last visited June 21, 2017). 
 55 Supra 53; Agreement between the Republic of Mauritius and the Republic of 
Mozambique for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, LEGAL 
SUPPLEMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT GAZETTE OF MAURITIUS (1997). 
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3. Tax Efficient Movement of Cash 
  A major consideration of any business with operating entities 
in foreign jurisdictions is how to get cash to those entities without 
suffering a debilitating tax. Consider the previous scenario. Investor 
parent company in China invests in an Operating Company in 
Mauritius, but now also invests in another Operating Company in 
Country Y. The Chinese company wants a way to move cash easily 
into the Operating Company in Country Y. As discussed supra, 
dividends paid would be subject to a 20% withholding tax in 
Mozambique, thus limiting the capital available for movement from 
China to Country Y. 
 
 
  
                                                      
 56 Supra note 52. 
Without Holding Company With Holding Company Structure56 
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Using a similar structure, the Chinese investors would interpose 
Country Y’s Operating Company as a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
Mauritius Co. subject to the same reduced 8% withholding tax.57 
However, instead of the Mauritius Co. redistributing the dividend to 
China it would make a capital investment either as equity or debt into 
Country Y’s Operating Company.  
C. Financing Structures 
  Another reason that companies develop holding structures is 
for tax efficient financing. In financing structures, the primary driver 
is often not tax efficiency, but rather non-tax considerations like the 
availability of external financing sources. Tax only becomes the 
bigger consideration when internal financing is proposed (e.g., the 
Holding Co. lending to the Operating Co. or CFC 1 lending to CFC 
2). 
                                                      
 57 Id. 
Cash Efficient Holding Structure 
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  As discussed infra Article IV, Section D, Chapter 4 (the 
Amazon.com, Hybrid and Reverse Hybrid examples), lending 
internally is an effective way of reducing income in a high-tax country 
and shifting it to a low-tax country. Some basic financing structures 
apply in this regard. 
 1.  Spain – Swiss Finance Branch 
Consider the following scenario: 
1. ParentCo. in High-Tax Jurisdiction owns Spanish Co., 
which is a corporate subsidiary. 
2. Spanish Co. owns subsidiaries in high-tax jurisdictions. 
3. Spanish Co. establishes a branch office in Switzerland. 
4. The Swiss Branch loans money to the high-tax 
subsidiaries for operating capital and the interest is 
sufficient to wipe-out the profits of the subsidiaries in the 
high-tax countries. 
5. Pursuant to Swiss Law, the branch is subject to a low-
level of taxation in Switzerland on interest income and no 
withholding tax on profits redistributed to the Spanish 
head office, because the branch is a disregarded or non-
existent entity. 58 
6. Pursuant to Spanish law there is no deemed interest 
income in Spain so the interest income in tax exempt in 
Spain. 59 
                                                      
 58 Corporate Taxation System In Switzerland, INT’L TAX REV. (2015), 
http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/pdfs/taxdata/tax_data_switzerland_0002
26.pdf (last visited July 6, 2015). 
 59 Barbra Mambrilla & Jose Manuel Calderon, The new Tax Protocol to the 
Spain-Switzerland Tax Treaty, GOMEZ-ACEBO & POMBO (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.gomezacebo-pombo.com/media/ 
k2/attachments/the-new-tax-protocol-to-the-spain-switzerland-tax-treaty.pdf (last 
visited July 6, 2015). 
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7. The end-result is a deferral strategy whereby the profits 
are shifted from the high-tax subsidiaries to the Swiss 
Branch. 
8. The effectiveness of this strategy is subject to avoidance 
of Spanish CFC legislation, which is discussed infra in 
Article IV, Section D, Chapter 2. 
2. Malta Financing Structure 
Consider the following scenario: 
1. Parent Co. in high-tax jurisdiction owns Malta Co., a 
Maltese subsidiary company.  
2. Malta taxes interest income at a low rate. 
3. Malta Co. loans money to the subsidiaries of Parent Co. 
in high tax jurisdictions. 
4. The high tax companies get the interest deduction. 
                                                      
 60 Madeleine Syré, MODULE 6 – M&A - TAX PLANNING (2014), 
University of St. Gallen, EMBL-HSG. 
The Swiss Finance Branch60 
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5. The interest is initially taxed at 35% in Malta.61 
6. The money is distributed by the Malta Co to the Parent 
Co. in the form of a dividend and subject to no 
withholding tax pursuant to Maltese law.62 
7. Under Maltese law, interest income is classified as 
“Passive Interest” if the interest income is not derived, 
directly or indirectly, from a trade or business and the 
interest income has not suffered or has suffered foreign 
tax of less than 5%. “Then a registered shareholder of a 
Malta company who has: (i) received a dividend from a 
Malta company, from (ii) profits of the company which 
arise from Passive Interest, is entitled to claim a 5/7th’s 
refund of the CIT paid by the Malta company on the 
Passive Interest.” 63 If the income is not “Passive 
Interest” the fallback is that the interest is classified as 
“Non-Passive Interest” an subject to a 6/7th’s refund of 
the CIT paid by the Malta company on the interest.64 
8. The effectiveness of this strategy is subject to avoidance 
of CFC legislation in the high-tax country, which is 
analyzed in detail in Section D, however it is likely given 
the fact that the tax is charged and a refund paid, that 
double-taxation treaty benefits would likely be available to 
the Parent Co. for the taxes paid in Malta at 35%. 
                                                      
 61 Jonathan Pisani, Taxation of interest income,  CHETCUTI CAUCHI 
ADVISORS (May 23, 2012), 
https://www.ccmalta.com/publications/taxation_of_interest_income (last visited 
Jul 6, 2015). 
 62 Nicholas Gouder, Malta: Withholding Taxes, MONDAQ (Oct. 1, 2013), 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/266212/withholding%20tax/Malta%20Withholding
%20Taxes (last visited Jul 6, 2015). 
 63 Supra note 61. 
 64 Id. 
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3.  Malta – BeNeLux Interest Free Loan with Notional Interest 
Deduction (“NID”) 
Consider the following scenario: 
1. Parent Co. in high-tax jurisdiction owns Malta Co., a 
Maltese subsidiary company and BeNeLux Co., a Belgian 
subsidiary company. 
2. Parent Co. makes an equity contribution to Malta Co. 
3. Malta Co. makes an interest free loan to BeNeLux Co. 
4. BeNeLux Co. makes a loan to OpCo in a high tax 
jurisdiction. 
5. OpCo deducts the interest paid to BeNeLux Co. 
6. BeNeLux Co. receives a “Notional Interest Deduction” 
equal to the amount of Belgium’s published rates. “The 
deduction for risk capital or more commonly called 
“notional interest deduction” (NID) is a unique tax 
                                                      
 65 Supra note 60. 
The Maltese Finance Subsidiary65  
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measure allowing a tax-free return on qualified equity by 
allowing a deemed interest deduction calculated as the 
qualifying equity multiplied by the applicable NID rate”.66  
7. This creates a tax deferred cash accumulation in BeNeLux 
Co. and only principal amounts remain owing to Malta 
Co. 
  4. Finance Structures Do Not Drive Business Substantively 
In evaluating structures both in the context of treaty 
application and financing structures, the question of whether or not 
tax is a business driver is ever present. Choosing where to establish a 
mailbox company and where to loan money for the purposes of 
deductions like the Notional Interest Deduction are strategies that 
haven’t truly driven business in a measurable way. These are tactics 
that allow business to function in more tax efficient ways, but do not 
introduce new lines of business or otherwise drive business out of a 
market. The end result is ultimately the same, profits are drained 
from high-tax subsidiaries into low-tax countries. That does not 
                                                      
 66 What NID Could Mean for Your Company’s Effective Tax Rate, ERNST & 
YOUNG (2015), 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Notional_Intrest_Deduction_2011
/$FILE/NID%202011.pdf (last visited July 6, 2015) 
 67 Supra note 60. 
The BeNeLux Co. with Notional Interest Deduction67  
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mean that the company has truly ceased any operations in those 
jurisdictions. 
D. Multinational Corporations 
1.  International vs. Intra-Europe 
Across the world companies have applied the disparate 
treatment of tax available from various double taxation treaties to 
their business model to create holding structures that are tax efficient 
both for the purposes of driving the bottom line and efficiently 
moving cash between subsidiaries. However, companies also have 
additional rules which apply to their activities when those activities 
take place within the European Internal Market. Two major 
European Union directives apply, they are the E.U. 
Parent/Subsidiary Directive and the E.U. Interest and Royalty 
Directive.  
  Article 31 EEA provides in relevant part that:  
[T]here shall be no restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment of nationals of an EC Member State or 
an EFTA State in the territory of any other state of 
these States. This shall also apply to the setting up of 
agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any 
EC Member State or EFTA State established in the 
territory of any of these states.68  
The language of Article 34 of the EEA (like Article 54 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) provides that: 
Companies or firms … shall, for the purpose of this 
Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons 
who are nationals of EC Member States or EFTA 
States.69  
In light of this core treaty language, the European Union has 
taken competence in this area. The E.U. Parent/Subsidiary Directive 
                                                      
 68 Supra note 23 at art. 31. 
 69 Id. at art. 34. 
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was adopted on December 22, 2003 “to eliminate tax obstacles in the 
area of profit distributions between groups of companies in the E.U. 
by: abolishing withholding taxes on payments of dividends between 
associated companies of different Member States and preventing 
double taxation of parent companies on the profits of their 
subsidiaries”.70 In sum, this language provides a mechanism that 
sidesteps the necessity of the holding structure described supra in 
Article IV, Section B. 
  The E.U. Interest and Royalty Directive was adopted on June 
3, 2003 “to eliminate withholding tax obstacles in the area of cross-
border interest and royalty payments within a group of companies by 
abolishing withholding taxes on royalty payments arising in a 
Member State, and withholding taxes on interest payments arising in 
a Member State.”71 In essence, interest and royalty payments arising 
in one member state are exempt from any taxes in that state if the 
beneficial owner of the payment is in another member state.72 
  All initial time periods for phased and member-state specific 
transitional implementation for both directives have passed.73 
2. CFC Rules, United States (Subpart F) and International 
  The United States tax system is built on two fundamentally 
inconsistent principles that drive the need for tax structures such as 
those discussed thus far. These principles are (1) that corporations 
are treated as independent fictitious persons for the purposes of 
taxation and (2) that all U.S based taxpayers are subject to worldwide 
taxation.74 The tax treatment of corporations was previously 
                                                      
 70 Parent companies and their subsidiaries in the European Union, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, TAXATION AND CUSTOMS UNION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/ 
business/company-tax/parent-companies-their-subsidiaries-eu-union_en (last 
visited June 21, 2015). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Office of Tax Policy, The Deferral of Income Earned Through U.S. Controlled 
Foreign Corporations: A Policy Study, DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, 1 (Dec. 21, 2000), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-
SubpartF-2000.pdf. 
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addressed herein. One distinctive and unique feature of the U.S. tax 
system is that it taxes all U.S. citizens, residents and corporations on 
worldwide income.75 Corporations are determined as U.S. domestic 
or foreign on the basis of their place of organization contrary to 
many other places in the world as described herein. Foreign 
corporations are taxed on income that is from “sources within the 
United States” or that is “effectively connected with the conduct of a 
trade or business within the United States”.76 There is a tension 
between the two principles insofar as tax Persons are incentivized to 
use offshore corporations as a barrier to U.S taxation of the income 
earned through those corporations. 
  From 1913 when the U.S Income Tax was enacted through 
1962, a number of tax avoidance techniques were developed by 
international investors and were subsequently addressed through 
legislation, including transfers of property to foreign corporations to 
avoid U.S tax on the capital gains, the incorporation of the personal 
or foreign personal holding companies or “incorporated 
pocketbook” used to hold all personal holdings in stocks bonds or 
other income producing property and foreign operating and 
investment companies in the wake of World War II.77 In 1962, the 
United States enacted what is known as “subpart F” regulations at 
I.R.C. §§ 951 – 964.78  
The Code provides: 
[E]very person who is a United States shareholder … 
of such corporation and who owns … stock in such 
corporation on the last day, in such year, on which such 
corporation is a controlled foreign corporation shall 
include in his gross income, for his taxable year in 
which or with which such taxable year of the 
corporation ends . . . . (i) his pro rata share … of the 
corporation’s subpart F income for such year[.]79  
                                                      
 75 Id. at 2. 
 76 Supra note 17 at §§ 881 and 882. 
 77 Supra note 74 at 8.  
 78 Id. at 12.  
 79 Supra note 17 at §§ 951. 
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In summary: 
Subpart F applies to certain income of “controlled foreign 
corporations” (“CFCs”). A CFC is a foreign corporation more than 
50% of which, by vote or value, is owned by U.S. persons owning a 
10% or greater interest in the corporation by vote (“U.S. 
shareholders”). “U.S. persons” includes U.S. citizens, residents, 
corporations, partnerships, trusts and estates. If a CFC has subpart F 
income, each U.S. shareholder must currently include its pro rata 
share of that income in its gross income as a deemed dividend.80  
Subpart F income includes the following: 
• Foreign personal holding company income (FPHCI), 
A major category of subpart F income is foreign personal 
holding company income (“FPHCI”).81 (I.R.C. § 954(c)) 
This category includes interest, dividends and rents and 
royalties. It also includes gains from the sale of property 
that produces passive income or that is held for 
investment, gains from commodities transactions, and 
gains from foreign currency transactions, as well as certain 
other income that is, in effect, the equivalent of interest or 
dividends. Because of its passive nature, such income 
often is highly mobile and can be easily deflected.82 . . . . 
Generally, rents and royalties earned by a CFC in an active 
business are excluded from FPHCI.83 This exception does 
not apply, however, if the CFC’s rents or royalties are 
received from a related person.  
• Foreign base company sales income [S]ales income is 
active income and subpart F generally does not apply to 
active income. However, certain sales income, referred to 
as foreign base company sales income (“FBCSI”), is 
subject to current inclusion under subpart F because, when 
the manufacturing function is separated from its sales 
                                                      
 80 Supra note 74 at 8-10; supra note 17 at §§ 957, 951(b), 957(c), 
7701(a)(30), 951(a). 
 81 Supra note 17 at § 954(c). 
 82 Supra note 74 at 10. 
 83 Supra note 17 at § 954(c)(2)(A). 
2017 Agresta 5:2 
573 
function, the sales income can easily be deflected from the 
jurisdiction in which the major economic activity that 
produced the value in the goods occurred, often a high-tax 
jurisdiction, to a low-tax jurisdiction where the “sales” 
activities occur.84 This is particularly true in the case of 
related party transactions. Thus, the FBCSI rules require 
current inclusion of income of a CFC from the sale of 
property (a) that is purchased from, or on behalf of, or 
sold to, or on behalf of, a related person, and (b) that is 
manufactured and sold for use, consumption or 
disposition outside the jurisdiction where the CFC is 
incorporated.85  
• Foreign base company services income Foreign base 
company services income is another category of subpart F 
income that applies to active income that can be deflected 
to a low-tax jurisdiction through related party transactions, 
in this case, through the performance of services.86 Foreign 
base company services income includes income from 
services performed outside the CFC’s country of 
incorporation for, or on behalf of, a related person. These 
rules generally were intended to address circumstances in 
which service activities are separated from the other 
business activities of a corporation into a separate 
subsidiary located in another jurisdiction to obtain a lower 
rate of tax for the services income. 87  
• Foreign base company oil-related income includes 
income from all oil activities outside the CFC's country of 
incorporation.88  
• Insurance income includes all income derived from 
insurance and annuities related to risks that are situated 
outside the CFC's country of incorporation.89  
                                                      
 84 H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1962) (1962 House 
Report); S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1962) (1962 Senate Report). 
 85 Supra note 17 at § 954(d); supra note 74 at xiii. 
 86 Supra note 17 at § 954(e)(2). 
 87 Treas. Reg. § 1.954-4(b)(1)(iv); supra note 74 at xiv. 
 88 Supra note 17 at § 954(g). 
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All other income earned by a CFC is not subject to U.S. tax 
until the income is repatriated to the U.S. The United States is no 
longer alone in implementing CFC rules, however it is alone in its 
application of worldwide taxation. Although, Germany, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, Italy, France, Spain, Denmark, Finland and 
Portugal have enacted CFC regimes that bear some resemblance to 
the U.S scheme, the United States has a special provision which 
permits the creation of what are known as “Hybrid Entities” and 
arrangements known as “Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements.”90 A 
Hybrid Entity is an entity that is taxed as a corporation in a foreign 
jurisdiction but treated as a partnership or disregarded pass-through 
entity for U.S. tax purposes. Conversely, a “Reverse Hybrid Entity” is 
an entity that is taxed as a partnership or disregarded pass-through 
entity in a foreign jurisdiction and treated as a corporation for U.S. 
tax purposes.91 This is a feature of the United States tax code known 
as Entity Classification Election or “Check the Box.” In order to 
receive treatment as a corporation or partnership, the eligible entity 
simply completes IRS Form 8832, which provides the following 
election:92 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
 89 Supra note 17 at § 953. 
 90 HRMC's International Manual, Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, as 
amended (hereafter ICTA88), sec. 747 et seq., INTM20000; Inkomstskattelag 
(1999:1229); §§ 7-14 AStG, Foreign Tax Act; Ernst & Young, An Overview of CFC 
Rules in Key EU Countries and an Analysis of Cross-Border Planning Structures to Avoid the 
Application of CFC Rules, UNIVERSITAT HAMBURG, http://www.m-i-
tax.de/content/Wichtige_Links/Alumni_Netzwerk/documents/cfcrules_000.pdf 
(last visited July 7, 2015). 
 91 Supra note 74 at 62. 
 92 Form 8832, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8832.pdf. 
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(i) Scenario: Deflect Profit to Low Tax Country 
  Consider the following scenario: 
1. Company A is a U.S. company with a wholly owned 
subsidiary, CFC X in Country X, a high-tax jurisdiction.  
2. In order to transfer operating income from CFC X in 
Country X where it would be taxed at a high rate to 
Country Y, which is a low-tax country, CFC X creates a 
wholly owned subsidiary Company Y in Country Y that 
is treated as a corporation in Country X and of course in 
Country Y, but would be disregarded for U.S. tax 
purposes.  
3. Company Y makes a loan to CFC X. Country X treats 
CFC X as a corporation and so the interest payments 
from CFC X to Company Y are deductible in Country X 
and thus reduces operating income of CFC X. Interest 
payments received by Company Y in Country Y, are 
subject to low-taxation in Country Y.  
4. Because the United States treats CFC X as disregarded 
for U.S. tax purposes, the taxpayer takes the position that 
interest payments between CFC X and Company Y 
should be disregarded for U.S. tax purposes and thus 
should not be considered subpart F income.93 
5. The end result is that CFC X pays tax significantly 
reduced income (by the amount of interest paid) in 
Country X and subject to any applicable double-taxation 
treaty benefits, tax on equally reduced income in the 
United States.  
 
 
                                                      
 93 Supra note 74 at 64. 
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(ii) Scenario: Shelter From Tax in All Jurisdictions 
Now consider an alternative scenario. 
1. Company A is a U.S. company with a wholly owned 
subsidiary, CFC X in Country X, a high-tax jurisdiction.  
2. Company A could establish Company X in Country X, 
the same high-tax jurisdiction, but the entity would not 
be a corporation, it would be a disregarded pass-through 
entity, such as a Partnership or Limited Liability 
Company. 
3. Company A would elect to treat Company X as a 
Corporation for U.S. tax purposes but the law of 
Country X would provide that the entity would be 
disregarded for tax purposes. 
4. Company A would make a cash contribution to 
Company X. 
                                                      
 94 Id. 
CFC Use of Hybrid to Deflect Income to Low-Tax Country94 
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5. Company X would make a loan to CFC X.  
6. CFC X would get a deduction in Country X for the 
interest paid to Company X. 
7. For purposes of Country X, Company X is a disregarded 
entity and no tax would be imposed on Company X for 
the interest paid to it. Assuming a double taxation treaty 
existed between Country X and the United States, the 
interest would likely be subject to minimal withholding 
tax in Country X. 
8. From the United States perspective, the U.S. would treat 
Company X as a Country X corporation as well as CFC 
X and thus interest payments between CFC X and 
Company X would not be subpart F income pursuant to 
the same country exception in section 954(c)(3)(A)(i) 
which “exempts from FPHCI dividends and interest 
received from a related corporation organized under the 
laws of the same country as the recipient, provided that 
the related payer corporation has a substantial part of its 
assets used in a trade or business in the same foreign 
country.”95  
9. The end result is CFC X has little or no income for U.S 
or Country X tax purposes because it deducts interest 
paid to Company X. Company X, a disregarded entity 
pays no tax in Country X because it is disregarded in 
Country X and no tax in the United States because the 
U.S. treats it as a Corporation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                      
 95 Id. 
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  This is of course, as in the first example, a tax deferral 
strategy as compared to an avoidance strategy. Whenever Company 
X in this example or Company Y in the prior example repatriates 
profits to the U.S. Company, these profits would be subject to 
taxation as dividends pursuant to the applicable double-taxation 
treaties between the United States and Country X or Y depending on 
the applicable example above. 
(iii) Scenario: Dual-Resident Corporation and Stateless Income 
Consider the following scenario: 
1. U.S. Company A owns CFC X1, which is a 
manufacturing corporation incorporated in Country X, a 
high-tax jurisdiction. 
2. The U.S. Company forms a sister corporation, CFC X2 
in Country X. 
3. CFC X2 is effectively managed and controlled in the 
United States and so it is a non-resident for the purposes 
of Country X’s tax code. 
4. CFC X2 enters into a contract manufacturing 
arrangement for CFC X1 to manufacture goods from 
Use of Reverse Hybrid to Shelter Income from Tax in All 
Jurisdictions1 
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raw materials that CFC X2 will purchase from the U.S. 
company and provide to CFC X1, thus reducing CFC 
X1’s profit. 
5. CFC X2 will then sell through a branch established in the 
country of sale. 
6. CFC X2 will not be taxed on its sales profits in Country 
X, because Country X treats it as a non-resident because 
its place of management is in the U.S. 
7. The U.S. tax law treats CFC X2 as a Country X 
corporation because it was incorporated in Country X. 
8. Because the income of CFC X2’s sales is derived from 
the sale of products manufactured in Country X, this 
does not constitute Foreign Base Sales Company Income 
(FBCSI). In order for FBCSI to apply the sales income 
would have to be derived in connection with the sale of 
products both manufactured and sold for use outside 
CFC X2’s country of incorporation (Country X). 
9. Thus, CFC X1 will have reduced its tax payable to 
Country X without any subpart F income arising in CFC 
X2 because of CFC X2 is a foreign corporation to both 
Country X and the United States.96 
10. CFC X2 is stateless.97 
  This is a key component of case studies to be examined 
subsequently in Article IV, Section E, where this article will be 
examining the tax structures of Apple, Inc. and Google, Inc. 
                                                      
 96 Id. 
 97 Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699 (2011), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1791769## (last visited 
July 8, 2015).  
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3. Transfer Pricing 
  Tax strategies have two major overlapping goals: (a) deferral 
and (b) avoidance. In large part the tax strategies described above 
focus on the avoidance aspect, e.g. how applying disparate treatments 
of treaties escapes a high level of taxation in the source country by 
interposing a holding country with a favorable treaty network. 
Although avoidance is the goal, the practical result of most modern 
tax strategies is deferral. Sooner or later the reality is that 
shareholders will pressure companies to repatriate offshore profits to 
reinvest or distribute in the form of dividends.98  
  Each of the strategies described above involve the use of treaty 
provisions to legally reduce the amount of tax due and owing in one 
country versus another and shift the profits of a company from a 
high tax country to a low tax country. Contrarily, tax evasion would 
involve an illegal reduction in tax by relying on sovereign privacy laws 
to hide foreign profits and assets. Alternatively, some corporations 
use what is known as transfer pricing in order to further reduce tax. 
Depending on the methods used to establish the transfer pricing, 
some legal experts have argued that such techniques might also 
qualify as illegal tax evasion especially as the pricing applies to hard 
goods.99  
  Transfer pricing involves the application of prices to goods and 
services sold between related companies. The price of the goods sold 
should be the same as the prices that would be paid by unrelated 
parties, or a so-called “arms-length transaction.” “By lowering the 
price of goods and services sold by parents and affiliates in high-tax 
jurisdictions and raising the price of purchases, income can be 
shifted.”100 The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines provide five 
                                                      
 98 Jane G. Gravelle, Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Jan. 15, 2015), 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf (last visited July 5, 2015); Apple under 
pressure for new dividends, repatriation of cash, MACNN (Mar. 11, 2013), 
http://www.macnn.com/articles/13/03/11/wall.street.government.wants.more.of.
companys.growing.cash.hoard/ (last visited July 5, 2015). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Gravelle. supra note 99 at 12. 
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methods to estimate an arm’s length price of transactions and allocate 
profits between companies: 
  (i)  the comparable uncontrolled price method 
(hereinafter “CUP”), which involves observing comparable 
transactions between two independent companies and applying the 
same price for group companies;  
  (ii)  the cost plus method, which involves approximating 
income from goods sold or services provided to the company within 
the group for a fair income level;  
  (iii)  the resale minus method, which involves 
approximating the costs of goods bought from and services provided 
by a group company for a fair cost of goods;  
  (iv)  the transactional net margin method (hereinafter 
“TNMM”), which involves using a net profit indicator, referring in 
principle to the ratio of profit per item compared to the profit and 
loss account of the firm, a fair margin is applied to be considered 
“arm’s length”  
  (v)  the transactional profit split method, which involves 
considering each of the related parties relative value of their 
contributions to the profit or loss and splitting the profit 
appropriately.101  
  It is relatively simple to police a simple product that has a 
markup and other competitive goods offered for sale in the 
marketplace. Failure to sell those goods between related companies at 
fair market value, which is what parties negotiating at arms-length 
would pay, is a violation of the transfer-pricing rules. Intellectual 
property and intangible assets are the primary assets where transfer 
pricing remains relevant within international tax planning, largely for 
one reason: there is no competitive market to license these assets and 
there is only one customer and only one licensee – the company that 
                                                      
 101 TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS, OECD (2010), 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/transfer-pricing-guidelines.htm (last 
visited July 6, 2015). 
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exploits the intellectual property. New inventions, new 
pharmaceutical drugs, trademarks have nothing to be compared to 
that would effectively affix a value to the intellectual property.102  
  By transferring the intellectual property to a subsidiary in a 
low-tax jurisdiction and requiring every use of the intellectual 
property to pay high-royalties, the royalties are deductible in the high-
tax jurisdictions and the income flows to the low-tax jurisdictions. 
4.  State Aid & Subsidies 
  State Aid is a tool that is used by many jurisdictions to attract 
specific companies. It is “A grant of money made by government in 
aid of the promoters of any enterprise, work, or improvement in 
which the government desires to participate, or which is considered a 
proper subject for state aid, because [it’s] likely to be of benefit to the 
public.”103  
  As a domestic American example of State Aid consider 
Mercedes-Benz. In 2015, Mercedes-Benz USA (“MBUSA”) the 
United States subsidiary of Daimler, AG negotiated a subsidy with 
the Governor of Georgia, whereby MBUSA would relocate its 
headquarters from the high-tax state of New Jersey, which imposes 
its own corporate income tax of 9% in addition to the United States 
corporate income tax.104 The State of Georgia imposes a corporate 
income tax of 6% in addition to the United States corporate income 
tax.105 Although 300 basis points is a significant reduction, the State 
of Georgia also agreed to enact an “incentive package” valued at 
$27,000 per job. MBUSA estimates that it will create 800 to 1,000 
                                                      
 102 Id. 
 103 Supra note 15. 
 104 Corporation Business Tax Overview, STATE OF NEW JERSEY 
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY 
http://www.state.nj.usU.S/treasury/taxation/corp_over.shtml (last visited July 6, 
2015). 
 105 Corporate Income and Net Worth Tax, GEORGIA DEPT. OF REV.,  
http://dor.georgia.gov/corporate-income-and-net-worth-tax (last visited July 6, 
2015). 
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jobs in Georgia by moving its headquarters. This amounts to a 
subsidy of up to $27 million USD.106 
  Article 107 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European 
Union provides that “any aid granted by a Member State or through 
State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between 
Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.”107 In 2014, 
the European Commission opened an investigation into 
Amazon.com, Inc.’s arrangements with Luxembourg over favorable 
tax treatment of income from Amazon’s transfer pricing 
arrangements.108 The decision involves Luxembourg’s validation of 
Amazon’s Advance Pricing Arrangement (“APA”). An APA is an 
agreement between various subsidiaries and branches of a multi-
national group to set prices based upon comparable prices, pricing 
methods and adjustments for various factors.109  
  Amazon’s structure is as follows: 
1. Amazon Company 1 (AC1) and Amazon Company 2 
(AC2) are based in the United States and own 100% of 
Amazon Europe Holding Technologies SCS (Lux SCS), a 
limited liability partnership. 
2. For the purposes of Luxembourg law, Lux SCS is a 
transparent entity. 
                                                      
 106 James Salzer, Gov. Deal signs tax breaks for Mercedes-Benz staffers, private 
college, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION (May 6, 2015), 
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/gov-deal-signs-tax-
breaks-for-mercedes-benz-staffe/nk9y6/ (last visited July 6, 2015). 
 107 TFEU Treaty, art. 107 opened for signature March 25, 1957. 
 108 David Meyer, EU Publishes Details of Amazon Luxembourg “State Aid” 
Tax Probe, GIGAOM (Jan. 16, 2015), https://gigaom.com/2015/01/16/eu-
publishes-details-of-amazon-luxembourg-state-aid-tax-probe/ (last visited July 6, 
2015). 
 109 STATE AID SA.38944 (2014/C) – Luxembourg Alleged aid to Amazon by 
way of a tax ruling, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Brussels (Oct. 7, 2014). 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:2 
584 
3. For the purposes of U.S. law, Lux SCS is a corporation 
and tax is deferred on its profits until they are repatriated 
to the U.S. as a dividend. 
4. Lux SCS owns all Amazon’s intangibles and intellectual 
property, and licenses both of them to Amazon EU Sarl 
(LuxOpCo) for which Lux OpCo must pay a royalty to 
Lux SCS. 
5. LuxOpCo operates all of Amazon’s European Sites and 
owns all of the shares in Amazon’s E.U. subsidiaries 
located outside of Luxembourg in the European Union. 
6. Lux SCS also loans LuxOpCo and other related 
companies cash to provide operating capital to the group 
and the group pays Lux SCS deductible interest 
payments. 110  
7. As a result of this arrangement, Amazon shifts most of 
its profits from subsidiaries located in high tax European 
jurisdictions to Luxembourg, where they are not subject 
to tax and deferred under U.S. taxation until those profits 
are repatriated back to the U.S. in the form of a 
shareholder dividend or distribution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
 110 Id.; Proposed Treasury Regulations under Section 385 would have profound 
impact on related party financings, PwC (Apr. 7, 2016), 
https://www.pwc.com/U.S/en/tax-services/publications/insights/assets/pwc-
proposed-section-385-regs-would-impact-related-party-financings.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2017). 
2017 Agresta 5:2 
585 
 
 
 
                                                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
111 
Luxembourg applied the Transactional Profit Split Method to 
determine that Amazon’s transfer pricing arrangement, which 
favored placing profits in Luxembourg over other E.U. member 
states, was a fair practice and in compliance with Article 164 of the 
Luxembourgish tax code of 1967 (“LIR”) which gives no discretion 
to tax authorities.112  
  In comparing the U.S. example of Mercedes-Benz USA, 
whereby the State of Georgia enacted tax law solely for the purpose 
of attracting a single firm, and the E.U. example of Amazon 
obtaining a ruling that its APA was in compliance with Luxembourg 
law, it can be seen that a far greater latitude is given to United States 
taxpayers than to member states of the European Union, in this 
regard. However, in both cases, the governments will toe the line of 
legality in order to attract large businesses to their jurisdiction. The 
fact that Mercedes-Benz USA moved to Georgia, and that Amazon 
setup their European headquarters in Luxembourg, evidences that, at 
                                                      
 111 Id. 
 112 Article 164 of the Luxembourg Income Tax Law of 1967; supra note 
110. 
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the extremes, when governmental assurances are provided, tax can 
act as a major business driver. 
E. The Present: Intellectual Property and Modern Tax Structures 
  In the context of intellectual property, the very nature of the 
property itself makes it a valuable tool for international tax planning. 
The features of intellectual property make it portable and relatively 
easy to relocate either by contractual terms or re-registering in foreign 
jurisdictions. When a product or good exploits a trademark or patent 
the company that manufactures that product or good must pay a 
royalty or licensing fee to the company that owns the intellectual 
property. In order for one company to control all rights to intellectual 
property that property must be sold and assigned to the other and 
those rights include the rights to receive royalties and licensing fees 
from that property. In other words, intellectual property could be 
compared to real estate in the sense that an assignment is a transfer 
of title to the property and the right to receive rental income for the 
property’s use. Whereas a manufacturing company has to pay rent to 
use a warehouse, it would also have to pay a licensing fee to use the 
applicable trademark for a good, the patent in the way that the good 
operates or is constructed, and even a sum for confidential access to 
a trade secret in how the product is manufactured or what the recipe 
consists of. 
  By relocating intellectual property from a high tax jurisdiction 
to a low tax jurisdiction, as in the Amazon example above, the 
royalties and licensing fees relating to that intellectual property are 
booked in the low tax country, and thus, subject to taxation there. 
  Two major multinational companies, Google, Inc. and Apple, 
Inc., provide a good example of how these tax rules can be used to 
their benefit with avant garde tax strategies that take advantage of both 
intra-European and international tax rules.  
1. Back-to-Back License Structure with Double Irish Dutch 
Sandwich Case Study : Google, Inc. 
The first example, Google, utilizes many of the strategies 
described thus far. Google primarily derives its taxation benefits 
through use of the double Irish-Dutch sandwich strategy, U.S. 
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Check-the-Box Rules, the E.U. Interest & Royalties Directive, and 
general arbitrage between definitions of terms such as Tax Residence 
and Transfer Pricing Opportunities. To illustrate: 
1. Google, Inc. transfers all of its intellectual property to an 
Irish holding company, Google Ireland Holdings, Inc., 
which has its company management and tax residency in 
Bermuda where the corporate income tax rate is 0%.  
2. This company has subsidiary sales companies that sell 
advertising, Google’s main source of revenue, to 
European markets (“High-tax OpCos”). 
3. However, sandwiched between the Irish holding 
company and the European subsidiaries is a Dutch 
subsidiary, Google, BV., and an Irish subsidiary, Google 
Ireland, Ltd. 
4. Google Ireland, Ltd. collects royalties from the 
subsidiaries at market value and transfers them by paying 
nominal royalty fees to Google, BV. in the Netherlands. 
Google Ireland, Ltd. incurs these nominal royalty fees by 
licensing hard-to-price intangible assets from Google, 
BV., using one of the OECD transfer pricing methods, 
as explained by the Amazon example  
5. Google BV. is incorporated in the Netherlands and the 
Company’s management is located in the U.S.113  
6. Google, BV. distributes its income to Google Ireland 
Holdings and is not subject to withholding tax on that 
distribution under Dutch law.  
7. Google Ireland Holdings is a tax resident of Bermuda 
and subject to 0% corporate income tax. 
8. This strategy allows the Irish operation to avoid “even 
the low Irish tax of 12.5% and, by using the Dutch 
sandwich, to avoid Irish withholding taxes -- which are 
                                                      
 113 Supra note 98. 
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not due on payments to European Union companies -- 
per the E.U. Interest & Royalties Directive”.114 
9. Because Google “Checks the Box” on Google Ireland 
Holdings and Google, BV. for U.S. taxation purposes, 
the royalty payments disappear when the entities 
disappear and all the U.S. sees are the fees from the 
operating company engaged in active business with 
Google Ireland Holdings, Inc., which has its tax 
residency in Bermuda.115 
 
                                                      
 114 Jane G. Gravelle, Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 12 (Jan. 15, 2015), 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf (last visited July 5, 2015). 
 115 Ruth Mason, Tax Planning for U.S. Multinationals, UNIVERSITY OF 
VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW (2015). 
 116 Id.; Jesse Drucker, Google Joins Apple Avoiding Taxes with Stateless Income, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (May 22, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-22/google-joins-apple-
avoiding-taxes-with-stateless-income (last visited July 8, 2015). 
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2. Case Study: Apple, Inc. 
  While Google takes advantage of intellectual property, 
transfer pricing, and royalty payments, Google also sells advertising, 
which is also intangible. Apple, Inc., America’s largest company 
applies a tax that is quintessentially Apple as it is perhaps the most 
simple and innovative modern international tax planning technique in 
use. Here’s how it works: 
1. Apple, Inc. is a U.S. corporation and U.S. tax resident 
pursuant to U.S. law. 
2. Apple sells goods to end consumers around the world 
through its retail stores in Europe, which are located in 
the various member states where they do business and 
are incorporated. The retail stores are tax residents in the 
relevant member states and are all disregarded entities for 
U.S. taxation purposes. 
3. The retail stores are owned by Apple Sales International, 
incorporated in Ireland with Management and Control in 
the United States.  
4. Apple Sales International is owned by Apple Operations 
Europe, incorporated in Ireland with Management and 
Control elsewhere. 
5. Apple Operations Europe is owned by Apple Holdings, 
incorporated in Ireland with Management and Control in 
the United States. 
6. Using arbitrage of the rules, Ireland considers Apple 
Sales International, Apple Operations Europe and Apple 
Holdings to be non-tax residents in Ireland because 
management and control lies outside of Ireland.  
7. The United States considers these entities to be tax 
resident in Ireland because of their incorporation in 
Ireland but Apple anyway checks the box on the Retail 
Subsidiaries, Apple Sales International and Apple 
Operations Europe. 
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8. Apple transfers its Intellectual Property including the 
patents, trademarks and know-how that go into making 
its products into Apple Sales International. 
9. Apple contracts with third party manufacturing 
companies in China at market price to manufacture its 
products for it. 
10. Once each product is complete, the third party 
manufacturing companies transfer written title to the 
products to Apple Sales International, which also owns 
all of the Intellectual Property. 
11. Apple then sells its products from Apple Sales 
International to its retail subsidiaries in Europe by 
transferring title and the items themselves are drop-
shipped to the retail stores. The retail subsidiaries pay a 
high mark-up price for the hard goods, which include a 
component for the intellectual property licensing. 
12. The retail subsidiaries re-sell the hard products to the 
end-consumers at a mark-up that is just sufficient to 
cover the cost of the retail subsidiary’s operations leaving 
minimal profit in the high tax jurisdiction. 
13. This leaves most of the income in Apple Sales 
International, which has a very large profit but is not 
taxable in Ireland because it is stateless. 
14. As a result of this strategy, Apple has $102 billion in 
offshore cash stored in Ireland, which cannot be 
repatriated because it would become subject to U.S. 
Taxation.117 
                                                      
 117 Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate, 
One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, United States Senate (May 21, 
2013), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg81657/pdf/CHRG-
113shrg81657.pdf (last visited July 10, 2015). 
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15. Like Google, Inc. the United States only sees the 
payments from the end consumers to Apple Holdings in 
Ireland. These streams through these stateless, check-the-
box companies are disregarded so it is as if the customers 
are dealing directly with Apple Operations 
International.118 
Apple’s Worldwide Operations119 
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V. FUTURE: PROACTIVE TAX PLANNING – CAN TAX DRIVE THE 
DECISION 
  Tax strategies such as those implemented by Apple, Inc. and 
Amazon.com have been subjected to public disclosure because 
governments and in particular the United States Senate and European 
Commission respectively have conducted inquiries into the practices 
of these multinationals and called upon representatives of these 
companies to testify publicly about their tax practices.120 As a publicly 
traded company, exposure to publicity affects investor confidence 
and thus stock price in a more qualitative way.121 
  Perhaps one of the simplest resolutions would be for the 
United States to abolish the “check-the-box” rules. By doing so, the 
IRS Subpart F regulations would resume their intended meaning 
because companies would not be able to use payments of interest or 
royalties to a hybrid entity in order to eliminate taxable offshore 
Subpart F income. It is important to recognize that the IRS’ official 
justification for enacting the “check-the-box” provided in part: 
Because the complexities and resources devoted to 
classification of domestic unincorporated business 
organizations are mirrored in the foreign context, the 
Service and Treasury are considering simplifying the 
classification rules for foreign organizations in a 
manner consistent with the approach . . . for domestic 
organizations.122 
  In other words, “check-the-box” was about providing 
simplicity in the tax code for multinationals. Although the IRS has 
implemented anti-abuse rules related to “check-the-box,” these rules 
                                                      
 120 Id.; State aid SA.38944 (2014/C) – Luxembourg Alleged aid to Amazon by 
way of a tax ruling, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Brussels, (Oct. 7, 2014). 
 121 Ben Rooney, Apple’s Tim Cook is Wall Street hero for a day, CNN MONEY 
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congress/ (last visited July 8, 2015). 
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do not apply for internal payments within a corporation.123 According 
to the Office of Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service, loans 
between a corporation and its disregarded branch in another country 
are disregarded for U.S. tax purposes.124  
  After the implementation of “check-the-box,” in countries like 
the United Kingdom and Germany where corporations are taxed at 
rates comparable to the United States, the tax bases dropped 
dramatically as profits were shifted offshore to low tax jurisdictions. 
In 1998, the IRS proposed new regulations to close the loophole and 
U.S corporations began a massive lobbying effort to stop the 
implementation.   
General Electric, PepsiCo, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, 
Monsanto and other major companies urged Congress to resist the 
change. The U.S., they said, was trying to be “the tax policeman for 
the world.” Allies in Congress dug in, and Treasury quickly rescinded 
the proposal.125  
  By 2000, over 8,000 disregarded entities were in existence with 
large concentrations in the Netherlands because of their specific 
treatment of royalties and interest discussed supra. By 2004, billions 
had built up in the Dutch bank accounts of major U.S. corporations 
and the United States Congress approved a tax holiday allowing these 
companies to repatriate the profits at a rate of 5.25 percent. Over $90 
billion USD was repatriated from the Netherlands alone.126  
 In 2009 when President Obama was elected, he included 
elimination of “check-the-box” loopholes as part of his agenda, 
however due to vehement opposition and threats that American 
companies would be bought by their foreign competitors, Obama 
                                                      
 123 Jeff Gerth, Corporations Couldn’t Wait to ‘Check the Box’ on Huge Tax 
Break, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 26, 2011), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/corporations-couldnt-wait-to-check-the-box-
on-huge-tax-break (last visited July 8, 2015). 
 124 Memorandum 201420017, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE (May 16, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1420017.pdf 
(last visited July 8, 2015). 
 125 Supra note 124. 
 126 Id. 
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retracted his position leaving “check-the-box” on the table as a 
valuable tool.127  
A. The Value of Tax to Management Compared with Other 
Business Drivers: Case Study: Inversion 
  Although society has seen tax impact business in the context of 
structures and branch operations, perhaps the single biggest impact 
that tax can have on major corporations is the inversion, or the 
inversion merger. In the introduction, we examined how Boris 
Becker moved his residency for taxation purposes. We have also 
addressed how taxation based upon source and residence rules allows 
companies like Apple to take advantage of stateless income that is 
not subject to tax anywhere on the basis of residence. As discussed, 
the United States is unique in its approach to the taxation of 
worldwide income. Because the United States views the place of 
incorporation as the determining factor for tax residency, many U.S. 
corporations have moved their legal headquarters overseas by 
reincorporating. To do this, the U.S. company establishes or acquires 
another company in a country with a lower corporate tax rate and 
then calls the new country home.128 As explained by The Economist: 
When a company becomes foreign through a merger, 
or “inverts”, it no longer owes American tax on its 
foreign profit. It still owes American tax on its 
American profit. But that, too, can be minimised [sic]. 
Often, the group can shift debt to the American unit, 
or have it borrow from the foreign parent. It can then 
pay interest to the parent while deducting the sums 
involved from its American taxes. Several studies have 
found such “earnings stripping” common when 
companies invert. When Walgreens, an American 
chemist, announced plans to merge with Swiss-based 
                                                      
 127 Id. 
 128 John W. Schoen, How Does a Corporate ‘Tax Inversion’ Work?, NBC 
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Alliance Boots, Barclays, a bank, reckoned the move 
could save $783m a year in taxes in this way.129  
  In practice, this is a relatively simple solution to a complex 
problem, however, the United States has changed the rules, so simply 
opening an office in London or Ireland, or even declaring a foreign 
country as the corporation’s tax residence is insufficient to change 
the tax base of the corporation as further discussed below.130  
  The September 2014 regulatory change resulted in an increased 
fervor of actual substantive business acquisitions. In 2014, U.S. based 
medical device manufacturer Medtronic signed a deal for $42.9 
billion USD to buy Irish competitor Covidien. The new 
conglomerate’s headquarters: Ireland; the effective reduction in 
corporate income tax: over 65% (from the U.S. rate of 40% down to 
the Irish rate of 12.5%). Shortly after announcing the merger, 
Medtronic announced a $10 billion USD investment in new U.S.-
based research and development commitments. We can surmise that 
the ability to make this investment may have been afforded as a result 
of the tax savings. With these figures, it is hard to imagine how tax 
could not drive these types of decisions in every major multinational 
corporation.131  
  According to Bloomberg News, as of April 2015, over 48 
companies had reincorporated in low-tax countries since 1982, out of 
these 48, 17 have occurred since 2012. These include some of 
America’s most cherished and valuable brands like Burger King, 
Mylan, and Aon.132  
                                                      
 129 Inverse logic, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 20, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21618912-america-
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B. Substance Requirements, Anti-Avoidance and Anti Treaty-
Shopping 
  One area that has been subjected to significant scrutiny in 
many tax structures is overall substance. As discussed in the context 
of inversions, the U.S. Treasury used a form of Substance 
Requirements to curb U.S. corporations’ ability to simply 
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reincorporate elsewhere, or to use the acquisition of a much smaller 
foreign rival to change the company’s overall tax residency.  
  Substance Requirements however, arise most prominently in 
the area of treaty shopping and the use of Special Purpose Vehicles 
(“SPVs”): 
In order to qualify for tax treaty benefits, which is 
what SPV's are all about, the SPV will in most cases 
have to meet two criteria generally contained in tax 
treaties: (i) the SPV must be a tax resident of the State 
it is registered in; and (ii) the SPV must be the 
'beneficial owner' of the income flow.134  
  The OECD model convention addresses substance in its 
“permanent establishment” and “beneficial ownership” rules. 
Revisiting the prior examples of Prevost and Indofood, we see two 
examples where courts treat similar situations differently. What 
occurred in Prevost could have been characterized as treaty-shopping. 
In 2011, the OECD introduced new language intended to address the 
ambiguities of the term “beneficial owner” contained in the model 
convention. In its summary, the OECD provided that in the case of 
the conduit company,  
the recipient of the dividend is not the “beneficial 
owner” because that recipient does not have the full 
right to use and enjoy the dividend that it receives and 
this dividend is not its own; the powers of that 
recipient over that dividend are indeed constrained in 
that the recipient is obliged (because of a contractual, 
fiduciary or other duty) to pass the payment received 
to another person.135  
                                                      
 134 Joseph Peters, Netherlands: Worldwide Developments in the Tax Concept of 
Substance, (Nov. 23, 2012), 
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  The European Commission has recently devoted a lot of 
attention to the Netherlands and whether by allowing the IP 
structures discussed herein they are creating harmful tax competition 
within the European Union. In response to European pressure, the 
Netherlands has also implemented its own national regime for 
holding companies and conduit companies that are established for 
the purpose of lessoning the tax liability incurred from capital gains, 
dividends, and interest and royalty payments. These rules are as 
follows: 
1. The entity should have sufficient equity (transfer pricing 
study required). 
2. The equity should actually be at risk (no non-recourse 
situations). 
3. The entity's gross profit margin should beat arm's length 
standards (transfer pricing study required). 
4. At least 50% of the directors should be permanent 
Dutch residents (nationality irrelevant). 
5. The directors should have proper professional 
qualifications in order to manage not only the entity but 
also its money flows; no 'dummies' allowed. 
6. The books must be kept, and the annual accounts should 
be prepared, in the Netherlands.136  
  Additionally, in order to avail itself of treaty benefits, an entity 
must have a “permanent establishment” in the jurisdiction of one of 
the treaty parties. The OECD applies a “fixed place of business” 
test.137 To wit: there must be a “fixed place of business through 
which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on.” 138 
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 137 OECD: Revised Proposals on Article 5 (Permanent Establishment) of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention, PwC (Nov. 6, 2012), 
http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/tax/newsletters/tax-policy-
2017 Agresta 5:2 
599 
• Fixed means that there is a link between the place of 
business and the specific location, as well as a degree of 
permanence. An "office hotel" or “virtual office” may 
constitute a fixed place for a business for an enterprise 
that regularly uses different offices within the space. 
Contrarily, where there is no commercial coherence, the 
fact that activities may be conducted within a limited 
geographic area should not result in that area being 
considered a fixed place of business. 
• A place of business. Means facilities used by an 
enterprise for carrying out its business. The premises 
must be at the disposal of the enterprise. The mere 
presence of the enterprise at that place does not 
necessarily mean that it is a place of business of the 
enterprise. The facilities need not be the exclusive 
location, and they need not be used exclusively by that 
enterprise or for that business. However, the facilities 
must be those of the taxpayer, not another unrelated 
person. Thus, regular use of a customer's premises does 
not generally constitute a place of business. 
  Business of the enterprise must be carried on wholly or 
partly at the fixed place.139 
The European Union also has repeatedly upheld the 
“Freedom of Establishment” as one of the four fundamental 
freedoms available to E.U. citizens pursuant to the European Union 
treaty. According to the European Court of Justice’s holding in 
Cadbury Schweppes v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue: 
“[F]reedom of establishment is intended to allow the 
nationals of the EMBL States to participate, on a 
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stable and continuing basis, in the economic life of 
another State” meaning “the concept of establishment 
involves the actual pursuit of an economic activity 
through a fixed establishment for an indefinite 
period.”140  
  Only the establishment in the host State and the pursuit of 
genuine economic activity falls within the scope of the provisions on 
freedom of establishment. The Court in Cadbury found that concept 
of establishment has a specific meaning and must not be interpreted 
narrowly. Any person or entity that pursues economic activities that 
are real and genuine must be regarded as taking advantage of its right 
of establishment.141  
  In order to determine whether or not an entity pursues real 
and genuine business activity in the host country, the Court must 
look to: 
“[T]he extent to which the CFC physically exists in 
terms of premises, staff and equipment . . . If 
checking those factors leads to the finding that the 
CFC is a fictitious establishment not carrying out any 
genuine economic activity in the territory of the host 
Member State, the creation of that CFC must be 
regarded as having the characteristics of a wholly 
artificial arrangement.”142  
  As a final catchall measure, many jurisdictions have sought to 
combat the types of tax structures analyzed herein using what is 
known as a General Anti-Avoidance Rule (“GAAR”). Although there 
is no uniform or model GAAR, there are consistencies in their 
formulation.  
  1. Identification of a scheme (Australia) or arrangement as is seen 
in China, Ireland, South Africa and New Zealand. 
                                                      
 140 Cadbury Schweppes, ECJ C-196/04, para. 53 and 54.  
 141 Id. at para. 68. 
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  2. Quantification of a tax benefit (Australia, Canada, Hong 
Kong and South Africa) or tax advantage (for example in Ireland) 
associated with that arrangement. 
  3. A purpose test. Identification of a sole purpose (Brazil), dominant 
purpose (Australia) or main purpose (South Africa) of obtaining a tax 
benefit associated with the arrangement.143 
  The United Kingdom however, only applies targeted anti-
avoidance rules and has not enacted a catchall measure. The United 
States does not have any form of GAAR and relies upon common-
law doctrines of statutory interpretation to prevent certain types of 
arrangements. “In 2011, the judicially developed economic substance 
doctrine, under which certain types of tax benefits are disallowed if 
the impugned transaction lacks economic substance or lacks a 
business purpose, was codified in legislation”.144  
VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS 
  In light of the forthcoming OECD BEPS proposals as well as 
the promulgation of GAARs and clarification of Model Treaty 
provisions, the core question becomes: will tax be a business driver in 
the future? In this Author’s opinion, tax will always be a business 
driver, however it will not drive business in the same way it does 
today. Sovereign nations want to attract major corporations to their 
tax base. Although their abilities to freely adapt laws to do so may be 
hamstrung by their existing obligations in treaties, or subjected to 
international pressures, countries will always want to compete in this 
regard.  
  The author cannot discount the success that the OECD has 
had in obtaining ratification of the Model Convention among major 
world powers. However, internal political pressures as described in 
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the United States have successfully preserved seemingly absurd 
loopholes like “check-the-box.” These indicators seem to be contrary 
to the ideals presented by the OECD in the BEPS project. While 
diplomatic relations seem to drive international discussions for an 
equitable tax system in one direction, domestic pressures demand 
attention. Even the Netherland’s revised substance rules take little 
effort for a large multi-national to fulfill. Moreover, the incentive has 
proven fruitful to low-tax countries. The prevalence of inversions 
and tax driven cross-border mergers are proof of this. 
  In introducing this topic, this Article broke tax into 
categories, e.g. taxes on consumption and taxes on income. However, 
what if both taxes could be replaced with another option. Felix 
Bolliger, lic.oec., HSG argues in his whitepaper “Micro Tax on All 
Monetary Transaction / Automatic Micro Tax on Debiting 
(AMTD)” that an automated tax could be implemented “free of any 
ideology and extremely abundant.” Bolliger argues that this type of 
tax “relieves stress and strain on producers and individual tax payers. 
Existing direct and indirect taxes become obsolete. The automatic 
micro tax on debiting helps to resolve the current international debt 
crisis.”.145 Moreover, the AMTD would force intra-European tax 
compliance with the E.U. principles against state aid and in favor of a 
free internal market. 
  Bolliger argues that the AMTD fulfills the goals of a tax 
system to be “fair, easy to understand and easy to apply,” and better 
than any other presently available tax methodology. Bolliger states: 
In Switzerland, total fiscal income for year 2011 
amounts to CHF 170 billion, which represent 30% of 
CHF 585 billion gross domestic product. A micro tax 
of 0.2% on CHF 95’000 billion monetary transactions 
equally generates a national tax income of CHF 190 billion. 
* * * * 
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Statistics issued by NYSE, Nasdaq, London Metal 
Exchange (LME) give a first idea about the size of 
international money flows. We are confronted with 
figures beyond common understanding. Foreign 
exchange transactions (Forex) alone amount to a daily 
volume of USD 4’000 billion, or roughly 7% of world 
GNP.146 
  While the proposal is radical, it addresses the fundamental 
paradigm laid out in the Introduction hereto. As long as there have 
been governments – there have been taxes. As long as there have 
been taxes – there have been strategies to avoid them. By eliminating 
pressures, automating the collection of taxes, and taking 
responsibility for their payment, the ability to avoid taxes is 
effectively eliminated. To the knowledge of this author, the AMTD 
has never been proposed to the OECD as an alternative solution. 
The tax is however, fair, equitable and international. If the OECD 
were braver and more innovative, it would take-on the AMTD or 
another similar automated means of taxation as a goal and abandon 
the BEPS project, which in the opinion of this Author, will ultimately 
be largely ignored at the last moment by the United States because of 
its own internal political pressures. 
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